Forums and methods of dispute settlement in Lesotho: a fresh look at the depictions of the judicial system by Kimane, Itumeleng
FORUMS AND METHODS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
IN LESOTHO:







ABSTRACT OF THESIS (Regulation 7.9)
Name ofCandidate ^™ELENG KIMANE
Address
Degree , Date
Title of Thesis Forums and Methods of Dispute Settlement in Lesotho :
A Fresh Look at the Depictions of the Judicial System.
, ■ „ ■ * , rTu approximately 110,000 words.No. ofwords in the main text of Thesis .t.f. .
The thesis is a study of forums and methods of dispute settlement in contemporary
Lesotho. Using a combination of research techniques, it explores how historical experience has
led to the prevailing complex system, and to the coexistence of institutions and dispute settlement
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chiefs' courts - remnants of the precolonial indigenous system - which are largely inquisitorial in
character, and the official courts - consisting of the customary courts and the received law courts
- which are based, in theory, on the western adversarial model, although this is less evident in
practice especially in the customary courts.
From the above, it is argued that the processes of dispute settlement in Lesotho represent
a legal pluralistic form more than a dualistic, parallel or adversarial system as depicted in the
existing literature. The thesis is able to illustrate this because it goes beyond simple descriptions
of the constitutional characteristics of existing dispute settlement processes, and looks at what
goes on at the practical level. The research, for instance, demonstrates that despite the 1938
Proclamations, the "unofficial" courts continue to exist and handle a variety of disputes at village
level. More than that it shows that the "unofficial" courts and the customary courts operate as
a continuum of each other, and that strong symbiotic relationships have developed between the
two, in which the rules of procedure and evidence in the former: have infiltrated the conduct of
proceedings in the latter. Adding the subordinate - superordinate relationships between the
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in a highly complex process of interaction.
In addition, the thesis demonstrates numerous constraints which render the application of
the adversarial principles difficult. Practices found to be prevalent in the official courts, have more
to do with a combination of factors and circumstances produced by the coexistence of dispute
settlement processes and clashing cultural expectations in a plural legal system, than with
manipulative practices resulting from organisational demands for discipline and order or informal
rules of those who operate the system, which have been used to explain the inadequacies of the
adversarial model in the western world. In the customary courts, the model is operated by
unqualified personnel whom in addition to their lack of knowledge of adversarial principles, are
more familiar with procedure used in the "unofficial" courts and thus bring it to bear in the
customary courts. In the received law courts the constraints include shortages of legal
practitioners, few experienced lawyers due to insufficient established firms, inadequate provisions
for legal representation and legal aid, unqualified prosecutors in the Magistrates Courts, the use
of a foreign language (English) and so on. In practice, the adversarial principles are redefined
in the context of these obstacles producing a new form of dispute settlement.
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As I grew up in the village of Hlokoa-le-Monate,
Mapoteng,1 I remember one day a neighbour suggesting to my
mother that, since one of the peach trees in our yard was
hindering some of the plants in her vegetable garden from
growing, they should share the produce from that tree. As
similar demands persisted, my mother one day discussed the
matter with a man who was passing next to our house. Then
she was told that if this continued she should take the
matter to "moreneng" (chief's court) and sue the woman.
On enquiring who the man was I was informed he was one of
"Mahlahana a morena" the chief's assistants.2 There were
several of these assistants in the village, one of them was
my grandfather. I knew that they used to take part in the
allocation of land, as they were present when my parents
were allocated the site on which we were living. But then
I heard that they also assisted in resolving disputes among
villagers. Not only that, my grandfather was a regular
attendant at the "Treasury Court" ("teraishareng") and was
close to some of the presidents "baokameli" who used to come
and work there.3
On yet another occasion the same neighbour claimed that
the peach trees behind our house belonged to her and
insinuated that she would take the matter to "moreneng".
Later, rumour went around that the woman had written a
letter to the Prime Minister's Offices, that the site on
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which we were living actually belonged to her family and had
unjustly been taken from their possession. Comments from
some of the people indicated that she should instead have
taken the matter to the chief's court. As time went on,
similar demands intensified to include at one time claims
that fence posts had been shifted into her yard, and at
another that a pig reared by my mother had destroyed some
of the crops in her garden. Similar claims are very common
and frequent in the villages, for instance there would be
other accusations where people would be taken to the chief's
court such as instances where children have stolen peaches,
or where there have been quarrels and fights between women,
boys and so on, or where herdboys have stolen mealies from
the fields. In some cases these ended up merely as threats
without anyone actually taken to the chief's courts.4
In yet other instances, the people concerned would
simply be ignored and their actions not taken seriously.
For example, there used to be a man who would use abusive
language, arguing that the site belonging to my parents
belonged to his family.5 Many times people in the village
told my parents that the man was sick mentally - he is mad,
they would say - others suggesting that it would be a waste
of time even to take him to the chief's court. The
situations spelt out above appear to be connected to ideas
about unilateral responses towards disputes (Felstiner,
1974; Hirschman, 1970) as indicated in Galanter (1981),
that many disputes both civil and criminal are resolved by
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either resignation, lumping it, or self-help. Merry (1979)
speaks of the employment of exit and avoidance in dispute
processes.
On another occasion, a daughter of one of our
neighbours was sent to the well (spring) to fetch water, and
she was stabbed with a knife by one woman of her age in the
neighbourhood. In this event abusive language was used and
this involved the mothers of the two women. Later the
matter was taken to court and as the people who had attended
the proceedings came home, there was a lot of ululation, and
I thought it signalled joy and that the matter was over.
However, long after this, I learnt that the same matter was
being heard, this time before the "teraishareng" ("Treasury
Court" ) and there was talk that this time the issue
concerned the stabbing, as the chief's court had only dealt
with the use of abusive language in the village by the women
and relatives.6 What I could not understand is how one
case could be put before different authorities, why one of
them could not deal with both issues together.
Another day I was with my mother and grandmother. We
had been to the hospital to see one relative who had been
ill for some time. As we approached home, some men
suddenly emerged running from the direction of the village,
and ululation7 could be heard from the point where these men
were coming. When they got onto the main road it became
obvious that they were actually engaged in a fight using
their "melamu" thick sticks. One of them got badly injured
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with bruises all over his head. By then people had
gathered around and from the discussions that went on, I
learnt that the men had been to the "teraishareng" for a
case and that one party was displeased with the judgement8
that was given, and that this had been the cause of the
fight.
Also there used to be herdboys from the mountain graze-
lands "moj;€-kO ", who would pass on the main road driven by
policemen on horseback. In many cases these boys would be
carrying skins of animals - sheep, goats or cattle - or
their carcasses. In other instances it would be a pot
containing meat. As they passed groups of people who would
be gathered on the sides of the road to watch, they would
be made to tell what they had done. For instance they
would be reciting that they have stolen somebody's animal,
usually they would mentioned the owner's name and home
village, and proclaim that they are thieves, until they
reached the police station. This kind of cases, instead
of being heard by the Treasury Court in Mapoteng were
commonly taken to Ha Motjoka.9 I used to wonder why this
was so, how come and why it was, that different sorts of
cases were taken to different courts.
The cases heard by the chief would sometimes, later on,
proceed to Bela-Bela to be heard by Chief Makhabane.10 On
the other hand, those heard in the "Treasury Court" would
first proceed to Ha Motjoka11 and then later to
Teyateyaneng,12 though this was only in a selection of
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cases. People often mentioned having taken "boipiletso"
appeal to Ha Motjoka or to Teyateyaneng, but all these could
not make sense to me. What I could not figure out was why
some people chose to go to Bela-Bela while others went to
Ha Motjoka and so on, and what influenced their course of
action in each case.
In addition, there were people called "baokameli"
presidents, who unlike chiefs, would come to work in the
"Treasury Court". From the way they were treated by the
villagers, I could gather they were people of some
importance. Different ones would come into the village,
work for some time, then leave only to be replaced by others
- transfer they called it. The presidents had "bangoli"
court clerks with whom they worked. At another time the
president of the "Treasury Court" in Mapoteng was a chief13
from one of the neighbouring villages. What puzzled me was
how he could be a president of the "Treasury Court" and a
chief at the same time, more so because there was a chief
in the village yet he was not a court president but only
operated at "moreneng". This particular president was
afforded even greater respect by the villagers and unlike
the others before him was always addressed as "Morera"
meaning Chief, and not as "mookameli" president. To some
extent I came to think there were now two chiefs in
Mapoteng.
At another time one of my sisters had a fight with
another woman and got bitten on the cheek. The case was
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put before the Magistrates Court in Teyateyaneng. One of
the key witnesses on my sister's side happened to be a
Magistrate in the same court. First, the Magistrate could
not hear the matter, but further she could not give evidence
in the case.14 This seemed a puzzle to me - the magistrate
was a very close friend of my sister and yet she declined
to hear the matter in which she had witnessed the event
where my sister got hurt. I could not believe it, nor could
I understand why she could not.
Somewhere in the 1960's some people from the Mapoteng
area were arrested, they were suspects in a ritual murder
"liretlo" case, and I was told they were taken to Maseru as
the case was to be heard in the High Court. During the
1970's following the state of emergency, attempts were made
to take-over several police stations in the Northern parts
of the country. These incidences led to the arrest of some
men in the villages constituting Mapoteng. Again I heard
they were to appear before the High Court - High treason
they called it.15 By this time I had also come to know
that there were people called "bachochisi" prosecutors and
"liakhente" defence counsels, and that the latter could
speak for people charged with any offence. But these
people did not appear at the "teraishareng" ("Treasury
Court"), at least I had never heard anyone saying they were
present in my village for court proceedings. However, it
seemed they appeared in some courts,16 though the reasons
for this were all not that clear to me.
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Some of the children I grew up with and those I went
to school with from various villages, districts and so on,
used to talk about their experiences similar to those I
observed in my village. They would be conversing, for
example, about neighbours, relatives having been sued in
various courts and the rest. Some of the children would
on occasion miss school because they were witnesses in some
of the cases, often these would be boys who from time to
time had to look after animals,17 however, this was not a
common phenomenon. What I came to realize is that the
experiences I summed up at the beginning were not unique to
my own village, but were constant occurrences in other
villages as well.
All the above appeared to be a very complex jig-saw
puzzle. The interest of this thesis is to unravel and
reflect upon the issues and questions18 raised in the
foregoing descriptions. It is an endeavour to explain
various methods and forums of dispute settlement available
in Lesotho today. It seeks to look at the various legal
mechanisms available, to explain their origin, their
characteristics and how in practice they work together.
The questions examined in this thesis fall within the scope
of issues addressed within the field of legal pluralism
which mainly relates to relationships between legal systems
of different origins.19 Legal pluralism encompasses a
variety of topics including as summed up by Allott and
Woodman (1985) the content of Contemporary laws, their
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emergence, their effects in terms of social control
functions and otherwise, their change over time and
relations to other social facts, interaction between
different laws and so on. In this context, I examine
forums and methods of dispute settlement including not only
their emergence and constitutional character - culturally,
ideologically and philosophically - as normative self-
regulative (Galanter (1985); Moore (1973)) parts of the
overall dispute settlement, but also their relations and
interaction with each other and how they function in
relation to social facts in the environment within which
they exist.
One of the major arguments is that what happens at the
practical level is different from the theoretical
speculations that have been made about the judicial
processes in Lesotho today. One example is evident in the
fact that there are officially recognised courts, whose
functions are supplemented to a large extent by what goes
on in the "unofficial" Courts. In the existing literature,
it is only the officially recognised courts that are given
extensive consideration, the emphasis being placed on the
dualism and parallelism of the Customary Courts and the
received law courts. No attention is paid to the
"unofficial" courts which, I shall argue, function as part
of the overall judicial system. This leads to tensions and
ambiguities in the literature because, while some of the
studies recognise the existence of the "unofficial" courts
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structure, there has been reluctance to accept that they are
integral to the smooth working of the system as a whole.
The explanation for this lack of attention and the resulting
ambiguities, lies mainly in the emphasis placed on
constitutional theory, as against what happens in practical
reality.
This explicates the notion of Galanter (1981) about
"legal centralism" with its focus upon remedies that operate
under the auspices of the states, which he claims is not
uncommon among legal professionals, and that the mainstream
of legal scholarship has also tended to look from within the
official legal order. According to Griffiths (1979) the
tendency to describe all legal phenomena in relation to the
state is essentially arbitrary because "the state has no
more empirical claim to being the centre of the universe of
legal phenomena than any other element of that whole system
does ..." (p. 48 ).20 The existence of the "unofficial"
courts in addition to the official courts (ch. 4 and 5)
brings up questions about the adequacy of the legal
centralist model in this case. Thus asserting what Allott
and Woodman (1985) state as the non-monopoly of state law
over the legal arena.
The thesis starts off by describing the pre-colonial
methods of dispute settlement amongst the Basotho.21 These
were organised in a fluid and decentralised manner, with the
various levels of operation enjoying independence from
superior authorities both in civil and criminal matters.
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The system operated at the community or village level under
the authority of headmen, at regional level the chiefs acted
as authorities. Both headmen and chiefs had panels of
assistants. At the national level, however, were the
sovereignty and council as ultimate authorities. The
chieftainship played a variety of roles including the
exercise of what today would be recognised as administrative
and judicial powers without any distinction. Within this
structure family heads and elders of various lineages played
an important role in cases involving criminal behaviour and
civil matters including abduction, trespass by animals on
fields or reserved pastures, inheritance of property, land
allocation, thefts, assaults, ill-treatment of children and
women, and in all other cases, involving inter-familial and
extra-familial relationships. The emphasis was upon the
restoration of relationships between parties as members of
families and the community.
The chiefs' courts had higher status, co-ordinating
activities of the headmen and handling appeals from their
courts and other matters like theft, arson, murder, serious
assaults and so on. With its supreme authority, the King's
court dealt with appeal cases from the chiefs' courts,
disputes among chiefs, inheritance in the chieftainship
families and other civil and criminal matters. Within this
system importance was attached to the involvement of the
people - villagers and community members - in dispute
settlement processes, whereby they were given opportunity
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to participate in the deliberations of important issues
involved in cases and in giving necessary advice.
A further characteristic of the indigenous system was
its emphasis upon social justice, with stress being placed
primarily on peace-keeping and social harmony, the intention
being to promote reconciliation and to integrate members
into society. All individuals were seen to have the duty
to correct one another's "deviant" behaviour within the
community. The principle of social justice within the
community further manifests itself in the concept that an
individual is seen as a part of a social unit. There are
no sharp distinctions, if any, between the private and the
public, between civil wrongs and criminal offences, between
politics, justice and administration, between political
issues, legal issues and moral issues. Little emphasis is
placed on the abstract formal criteria of justice. These
features are evident, for example, in Duncan (1960); Maema
(1985); and Mokoma (1984/85) who point out that no strict
technical distinction was made between the civil and
criminal matters under the indigenous system of dispute
settlement among the Basotho, civil proceedings always being
incidental to criminal proceedings, with a case dealt with
generally as a breach of law. Many of the characteristics
spelt out here, it is argued in this work, persist in the
"unofficial" chiefs' courts and some have infiltrated the
nature of proceedings and practices in the customary courts
as well.
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The thesis contends that during the colonial times,
this indigenous system came under attack leading in the end
to the introduction of a different system ideologically,
philosophically and administratively. First, this involved
a shift towards principles of "legal justice" (Rawls, 1971;
Miller, 1976) which equals the justice of the "judge",
imposing punishment and making orders for compensation to
be paid, including the idea that men are to be treated
equally and impartially (Kamenka, 1979). But more than this
the introduced system represented a shift toward the
accusatorial model originating form the western world.
This is evident from the personnel brought in^to man the new
courts, the rules of procedure and evidence and so on. In
the customary courts for instance, the presiding officers
came to be appointed as "judges" called presidents, assisted
in their duties by clerks of the court and messengers.
They were to deal strictly with cases involving the
customary law and a limited number of statutory laws as
would from time to time be determined. Their criminal and
civil jurisdiction was limited and spelt out within their
respective warrants which conferred upon them powers to act
as "judicial" institutions. In addition, a new power in
the name of the state was superimposed over these courts,
and all fines and monies raised in them were to go into
state coffers and were no longer to be under the control of
presiding authorities.
The changes in the judicial system were accompanied by
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those.in the legal system, and occurred in stages throughout
the colonial period, though in 1938 the process intensified
when simultaneous proclamations were passed introducing the
Native Courts System,22 the Subordinate Courts and the High
Court.23 The first formed the initial customary courts
structure, and today they consist of the Central and Local
Courts and the Court of the Judicial Commissioners. The
latter two constitute what in the context of this thesis are
referred to as the received law courts. In their origin,
the customary courts were intended to replace the indigenous
courts of headmen, chiefs and the king. But empirical
evidence shows that this is not what happened; instead the
courts of traditional authorities continue to function
outside the officially recognised structure bearing the same
features of the pre-colonial times. This suggests that the
judicial system of Lesotho is more than just dualistic,
rather what we have is a triadic or even a multiple system
consisting of two levels in the official structure
customary courts and the received law courts - and then the
"unofficial" chiefs' courts. The officially recognised
courts since the colonial times have remained basically the
same and even since independence no serious attempt has been.
made to change or transform the court system.
The received law courts forming the second level of the
officially recognised judicial structure, bear more
characteristics of the ac^v €<"S-&-rial model of trial than the
customary courts. In them the presiding officers are
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recruited on the basis of qualifications and merit
determined mainly by the kind of training they have
received, and this has become more so in recent years.24
In their theoretical outlook the official courts possess
features of the western world courts, including such
features as the employment of legal representation, trial
before a neutral body, adversarial procedure, just to
mention a few. These courts are backed in their judgements
by the organised power of the state and the decisions they
make are binding to all parties. At the practical level,
however, the customary courts have a close working
relationship, as mentioned earlier, with the "unofficial"
Chief's Courts especially in terms of procedure and rules
of evidence. The received law courts also, from the data
obtained during the fieldwork, have been found to operate
in a distinctive manner from the courts in the western world
despite the theoretical aspects they share. Although some
practices similar to those prevalent in the western world
can be identified, the situation in the official courts is
much more complex influenced mainly by the fact that the
social environment and the cultural expectations in this
case are somewhat different. The most influential
conditions in this regard include the coexistence of
judicial processes of different origin exerting pressure on
each other, and this is coupled with the fact that the
ac^ve-fi o.rial model in this case is alien - western
institutions operating in a non-western setting25 - working
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among people who are familiar with principles of a different
kind of judicial processes, and who have a different
perception of what to expect and how to run dispute
settlement processes, but also resting on a number of
constraints such as unqualified "judges" in the customary
courts, lack of adequate knowledge about accusatorial
principles among some of the court personnel, insufficient
numbers of qualified and experienced legal practitioners,
the use of the English language26 and so on. The resulting
complex system of courts upon which the descriptions in this
thesis focus is indicated in the accompanying diagram:
DIAGRAM 1
THE HIERARCHICAL COURT STRUCTURE IN LESOTHO
KEY Indicates the lines of appeal
Shows the "unofficial" line of appeal between
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the customary law courts and the Chiefs'
courts.
The broad themes of the inquiry and descriptions
contained in this thesis can be summed up in the following
set of propositions:
1. That the judicial system of Lesotho is not dualistic
but rather is a multiple system consisting not only of the
officially recognised courts, namely the Customary Courts
and the received law courts as depicted in existing
literature, but also of the "unofficially" recognised courts
structure which while its existence is acknowledged in some
of the works, it has not yet been recognised that in
practice they function as part of the overall judicial
structure, and that they have tremendous influence upon what
happens in the customary courts.
2. That the organisation and relationships existing in the
practical world of the various courts, suggest the operation
of a hierarchical system with the received law courts being
superior, thus suggesting that the various courts do not
function parallel to each other as suggested in the
literature. This position becomes further illuminated when
examining the jurisdictions of the various courts, and is
confirmed by the fact that even the "unofficial" courts deal
with matters which do not reach the official structure
either because they are normally not reported to the police,
or because the concerned parties prefer to seek recourse to
the chiefs.
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3. That the "unofficial" courts, because of the
recognition of the significant role they play in promoting
reconciliation among concerned parties, and because of
mutual and symbiotic relationships they have developed with
the customary courts and the infiltration they have had on
the procedures and rules of evidence used in the latter,
cannot be regarded as totally "unofficial" except in the
theoretical sense.
4. In the western world, the "gap" between the theoretical
aspects and functioning of the adve.rscurial model have been
explained in terms of the informal-manipulative practices
of those actors who operate the system.27 In the context
of Lesotho the gap seems to be more connected not only to
the fact that the model is alien, but to the reality that
the social environment contains a different set of
circumstances. Most prominent among these is the
coexistence of dispute settlement processes of different
origin, which at the practical level tend to exert different
kinds of influences on each other.
The descriptions made in this work are based mainly on
information of how dispute resolution is carried out in
practical reality, in addition to what has been written so
far. I spent eleven months28 in Lesotho doing fieldwork,
and during this period, I observed many civil and criminal
court proceedings in various courts. As well, I talked to
judges, magistrates, legal practitioners, law teachers, and
other persons who have something to do with and to say about
18
processes of dispute resolution in the country.29 What
finally emerges from all the information is that while the
system strives to work according to the accusatorial
principles it finds itself faced with a series of
circumstances and obstacles preventing it from working as
it should.
The thesis serves as example which "may assist an
understanding of general issues concerning the possibility
of incorporating other bodies of norms into legal systems,
and the consequences of attempting to do so". (Woodman,
1985: 157). Lesotho as a case study, illustrates the kind
of tensions that accompany such an enterprise, leading
consequently to the creation of new kinds of forums and
methods of dispute settlement which are neither wholly
inquisitorial nor ad Vt. CS Qjrial in character - a kind of
"combined law" in the terms of Fitzpatrick (1985),
influenced highly by cultural expectations of the people
concerned. The extent of interactions between the
"unofficial" chiefs' courts and the customary courts is
particularly an interesting one, and has not yet been
addressed in any existing works on Lesotho.
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CHAPTER 1
THE METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE OF SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Because the scope of the study is so broad - involving
making a description of existent mechanisms of dispute
settlement in Lesotho, how these various mechanisms came to
coexist; showing also the changes that have occurred over
time, and how the present complex system presently operates;
together with the rules of procedure and evidence employed
in them and the manner in which these rules are made use of
in practice - no single fieldwork strategy could alone have
sufficed in studying these phenomena. Hence it became
necessary to make a careful selection of a combination of
methodological techniques that would assist in realizing and
fulfilling the aim of the study. The methods of research,
as Goodwin-Jones (1984) notes, are not incidental but tied
into the crux of it. Thus the methods chosen in a
particular study should be related to the research design
and to the issues being studied.
Various works on social research have noted the
importance of proper selection of field techniques as part
of the whole research exercise. Generally, it has been
argued that such exercise does not involve identifying which
technique is most appropriate or better than others, or in
the words of Burgess (1982), it does not only involve
'outlining an ideal scientific procedure' of data
collection. But rather, as pointed out by Becker and Geer
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(1982), what is required is a selection of a data gathering
technique that maximizes the possibility of discovering all
of the phenomena under study. Zelditch (1982) says it is
more fruitful to recognise that a field study does not
involve using a single method; seeking a single kind of
information, rather the kinds of methods employed depend on
the kinds of information sought. In this particular
enquiry each of the selected techniques, became suited in
collecting different pieces of information at various stages
of the research.
Part of the information necessary in this research was
obtained through open-ended interviews with various
categories of informants and respondents. But it was
further realised that employing such a method alone would
not be sufficient. As Beattie (1964) explains:
Unless the anthropologist 'takes part' in the
culture ..., he can never really hope to see it
as its members see it. Only by at least some
participation in community life can he hope to
understand what people really think and how they
really act, which are not always the same as
what they say they act, when they are asked
(Beattie, 1964:87).
Acting on the word of Becker (1958) that observation
produces an immense amount of the detailed description -
which the thesis is all about - courtroom observations were
seen as the most feasible approach to complement the
information gathered through the interviews. A further
characteristic feature of observation is revealed by Becker
and Geer (1982) that it provides first-hand reports of
events and actions, and a much fuller coverage of an
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organisation's activities, giving direct knowledge of
matters that, from interviewing, could only be known by
hearsay.
It was through the characteristic nature of the
observation technique, in particular, that the data for
this thesis was mostly gathered. Since participant
observation is deliberately unstructured in design (Denzin,
1970), it further provides for an opportunity to maximize
the discovery and verification of the observed behaviour
and meanings inherent in the symbolic world. This point
is further discussed later on in the chapter; under the
sub-heading of " Courtroom Observations".1
For purposes of elaborating on the sources of
information and methodologies employed in this study, and
also to facilitate easy reading this chapter is divided
into two main Parts. First, is the literature review
section, showing how secondary data and literature were
employed to try to understand the legal system of Lesotho
and its development, together with changes that have been
introduced in the judicial structures and the methods of
dispute settlement to the present moment. The second part
consists of the methods employed for collection of primary
data, in which courtroom observations and interviews were
used to gather empirical evidence about the operations of
the courts.
According to Denzin (1970) such a blending of methodo¬
logical techniques, as that employed in this study, is
only characteristic of participant observation which he
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describes as a field strategy capable of simultaneously
combining document analysis, respondent and informant
interviewing, direct participation, and introspection.
The use of each one of these technigues in the present
research is discussed in the sections that follow.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
To arrive at the description about existing forums and
methods of dispute settlement and how they operate in their
endeavour to administer justice, the study began with the
literature review of the variety of works on the legal
system of Lesotho generally, its development and changes
that were introduced during the colonial era, especially as
they affected the judicial institutions in terms of their
structure, jurisdiction, personnel, rules of procedure and
evidence.
Furthermore, it became necessary to consider pertinent
literature on dispute settlement processes from other parts
of the world. These works and the knowledge gained from
them are made use of in the subsequent chapters of the
thesis, to verify and supplement the information obtained
through court-room observations and interviews carried out
during the fieldwork. The following is a description of
some of the literature that was reviewed, and how each
category became useful for purposes of this thesis,
a) Literature on the Historical Background.
In view of the changes that have occurred in the legal
system, judicial structures and their jurisdictions, and
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methods of dispute settlements, it first became necessary
to set the study into historical perspective.
A wide literature review was thus made, examining some
of the work done by authors such as Ashton (1952), Burman
(1976,1985), Duncan (1960), Hamnett (1975), the autobio¬
graphy of Jingoes by Perry and Perry (1975), Jones (1951),
Machobane (1985), Maope (1985,1986), Mohamed (Judge; 1985),
Palmer and Poulter (1972), Perry (1977), Poulter (1979),
Ramolefe (1969), Sanders (1985), Hamnett (1979) and others.
These works enabled me to work-out the nature of dispute
settlement processes at different historical times and also
in identifying various aspects regarding their
organisation, recognition, constitution, powers,
jurisdiction, purpose, procedure and rules of evidence that
applied at each historical point. These works, however,
pay attention to the customary courts and the received law
courts, arguing, therefore, that the judicial system of
Lesotho is dualistic. Some go on to add that the above two
structures function parallel to each other (e.g. Palmer and
Poulter (1972), Leslie (1969), etc.).
In addition, a review of official documents pertaining
to and indicating trends in the changes mentioned above was
made. Some of these are included in Appendix J. There
are many more of these official documents, only a few are
mentioned. An elaborate discussion of the changes
introduced by these proclamations is contained in the
subsequent chapters.2 These documents point to the
beginning of the shift away from the indigenous methods of
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dispute settlement, presided over by chiefs and headmen, to
the establishment of a new system of courts referred to in
this thesis as the official courts structure as well as
changes in the constitution, powers and jurisdiction of the
courts at various levels.
The textual research on Lesotho, enabled me to work¬
out how the various courts structures (Diagram 1, p. 15)
are placed within the overall legal system. To these I
have added the "unofficial" chiefs' structure. Thus it
assisted in setting the stage for the fieldwork. It is
the Courts identified in the Diagram 1 which became the
focus of the study, my contention being, they all form the
totality of the machinery of dispute settlement among the
Basotho today. The nature and origins of each one of them
is dealt with further on in the thesis,
b) Literature from Other Parts of Africa.
In addition, the literature dealing with the nature
and mechanisms of dispute settlements in other parts of
Africa, became of great value in building up a greater
knowledge of the various mechanisms and principles for
settling disputes in different societies. Very little has
been written on Lesotho especially with regard to the
indigenous methods. Some of the works considered here
include the following: Beattie (1957), on the informal
judicial activity among the Bunyoro of Uganda; Gibbs
(1963), on the therapeutic effects of the Kpelle of Liberia
moot; Ndaki (1981); Comaroff and Roberts (1981); Colson
(1974); Gluckman (1969) on procedures and evidence in
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African customary law. As shall be indicated later on,
many aspects described in these literature prevail, to a
large extent, in the "unofficial" chiefs courts.
In addition I learnt more about the nature of rules of
procedure and evidence these forums employ, criticisms
raised against them, their ideology, and, their strength or
advantages. The works of Allott (1965), Junod (1966),
Bennett (1985), Chimango (1977), etc. outline how African
dispute methods were affected by the introduction of
foreign systems of law. The respective works focus on
different aspects, of course.3 For purposes of this
chapter, it is not possible to refer to all such works
here, but their usefulness becomes apparent later on.
c) Literature on Legal Pluralism
Dealing with dispute settlement processes in a
situation where there is a coexistence of forums and
methods of different cultural origins, also necessitated
examination of existing works from the field of legal
pluralism. Such literature has become relevant in this
thesis in a variety of ways. While Snyder (1981) and
Griffiths agree that a satisfactory theory of legal
pluralism is yet to be produced, both acknowledge the
coexistence of a plurality of legal orders or their
fragments in different societies. In the present work we
examine the coexistence of the "unofficial" chiefs' courts
originating from the indigenous customs and laws of the
Basotho, with the customary courts and received law courts
both of which are officially recognised, and were
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introduced during the colonial period, bearing a different
ideological and cultural philosophy.
The inclusion of the "unofficial" courts, in addition,
puts forward another important assertion within the legal
pluralism scholarship. This relates to the non-monopoly
of state law, over legal phenomena (Allott and Woodman,
1985), which in turn is connected to the interest the field
of legal pluralism has potrayed about the concept of "legal
centralism". According to Galanter (1981), this concept
was first coined by Griffiths (1979). Furthermore, the
focus of the field on questions of "folk law" (Allott,
(1985); Galanter, (1985); Moore, (1973)) whose
approximate synonyms have been given as "people's law,
customary law, unofficial law, and indigenous law" (Allott
and Woodman, 1985:2), has been useful, for instance, in
sorting out the statuses of the customary courts and the
"unofficial" chiefs' courts.
In summing up the topics studied in the field of legal
pluralism, Allott and Woodman (1985) note the following:
content of contemporary laws (not excluding laws and
institutions not recognised by the state); their relations
to other social facts; their emergence; interaction
between different laws (e.g. incorporation, choice of lew,
recognition of one law by another, etc.); their influence
upon each other; and so on. All of these are relevant in
the present descriptions. Other works found to be useful
besides the ones already mentioned include: Allott (1984),
von Benda-Beckmann (1984; 1985), Fitzpatrick (1984; 1985),
Chanock (1978, 1985), Roberts (1984), Santos, De Sousa
(1984), just to mention a few. The usefulness of these
works became even more significant when the data collected
revealed a high level of interaction between the
"unofficial" chiefs' courts and the customary courts,
d) Review of Literature from other parts of the world.4
Finally consideration of the literature from other
parts of the world was important. Among these are:
i) Those on the features and nature of dispute settlement
machineries in societies of different modes of
production and levels of development, such as the work
by Roberts (1979).
ii) Those on dispute settlement in respective communities,
for example, that on rural Turkey by Starr (1978),
whose characteristics I found to resemble those of
dispute settlement in the "unofficial" courts.
iii) Those describing the routine operations and behaviour
of the courts focusing on the theory and practice of
criminal justice institutions, McBarnet (1976, 1981)
and Carlen (1976), Blumberg (1967).
iv) Those focusing on the critical aspects and weaknesses
of the adversarial trial procedures such as the works
by Baldwin and McConville (1977, 1979, 1983),
Bottoms and McLean (1976), Ericson and Baranek (1982),
Frank (1949), Freeman (1981), Friedland (1965, 1968,
1975), Galanter (1974), Paterson and Bates (1983), and
Zander (1969, 1973, 1974).
v) Those suggesting solutions to overcome the
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shortcomings of the adversarial system, for example,
Cavanagh and Sarat (1980), Myers (1981), Wexler (1970,
1972), Yngvesson and Hennessey (1974).
vi) Those suggesting alternative forms of dispute
settlement such as Danzig (1973), Danzig and Lowy
(1975), Merry (1979, 1982), Sarat (1975), and Tomasic
and Feeley (1982), Felstiner (1975), Nader, (1979).
e) Other Pertinent Literature.
As envisaged during the preparation for the fieldwork
it also became necessary to review some of the literature
on the notions of justice. In my opinion various methods
and mechanics of dispute settlement are underpinned by
different notions of justice. For instance, the
adversarial system appears to be linked to "legal justice"5
as against the idea of "social justice".6 The indigenous
judicial system - now largely forming the "unofficial"
court structure seems to bear the characteristics of the
latter, while on the other hand, the new official courts,
and in the main the received law courts, are marked by
principles of "legal Justice".
Social justice emphasizes peace-keeping and social
harmony and has further been described for example, by
Kamenka and Tay ( 1979), as more profound in theories of
justice that elevate its connection with the social
organism or whole, with determining the "proper" place of
individuals, activities, and institutions in a structured
totality free of destructive conflicts. The legalistic
notion of justice, on the other hand, arises out of the
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growth of individualism and is often identified with the
modern commercial, politically pluralistic and democratic
society with a different type of law and legal regulation.7
Additional works considered under this section include the
following: Miller (1976) on Social Justice; Perelman
(1963) on the idea of justice and the problem of argument;
and Rawls (1971) on the theory of justice.
Doing this research thus involved, first of all,
learning a lot about mechanisms and methods of dispute
settlement from a variety of literature. The list of the
works cited above, does not claim to be exhaustive. It is
only meant to illustrate some of the important literature
which were used to provide a background for this study,
even before the actual fieldwork was conducted. Not
having any formal legal training myself, this literature
review assisted me to get acquainted with the various
aspects relating to how the courts operate, the legal
terminology and concepts; and the legal process itself.
2. FIELDWORK
The methodology selected for the fieldwork as pointed
earlier, consisted of courtroom observations and open-ended
interviews. The main purpose was to facilitate easy
cross-checking of the validity information gained through
each one of these techniques, and to find out whether
conclusions reached about the observations were correct.
I found this multi-dimensional approach to be very
useful, each of the techniques assisting to gain
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information and for getting answers to certain questions
and events which the other could not so adequately obtain.
For example, it would not have been easy to come up with
concrete instances indicating people's understanding or
lack of understanding of the rules of procedure and
evidence through the interviews, but the observations made
this possible. To illustrate this point further, while it
would have been easy to interview the people about how the
courts operate and the extent to which the new court
procedures and rules of evidence are employed, I would not
have come up with empirical evidence supporting their
statements, which has been possible through court-room
observations. In fact as Beattie (1964) points out,
observing how people think and really act, may not always
be the same as what they say they think and how they say
they act when asked about it in interviews.
These research instruments also tended to complement
each other. I was able through the fieldwork to check
some of the conclusions tentatively deduced from the
preliminary literature review I had done; and also to find
out how far actual practice fitted with or differed from
the written accounts of how the overall system of courts
operates.
Careful consideration was taken to interview as wide
a variety of persons concerned with the use and functioning
of the courts as possible. Attempts were made to include
in the sample of informants and respondents, as many
categories as possible. This included not only the court
31
personnel and other agents of the justice system, but also
the parties in the disputes and the witnesses too. So
that the conclusions made in this thesis could be accepted
as adequately representative and accurate about the
functioning of the courts and dispute settlement process in
Lesotho. The courtroom observations were conducted in a
range of courts, and I did not only concentrate on one
level of the courts but a cross-section of them.8 It also
means that a wide variety of cases were included, both
civil and criminal, among the sample of proceedings
observed.
The fieldwork was carried out over a period of eleven
months beginning in October, 1986, and ending in August,
1987. The work-plan (Appendix C), shows how the fieldwork
activities were organised and scheduled over the time I had
available. However, a few explanations should be made
about the fieldwork plan. Phases 2 (Court-room
observations) and 3 (interviews) of the fieldwork took
place simultaneously, and the interviews of most parties
and witnesses took place when proceedings were on recess
and in between the proceedings. Attempt was made to
follow this workplan as closely as possible especially as
the allocation of time for each of the phases was
concerned. The last two months, July and August, were
used to fill up the gaps, having gone over the data at
hand.
With the exception of the Judicial Commissioners'
Court, the observations in other courts were carried out at
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different points of the fieldwork. At various times, the
research activities of courtroom observations and
interviews were interchanged. Denzin (1970(a)) argues
that this has the advantage of enabling the assessment of
various variables. Schwartz and Schwartz (1955) on the
other hand, point out that the observer's presence in the
field produces behaviour and actions that would otherwise
not appear. It was in an attempt to reduce these reactive
effects, sometimes from my part as against that of those
under study, that the activities of the fieldwork were
varied at different points of the research. At times I
got tired with collecting data in one particular court,
which greatly affected my productivity in recording the
events of the proceedings in question. On such occasions
I would leave the court and carry on with another activity
such as interviewing. This was also in line with the
advice of Denzin (1970) that the researcher can leave the
field for a period of time and re-enter at a different
point to access his reactive influence.
The above is also an illustration that the processes
involved in research do not consist of prescribed stages
following one another neatly as often presented in the
books. It further confirms the statement of Watson (1968)
which demonstrates that:
Science seldom proceeds in the straight¬
forward logical manner imagined by
outsiders. Instead, its steps forward
(sometimes backward) are often very human
events in which personalities and cultural
traditions play major roles (Watson,
1968:13).
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As further argued in Burgess (1982) there should be
awareness that research does not occur in 'stages' and does
not follow a linear path, but instead is a social process,
in which overlap occurs between all areas of the
investigation.
ACCESS : REQUESTING PERMISSION TO CARRY-OUT THE STUDY
First, permission to carryout the research had to be
sought from the responsible Government Ministries under
which the dispute settlement machineries fall. As
discussed in some of the literature on research
methodology, access is not simply a matter of physical
presence or absence; and it is not simply a matter of the
granting or withholding of permission for research to be
conducted. Even for domains which are regarded as
"public" - in the sense that no process of negotiation is
required to enter them - the literature points out that,
things are not so straightforward. The main issue,
pointed out is that, in many settings, while physical
presence is not itself problematic, appropriate activity
may be so, especially where permission or access has not
been properly obtained.
During the preparatory stage I had made the decision
to include both the official and the "unofficial" court
structures in the study, which in my conviction represents
a complete picture of the nature and mechanisms of dispute
settlement in Lesotho. It was felt that the exclusion of
either of these from the study would result in an
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incomplete picture of the nature of and mechanisms of
dispute settlement existent in the country. The inclusion
of the various structures was also crucial in another
respect, that the thesis is also about the differences
and/or similarities among existing mechanisms of dispute
settlement operating in the country at the present moment.
Gaining access into the official structure of courts
did not pose any major problem. I contacted the Ministry
of Prisons and Justice to which these judicial courts are
responsible, and I received a prompt and positive response.
A letter of introduction was issued addressed to the court
personnel concerned - judges, magistrates and court
presidents. Perhaps the reasons for the immediate
response from the Ministry ought to be advanced, the main
one being that I had, prior to this, been in close contact
with the Ministry in a variety of ways. My interest in
knowing more about dispute settlement processes became
sharper during this period of contact with the Ministry.
My first links with the Ministry of Justice began in
1975/76 when I was a university student at Roma. During
the long vacation of that academic year and also in 1976/77
I did part-time jobs with them. Furthermore, following
the completion of my studies in mid-1979, I took a job with
the Department of Prisons. So when I made a request to
carryout the present study, I was already known to a good
number of the staff in the Ministry, hence perhaps the
cooperation received. Close links continued even after I
left the Department of Prisons, since I quite often helped
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with the instructional courses they run; mainly for the
new recruits and I also served on the Prisons Visiting
Committee for the Maseru District for three consecutive
years beginning in 1982.
During one of the vacation jobs with the Ministry I
had actually been placed with the High Court of Lesotho as
a clerk assisting in receiving and forwarding papers for
cases coming before the court. Here too, I had a number of
people who knew me, for instance, I had had previous
contact with one of the judges, the Registrars, and some of
the interpreters. A lot of the lawyers, both defence
counsels and prosecutors, were also known to me, some
having been colleagues and fellow students at the
university.
The cooperation was built-up even further when later
I met the judges to introduce myself as a researcher and to
make arrangements to begin the observations of courtroom
proceedings. They first agreed to my reguest for
interview appointments, and then allowed me to observe the
proceedings in their courts. The same happened once I had
approached the Chief Magistrate, he agreed to an interview,
and then the other magistrates only seemed to follow suit.
The same cooperation was experienced with the
customary law courts' personnel. The Judicial
Commissioners agreed to an interview, and allowed me to
observe proceedings in their courts. The "Special" Local
Court President in Maseru welcomed me too, so did the
President of the Roving Stock-theft Central Court and their
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staff.
Despite the overwhelming cooperation received, I had
to exercise a good deal of control not to lose track of the
interest of my research and not to create a different
atmosphere towards my presence in the courts. Good
rapport and working relationships had to be maintained for
the success of the study. Further discussions about the
importance of this factor are contained in the next
section.
Thus to an extent I was familiar with the setting I
was to be researching on. But this was only in so far as
knowing some of the court personnel was concerned. The
activity of court-room work itself was not so familiar.
Although I had been to the High Court several times before,
for instance, sometimes following up the events in the
proceedings was not so easy; an experience which from time
to time caused a panic of self-doubt, and a sense that I
was somewhat an inadequate research worker,because my
observations were not falling neatly into the sort of
categories suggested by the wisdom received through the
literature review I had done.
Because of such familiarity with the research setting,
I found it much more difficult to suspend my
preconceptions, deriving both from the literature review
and from everyday knowledge. It all looking so familiar,
it was at the beginning very difficult to single out events
that occurred during the proceedings, even when they were
happening right in front of me, and it took a tremendous
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effort of will and imagination to stop seeing only the
things that are conventionally "there" to be seen (cf
Becker, 1971) and pick out aspects of relevance to my
research. It took a great deal of will power too, to sit
through the court-room proceedings, for instance, and to
see (or record) anything beyond what "everyone" knows, and
what has already been written about the judicial processes
in Lesotho.
The familiarity with the setting of the research
caused another further problem. This problem is explained
in the literature on social research methodology that in
one's own society one may not be allowed to take on a
novice role. That is, one is faced with the difficult
task of rapidly acquiring the ability to act competently,
which is not always easy even within familiar settings.
While simultaneously privately struggling to suspend for
analytic purposes; those assumptions that precisely must
not be taken for granted in relation with participants,
from time to time some of them tried to influence me to
reveal conclusions reached out of the study, which was
difficult and would not be possible until the whole
research exercise was complete. But to explain this to them
I had to exercise extreme caution so as not to annoy them,
as it could destroy the relationships already established
with them.
Things had worked according to the plan, but so far
only the question of access into the official courts had
been dealt with, there was still outstanding, the issue of
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gaining access into the "unofficial" courts. For this, I
had to approach the Ministry of Interior which is the
authority with responsibility over matters of Chieftainship
Affairs and these category of courts are presided over by
chiefs and their assistants in the villages. In the same
manner as in the case of the Ministry of Justice, I made a
written request for permission to enter the villages and
visit the chiefs' courts; but for months on end there was
no reaction.
The only explanation I can offer why perhaps no
response was forthcoming from the Ministry is with regard
to the tensions caused by the continued existence and
operations of these courts. In strict legal terms these
courts ought not to handle judicial matters at all, and yet
in reality everyone knows that they are doing so.
However, my request was in a way asking the Ministry to
grant permission into institutions that are otherwise
"unofficial", thus conferring over them a status of
officialdom. They could have dealt with the request to
enter the villages, I suppose, as long as it was not tied
to the issue of dispute settlement by the chiefs' courts.
Yet that was exactly the purpose of the research for which
permission was being sought; thus I could not avoid
revealing that.
I was faced with a dilemma, and could not enter the
village for purpose of research without having been granted
permission to do so. The alternative could have been to
move into the villages and carry on with the observations
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of the chiefs' courts. Yet this could have possibly made
research activity extremely difficult,9 because public
domains such as the chiefs' courts, among other things may
be marked by style or social interaction involving what
Goffman (1971) terms "civil inattention", such that
anonymity is not their contingent feature. The
f ieldworker' s attention and interest may thus lead to the
possibility of infringement of such delicate interaction
rituals. This raises the point that was made earlier on
that conducting research in many settings is not merely a
question of physical presence, but it must also permit
appropriate activity to be carried out. Entering a setting
without permission also involves a question of ethics in
social research, which states in general terms that the
researcher's presence and purpose should be explained to
those being studied.
The role I would have had to play under the
alternative referred to above, is described in Denzin
(1970) as the "complete participant" role in research, in
which the observer and his interests are wholly concealed
and not made known. But disguised entry poses problems
such as those with regard to recording observations. It
would have meant I could not openly have taken notes as in
the case of observations in the official courts, and I
would have had to resort to "backroom" recording at the end
of each day. Ultimately this would have raised doubts
about the accuracy and validity of the data collected in
this manner. The fieldnotes obtained in this way would
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have been affected by memory distortions leading to
confusion of issues or speakers, and there would probably
be incomplete recording as a result of general field
fatigue. Despite this problem, the fact that I needed the
data about what happens in the "unofficial" chiefs' courts
could not be dismissed, and I needed to devise some means
around this problem, as described below.
This being the position, I had to adopt the second
best strategy to interview the chiefs about what goes on in
their courts. The guestions asked were aimed at getting,
as close as possible, descriptions of how proceedings in
the "unofficial" chiefs' courts are conducted. This
involved, first, making enquiries about some of the re Hown
persons who could most ably provide such information.
Through some of the informants, this became possible.
Consequently, some chiefs were identified and were
requested to provide detailed descriptions of the kinds of
disputes that come to their courts, and generally about the
nature of proceedings therein. In addition, I continued to
interview various categories of respondents and informants
including the parties and their witnesses on the one hand,
and the court personnel such as the magistrates, Director
of Public Prosecutions, the Attorney General, the judges,
legal practitioners and some intellectuals about aspects
relating to the "unofficial" courts. They were
interviewed about the existence of these courts, how they
operate and their perceptions about them and the rules of
procedure and evidence used there. It was striking how
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members of the legal profession responded to questions
about the chiefs' courts without any inhibitions
whatsoever, as if they were not talking about "unofficial"
institutions.
ACCESS : NEGOTIATING ACCEPTANCE AND MAINTAINING GOOD
RAPPORT
As is evident from the foregoing, the task I was faced
with was not only of finding out how the courts operate,
but also that of collecting information that would
ultimately enable me to arrive at explanations about the
observed situation, whatever it turned out to be. For
instance, it meant not just studying the behaviour of the
court personnel, for example, legal practitioners during
the proceedings, but also understanding the reasons
underlying such behaviour and their perceptions about how
the courts operate. This was not easily accomplished.
A good rapport had to be maintained with those constituting
the area of study right through the period of the fieldwork
for the objective to be achieved.
As Denzin (1970) points out, cultures do not provide
within their social structures a role called "participant
observer", therefore a fieldworker needs to convince those
he is studying to accept him and allow him to question and
observe them. The problem is in working out the
relationships that lead to such acceptance and to its
maintenance thereafter, in order to get the information
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required.
However, on my part, the situation seemed to be eased
up a bit by the cooperation I got as a researcher by the
various categories of people I was working among, as shown
earlier on. The legal practitioners, for example, were
often at ease, and would discuss almost anything related to
the cases they had, and about courtroom proceedings and
that usually provided me with a lot of information and
ideas.
Perhaps the above was to some extent facilitated by
the uncertainty and confusion which seemed to have been
caused by my presence in the courts. However, many were
trying to figure out what a sociologist would be looking
for in the courts. This can be demonstrated by questions
and remarks passed to me by some legal practitioners. For
example, one day one of them asked: "have you come to find
out about the causes of divorce?" This was during a
recess of the Motion Roll in the High Court; which
normally is on Mondays. The roll of the High Court
abounds with matters of divorce on such days. I am not
sure that I can remember vividly what my response was to
the question, but the same legal practitioner went on to
point out that: " ... in most of these cases; adultery is
the ground on which divorce proceedings are instituted".
On yet another occasion, it was during the Motion Roll
proceedings, another lawyer whispered to me and said:
"have you observed the high frequency
of divorce cases? Even the marriages
are just as many as that."
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He smiled and then walked out of the court. This was, in
my opinion, an attempt from their part try and place me
within a recognizable social role which would be acceptable
to them. As a non-lawyer they did not fully understand the
meaning of my role among them. As a sociologist, they had
an impression that my interest in being in the courts could
be in investigating about matters such as divorce which, as
it emerged from further discussions with some of them, is
regarded as one of the most serious social problems now
threatening the fabric of the Basotho society.
They could not see the deep interest my research had
in the law, and, in particular, how one of its
institutional structures - the courts - actually operate.
They failed to judge that, as part of the study, I was
interested in their work and how they carried it out.
Hence a lot of information was dished out voluntarily
during the discussions they had with another in my
presence. In Quthing, I came to discover later on, that
the clerks of the Magistrates' Court and the prosecutors;
associated me with the Ministry of Justice or even more
with the Judicial Commissioners' Court, since I had
arrived, for part of the fieldwork, while this court was on
circuit there. Because of these assumptions they had
about me, they answered freely to my questions about the
rules of procedure and evidence and any other matter raised
with them.
Sometimes I did not know how to respond to the
comments such as those made by the legal practitioners
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quoted above. Even when I responded, it was with utmost
caution not to destroy the good relationships already
established. It revealed, however, that the process of
negotiating access and establishing rapport is a matter of
progressive initiation, which is extremely important,
particularly when the area of study consists of people
whose work is founded upon beliefs and commitments of a
profession such as that of the legal practitioners. Often
I had to be careful not to appear as having feelings of
disapproval about how the courts operate, or even to have
intends to initiate action about how the legal institutions
and professionals function. Putting up such a "personal
front" (Goffman, 1955) was an important factor in
negotiating and maintaining good rapport in the field.
Furthermore, the uncertainty about my role in the
courts, provided a good chance "for listening to telephone
conversations, noting passing comments, sitting in on
discussions" (cf Goodwin-Jones, 1984: 33) by various court
personnel, such as the magistrates, prosecutors, defence
counsels, court clerks, who would be generally chatting
about various aspects relating in one or more ways to my
research. With this I was able to build up a picture of the
normal routine operations of the courts. Among the
suggestions put forward for implementing the participant-
as-observer role Polsky (1967) includes "learning how to
listen and keeping one's mouth shut". That is the
strategy I was employing here. The parties and their
witnesses too passed comments about the functioning of the
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courts. A frequent comment often pertained to delays
encountered in the administration of justice due to the
complex rules, and heavy expenses borne by the people as a
result.
Together with the information gathered from the open-
ended interviews and prolonged courtroom observations, I
was able to judge how far the picture built up represented
normal practice, and also to find out reasons, opinions,
perceptions and explanations about what is going on. The
question that could be raised is how far the court
observations and the interviews were representative of what
happens in the courts in general. This point is answered
in the next two sections of this chapter; where the extent
of the observations and interviews are discussed
respectively.
It was equally important to work-out good
relationships with the clerks of court at various levels
and with the interpreters too - what could be referred to
as "court marginals".10 They became, as it turned out to
be, good sources of information and guidance, for instance,
about what cases were on the daily rolls and sometimes even
making it possible to arrange appointments for interviews
with the judges, magistrates or court presidents. In
court cases that had begun before I started visiting the
courts; they would provide background information about
what the case was all about and what was remaining of it.
Maintaining good relationships with these category of
people was important and it made it easy for me even in
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getting permission to take notes during the proceedings,
without fear that they could be confiscated.11
There turned out to be nothing so particular about the
manner of dress for the general public in attendance,
except the insistence that the men should at least have a
jacket on; and women ought to have arms covered - no
short-sleeved dresses - and also ought to have some form of
head-cover. One Registrar of the High Court, when I
questioned her about the issue of the head-dress, responded
that she regarded this as some old practice inherited from
colonial days. Despite this some members of the court
personnel appeared to be very strict about it.
The application of the "dress regulations" (Parker,
1974) tended to vary from one court to another, depending
also on who was presiding over the proceedings. For
instance, at one of the sessions, a magistrate warned one
woman who was in attendance that:
You should never appear before my Court
dressed-up in that manner.
When she said this, the magistrate was almost shouting.
When I turned around to see who was being reprimanded, I
discovered it was a young girl of about thirteen years.
She had a short-sleeved dress on. Generally, though, the
people observed the regulations closely, hence reminders
such as the one above rarely had to be made.
I found I also had to be extremely careful about the
forms of dress because as Patrick (1973) indicates, they
form part of the crucial considerations for the researcher
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who seeks to maintain the position of the acceptable
marginal member, and a mistake over such a simple matter
can, in fact, jeopardize the entire enterprise of research,
for the purposes of which he is in that setting.
However, since I was allowed to sit together with the
lawyers, through the influence of the Clerks of Court and
the interpreters, I was saved from demands concerning a
headdress, except in Quthing. The first day the Judicial
Commissioner's Court came into session, the court messenger
asked me and another young woman who was sitting next to
me, to put on something on the head when the court next
resumed. But realising my association with the court staff
during the recess that followed, he never made further
demands with me, the other lady had to get something
though. The court messenger was only to remark during the
lunch break that:
. . . you ought to set the example to the
other people though, as to how to
appear in court.
I realised that he thought I was either a legal
practitioner or part of the Judicial Commissioner's Court,
as I was with the Clerk of that Court then.
The judges of the High Court were always robed; often
in red, so were the Counsel appearing before them. The
magistrates and the Judicial Commissioners also appeared in
their robes, but it appeared to be common practice that
counsels appeared before them unrobed. The majority of
the prosecutors, except in the cases heard before the High
Court, appeared not robed too; perhaps because most of
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them are not Legally trained. The police prosecutors
appearing in criminal matters in the (Magistrates' Courts
were often uniformed, so did those who appeared in the
Roving Stock-theft Central Court. From time to time,
there would be uniformed police, acting as messengers of
the court, but this was more common in the High Court, than
in the Magistrates and Judicial Commissioners' Courts.
Besides these, all other court personnel - interpreters,
assessors -would be ordinarily dressed.
COURT-ROOM OBSERVATIONS
During Court-room proceedings notes of events as they
unfolded were recorded. My main interest here, was to
record anything that was said or done by those involved in
the proceedings; be it parties, their witnesses or
counsels, "judges" (those presiding over the proceedings -
magistrates, court presidents, judicial commissioners
inclusive), prosecutors and interpreters, which related to
the application of prescribed rules and their
implementation. The aim was to see how far these rules are
generally applied and how far the people are familiar with
them.
Furthermore, the intention was less concerned with
recording the frequency and distribution of events, than
with linking interaction patterns observed with the symbols
and meanings believed to underlie such behaviour. This is
connected to the purpose of the study in that it would
enable me to arrive at a qualitative analysis of the
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complexities involved in how the courts operate, especially
in view of changes that have occurred within the judicial
structures over time. By this is implied not simply
spelling out the characteristics of the various judicial
institutions, but rather unravelling the complex and
interrelated connections between them, identifying their
structure and nature, the similarities and differences they
possess, capturing the historical processes they have
undergone and describing their present reality, both in
theory and in practice. It actually required watching the
people in the court proceedings and dispute settlement, and
seeing what situations they ordinarily meet and how they
behave in them, (cf Becker and Geer, 1982), and further it
meant talking with the participants and discovering their
interpretations of the events and the observed behaviours.
Some focusing was necessary as it was not always
possible to note down everything during the Court
proceedings. Therefore, from time to time I had to decide
what type of data was important, and make such decisions
from moment to moment. Inevitably, some things which
later seemed noteworthy were at times left out. The notes
of the observations, however, contain the following: date,
time and location of the proceedings; details about who
was presiding, whether parties were represented or not;
problems emerging from how the questions were asked and
responded to; problems pertaining to the understanding or
misunderstanding of questions; where parties were not
represented whether they could examine, cross-examine, or
50
re-examine; indications whether there had been
collaboration between the legal practitioners and their
clients before the proceedings concerning certain routine
operations of the courts; delays, postponements and what
appeared to be their cause; questions relating to the
translation of proceedings from English into Sesotho and
vice-versa, loss or misplacement of documentary evidence,
non-attendance of medical practitioners and so on.
For reasons explained later on, linked mainly to
limited financial resources, the bulk of the court-room
observations were carried out in the courts in Maseru (the
Capital town). Some were done in Quthing, a district in
the South of Lesotho. In all, a total of 259 Court
proceedings were observed, and it is on the basis of these
observations that part of the discussions and descriptions
in this thesis are made. Attempt has been made to use
some of the observed cases in the various chapters of this
work.12
I had an opportunity to sit-in and observe proceedings
in various courts: the High Court; the Magistrates'
Courts; the Judicial Commissioners' Court; the Roving
Stock-theft Central Court and the Maseru "Special" Local
Court. On these various occasions, different judges,
magistrates and court presidents were presiding; and
prosecutors, defence counsels, parties and witnesses also
changed with cases before the courts. I also had a chance
to see various interpreters as well as court clerks in
action. Thus a cross-section of actors were included in
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the observations; which increases the validity of the
descriptions and conclusions made in this work.
However it may be useful to point out at this juncture
that it was not possible to observe each and every case to
its completion, especially in action and trial proceedings.
Sometimes my observations commenced in the middle of an
already on-going case, or even stopped before the whole
case was concluded. This was mainly in the interests of
time (other proceedings such as in murder trials continuing
for a duration of two weeks or even more), but it was also
due to the fact that more than one court would be holding
proceedings at the same time; and my interest was to
include in the data collected, as wide a variety of cases
as possible, for analysis in my thesis.13 Sometimes it
became very interesting as I literally had to be moving
from one court to another. To borrow the words of Denzin
(1970), it meant partaking in as many of the activities as
possible and joining in the daily rounds of activity of the
people studied.
Through the information from various sources, it was
possible to have a clue of cases that would possibly raise
interesting facts pertaining to my research. Some of this
information came from the court personnel themselves such
as interpreters who would at times tell me what cases were
on the roll for the day, and even give me a brief summary
of the facts of a particular case. Some legal
practitioners went a step further to indicate how they were
going to proceed with a case, often this would be when a
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technical point of procedure was going to be argued in
defence.
The university driver who helped me during the
research, especially when I had long distances to travel or
if the roads to the places of research were not so good and
needed careful driving, provided me with some information
too. Often he would be attending proceedings in one of
the other courts, while I was in another. One day he came
to the flat where I was staying to inform me of a case
concerning dispute over a dead man's body (a corpse).
This was due to be in Maseru, according to his information,
a distance of about 35 kilometres from where I was staying
(University Campus). By the time we got there, no one
seemed to have any idea of it in the Maseru Special Local
Court. Following indications by some of the staff there,
that it could be at the Magistrates or High Court; we
rushed there. On arrival it was not there either - it was
actually like chasing after people's court cases though.
Both civil and criminal proceedings were observed,
though civil cases seemed appear more frequently at all
levels of the court structure; but this was particularly
so in the customary law courts i.e. the Local, Central and
Judicial Commissioner*1 Courts. This is perhaps in the
nature of the law itself, which has removed a great
majority of the criminal matters from the jurisdiction of
these courts - setting the penalties for most criminal
offences too high than these courts are empowered to impose
leaving them only with what could be regarded as
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"trivial" criminal offences. For instance, the provisions
are such that once a criminal offence has been investigated
by the police, it automatically as of procedure, has to be
heard by a magistrate as a matter of first instance.
To get a full impression of how the courts operate did
not only mean observing court-room proceedings, it turned
out to mean "spending a lot of time hanging about with
lawyers" (Goodwin-Jones, 1984: 32), the magistrates, other
court personnel, while proceedings were on recess and after
the sessions at the end of the day, thus "sharing some of
their social, as well as professional, life" (Goodwin-Jones,
1984: 32). A lot of useful information was obtained from
comments made during such "informal settings".
The strategy during the fieldwork was to keep on
rechecking these observed behavioural phenomena, to
ascertain their validity thus acting on the advice of
Lindensmith (1952) that:
The investigator who has a working
hypothesis concerning his data becomes
aware of certain areas of critical
importance. If his theory is false or
inadequate, he knows that its
weaknesses will be more clearly and
quickly exposed if he proceeds to the
investigation of those critical areas.
This involves going out of one's way to
look for negating evidence
(Lindensmith, 1952: 492).
Checking the universality of the behavioural patterns
mentioned above in the various courts, assisted in
examining, redefining and reformulating the observations
"each negative case calling for a redefinition, or a
reformulation" (Robinson, 1951). Further data gathering
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tended to take its direction from provisional analyses (cf
Becker, 1958) made possible by this redefinition and
reformulation of the observations. This exercise made it
possible for me to discover how typical and widespread the
observed events were. In Becker and Geer (1982) this
exercise is described as a constant redesigning of the
study to uncover new data.
INTERVIEWS14
This was the second methodology employed for the
fieldwork. Open-ended interviews were held with various
groups of informants and respondents.15 For Denzin (1970)
open-ended interviews; as opposed to closed or structured
ones, are typical in participant observation. Palmer
(1928) summarized the aims of the unstructured interviews
very well, noting that they provide the opportunity for the
researcher to probe deeply, to uncover new clues, to open
up new dimensions of a problem and to secure vivid,
accurate, inclusive accounts based on the informants'
personal experience.
The first category of respondents included various
court personnel. I had an opportunity to interview at
least two of the three High Court judges who were there at
the time, all of whom were Basotho, magistrates of
different classes, court presidents, both of the judicial
commissioners now employed, prosecutors, defence counsels,
the chief legal aid counsel, court clerks and interpreters.
I had no opportunity unfortunately, to interview the court
55
assessors, most of whom are quite elderly people, who could
have been very informative, first about the new foreign
judicial system and its procedures; secondly, about the
indigenous system now largely forming the "unofficial"
structure of courts and of customary law in general; as
well as about their principles and procedures.
The next group of interviewees consisted of people
whose cases had come before the courts, and have been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment. At least a group of
ten men from the Maseru Central Prison and ten women from
the Maseru Female Prison were interviewed. I had
requested the Prisons staff to make a random sample of the
inmates. However, it may be worthwhile to mention that
the sample at the Central Prison came out to contain more
of the long-term prisoners. One of the originally selected
male inmates refused to be interviewed, then I had to
request permission to interview yet another to maintain the
figure sample of ten. The sample of female inmates
included at least two juvenile offenders. These, however,
could not recall, for instance, whether they had appeared
before a "Children's Court" or a Subordinate ( Mag istrate)
Court. They could not make the distinction between the
two. The law makes provision for such an option
depending, for instance, on the nature and seriousness of
the offence for which a child is being charged.16 These
inmates were asked to recall events of the days they
appeared in court, and this was in an attempt to establish
whether they could remember what happened and what they
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made of the whole court process. From this it was
possible to make an assessment of their understanding of
the procedures and the rules of evidence and other aspects
of the proceedings, including issues related to legal
representation, conducting proceedings in the English
language and so on.
One thing most of them seemed to remember vividly was
with regard to their sentences - length of the term of
imprisonment - which they recited with much ease counting
even the months. Often they could not tell exactly what
the charges were as read in the court. For example, they
made no distinction between charges of murder and culpable
homicide. They could not recall discussing the charges
with their counsels so distinctively. Some complained
that the number of charges had been increased. I think
here, they were not aware that a chargeable offence could
be split into various counts; and that they could plead
guilty to some and not all of the counts and that each one
of them could carry a separate sentence or they could be
all taken as one for purposes of sentencing.
Those sentenced to death expressed it in the words
which when translated would read, "you will hang, and hang
until you are dead". In Sesotho, they tended to express
it in almost the same words, as if in court it was said to
each one of them in exactly the same fashion - perhaps by
the interpreters. The male inmates used other common
expressions such as referring to the High Court as
"Lekhotleng le letala" (the Green Court) because the
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outside roofing of the court is painted green. They also
mentioned the name of Justice Cotran, one of the High Court
judges, who has now left Lesotho, guite freguently. They
would say, for instance, "Lekhotleng la Cotran" meaning,
Cotran's Court.
I carried out interviews with other parties not given
custodial sentences as well. The majority of whom had
been involved in civil disputes. Some interesting points
were raised, especially by those involved in divorce
proceedings. In a similar manner the guestions put to this
category of respondents, related to events of the court
proceedings involving rules of procedure and evidence and
their understanding of these rules.
The last group of interviewees consisted of people
whom I thought knowledgeable and experienced in the work of
the courts or historical developments in Lesotho,
especially those pertaining to the legal system and the
judicial changes in particular. Some had first-hand
information of historical developments - one, (Bereng) for
example, worked under the colonial regime and was actively
involved in the preparations for Lesotho's independence in
the mid-1950's and was also involved in the drafting of the
Independence Constitution. Another (Damane) is regarded as
one of the great historians of Lesotho at the present time;
he was formally a University lecturer in the Department of
History of the University of Lesotho and is now retired
(see Appendix F).
Interviewing these people, added another dimension in
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the techniques employed - that of oral history - which was
part of the attempt to get close to the data in order to
see how the Basotho themselves interpret and view the
judicial processes and the nature of dispute settlement, as
well as the changes that have occurred over time. As
Burgess (1982) points out, oral history provides materials
concerning people about whom very little written documentary
evidence is available. This sort of technique counteracts
the problem that arises in the use of written evidence which
Samuel (1975) comments upon as follows:
It is remarkable how much history has
been written from the vantage point of
those who have had the charge of
running - or attempting to run- other
people's lives and how little from the
real life experience of the people
themselves (Samuel, 1975 : XIII).
Historical accounts of the legal and judicial system of the
Basotho have in fact been written by scholars and other
people from outside. This is mentioned here not by any
means as a suggestion that such accounts should be
discarded. Some of these are referred to under (a) of the
literature review section, and their usefulness cannot be
undermined. Rather the use of oral histories brings
forward a different perspective of the past, and
complements what has already been documented, thus
counteracting the problems that would arise if only the
written accounts had been considered in this thesis; by
offering further dimensions from the Basotho's point of
view.
The above were formal interviews, however, in
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addition, informal discussions were held with various
people, for example, those attending court sessions
(witnesses, relatives of parties, other observers), staff
from the Ministry of Justice, and colleagues at the
University of Lesotho. Some discussions took place while
court proceedings were on recess. Sometimes I would not
be taking part in the discussions myself but would listen
to the remarks and comments from these various people.
Other discussions took place even outside the courts'
precincts.
The main idea was to enter into conversations with some
of the participants and informants in the area of study, in
order to discover their interpretation of the events
observed, (cf Becker, 1958). As Palmer (1928) indicates:
The conversations of human beings are
an important part of the data of social
research, as well as an important part
of social research technique (Palmer
1928: 169).
He further writes that, the ability of the objects of
social research to converse with the investigator is so
vital a part of the subject matter of the social sciences,
that it cannot be disregarded in any well rounded study.
Because of the methodology adopted which was
unstructured, it was possible, during the fieldwork, to
include aspects emerging form the observed events in the
interviews, using them to get further details and better
informed descriptions of how the courts operate. The
unstructured interviews, in addition, maximized the
possibility for the informants and respondents to say more
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than what I had expected, and did not narrow them or
restrict the perspective of the study - the interviews were
flexible, but also controlled - making the informants focus
on the judicial processes and the nature of dispute
settlement. The designed questions as contained in the
schedules (Appendix G) served only as guidelines, but in
the main assisted as a means of keeping the subject to the
major themes, and to secure more details at given points of
a narrative, or to stimulate conversation when it tended to
lag (cf Burgess, 1982).
The interviews produced voluminous data, especially
because a tape-recorder was used in an attempt to record
them as close to verbatim as possible. It provided for a
fuller recording, not losing on any data that could open-up
new promising avenues for further interviewing. The use
of a tape-recorder was approached with utmost caution
because sometimes it can be counter effective, and inhibit
full and frank discussion of issues. However, none of the
respondents, because of the good rapport I had established
with them, resisted being tape-recorded. What really
consumed much time is the transcription of these interviews
into writing, ultimately an assistant was engaged to help
in finishing up the job. The transcriptions were later on
checked against the tape-recordings for any omissions.
During the interviews, I also made short notes,
especially on the points that I felt I would need the
informants to elaborate upon. Questions on these points
were brought up at the convenient time, either during or at
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the end of the whole interview. This helped to develop
the accounts further, on the items most pertinent and
appropriate to the purpose of the study.
Attempt is made in the thesis to make use of the
information gained from the interviews, and great care is
taken to be as accurate as possible, so as not to change
the sense of what the informants said. Hence while some
of the quotations may appear to be linguistically
incorrect, they are a close statement of the respondents'
views.17
UNPLANNED FIELDWORK ACTIVITIES
During the period of the field research, I discovered
there were certain other activities which were not part of
the planned strategies, but would be useful in throwing
more light on some of the issues under study, and, in
addition, would aid in developing and seeking further
directions in the description of how the courts operate.
Some examples of observations and information obtained from
these activities are used to complement the main trends of
descriptions and arguments in the subsequent chapters.
One question that often bugged my mind was whether the
teaching of law, in a country with a mixed system of law
and courts such as Lesotho, for example, encompassed
principles of both the customary law and the received law.
I therefore, decided to request the Faculty of Law of the
University of Lesotho to allow me to observe lectures for
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some of their courses. Other activities included the
proceedings of University of Lesotho Students Disciplinary
Committee, and in addition, what I heard people referring
to as the "Street Law Project". The importance of these
activities within the context of my research are discussed
in the sections that follow.
a) Classroom Observations
The information obtained from classroom observations
was of great assistance in filling up the gaps in my
knowledge of, for instance, the law of the procedure and
evidence. It helped me to get acquainted with some of the
legal concepts relating to procedure and evidence before
getting to the field. Such knowledge assisted me to
identify and follow-up crucial issues relating to the legal
profession and to revise my thinking about legal
representation in the courts.
Since time would not allow me to observe lectures for
all courses offered in the Faculty, I decided to choose the
ones which I thought are directly linked with questions in
my research. I attended lectures for three courses
namely, Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure and the Law of
Evidence. The observations were mainly dictated by the
routine activities of the law students. I attended the
lectures with them, frequented the gatherings they had
prior to and after the lectures, watching them and
listening to their casual conversations about discussions
and events which occurred during the lectures. During
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such conversations I took the advantage of having informal
discussions with the students mainly about such aspects as
procedures, rules of evidence and how far they thought
these would apply and be understood by the majority of the
Basotho people.
In all the three courses, the teaching was almost
invariably concentrated on the theoretical dimensions of
the new rules of procedure and evidence; especially as
they should be applied in the received law courts. This
was obvious from the cases selected for discussion - none
came from the customary law courts; perhaps due to the
fact that record-keeping in these courts is very poor, but
also because their judgements are hardly ever published.
The training in customary law and procedures is almost
totally neglected, the focus as indicated above being
placed only on the received law and principles of procedure
and evidence.
During the time I carried out the observations, no
mention was ever made of the customary law courts. Except
in the Criminal Procedure class, where it was discussed
that legal practitioners have no right of audience in the
Central and Local Courts in civil matters. In Civil
Procedure and Evidence classes the tendency seemed to be
emphasising the point that there has been a move away from
the inquisitorial to the adversarial principles.
The tendency was also to lecture about the procedures
and rules of evidence as they are in the books, making no
reference at all to the complications which arise in the
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application of these procedures and rules of evidence.
One got the impression that no difficulties are encountered
in the implementation. For instance, it was never
considered that the personnel in the customary law courts
is not professionally trained, and therefore, not
acquainted with the adversarial procedures and rules of
evidence. This was so even in the consideration of
criminal procedure, in which legal practitioners can appear
before the Central and Local Courts.
This bias in the teaching of law perhaps explains the
observations I made and the information obtained from the
interviews, that while it is claimed that criminal
procedure is the same in both the customary and received
law courts, in practice this is not obvious in the former.
Also while the legal practitioners do have a right of
audience in the former courts in criminal cases they seldom
appear.
In more general terms, what the observations under
this section revealed is that, while in practice there are
courts exercising powers and applying the customary and the
received law, graduates from the University are barely
equipped with the customary law procedures and rules of
evidence. This, of course, is to a large extent with the
exception of a few who come to the University through the
recommendation of the Ministry of Justice, and have
normally worked in the courts, mainly the customary ones;
as clerks of court and/or court presidents, and thus
already have some basic acquaintance with the customary law
65
principles. The full implications of this on the
functioning of the courts are dealt with in the subsequent
chapters.
b) The Students Disciplinary Committee
The Students Disciplinary Committee deals with such
matters as discipline and disputes within the Students'
Union. It is not a court of law but exercises tremendous
powers such as rusticating a student from the University
for a set period of time, imposing a fine, etc. The
members of the Committee include the Staff members and
members of the Students' Representative Council. During
the term of my fieldwork when I had the opportunity to
observe some of the Committee's proceedings, the "judge"
and the "prosecutor" were staff members. The senior law
students normally appear as "defence counsels" for the
students against whom the proceedings have been instituted,
which gives them a good chance for practising what they
have learned in class.
The procedures and rules of evidence used in this
Committee follow the pattern very close to that used in the
received law courts. During the period of my research
there were a number of cases going on before the Committee.
The observations of its proceedings enabled me to see some
of the law students in "practice" . It also gave me an
opportunity to see how the University students cope and
understand the court procedures and rules of evidence,
representing as it is, a group of people who have a higher
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standard of education, and having a fair exposure and
knowledge about the principles of the new judicial
structures.
The observations focused on items similar to those
studied in the courts of the country such as those relating
to examination, use of the English language in conducting
the proceedings, understanding of what is going on by those
concerned "parties", and so on. The intention was to
compare and contrast findings from these proceedings with
those obtained from the courts of the land; whether they
would reveal similar or different trends about the people's
understanding and ability to handle the received law rules.
The proceedings of this committee are conducted in
English. While one would have presumed that this would
pose no major problems for the University students, it was
amazing to find out that most of them had a lot of
difficulties, for instance, in expressing themselves
adequately during examination. The question raised in my
mind was that this must be more difficult for those members
of the general public who are not even educated to this
extent and thus have a limited knowledge of English than
the University students.
Usually these proceedings attracted a large attendance
from the students. Some of the participants would be
standing; leaving no room whatsoever for easy movement, a
factor I did not find in the customary or received law
courts except on Motion Roll days - on Mondays in the High
Court and on Fridays in the Maseru Magistrates' Courts.
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In action and trial proceedings, the courts are often not
full, those in attendance besides the parties, counsels and
the bench and other court personnel, being relatives of the
parties and few other people, usually those awaiting
proceedings of their own cases.
c) The "Street Law Project"
Another interesting activity which I came across
during the term of my fieldwork, was what I heard people
referring to as the "Street Law Project". Basically the
project is concerned with laying the ground for the
introduction of law as a subject in the High Schools of
Lesotho.
I do not have the full details as to the background of
this project - how it started, the need that prompted it,
its final aim, etc. Also how the High schools came to be
identified as the point of focus for the project; is not
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clear to me. In opinion, the majority of the people in
the country need legal training or information about most
aspects of the law including the rules of procedure and
evidence. They need to be informed of their rights under
the law; and so on.
While I was on fieldwork "mock trials" were organised
in the High Court as part of the project, in which certain
High schools were in competition. The preparations for
the "mock trials" had been done with the cooperations and
in collaboration with the staff in these selected schools,
and some lawyers had also been involved; providing
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training in preparation for the competitions. It seemed
a very big occasion, and it even formed part of the news
broadcast over the national radio station.
On the day of the "mock trials" some members of the
court personnel were present including some of the private
lawyers and public prosecutors. The High School students
appeared in everything - as registrars (clerks) of court,
prosecutors, defence lawyers, messengers of the court,
including interpreters, etc. Those who acted as
prosecutors, defence counsels and the registrars were
robed. Presiding over the proceedings were the judges of
the High Court, three of them in all, sitting_ in separate
court rooms, and they were also robed. Proceedings took
the normal approach of the proper courts and were in
English.
While I disagreed with the approach of teaching the
law through court proceedings, interesting things were
observed, indicating that the majority of people in the
country do not understand the new procedures and rules of
evidence. As mentioned earlier, it was a big day, the
students, in particular took the event very seriously.
During the lunch break when proceedings in one of the
courts had not been stopped, one lawyer complained: "Judge
X is taking these proceedings too seriously, these children
ought to go for a lunch break". They would have to
reassemble for the finals in the afternoon. Some examples
of observations made on this day are used later on.
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PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
Finances were the main problem in carrying out the
study. This tended to ultimately influence both the
sample of the courts in which I carried the observations
and also the choice of the people selected for the
interviews. Hence the fieldwork tended to concentrate on
nearby areas, mainly Maseru.
I got an opportunity, however, to go to Quthing, a
district in the south of Lesotho. I made court-room
observations in the Judicial Commissioner^' court and the
Magistrates' courts as well. Endeavours to visit Thaba-
Tseka, in the mountain areas, were delayed due to lack of
financial support for the research. By the time I got
some funds, I was already busy in the courts of Maseru and
had many activities and appointments already scheduled.
Going to Thaba-Tseka during the summer months as planned,
was thus impossible. The weather conditions of the winter
ultimately made it impossible to travel there. The last
attempts, made in August, 1987, also failed due to the snow
which fell unexpectedly. On one of these attempts, I was
returned form the airport, there were going to be no
flights to Thaba-Tseka for an estimated time of a week,
when efforts to clear the snow from the runway were
complete.
Another major problem encountered, as discussed
earlier on, was that no permission was granted by the
Ministry of Interior and Chieftainship Affairs, to enable
me to carryout observations in the "unofficial" chiefs'
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courts. Thus entering the villages as a researcher was
rendered a risky business in the circumstances. The
problems of entering the villages under disguise were also
mentioned earlier. With an additional element; of time
running out, the alternative of obtaining detailed
descriptions about the nature and conduct of proceedings in
these courts, was finally settled upon. The data
collected through this strategy consists of descriptions
provided by the chiefs. Despite indications of the
scepticism and reluctance by the chiefs to admit that their
courts do, from time to time, deal with some criminal
offences, the rest of their descriptions compare well with
other information obtained from other interviews and the
literature. Many of the personnel in the official courts,
made strong indications that the chiefs do handle matters
which, under the strict interpretation of the law, could be
defined as criminal. The best examples here would be
"fights" involving children, women, herd boys, boys in
circumcision schools, most of which are often hardly
reported to the police. The value of these indications
for purposes of the thesis cannot be disregarded, as this
shall be indicated later.
CONCLUSION
The type and variety of data collected during the
fieldwork proves sufficient for the purposes of my thesis.
The items of evidence used for the descriptions in the
thesis consist of statements from interviews with various
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groups of people who were under study, about the events
relating to how the courts function, and about what they
feel about the manner the proceedings in various courts are
carried out. Such statements cannot be taken at face
value of course, nor can they, on the other hand, be
dismissed as valueless. Careful screening of all the
information obtained has been undertaken.
Many of the items of the evidence also come from
volunteered statements from various people about themselves
or others, or about something which occurred during the
proceedings. Some were general comments made
spontaneously about how the courts operate in administering
justice. A lot of these were collected from casual
conversations the participants had with one another
following the proceedings, or from intimate discussions
held with the informants.
The credibility of the informants and the respondent
groups was ascertained, and there is no reason to believe
they were made to conceal anything, or to lie about the
prevailing situation as to how the courts operate, and the
people's understanding and appreciation of the new
procedures and rules of evidence. For instance, there is
no cause to believe that the legal practitioners nor any of
the court personnel had any reason to mis-state their role
or perceptions about the operations of the courts. Even
the interviews statements of those parties in custody about
events of their trials could not be so seriously defective.
Precaution has been taken to report mainly about those
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events, which by virtue of their recurrence during
courtroom observations, appear to be common phenomena in
the practice of the courts. The facts from the interviews
got the concurrence of two, and in most cases, more
informants or respondents. With the discussions already
made of how the data was collected, I believe the
descriptions contained in the thesis are valid. An
attempt is made to use the data in such a way as to enable
the reader to understand the basis on which I have arrived
at certain descriptions and conclusions. In doing so, the
data is presented in a shorter form than the voluminous
pages of the field notes. Where translations of
interviews have been made, I have tried to quote the
statements from the respondents as close as possible.
Unlike quantitative data, the data of participant
observation, which are qualitative, do not render
themselves to ready and easy summary. Different kinds of
observations which seem to bear on the same points as those
obtained from the interviews are brought together. It has
not been possible though, to bring out what the entire body
of data gathered shows - it is clearly out of question that
I could possibly publish all the data gathered.
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CHAPTER 2
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PRESENT JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN LESOTHO
This Chapter is both a historical analysis of the
emergence of the mechanisms of dispute settlement in
Lesotho and of the system of courts as they operate today.
Attention is focused on those events which mark important
historical moments in the development of the present legal
and judicial structures.1 To do this I have relied mainly
on written sources, (Burman, 1985, Machobane, 1985; Palmer
and Poulter, 1972; etc.) dealing with legal and judicial
developments in Lesotho.
The main argument is that the Basotho, from times
immemorial, had their own indigenous mechanisms of dispute
settlement, but that with colonial domination these were
drastically altered and transformed, and a new system of
courts2 was introduced which rendered the indigenous
institutions3 illegal. These institutions,4 while outlawed
have, however, never disappeared but continue to operate
unofficially outside the constitutionally recognised,
official system of courts (the customary courts and the
received law courts). The contention is that we are not
dealing here, with a dual system of law and courts as so
often depicted in the existing literature, but rather with
a much more complex set of structures, and that the roots
74
of this lie in the period during which Lesotho was under
colonial rule. The judicial system which was established
during that time, has for all intents and purposes, been
maintained, even after attainment of Independence.
Unravelling the development of the judicial system of
Lesotho is rather a complex task. The exercise cannot be
easily separated from the consideration of the broad legal
changes and administrative reforms introduced during the
period when Lesotho was under British protection, including
its experience while under the Cape Colony rule. A
discussion of the legal provisions5 which sought to bring
radical changes into the indigenous system of the Basotho
is required, showing how far these changes resulted in the
complex judicial system prevailing in Lesotho today. A
detailed description of the characteristics of each set of
courts and how they operate is, however, left to the next
three chapters.
The present chapter begins with a brief analysis of
how Lesotho came under British protection and of the
relationships that existed between the indigenous
government and the colonial administration during that
period. These relationships continued up to the time of
independence when Lesotho obtained Responsible Government
in October 1966.
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LESOTHO UNDER BRITISH RULE (1868-1870).
The nineteenth century feuds between the Basotho and
the Boers of South Africa were accompanied by pleas for
protection by the British by Moshoeshoe, the first king and
founder of the Basotho nation. This was during the years
1842 and 1868 (Palmer and Poulter, 1972).
Following Moshoeshoe's initial request for protection
in 1842 - he had become an ally of the Cape Government in
1843 - the British Government in 1848 declared sovereignty
over Lesotho and other territories North of the Orange
River, including those that were occupied by the Boers of
the Orange Free State. However, in the case of the
latter, the claim to sovereignty was withdrawn in 1854.
This left the Boers independent, and Moshoeshoe and his
people facing them alone (Palmer and Poulter, 1972). It
was only four years later in 1858, when the Boers commenced
attacks on the Basotho and were defeated, that the Boers
sued for peace. Later between 1865 and 1868, in the
Second Free State War they reversed their fortunes and
reduced the Basotho to desperate straits. By then, as
Burman (1985) states, the danger of disintegration for the
Basotho nation was real. It was then that the British took
action to protect the Basotho.
Lesotho thus became a British colony on March 12,
1868. When the British took Lesotho under their
protection through Moshoeshoe's persuasion, they did so
reluctantly, since from the onset their determination had
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been that the territory should be annexed to some other
British colony in the region(Burman 1985). Since that
time, the constitutional role of the chiefs and the
relationships between the indigenous government and the
colonial administration has been a confused affair
(Machobane, 1985). Nevertheless, Palmer and Poulter
(1972) argue that, on the advice of Sir P. Wodehouse, the
High Commissioner in the Cape, the Crown declared by a
Proclamation of March 12, 1868, that Lesotho was a British
Territory; a statement which Sir Wodehouse was requested
to qualify, by Moshoeshoe and his Grand Council, on April
21 of the same year. Wodehouse did not put his response
in writing at that time, since he left South Africa in May.
His statement that followed later, seems to have
accepted the arrangement proposed by Moshoeshoe in 1862 in
one of his efforts to seek British protection.6 Sir
Wodehouse's statement was made after the Gun War (1880-81)
by which time he had retired. He was asked whether he had
intended 'Basutoland for the Basuto only'; Wodehouse
replied:
I can only reply, that such was the
very thing to the attainment of which
all my efforts were directed - it was
for the purpose of putting an end to
the Border disputes, and for removing
doubts as to the true limits of the
Territory to which the claim that
Tribe, and that alone, should be
admitted for the future, that these ...
negotiations were carried on . . . The
object was to secure peace and comfort
for the Basutos in the future
(quoted in Machobane, 1985: 4).
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As Machobane (1985) argues, according to
constitutional convention Lesotho had thus become a crown
colony by cessation, this meaning that Moshoeshoe's crown
and that of his heirs had been ceded and that the British
crown had thereafter total control over the Territory. In
practice, however, in Lesotho the original political
structure and its leadership as known to the Basotho, for
all intents and purposes, "continued to rule as it had in
the pre-colonial era" (Machobane, 1985: 3). It is this
confusion in the constitutional status of Lesotho, as shall
be argued below, that made it possible for the indigenous
structures to persist and function independently, despite
consistent attempts by the colonial power to introduce a
new legal order and system for the settlement of disputes.
This situation was further facilitated by the British
Government's desire to annex Lesotho to some other British
Territory in the region. According to Burman (1985) for
a while no such arrangements were possible as there was
little money available to spend on Lesotho's
administration. The British solution was to leave the
Basotho to rule themselves so far as the mid-Victorian
Christian conscience would allow, and to ensure that the
people of Lesotho paid for any costs incurred. This ran
counter to the idea then prevalent in Britain and South
Africa, that it was a Christian duty to introduce Africans
to the benefits of "civilized laws and values" (Burman,
1985: 26).
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A similar point is expressed by Hamnett (1970). He
argues that the Territory was never supposed to remain a
British colony permanently; the expectation was that at
some later date it would be merged or incorporated into
what later became the Union of South Africa. Hence, until
just before the outbreak of the Second World War, there was
only minimal Government intervention, and no effort was
made to develop the country economically or to prepare it
for any other destiny than as part of the Union, now known
as the Republic of South Africa. This period aided the
indigenous dispute settlement system, by allowing it to
continue functioning independently of the colonial
administration. This suited the Basotho as they saw
themselves as requiring only protection and not domination
by a foreign power.
The uncertainty about the constitutional status of
Lesotho continued, not only among the Basotho alone, but
also among the British, and this is obvious from some of
the official correspondence. In his correspondence dated
April 21, 1868 to Sir Wodehouse, Moshoeshoe requested that
Lesotho should be treated as a "Special Territory" which he
had described as:
A Native reserve where natives alone
should be allowed to dwell and which
would be dependent from the High
Commissioner. ^Cited in Machobane, 1985
: 3 ) .
It seems all that Moshoeshoe had wanted was protection
from Boer attacks, while maintaining his Sovereignty as he
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had proposed to the High Commissioner. For example, in
1862, when Sir Wodehouse had sent Messrs. Burnet and Orpen
to ascertain his real intentions, Moshoeshoe clearly
indicated that he did not want the Colonial Government to
send its magistrates, as the Basotho would not accept their
presence or understand their role. He wrote:
. . . what I desire is that the Queen
should send a man to live with me, who
will be her ear and eye, and also her
hand to work with me in political
matters. He will protect the Basuto
and gradually teach them to hear
magistrates while he is helping me in
political matters ... (Theal 1883-1964
: 143).
And he continued:
If I obtain an agent he will be under
the Queen as her subject and my people
will be her subjects, but under me ...
I wish to govern my people by Native
Law, by our laws, but if the Queen
after this wishes to introduce other
laws into my country I would be
willing, but I should wish such laws to
be submitted to the Council of the
Basuto; and when they are accepted by
my Council, I will send to the Queen
and inform her that they have become
law (Theal 1883-1964 : 144).
As Pirn (1935) commented, these words of Moshoeshoe
might seem to be ancient history, but they represent the
feeling of the Basotho chiefs and probably also of a large
majority of the Basotho people. As will be shown later
on, these words of Moshoeshoe were invoked time and time
again at various points in the history of the Basotho,
particularly when conflict arose between them and the
Colonial Administration. This indicates how strongly they
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held to these words, but even further, the words
demonstrated that the Basotho believed they had always
ruled themselves according to their customs and laws. It
is contended that, this belief also partly contributed to
the adherence to the indigenous judicial mechanisms during
the colonial period and even today.
In Poulter (1972), the above argument is carried
further; he argues that the words of the Proclamation of
Wodehouse that:
... I do hereby proclaim and declare
that from and after the publication
hereof, the said Tribe of the Basutos
shall be taken to be for all intents
and purposes, British subjects: and
the Territory of the said Tribe shall
be and shall be taken to be British
Territory (Proclamation NO.14, 1868).
were never accepted by Moshoeshoe, and have never escaped
challenge by many Basotho even in recent times. The
Basotho held,7 and still hold, that they had requested
British protection and not colonisation - a contention
which affected their relations with the British
Administration right up to independence in 1966.
This argument was reiterated in an interview with one
of my key informants8 who held that the British
Administration only came to Lesotho to assist Moshoeshoe in
the administration and government of his people.
According to him, the British had only been requested to
provide protection for the Basotho, while at the same time
guiding them to build up their own internal government in
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accordance with their own customs. The idea was not for
the British to introduce a new system of government among
the Basotho. The British, in his view, maintained this
path from 1868, and things only started to take a new turn
in 1871, when Lesotho was given over to the Cape.
As mentioned earlier, the whole issue of the
constitutional status of Lesotho was not clear to the
British either. In May, 1868, the British Crown Law
Officers expressed the opinion, that on a strict
interpretation of the law, Lesotho had not yet become a
British dominion and that its cession would be valid if it
was "duly authorised by the Queen and recognised by his
[High Commissioner] creation as Governor or in some like
manner" (Machobane, 1985: 3). Therefore, it may be said
that until Lesotho was annexed by an Act to the Cape of
Good Hope Colony in 1871, in Legal terms, the British rule
over Lesotho was questionable. Palmer and Poulter (1972)
point out that the annexation was put through without prior
consultation with the Basotho. By this time Moshoeshoe
had died in 1870 and was succeeded by his son Letsie I.
In agreement with Palmer and Poulter (1972) above, Maope
(1985) also notes that the annexation had been effected
without prior consent from the inhabitants, and further
points out that there was a lot of discontent with Cape
rule. According to Hamnett (1970), the prospect of
annexation had been resisted even before the post-World War
II government of the Union of South Africa adopted policies
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that made the incorporation totally unacceptable to the
Basotho.
The main source of this discontent originated in a
reaction to the memorandum drafted by Emile Rolland, a
French Protestant missionary, and forwarded to Wodehouse in
1868. As pointed out by Bereng, an informant, Rolland was
the son of one of Moshoeshoe's first missionaries. He had
grown up in the country and his analysis of Lesotho society
came to be crucial in shaping government policy for the
Territory in the years that followed. As discussed in
Mokoma (1984/85), the main thrust of Rolland's memorandum
called for the destruction of the power of the chiefs,
which he saw as a source of their wealth and authority.
He recommended that, the chiefs' power must be diminished
in order for British authority to supercede that of the
chiefs. This he contended would create conducive
conditions for the future domination of British laws and
culture.
Rolland's ideas about change began with the assumption
that some magisterial control should be instituted. He
argued that the power of the chiefs was the main obstacle
to rendering the Basotho subject British law. In his
words, the Chiefs' power, "was a major obstacle to Her
Majesty's rule in Lesotho".9 The aim of the Government
would, therefore, have to be, to diminish this power in a
way that would not embitter the prejudices of the people
( Basotho) .10
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The regulations drafted by Wodehouse before his
retirement embodied many of the ideas expressed in
Rolland's memorandum; and these were publicised at the
meeting of chiefs and headmen where Moshoeshoes's death was
announced. These regulations, while declaring only a few
aspects of customary law illegal, indirectly attacked the
chiefs' power and contained a number of measures favouring
Roman-Dutch law principles which conflicted with aspects of
customary law on which the chiefs relied for income and/or
patronage. The regulations undermined the validity and
existence of indigenous laws and the chiefs' courts. For
instance, the chiefs were not to be allowed to enforce
their judgements, and a suitor was provided with the
channels for bringing the same case to a magistrate on
appeal from a chieffe court.
Burman (1985) further points out that, as an
indication of what was in store in the future, the
regulations also contained a provision which looked forward
to the annexation of Lesotho to the Cape Colony (a British
Possession in the region) which was about to obtain control
of its own affairs under a form of Responsible Government:-
a blanket clause provided that all acts which were
offences in Cape law were to be punishable in Lesotho as
well, subject to the special circumstances of the country.
The Roman-Dutch law principles operating in the Cape, had
clearly been introduced in Lesotho from that moment,
although recognition was also given to Lesotho customary
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law. This was, later on, to affect the organisation and
manner in which the courts worked and disputes settled.
In the meantime there had been serious feuds between
Letsie, Moshoeshoe's heir and his two most powerful
brothers, Molapo and Masopha, over whom he seemed to have
little influence and control.11 When the above regulations
came to be read out at a national meeting in December 1870,
they aroused heated protests. The brothers of Letsie
openly objected, one ground for their objection being that
the regulations ignored the chiefs. It was only on
Letsie's insistence that the regulations were accepted, and
vocal opposition halted. Failing to realize the strength
of the feelings against the regulations, and the opposition
that the magistrates would encounter as a result of such
feelings, the new High Commissioner Sir Henry Barkly set
about arranging the Annexation of Lesotho to the Cape.
LESOTHO UNDER ANNEXATION (1871-1880).
The Cape reluctantly accepted the annexation
arrangement, and decided to accept the British rules of
December 1870, although these were contrary to all previous
Cape policy in administering African territories (Burman,
1985). With the distance between Cape Town and Lesotho,
there was, perhaps, little incentive for the Cape to insist
on the full-scale introduction of the Roman-Dutch law.
As Bennett (1985) points out, the Basotho were not
enthusiastic about the prospect of being governed by the
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Cape either, as this is revealed in the descriptions that
follow. The relations on the two sides of the annexation
arrangement were marked by hostility, and thus made it
impossible for the Cape Administration to rule the Basotho
and to enforce magisterial domination.
In addition to the legal arrangements mentioned above,
the Cape revealed its lack of interest in the Territory
through the total absence of budgetary provisions for
public works, buildings, education or postal
communications. It had no interest in developing Lesotho
beyond meeting the demands of the humanitarians and
missionaries. The new system of rule was to be
implemented through an imperial officer who was to apply
regulations that made many "civilizing" innovations, but
would still at least recognise most aspects of customary
law and require much less enforcement than the alien law of
the Cape (Burman, 1985).
In this manner Burman (1985) argues, the annexation
vested the duty of legislating for the Territory in the
Governor, who was to lay all legislative enactments before
the Cape Parliament within fourteen days of the opening of
the session; and unless altered, the enactments would
remain in force. No parliamentary act could apply to the
Territory unless expressly stated to do so in the act
itself or in a proclamation by the Governor. After the
Annexation Act became law, the new regulations were
proclaimed as the "Governor's Code", and came into force on
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1 December 1871. As one informant commented, the Basotho
were very dissatisfied by this "handing-down" of laws.12
Burman (1976) notes that the 1871 regulations were
contrary to the traditional laws of Basotho in a number of
ways. The following sections from the "Courts of Law"
title can be given as examples demonstrating the changes
introduced: the establishment of the magistrates' courts
in opposition to the indigenous courts of chiefs; powers
of chiefs to try cases and enforce their judgements were
interfered with; Capital offences were introduced;
whipping, imprisonment, deportation, - which up till then
were unknown as forms of punishment - were introduced, etc.
As pointed out in Poulter (1972), the overall attitude
towards these regulations was one of resentment, and they
were simply disobeyed with impunity in many instances and
their enforcement proved beyond the power of the
Government's Agent, the Chiefs continued to act independent
of the colonial administration.
The history of this period of Lesotho's annexation to
the Cape, is marked by problems in the endeavour of the
Cape Government to administer it. The Department of
Native Affairs, set up when the Cape Colony formally
received Responsible Government in 1872, remained
relatively small and increasingly overworked, with delays
in answering letters growing ever longer. As a result,
the men in Lesotho - actually in charge of administering
the country - had a great deal of discretion until 1879,
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when a change of government and policy in Cape Town, was to
leave a permanent mark on Lesotho (Burman, 1985).
According to Mohapeloa (1977), what the Cape attempted in
governing Lesotho was to introduce direct rule. That is,
the replacement of the chiefs' authority with that of the
Resident Magistrates, a system which the former complained
about from the beginning.13 This rule broke down as a
result of the Gun War (Crawford, 1959) as shall be
illustrated later on.
Under the Cape, Lesotho was divided into four
districts, with each of the three major chiefs residing in
one, the districts were also placed under the jurisdiction
of the magistrates, who were answerable to the Governor's
Agent. A few years later, some of the districts were
further sub-divided; but the size of the administration
remained small. At this time it was headed by Charles
Duncan Griffith, as the Governor's Agent, who apparently
proved to be a most impressive administrator, who both
liked and respected the Basotho, and his feelings were
clearly reciprocated. He and the magistrates assisting
him were sceptical of the missionaries' claim that good
could come from rapid abolition of Sesotho customs, and
they, as a result, did not push the pace of legal change in
Lesotho as the missionaries would have liked.
As expressed by two of the informants14 interviewed,
the Cape's approach towards governing Lesotho, was contrary
to the original agreement between Moshoeshoe and the
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British. The Cape hurried into introducing districts,
making the magistrates responsible in each of them to
govern the affairs of Basotho, without even making the
people understand the system of magisterial rule first, as
Moshoeshoe had envisaged would be necessary. The Cape had
introduced magisterial rule in other territories
responsible under them such as the Transkei, and had hoped
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that it would also work in Lesotho. As A emerged from
interviews with Bereng15 and Damane,16 the British
themselves, had not appointed magistrates when they gave
Lesotho over to the Cape in 1871.
The magistrates' and missionaries' ultimate aim,
differed only on the desirable speed and method of
abolishing Sesotho customs and law. The chiefs not
unnaturally did all they could, to counteract this threat
wherever they detected it; but such moves at abolition met
with reinforced determination, from the colonial
administration's part, to undermine the chiefs' power even
further.
The magistrates' manoeuvres tended to be in the
interest of the Paramount Chief, Letsie, from whom they had
little to fear. A particularly wary eye was kept on his
two younger brothers by Moshoeshoe's first wife. These
brothers seemed to have a dislike of government policies
which could result in a national revolt if care was not
exercised. Masopha, in particular, came into conflict
with the Government shortly after its arrival and this
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continued throughout the period of Cape rule. Later on,
the conflict turned out not to be in the interests of
Lerotholi, Letsie's eldest son and heir, to join in the
ant i-Government plot unless he felt very sure of its
success and of its support by the people. Government
policy turned towards employing the junior chiefs where
possible, thus firmly tying their interests to those of the
Government. At the same time, the magistrates exercised
extreme caution not to give the major chiefs any
unnecessary cause for grievance against the Government that
might, despite other interests, drive them into Masopha's
arms.17 It is pointed in the literature, for example in
Burman (1976) that, by careful manipulation of divisions
among the chiefs, the magistrates did succeed in obtaining
some good measure of cooperation from the Basotho, enabling
the former to enforce the regulations - but it did not
completely suppress feelings of dissatisfaction with
changes that were being introduced into Lesotho custom and
law.
Closely associated with the Government's policy of
dividing chiefs was that of weaning their people away from
them.18 As long as this proceeded carefully and
successfully, the danger of revolt led by chiefs continued
to diminish. Simultaneously, however, the magistrates
were attempting to push through a number of unwelcome
changes into the daily life of Basotho people, but in doing
so, they required a good judgement of what changes in
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Sesotho law would be tolerated by the people, in return for
such advantages as Government protection from unwelcome
impositions by the chiefs. Every means was adopted to
take over various ways with which the chiefs had contact
with the people, from the custom of holding national
meetings (pitsos) to discuss laws, to encouraging migrant
labour, Christianity and education, and a number of ways
were employed to introduce the people to the money economy
and its individualistic values.
When the Governor's Agent, Griffith, introduced the
Basutoland Mounted Police Force in 1872, it was to give
greater weight to magistrates arguments that the Government
provided a more effective way of settling disputes than the
chiefs did, forbidden as the latter were, from enforcing
their judgements. The Government was in a favourable
position to enforce its decisions, and commoners benefited
by being able to defy their chiefs on certain issues with
effective Government support. Within the courts a
flexible approach towards Cape rules of evidence did much
to decrease the people's feeling of unfamiliarity with the
new court procedures. Burman (1985) argues that, within
seven years, the Government successfully won enough support
from the people to be settling most of their cases, despite
initial opposition from the chiefs. This, she adds, at
first gave rise to suspicion that perhaps the magistrates
were not enforcing those aspects of the regulations most
unpopular with either the chiefs or people, which included
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a lot of the imported Roman-Dutch Law principles.
Such a success story led to the decision to extend the
scope of the regulations. In 1872, Griffith set up a
Special Commission under his chairmanship, to inquire into
and report upon the laws and customs of the Basotho, and on
the operation of the regulations established for their
government. The other members of the Commission consisted
of the magistrates. The Commission produced its report
and a redrafted version of the regulations in 1873. After
four years of further drafting and redrafting, an amended
version of the regulations was eventually proclaimed on 1
July 1877.19
Of the various innovations contained in the final
version, the most radical change was that which, for the
first time, made provision for the Cape law to apply to the
white section of the population in Lesotho - as the law had
stood up to that time, it was illegal to do so, yet, on the
other hand, it was inconceivable that customary law should
have been applied by a white magistrate in a dispute
between two white men. The new regulations, however,
provided that Cape law was to apply except where all
parties in the case "are what are commonly called Natives,
in which case it may be dealt with according to Native
law."20 Thus in disputes between white men and Basotho,
Cape law would apply. As it was further provided, the
relevant section stated that:
the proceedings shall, as near as may
be, and so far as circumstances will
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permit, be the same as those in the
Courts of Resident Magistrates in the
Cape Colony.21
A fair amount of discretion was thereby allowed to the
magistrates as to how rigidly to apply colonial procedure.
The regulations of 1877, remain the original source of the
introduction of more than one system of law into Lesotho
(Cf Burman, 1985).
What this meant in practical terms is that the
received law came to apply to all inhabitants, while in
addition, the indigenous law was to apply to the Basotho.
The same position continues today. As Maope (1985) has
pointed out, this type of distinction based on ethnic
origin is still not prohibited.22
The transformations introduced so suddenly into the
society for religious, economic and legal reasons,
generated considerable unease and discontent among the
people, who up to that point had known no other system of
law and administration of justice except their own. The
regulations are believed,23 to have been a direct cause of
the rebellion by Moorosi and his sons. As a result of a
further sub-division of one of the larger districts in
1877, a magistracy was established in Moorosi's district.
Clashes occurred between him and his magistrate over the
application of the regulations. A full-scale revolt
culminated which led to the killing of the chief, Moorosi,
and all of his principal sons, together with many other
people under him. This revolt is only an indication of
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the delicacy of the balance upon which the whole system of
the magistracy was built. As pointed out by Bereng
(informant ), Moorosi was resisting magisterial rule and
defending his own independence.
The Sprigg Ministry that followed, continued on these
lines to undermine the power of the chiefs and replace
Sesotho law and institutions with colonial ones. The
previous Government, however, had proceeded much more
cautiously in this endeavour: customary law and the chiefs
were undermined when and where chance arose. It was
envisaged as a gradual process which would take many
decades of slow steady loosening of traditional bonds.
Sprigg, on the other hand, came with a new approach of
"vigour" with changes to be introduced immediately when
ordered by the Ministry in Cape Town. It was this
increase in pace, as against a strategy combining patient
whittling away of chiefly powers and improvising on
opportunities, which in combination with a disarmament
policy, speeded the process towards the disannexation of
Lesotho from the Cape following the Gun War.
THE WAR OF GUNS (1880-1881).
The 1878 Peace Preservation Act which set out to
disarm the Basotho and other nations in the region, was the
last stage in the Cape's rule over Lesotho. As stated in
Burman (1985), the Act was partly a consequence of a scheme
of Sir Battle Frere, the Cape Governor since 1877, to
94
confederate the South African territories, for the success
of which he believed disarmament was an essential pre¬
requisite. Jones (1951) described the decision to disarm
the Basotho as a misguided attempt.24 Bereng (informant)
claims that the disarmament policy was intended to make the
black (my underlining) peoples responsible to the Cape,
hand over their guns to the government.
Gun buying had increased in the immediately preceding
years, funded by the wages earned by migrant workers at the
diamond fields in South Africa. From the minutes of the
meeting enclosed by the Governor's Agent in his letter to
the Secretary for Native Affairs dated 14 July 1880, it is
evident how strongly the Basotho objected to the order to
disarm them. This meeting had been called by the Chief
Letsie, to enable the deputation to report the results of
their mission to Cape Town, where they had been sent to
present a petition against disarmament, and for the Chief
to inform the people about what decision he had reached
with regard to the surrendering the arms. The Governor's
Agent had intimated in his letter mentioned above, that, in
his opinion, the Basotho were adverse to surrendering their
arms and did not intend to do so.
The Basotho finally interpreted the disarmament policy
as a sign of the Cape Administration's mistrust in them.
Their chiefs' deputation to Cape Town, had not been
permitted to argue their case before Parliament (Burman,
1976). For the Basotho, no argument from Government or
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missionaries could overshadow the combined force of the
considerations that they needed the guns for their own
protection against the Boers of the Orange Free State,
should the Cape ever abandon them, as the British had done
in 1854 (Burman, 1985). The dissatisfaction aroused by
the disarmament legislation was intense and culminated into
the Gun War.
Sprigg had ignored representations made from various
quarters - the Governor's Agent, magistrates, missionaries,
traders - and pushed ahead with his scheme, this
antagonized most Basotho. Their long-standing grievances
over the effects of the regulations on the chiefs'
customary powers spearheaded the people behind them
(Burman, 1985). Due to old age, ill-health and other
factors, Letsie himself, was unwilling to lead a revolt
and, therefore, did all in his power to avert armed
resistance, hence the delegation to take a petition to the
Cape Government. Its rejection led to mounting
dissatisfaction among the Basotho, Masopha held a strong
position, leading the opposition to surrendering the guns,
joined by Lcrotholi (Letsie's heir) who wanted to retain
his paramountcy.
As pointed in Burman (1985) the people had split into
"rebels" and "loyals"; the latter consisting of nearly all
Christians, although some Christians did join the rebels
against Government policy. Magisterial authority
gradually collapsed as the actions of the "rebels"
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intensified. The inevitable outbreak of the war came in
September, 1880, when Lerotholi attacked a column of Cape
Mounted Rifles who had crossed the border to garrison the
magistracy of his district. The Gun War had begun, and it
marked the end of the magistrates' carefully constructed
network of trust and interests, which had enabled them to
impose their new legal ideas, despite widespread - and, in
the case of Chiefs, strong - opposition to the regulations.
The Cape's ability to control Lesotho had come to an end
(Burman, 1985) and its power had collapsed; yet the
Basotho remained armed.
The Gun War proved more disastrous than even Sprigg
had feared, and the heavy expenses that the Cape had to
bear, pushed the Cape Government to anxiously negotiate for
peace. The terms of their initial offer were, however,
unacceptable to the Basotho and hence were rejected.
Lerotholi's ill-health and fear of the approaching
unfavourable weather conditions, made the Basotho speedily
conclude an agreement. Negotiations for peace recommenced
on 29 April 1881 and the Governor - accepted as an
arbitrator by both sides - announced his Award.25 Masopha
refused to submit to the Governor's Award, until he was
forced to do so in September 1881. As he continued to act
as a focus for dissatisfaction, the people remained
unwilling to take their cases to the magistrates. But
more importantly, his stand represented continuing refusal
to submit to the changes introduced by the Colonial
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administration.
So disenchanted did the Basotho become with the Cape
Government that they did not welcome even its last
desperate offer in 1883 - to leave the management of
internal affairs to the Chiefs and to control only external
relations. Worse, the Cape Government as pointed out in
Jones (1951), had not even been able to protect those
Basotho who had remained loyal to it during the war. At
the beginning of May 1883, the Cape opened discussions with
the British to hand back the country to its care. When
arrangements were finally made, the pitso26 was called on 29
December to ask the Basotho if they were willing to be
ruled by Britain through the High Commissioner. Letsie,
his sons and the majority of the people but, again, not
Masopha, replied in the affirmative, and the British
accepted the country back under its rule. Until 1886,
Masopha is reported to have refused to receive a magistrate
in his district27 (Burman, 1985). Bereng, one of my
informants, explained that Masopha had refused to accept a
magistrate because he could not be convinced that the
freedoms and rights of the people would be maintained and
promoted - "when the Cape Government left there was still
no magistrate in Teyateyaneng".
LESOTHO'S DISANNEXATION FROM THE CAPE AND THE BEGINNING OF
PROCLAMATIONS
As discussed earlier, the war had been precipitated by
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the decision to disarm the Basotho. The Cape Government,
disillusioned by the heavy expense caused by the war,
requested the Imperial Government to take charge of the
Territory. Lesotho was then accordingly disannexed from
the Cape by Act 34 of 1883; following which additional
provisions were made for customary law to continue to be
administered in cases between Africans by the Chiefs'
Courts; a condition in line with the policy of indirect
rule.
The British ruled through the Resident Commissioner
and revived also, magisterial rule. The former was
ultimately responsible to the High Commissioner for South
Africa. No significant changes were made, except to give
the Chiefs jurisdiction over minor Civil and Criminal
cases. Their judgements, however, were to be the subject
to review and scrutiny by the Commissioner. As described
by Sanders (1985), it was a characteristic feature of the
proclamations intended to provide for the introduction of
European law as the general law for Lesotho, Botswana, and
Swaziland, to also provide for the continuation of
indigenous laws and institutions; to the extent that they
were compatible with the new order, of course. It is in
this sense that Mohapeloa (1977) argues that, the year 1884
marked the beginning of indirect rule in Lesotho.
However, the British Government only took full control
of the Territory in 1884 (proclamation2B of 1884). Poulter
(1972) says that the oppressive (my underlining)
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regulations were repealed, and the chiefs' courts and their
administration of customary law as well as their land
allocation powers came to be recognised. In addition, the
registration of marriages, introduced by the Cape
Government, became optional. According to Bereng, the
British were convinced that the Basotho were capable of
conducting their own affairs and that their form of
government was somewhat democratic, as demonstrated by the
practice of holding the pitsos in order to sound public
opinion on important issues. Palmer and Poulter (1972)
claim that this marked the beginning of proclamations
intended to bring change in the form of Government in
Lesotho.
The General Law Proclamation of 29 May 1884, is worth
nothing for a further reason in that the basic legal
structure set out in it, was carried through into
independence. However, Burman (1985) argues that the
introduction of Roman-Dutch law principles was contained in
the regulations first made public at the meeting of
December 1871, discussed earlier on.28 By implication,
changes actually began prior to 1884. Maqutu (1982)
concurs with this, arguing that Roman-Dutch law first
became the Common Law of Lesotho when the Basutoland
Annexation Act of 1871 introduced the Law of the Cape into
Lesotho.
Furthermore, the famous Proclamation 2B of 1884, gave
the Resident Commissioner the power to appoint Chiefs:
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to adjudicate upon and try such cases,
Criminal or civil, and to exercise
jurisdiction in such manner and within
such limits, as may be defined by any
rules established by the authority of
the Resident Commissioner, who is
hereby empowered to make all such rules
as may be necessary in that behalf, and
to amend, alter, and cancel the same as
he may think fit.29
According to Machobane (1985), if implemented this
provision could have brought an end to the parallel30 system
of Government. But as he argues further, it was found
imprudent to risk another confrontation with the Basotho,
so soon after the conclusion of a war. Hence these
provisions were shelved and forgotten until 1922, when for
the first time the Colonial administration decided to table
them again,31 this time in response to the pressures form
the commoners arising out of among other things, the
inadeguacies and corruption in the administration of
justice. Palmer and Poulter (1972) indicate that in 1922,
there was growing dissatisfaction with delays which had
become a prominent feature of the Chiefs' Courts. This
consequently led to proposals for reform which were placed
for discussion before the Basutoland National Council in
1929 (Discussed later). The complaints about such matters
as delays encountered in the chiefs' courts, formed a
subject of discussion at every session of the Basutoland
National Council from its inception throughout its
lifetime.
Machobane (1985) indicates that by the end of the
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nineteenth century the indigenous Government of the
Colonial Lesotho had, for all intents and purposes, broken
down. This, he says, was due to the political, economic
and social factors32 prevailing at that time. The
political factors that followed the Gun War included the
feuds or disputes among the chiefs themselves. In Jingoes
autobiography, (Perry and Perry, 1975), it is stated that
the chiefs were involved in continual squabbles, trying to
maintain and enlarge their territories; a problem that
could be traced to the fact that there were too many chiefs
and virtually no more land on which chiefs could install
their children.
The political feuds among the chiefs led to the
breaking down of two important institutions of indigenous
Government - the Grand Council and the "pitso". The
latter had been a singularly democratic institution, where
subjects of discussion were brought to the people for them
to express their opinions as openly as possible. Part of
the reason for its breakdown was that the Colonial
Government in the 1870's, had turned it into a forum where
they introduced their distinguished guests into the
Territory, but in addition, the chiefs had become
intolerant of differing views aired by the people
(Machobane, 1985).
It is pointed out, for example, in Burman (1976) that
the Basotho had become increasingly sceptical about the
extent to which they were able to influence policy, for
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instance, as regards laws, through the pitso. One Mosotho
man is reported to have demanded at the 1875 national
pitso:
I want to know what answer the Queen
has ever sent to our misgivings at
these meetings? And yet I have often
heard misgivings expressed but never
any answer.33
The Basotho had come to be deprived of the democratic right
to recommend, make, alter or repeal the laws (Mokoma,
1984/85) - a right which they previously exercised through
the pitso.
The economic factors that led to the feuds, on the
other hand, included the introduction of a compulsory form
of "hut tax" (i.e. house tax) by the Cape Colony in 1871.
The chiefs and headmen were given the responsibility for
tax collection, for which in return they were given
allowances. They began to feel increasingly indebted to the
colonial administration because of their dependence on
these allowances. Subsequently, their political bond with
the commoners was proportionally worn out.
The social factors, Machobane (1985) mentions include
the introduction of the white man's drink, whisky, and the
impact of western civilization and Christianity. The
chiefs, because they had the money to purchase the white
man's drink, were the ones hit hardest, they became
drunkards and hence failed to fulfil their official chores
including their crucial responsibility over judicial
matters. The commoners thus began to complain of the
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injustices they were experiencing in the chiefs' courts.
Amidst all the problems, the indigenous government and
the colonial government largely operated separately; the
former being in full command of the internal administrative
affairs involving the Basotho, under the leadership of the
chiefs. This state of affairs was commented on later on
by Sir Alan Pirn, who in 1935, reported34 that from his
observations the Colonial Government and the "Native
Organisation" still functioned practically independently
of each other, there being no attempts to combine the two
into one system of government and nor had there been any
modifications made to render the Native System capable of
dealing with changing social conditions such as the
introduction of the money economy. But more than that,
the two administrations, in some ways had become even more
aloof from one another, to an extent that even the practice
of involving a representative of the colonial
administration in the boundary disputes among the Basotho
chiefs had fallen into disuse.
It is argued, in the literature, that this was not the
type of "indirect rule" exercised in other territories
under British authority at that time. For example, Sir
Donald Cameron is reported to have said the essence of true
indirect rule - "the allegiance of a people to a tribal
head, freely given and without external cause" - was found
in a high degree among the Basotho. This was not
"indirect rule" as understood in other parts of Africa -
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not only the acceptance and the preservation of recognised
tribal institutions "but making the Native Authorities a
living part of the machinery of government and directing
the political energies and ability of the people to the
development of their own institutions" (Pirn, 1935). Pirn's
report pointed to the failure of the colonial
administration to provide the necessary control and
guidance in Lesotho; and thus ultimately its
ineffectiveness in introducing colonial rule. As Pirn
(1935) described it, the practice in Lesotho presented a
different case - it was more a policy of non-interference,
of proferring alliance, of leaving two parallel Governments
to work in a state of detachment unknown in Tropical
Africa. In contrast, under indirect rule, native
institutions are incorporated into a single system of
government and subjected to continuous guidance,
supervision and stimulus of European officers. Under
these circumstances Pirn (1935) had concluded that there was
no rule, direct or indirect by the British Government in
Lesotho.35
In reality, just as before colonisation, the chiefs
ruled the nation. Machobane (1985) indicates that for as
long as there was no conflict of authority the colonial
administration emphasized British "protection" in its
relations with the indigenous Government. This is
supported by Pirn (1935) who observed that the colonial
government could only provide advice, which was most
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welcome only when a difficult issue arose. He, therefore,
concluded that the Basotho received protection without
control and that this was not only acceptable to the
chiefs, but to the masses of the Basotho people as well.
The point is that it allowed the indigenous system to go on
and the chiefs continued to handle even disputes among
their people in the traditional manner.
THE FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL AND THE EVENTS UP TO
1935.
It was at the beginning of the twentieth century that
the long standing suggestion by the colonial administration
concerning the establishment of a National Council was
finally agreed to. Poulter (1972) shows that the earliest
proposal to set up this council of chiefs and headmen, as
a body meant to give advice to the colonial administration,
was put forward by Mr. Scanlan, the Prime Minister of the
Cape Colony at the end of the Gun War. The idea was
accepted by Letsie I, Moshoeshoe's successor, but many
other chiefs rejected it. Machobane (1985) indicates that
the chiefs had suspected it to be a potential instrument
for their control.
The first Resident Commissioner of Lesotho, Lieutenant
Colonel Marshall Clarke had revived the idea in a private
letter to Letsie I, after whose death in 1891, the proposal
was shelved for the first eight years of the rule of his
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successor, Lerotholi. Seventeen years later, in 1903, the
idea was finally agreed upon (Poulter, 1972). Machobane
(1985) indicates that it was during the Anglo-Boer War
1899-1902 that Lerotholi decided to change his mind about
the establishment of a national council. For one, he was
considerably ill at that time, but most important, he had
realised that his successor, Letsie II, was an exceedingly
weak leader due to the white man's drink. Lerotholi was
therefore eager to strengthen the position of his
successor. Poulter (1972) points out that Lerotholi had
reopened the matter concerning a national council again in
1901; apparently, on the advice of an American missionary,
Rideout, that such a body would strengthen the power of the
chiefs.
Having finally decided to set up the National Council,
its first session was ultimately held in July 6, 1903,
under the presidency of the then Resident Commissioner,
Herbert Sloley (Poulter, 1972). It was at this session
that recognition was given to the most pressing problem in
the system of indigenous Government - the lack of justice
in the courts. The Basutoland National Council(as it was
called) saw its first and major task as the codification of
customary law (Machobane, 1985). A committee which was
duly formed to work on the assignment produced twenty four
laws, not all of ancient origin, and these having been
deliberated upon for six days were reduced to eighteen and
were named after the then Paramount Chief, as the "Laws of
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Lerotholi" (Machobane, 1985). These laws were upheld for
fifteen years, but by 1918-1919; another set of seven new
laws was passed among which were included procedures for
the courts; a revised edition of the Laws of Lerotholi was
published in 1922 with these new additions (Poulter, 1972).
The membership of the National Council was largely
dominated by the chiefs or their representatives appointed
by the Paramount Chief himself - there were ninety-four of
them out of a total membership of a hundred. Five of
these members were the appointees of the Resident
Commissioner (Poulter, 1972). Machobane (1985) says the
Resident Commissioner's appointees included four commoners.
Despite the encouraging beginning, the Council was not
always so ready to voice criticisms of the chiefs to check
their abuses. It soon came to reflect the wishes of the
chiefs, especially the higher ones in the hierarchy
(Poulter, 1972). Conflict of interest arose between the
chiefs and the commoner-members and the National Council
began to be questioned.
There have been debates about the authority of certain
parts of the Laws of Lerotholi, especially Part I. While
I do not wish to indulge in a prolonged discussion of
whether or not these laws had the force of law, since the
National Council had no legislative powers, it is worth
noting that the laws were circulated, the first set in
Lesotho, as "Memoranda for guidance of the Native Courts
and Courts of Appeal". The thinking was that these laws
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would serve a useful purpose in establishing a written code
for reference where oral tradition alone was insufficient
to ensure a proper administration of justice (Poulter,
1972) .
Noting the attitudes of the people towards these laws
and the Council' s perception about them is equally-
important. Bennett (1986) shows that the Council and the
Basotho people regarded even the final compilation of the
Laws of Lerotholi as binding law. The Basotho courts or
the official customary law courts, still regard them as
such, and the people in general attach great importance to
them, especially because of strong attitudes, which still
prevail towards customary law.36
Ashton (1952), writing about the people's views of the
Laws of Lerotholi, indicates that they were viewed as:
...less an authoritative collection of
traditional laws than as a definite
legislative enactment and several of
them ... have gained a currency, as a
result of their publication and
association with the Basutoland Council
that they never had before or are
likely to have acquired on their own
(Ashton, 1952: 467).
He himself described the laws as "that authoritative
compilation". Poulter (1972) points out that the Colonial
Government's policy of non-interference had allowed the
traditional authorities to believe that they possessed far
greater powers of legislation than they actually did.
This contributed significantly to the coexistence of
various systems, including those for the settlement of
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disputes, which is one main theme of this work.
As noted further, for example in Poulter (1972), the
National Council believed that they were the only ones who
could make laws affecting the administration of justice
among the Basotho, a sentiment shared by many members of
the Council. In his opening address at the 1928 Council
Session, the Paramount Chief, Griffith, reiterated this
attitude, and clearly declared that the Government's
proposals should be left in the hands of the Council:
who are the mouthpiece of the Nation,
so that the Nation may make its own
laws ... the laws that the Nation will
ask for are the only ones which will
satisfy them (cited in Pirn, 1935: 26).
As Bennett (1985) shows, the publication of the revised
edition of the Laws of Lerotholi in 1922, heralded a change
in the Council's self-conception; they came to regard
themselves, not merely as a passive instrument but as the
legislative voice of the Basotho people - that was despite
the fact that in theory, such power to make the laws was
vested in the High Commissioner.
The Pirn Report of 1935, contains a quotation from the
speech of one Councillor, which expressed the sentiments
shared by many members of the Council and spelled out their
self-conception most eloquently:
. . . the Resident Commissioner should
not make Native laws, he should advise
and confirm the Chiefs of Basutoland
who were appointed by God, by birth and
who were confirmed by Queen Victoria
... The subject is surprising, that we
have you making our domestic laws.
Advise and see if it will be rejected
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. . Give advice, that is what you are
sent here for by the Imperial
Government. (Pirn, 1935).
Reference had been made at the beginning of the above
statement, to the words of Moshoeshoe to Messrs Burnet and
Orpen in 1862, and on that basis it was alleged that the
British Government, by making the laws for the Basotho, was
acting contrary to its previous undertakings and trying to
curb the hereditary power of the chiefs.37 This recalled
the words of Moshoeshoe, that his request had only been for
"protection" in which case the chiefs were the ones to rule
the Basotho people and make laws for their government.
Further and more important, it was a revelation of the
chieftainship and councillors' attitude, as regards the
whole question of the legislative power of the Council,
contained by implication, also in the Paramount Chief,
Griffith's statement on the previous page.
A further opinion can be found in Machobane (1985);
he indicated that the Code (i.e. the Laws of Lerotholi) did
not resolve the problems of injustice in the Basotho
Courts, a fact which was admitted even by the chiefs
themselves. The problem of injustice therefore became a
repeated topic of discussion in the National Council - but
the chiefs, in contrast, were becoming more and more
irresponsible in their administration of justice.
Prominent among the accusations were delays in the trial of
cases. In some courts, chiefs were no longer presiding
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over their own courts and there were stories that commoners
had to pay bribes for their cases to be brought to trial
quickly.
In the meantime, two critical political pressure
groups had emerged which were actively pressing for the
reforms in the system of Native rule and the administration
of justice, on behalf of the commoners. In our
discussions, Damane (refer to Appendix F) pointed out that
these two groups were determined to fight against the
malice of delays in the justice process, and that the
people were no longer satisfied with the way in which the
administration of justice was being carried out. For
instance, he mentioned that complaints were being raised
concerning the tradition of matsema38 and lipitso which had
been turned into "traps" for bringing to court and fining
people who did not comply with their chiefs' orders -
people were being fined for not joining in the matsema and
for not attending the lipitso. In an interview him Bereng
(see Appendix F) confirmed this point, that chiefs were
making unreasonable demands on their people, which if not
complied with, resulted in people facing innumerable
charges for failure to obey their chiefs' directives.
Bereng also stated that these included among other things,
not complying with orders to attend the "pitsos". As he
further noted this prompted complaints that the chiefs had
"turned the nation into gold mines", that is, they were
enriching themselves by making people face endless charges
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for disobedience of the directives and orders.
Recognition should be given to the fact that, the
matsema practice had taken a different form from its
original one. While in the past the so-called "tsimo-ea-
lira" was the one in which the people had to pay service to
the chiefs, recent practice had changed into people being
ordered to work on the fields of the chiefs' wives,
including the most junior ones.39 The Progressive
Association (one of the political pressure groups), in
particular, raised complaints about this new practice of
matsema. As illustrated by one of the informants, Damane,
when closely examined, the problems surrounding the
matsema practice as described above, were linked to the
misuse of the "placing" system, as discussed later on.40
The Basutoland Progressive Association was founded in
1907 by Simon Majakathata Phamotse, from the Leribe
District. It was mainly an elite group, very western in
thinking and among its distinguished members were Thomas
Mofolo and Z. Mangoaela, both writers; others were
Ministers of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society,
teachers and businessmen. It was more comfortable with
the colonial administration than chiefs, a characteristic
which made it different from the second group, the
"Lekhotla La Bafo". The Progressive Association viewed
the chiefs not only as corrupt, but also backward and
ignorant (Machobane, 1985). Poulter (1972) points out
that this group pressed for reforms in the system of
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indigenous rule; and was constantly critical of the
administration.
The second group, the Lekhotla La Bafo, "Commoners
Council", was founded by Josiel Lefela in 1909, and was
comprised mainly of the poorer Basotho, landless migrant
workers to South Africa, members of independent churches,
disgruntled junior chiefs and a significant number of
women. It was clear that chieftainship should be retained
and its pre-colonial calibre restored. It made more
attacks on the colonial adminstration and on Imperialism in
general and also on the Christian church. Its founder,
who had been a member of the National Council was kicked
out in 1920 (Machobane, 1985). The Lekhotla La Bafo came
to be associated with the eventful years of change in the
administration of Lesotho by stirring up conflict, and
raising many questions about the chiefs' actions in the
interests of the commoners (Perry and Perry, 1975).
According to Bereng this group was commonly known as
Lekhotla La Sechaba (People's Council) among the Basotho.
While not denying the abuses in the administration of
justice, Damane pointed out that the Lekhotla La Bafo was
opposed to the practice of paying chiefs salaries, arguing
that it would turn them against the nation while
strengthening their allegiance to those who paid them. As
he further explained, this group was against the new court
procedures, which they viewed as diminishing the rules set
by custom, as well as changing the role of chieftainship as
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an institution with obligations to the society. He also
pointed out that, as a result of the reforms denying the
chiefs judicial powers and access to fines, chiefs had
ceased to provide food to their people at khotla. This
was not received well by the people, who then began to
question the new system.
On 9 March 1921, the two associations combined efforts
and featured an article in a local newspaper
"Mochochonono", reacting against Lefela's expulsion from
the National Council. The article expressed that:
If the President desired to exercise
his authority over the Council which
has lain dormant for many years why in
all goodness did he not start by
suspending thieves, murderers, and law¬
breakers [chiefs] who constitute a
majority of the council? He is
pleased to listen to the advice of such
outcasts and confer with them in
matters of theft, murder and law-
breaking, but shuns the society of a
man who fights both tooth and nail
against such barbarities. ... It is
simply scandalous, (cited in Machobane,
1985: 20).
In December of the same year, The Friend, Bloemfontein
(South Africa) newspaper featured two aggressive articles
against the court system in Lesotho. One complained about
the lawlessness of the chiefs, how cases were stockpiled
before trials, and how the system of appeals was made
impossible with cases often being returned to the courts of
first instance. It accused the chiefs of great misuse of
the courts. The second article followed two weeks later,
written by Simon Majakathata Phamotse. It referred to the
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"uneven balance" of justice in the country, and pointed out
that chiefs ran the courts with subjectivity and
vindictiveness. It urged for reforms and proposed for the
establishment of a Department of Justice to be presided
over by an "experienced and qualified judge" who would
"have nothing to do with political affairs". As Machobane
(1985) points out, this was the first suggestion from a
Mosotho for the separation of powers in the customary
functions of the chiefs. Two more articles followed in
local newspapers, Naledi and Mochochonono in February 1922,
one of which was by Phomotse again (Machobane, 1985).
As an example of how chiefs abused their powers of
administering justice, Bereng pointed to the unfair
practice by which chiefs began to fine people who refused
to go on errands to far away places on their behalf, and
those who did not attend the pitsos. He said, in
addition, the headmen made their own demands on the people,
and in the same manner fined the people for non-compliance.
As a result the nation became very bothered at the manner
in which justice had come to be administered. This
supports Machobane (1985) in his observation that, the
charges against the chiefs had escalated during the third
decade of the twentieth century, hence the reports of
maladministration of justice began to feature in the
newspapers of Lesotho and South Africa. It was in an
attempt to attend to these problems, that changes described
in the following sections were made.
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Following these reports, the Paramount Chief, Griffith
Lerotholi convened a huge pitso at the royal residence,
Matsieng, whereby Simon Phamotse and his followers were
called to speak about their charges. They refused to be
cross-examined and said they would only do so in a proper
court trial. At the end of that pitso, it was quite
evident that Phamotse and colleagues had won, as women of
the Paramount Chief's village came to shake hands with him
(Machobane, 1985).
It was at that point that the Colonial administration
thought seriously about initiating reforms along the lines
of Phamotse's proposal for a new judicial body. A
modified form of this proposal was for the establishment of
a Court of Appeal to deal with appeals against judgements
of the chiefs' courts. The Resident Commissioner,
however, cautioned:
The suggestion for this innovation
should emanate from the nation itself,
and not be thrust on them by the
Government. I think that a motion
introducing the suggestion could be
arranged for the next session of the
Basutoland council.
He was referring to the 1923 session. Such a suggestion
for the nation's participation in decision-making could not
be rejected by the Basotho. It was certainly in their
interests and conforming to their desires. Griffith, on
the other hand, rejected the idea for such a reform,
outright, seeing it as undermining the role of his own
court in Matsieng. Making a fresh start, the colonial
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administration decided to introduce the reforms directly.
The chiefs had by this time accepted their failure to
deal with their own administration and the judicial
problems and thus welcomed intervention by the Colonial
administration. The new Resident Commissioner, J.C.R.
Sturrock, set about drafting a lengthy set of regulations
in 1927, which were then circulated throughout the country
for comments and were to be presented to the National
Council in April 1929 before being passed on to the High
Commissioner for proclamation(Machobane, 1985). That
session, due to some problems, was ultimately convened in
October, the same year.
In his opening statement of the Draft Proposals for
the New Native Court Regulations, the Resident
Commissioner, Sturrock, made it clear that all councillors,
except one closely connected with the Paramount Chief's
Court, had admitted to the need for improvement in his
hearing in Council. He mentioned that the number of
chiefs who had the right to exercise judicial powers was
both undefined and also too great. This he said, was due
to the fact that any son of a chief, who had been "placed"
automatically obtained judicial powers. He felt that this
practice had to be brought to an end; as Section 4 of the
Proclamation 2B of 1884 provided (quoted earlier). He
suggested that, in consultation with the Paramount Chief
and the National Council, a schedule of chiefs be drawn up
and appointed with judicial powers, and that their powers
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be defined.
The point about the "placing" system in which the
chiefs were giving privileged positions to their sons, is
that it led to an increase in the number of authorities,
and the numbers of people entitled to hold courts also grew
by the day. In the traditional practice each chief had a
court that performed both administrative and judicial
functions in his area of jurisdiction. In the words of
Bereng, one of the British Government officials once
remarked:
Their [Basotho] number of chiefs has
become an astronomical problem (Bereng:
28.4.1987).
As he further indicated, the increase in the numbers of
chiefs and thus their courts as well, meant that the line
of appeal grew longer and longer, and this led to the even
greater complaints about delays in the administration of
justice.
A comment made by Bereng about the system of "placing"
stated above, however, is that when the criticisms were
being made, it had changed from what it had been during the
time of Moshoeshoe. Moshoeshoe had only "placed" his four
sons from the "first house" (by his first wife), though the
fourth, Majara, died before he could take charge. But as
time went on, the sons of Moshoeshoe changed the practice,
"placing" all their sons including those from "junior
houses" - they had many sons - whom when all were "placed",
led to this high numbers of chiefs, as they continued to do
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the same. In alluding to the same problem Damane made an
example of Matsieng, "the place of chief Letsie", whose
first sons by each of his six wives had all been "placed"
as chiefs. As he further pointed out, with the increase
of chiefs, the courts also multiplied.
The result of this was that numerous delays were
caused in the administration of justice. As the system of
"placing" continued and some of chiefs from "smaller
houses" were given areas over which to rule, it meant the
system of appeal from one junior chief's court to that of
a senior one immediately above him became more complex.
Even at Matsieng there would be numerous courts of chiefs
superior to those from where the people came. To show how
complex the system had become, Damane said, there were even
rumours that people had to bring bags of maize an wheat to
feed on, while at Matsieng awaiting their cases to be
processed. Further, he showed that bribery thrived as
people tried to push for their cases to be heard fast -
people were being charged financially for the
administration of justice. Certain cases came to receive
outmost urgency and priority because of the benefits they
would immediately bring to the chiefs. In addition, he
mentioned that there were accusations that the chiefs were
avoiding the responsibility of discharging their judicial
functions and some were accused of conniving in stock
theft.
Further, the Resident Commissioner brought up the
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question of regularising the procedure in the courts, which
he hoped would obviate delays. Section 1 of the Rules of
Procedure in the Draft Proposals stipulated that:
The court shall sit for business every
working day, and cases shall be
arranged so that parties are not kept
waiting unduly.
The proposals, in addition, included provisions for records
of cases dealt with to be kept, all proceedings were to be
taken down in writing and filed. Provision was also made
for the fines to be paid into a Native Administration Fund
instead of being retained by the court, an innovation not
in accordance with ancient Basotho custom as shall be
discussed in the next chapter. This suggestion regarding
the disposal of fines was made in recognition with the
words of High Commissioner, Mr Amery, who had said to the
Council once before that some of the customs of the Basotho
may not suit the times. The proposed Native
Administration Fund was to be in the first instance used to
provide salaries for the chiefs who presided over the
courts. Further, while traditionally fines were paid in
kind, effort was to be made, as soon as possible, to
receive payment in cash as in European Courts.
Finally, the conduct of appeal to the Paramount
Chief's Court was seen as also needing urgent improvement,
in view of serious delays which often occurred in their
settlement. Suggestions had been made to establish a
circuit court in the 1922 session, and these were revived,
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with the caveat that they should not infringe upon the
power of the Paramount Chief.
Meantime, the relationships between the Lekhotla La
Bafo and the Basutoland Progressive Association had
deteriorated. Lefela believed that the latter were
politically disoriented and were agents of imperialism.
The former had initiated a campaign a few weeks before the
Draft Regulations were to be discussed in the National
Council, in defence of the chiefs. Lefela apgued that
Lesotho was a Protectorate and that the Colonial
administration had been sent to protect the country, and
he was thereby appalled to find that the colonial officers
were bent on the:
breaking down of our social fabric to
bring about detribalisation of our
political existence as a nation ... in
the vilification and pollution of our
chiefs by the officers of Government
though enmeshing them in judicial
manoeuvres directed against them to
prepare for their expulsion from posts
of exercising their duties as judges
for the people. ... (cited in
Machobane, 1985: 24).
This was not because the Lekhotla La Bafo did not want
reform, but many thought the reforms were too radical and
diminishing the relevance of their customs too fast.
Jingoes is said to have spoken to the Paramount Chief and
her advisers at Matsieng this way;
... I appeal to you to approach the
Government. Tell them the time is not
yet ripe. I do not mean that I am
against what the Government is
introducing - I know we need many
reforms in our country but this is not
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the time for us to change our ways so
radically - not yet ... Let the British
teach us first how to handle new ways
41
In a similar fashion Pirn (1935) indicated that the conduct
of chiefs and the need for improvement was generally being
admitted. However, as a result of strategies worked out
by the Lekhotla La Bafo, Machobane (1985) argues that when
the Draft Regulations were finally brought to the Council
for discussion in October 1929:
Chiefs torpitoed them out. The
strategy was to knock down the centre
pin of the Draft Regulations, namely,
the enabling Proclamation 2B of 1884.
(Machobane, 1985: 24).
The argument was mainly that the Proclamation was a Cape
Colony creation and not one of the British Government, and
hence was null and void. According to Machobane (1985),
the contrary was the case, but the Resident Commissioner
did not know the facts. This point is further endorsed in
Pirn (1935); he contends that, the majority of the Council
had come to view the proposals as an attack on the
hereditary rights of the chiefs who, in the provision of
Proclamation 2B of 1884, could now be appointed by the
Resident Commissioner to adjudicate:
or have their powers limited in any way
except by addition to the so-called
Laws of Lerotholi first accepted by
themselves and incorporated in the law
by order of the Paramount chief.
Having deliberated on the proposals without any
conclusion and agreement, the chiefs were then given leave
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"to consult with the Nation. When they returned five days
later they claimed that they had held public assemblies
throughout the country and the people were in agreement
with them, and that they did not want the Regulations
(Machobane, 1985). On October 19 , the usual panacea
(Pirn, 1935) of referring the Regulations to a strong
committee, was finally adopted. Then on the 23, only five
days later (Pirn, 1935; Machobane, 1985), the committee
felt itself able to report as follows:
Your Committee, Your Honour, submits
as they have been appointed as coming
from all the corners of Basultoland,
they called Pitsos in order to find out
the feelings of the people with regard
to the little book (i.e. the Draft
Proclamations) which, Your Honour, we
have found through letters and reports
submitted to the Committee that the
Basotho Nation throughout unanimously
fear the enacting of the proposed
Proclamations and the Nation desires
that the book of the Laws of the late
Paramount Chief Lerothodi should be
confirmed (enforced), caused to be
respected, and made use of by the
Courts of Chiefs in Basutoland. For
these reasons, Your Honour, Your
Councillors recommend that a
Proclamation should not be made but the
Laws be made which will be in the book
of the Laws of Lerothodi which the
Nation likes.
Thus again the efforts towards reform had failed. As Pirn
(1935) put it, the colonial administration had tended to
confirm the attitude of the Council which was set out by
Moshoeshoe in 1862, by putting the proposals of such
importance to the Nation; not as policy adopted by the
Government, but as mere suggestions at the discretion of
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the Council.
Poulter (1972) believes that it was only as a
consequence of Sir Alan Pirn's Report of 1935, that
important administrative and Hative Court Proclamations of
1938 were made. A similar view, that it was the Pirn
Report which finally culminated into the 1938 reforms is
expressed in Palmer and Poulter (1972). Another view,
however, is that the reforms of 1938 were the culmination
of a historical process; consisting of factors relating to
the ill-defined constitutional status of Lesotho under the
British Crown, which resulted in contradictory and
unsystematic policies the British adopted in ruling the
Territory. In addition, the chiefs had lost touch with
the commoners and there was a growing demand for political
change by the commoners who had become resentful of chiefly
abuses (Machobane, 1985 ).42
The Pirn Report focused on how the customary system of
"placing" had been widely abused, owing to the great
increase in the numbers of the so-called chiefs which
necessarily also meant an increase in the numbers of the
courts as well. It also made reference to the fact that
the only penalties which the chiefs could inflict were
fines of stock, part of which went to the court, a part
which naturally had to be realised before others. This
made, as it was claimed, the income of the chiefs dependent
largely on the amount of crime. The report also pointed
to the lack of compulsory measures for record-keeping of
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cases except in the Paramount Chief's and Principal Chiefs'
Courts. In addition, Pim reported on the widespread
complaints of delay or denial of justice which had often
been voiced in the National Council. Generally, he felt
that the fundamental defect could be traced to the
multiplication43 of courts and the chiefs' partial
dependence on fines inflicted in the courts. With mounting
pressure from the people, the colonial administration
decided to introduce reforms, which affected dispute
settlement processes. In 1938, simultaneous Proclamations
were passed, based mainly on suggestions contained in Pirn's
Report of 1935.
THE 1938 REFORMS44 AND THE EVENTS THAT FOLLOWED
In his autobiography by Perry and Perry (1975),
Jingoes points out that the period between 1938 and 1948
was a time of turmoil in Lesotho, when the trust between
the Chiefs and the Commoners was put to severe test, and
when the chiefs misguidedly signed away most of their
powers. It was at this time that he claims to have
evidenced the indigenous system of the Basotho crumbling.
Machobane ( 1985) says it was in December, 1938 that
Sir W.H. Clark, the British High Commissioner, promulgated
two radical Proclamations affecting the Crown Colony of
Lesotho; namely Proclamation No. 61, the Native
Administration Proclamation and Proclamation No. 62,
entitled the Native Courts Proclamation. The former,
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provided that the High Commissioner could, in consultation
with the King of Lesotho, declare any person to be
Principal Chief, Ward Chief or Headman in the Territory.
Section 3 of the same Proclamation gave the High
Commissioner powers to revoke or vary appointments of
chiefs. The Proclamation specifically defined the
functions of the chieftainship and its powers were reduced.
The chiefs were brought under the control of the Colonial
administration and their numbers were cut from about 2,500
to 1,340.
The second Proclamation No. 62, the Native Courts
Proclamation, provided for the "recognition, constitution,
powers and jurisdiction of Native Courts and generally for
the administration of justice within ..." the Territory.
The Proclamation gave the Resident Commissioner power, with
the approval of the High Commissioner, to issue warrants
recognising or establishing such Courts as he saw it fit.
Thus he exercised control over the number of courts as well
as the personnel in them. Members of the courts could be
suspended and even dismissed, again with the approval of
the High Commissioner. According to this Proclamation,
only the courts with warrants could exercise jurisdiction
under the law and get engaged in dispute settlement. The
1,340 chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen were, under the
Proclamation No. 61 of 1938, to be recognised by
identification in the gazette and were all issued with
court warrants at the outset.
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Hamnett (1975) argues that the 1938 Proclamations,laid
the foundation for a revolutionary change in the structure
and role of the courts, by specifying that no chief could
hold a court without a warrant and limiting each court's
powers and jurisdiction to what the warrant specified. He
further argues that the award of warrants to all the 1,340
chiefs whose names appeared in the first gazette with the
initial introduction of the 1938 Proclamations, served to
disguise from most Basotho, the magnitude of the changes
contemplated by the new laws. In particular, it obscured
the basic principle that it was no longer the chieftainship
but the administrative recognition by warrant that bestowed
the authority to hold a court. Common practice, even in
recent years, as discussed in the next two chapters,
reveals that people have still not appreciated this.
As Jingoes (Perry and Perry, 1975) puts it, the
Proclamations were an attempt by the British to stabilize
the then existing political structure by recognizing only
a limited number of chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen through
a gazette, in which those not gazetted were not officially
recognised. According to him, the right to gazette was
actually placed in the hands of the Principal Chiefs, who
acted in collaboration with the District Commissioners in
recommending to the Resident Commissioner as to who was to
be gazetted. This, as he says, came as a blow to the
petty chiefs, especially for the headmen who were commoners
and happened to fall out of their Principal Chiefs' favour,
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and as a result were struck from the gazette. In his
view, the Proclamation led to even worse abuse, since many
Principal Chiefs saw to it that only their favourites were
gazetted, while many efficient and respected men went
unrecognised.
Further changes were introduced later on. According
to Ashton (1952) the real initial reduction in the number
of courts came in 1946, when the first attempt to separate
administrative and judicial functions of native
authorities, namely, the chiefs, was effected as a result
of the 1938 Proclamations. In that year only 121 chiefs
were issued with warrants (Ashton, 1952; Hamnett, 1975;
Palmer and Poulter, 1972); and in 1949, this number was
further reduced to 106 (Ashton, 1952; Palmer and Poulter,
1972). The 1946 reduction was a consequence of the
setting up of the National Treasury for the Territory which
necessitated a careful scrutiny of the number of customary
courts the country could afford. The Drafting Committee
had recommended a reduction of the courts to a number
totalling 117, including five Central Courts of Appeal, but
had not set down a clear principle for the separation of
executive and judicial functions, the presumption being
that the chiefs would not ordinarily sit in their own
courts but would rather appoint others to act as
presidents, perhaps from among responsible sub-chiefs
(Palmer and Poulter, 1972). This is how the Native Courts
came to be commonly referred to as the "National Treasury
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Courts" a term which Ashton (1952) employs. Hamnett
(1975) also points out that of the 121 original courts
awarded warrants in 1945, only 106 were remaining after
another reduction a few years later - which was in 1949.45
In an interview, Bereng 46 argued that the
establishment of the National Treasury came with the
realization on the part of the British that, the attempt
of regularizing the system of government and judicial
courts was not in itself sufficient. The courts, in
effect still remained sources of revenue for the 1,340
gazetted chiefs recognised in accordance with the
Proclamations No. 61 and No. 62 of 1938. The idea was
that the courts should not enrich the chiefs, which was
only possible if the chiefs were denied all judicial
powers, and left to be only administrative authorities as
provided for in Proclamation No. 61, and forbidden to
appropriate fines paid into their courts for personal
benefit. The aim of the Proclamations, including the
establishment of the National Treasury, was to bring an end
to this abuse; and to the chiefs' control over judicial
matters.
A further explanation about the establishment of the
National Treasury made in the autobiography of Jingoes
(Perry and Perry 1975), is that this was a move by the
British to grant the Basotho more control over their own
affairs, a thing for which they had been clamouring. The
funds that were to be deposited into this Treasury would
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come partly from a new system of law courts that were to be
created, which when they came into operation became
commonly known to the Basotho people as the Basotho
Treasury Courts. As he observes, up to that time, the only
Courts which the Basotho had had apart from the British
hierarchy of Magistrates' courts, were the chiefs' courts.
The numbers of these courts were cut down drastically and
the people who worked in them became salaried officials and
the fines no longer went to the chiefs. Bereng added that
the courts were given case registers and receipt books, the
latter being used when any payment, whether to "open the
court" or of fines were made. The people were to be given
payment receipts, and all the proceeds from the courts were
to be deposited with the Treasury. The accountants in the
districts had the collections made at the courts, deposited
with them each month - they would check the money against
the receipt books before forwarding it to the Head of the
Treasury at Matsieng. This checking assisted to overcome
the problem of misappropriation of funds, which as he
noted, had become very rife. In addition, even stray
stock, was according to the new system, to be sold and the
money deposited into the Treasury and the chiefs were
compensated by being paid salaries by the Government
(Bereng: 28.4, 1987; Perry and Perry, 1975).
Another problem mentioned by Bereng is that when the
chiefs became salaried they only functioned to impress the
British administration in order to get increments. As he
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explained, they came to forget that "a chief is a chief by
the people"47 and became chiefs by the white man from whom
they were getting the money.
In addition, Jingoes (Perry and Perry, 1975) observes
how the chiefs' loss of the rights to impose fines in their
courts led to a chaotic situation for some time, for many
of the headmen and chiefs persisted in the old ways and
kept fines for their own benefit. They could not
appreciate the fact that their courts only existed in an
unofficial capacity, to try and make peace among their
subjects. They had become only mediators; without powers
to enforce their decisions. This, they could not grasp -
they could not understand that what had always been
tradition had suddenly become misappropriation of property,
as a result, many headmen had to be punished in this period
of confusion, some even appeared before the same Treasury
Courts. He further notes that not only did the chiefs and
headmen have trouble in implementing the new law; but the
people suffered as well because they knew nothing about the
revised court procedures.
Making reference to one case Jingoes, (Perry and
Perry, 1975), illustrates the above point more clearly.
He notes how one presiding headman is reported to have
said:
This court has no power to fine you,
Makiki. My court is only there to try
to make peace. It is up to you now,
Monakoli, to make up your decision.
If you want peace with Makiki, you can
drop the matter, but if you want to
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charge him, you can take him before the
Treasury Court (cited in Perry and
Perry, 1975: 227).
In certain respects the new courts were more welcome
to the people, because they aided in overcoming the problem
of delays. For one, the system of appeal became diffused;
with appeal courts more widely distributed throughout the
country than before when all cases on appeal had to be
heard at Matsieng. Thus previously people had to travel
long distances, but even more, they had to spend days,
sometimes months, awaiting their appeals to be attended to.
There were instances when people got tired with the waiting
and returned home, their cases unattended to.48 Under the
new system there were several appeal courts.
The National Treasury functioned from 1 April, 1946 up
till 31 March, 1960, when it was closed to keep in line
with the constitutional reforms that were taking place at
that time. There was pressure from the people, for
instance, for the need to establish a legislative council.
They felt they were no more satisfied with the Basutoland
National Council, but demanded for a national legislative
body that would make laws for their government. On the
whole the constitutional reforms referred to above were
already in preparation for independence.49
However, when the National Treasury was dissolved the
courts remained, with only minor adjustments introduced.
For instance, the original courts had so far been fairly
or evenly distributed over the country, so that the people
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would not have to travel long distances to find a court.
With the closure of the Treasury, consideration was only
given to leaving a reasonable number of courts in operation
in order to reduce costs.50 The issue of distances to be
travelled was no more viewed as of significance in
determining the number of these courts. The courts'
numbers were again reduced to a total of 63. For the
present numbers of the Central and Local Courts, refer to
Appendix B.
SUMMARY
This may seem to have been a round-about account of
explaining how the present court structures in Lesotho have
come about. However, it is only through understanding and
coming to terms with the historical events contained in
this chapter that features of the present court system and
how it operates can be adequately described. These
historical events have actually led to the coexistence of
court structures of different origin, and in my opinion,
continue to have a bearing on the manner in which the
courts are generally organised and still operate today.
First was the question of the constitutional status of
Lesotho, and then the idea that the Territory would
subsequently become merged into South Africa. Both
enabled the indigenous structures to continue functioning
with minimal disruption and interference by the colonial
administration. In addition, these two factors fostered
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the strong feelings among the Basotho people that what they
had was only British protection, and that their internal
affairs continued to be in their own hands, and that they
still ruled themselves through their chiefs; who also had
powers over dispute settlement processes. As a result,
the feeling of Basotho chiefs and many of their people that
what they had requested for was merely protection as
expressed in the words of Moshoeshoe became strongly
embedded.
Furthermore, an attempt has been made to describe the
events of the period during which Lesotho was under Cape
rule. The relations between the Cape Government and the
Basotho remained tense up till the Gun War. The Basotho
resisted any form of change which the Cape Government
attempted. At the end of that rule, the chiefs remained
dominantly in power; governing and settling disputes of
all kinds among their people.
The annexation as noted earlier, was put through
without prior consultation with the Basotho people, which
tended to cause a lot of discontent against the Cape rule;
and even further tensions were caused by policies adopted
by the Cape. The feelings on both sides of the
arrangement were those of hostility, as the Basotho made it
impossible for the Cape administration to rule and enforce
magisterial domination. The lack of committed interest in
the Territory from the side of the Cape administration,
added to the already complex situation, and consequently
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made it possible for many aspects of customary law to
continue being recognised, with much less enforcement of
alien laws of the Cape. This was mainly to avoid direct
confrontation with some of the major chiefs who resisted
change. However, the innovations contained in the
"Governor's Code" of 1871 were introduced, and this
intensified the already brawling dissatisfaction, and
caused the Basotho to act disobediently against the rules,
that is, in addition to the fact that it was difficult for
the colonial administration to enforce the rules. Due to
the latter, the chiefs thus continued to act independently
in the traditional manner.
When the Cape attempted to exert more control over
Lesotho following change of government in 1879, replacing
the chiefs' authority with that of the magistrates, bitter
complaints arose. The missionaries, on the other hand,
pressed for rapid changes to be made altering Lesotho
customs and wanted the pace of legal change to be hastened.
Efforts to change the Basotho way of life so rapidly were
counteracted by the chiefs, but rivalries between
Moshoeshoe's sons added a new dimension to the situation;
Masupha, in particular, was totally opposed to the changes
accepting no magistrate in his district. The Colonial
administration thus had to exercise caution not to cause
even great bitterness among the major chiefs. Only
through such careful manipulation did they win the favour
of the minor chiefs and a good number of the Basotho; thus
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creating a rift between the chiefs and the people. The
introduction of magisterial rule, caused unease at
different times. For instance, it is held to have been a
direct cause of the rebellion of Moorosi and his sons; as
a result of the establishment of a magistracy in his area;
following a further sub-division of one of the larger
districts.
Things took a new turn under Sprigg, who wanted a much
more vigorous path to change and curtailing of the chiefs'
powers. Combined with the disarmament policy, a rebellion
against the Cape's style of government resulted, and this
sparked off the War of Guns (1880-1881). This brought a
collapse to the magistrates' rule and ability to enforce
the new legal ideas. Due to heavy expenses the Cape
government incurred through the war, peace was negotiated,
and discussions were opened for the British to take charge
over Lesotho. The disannexation was accordingly arranged
by Act 34 of 1883, though the British took full control in
1884.
The fact that the Cape had no real intention to spend
more than the tax collected on the Territory is of
significance. Because of this, the administration in
Lesotho remained small, and perhaps contributed to the
failure to set the magisterial rule from the ground. The
attitude to keep expenditure on the Territory to the
minimum persisted even under the British following the
disannexation of Lesotho from the Cape in 1884 - the
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original idea of the British having always been that
Lesotho would finally be incorporated into South Africa.
But it was perhaps thought this was the easiest way of
administering a country so determined that all it wanted
was protection and not rule. The British when they took
charge, introduced no significant change to policies
already set forward by the Cape, magisterial rule was
revived, giving the chiefs jurisdiction over minor civil
and criminal cases and their judgements were made subject
to review and scrutiny of the Resident Commissioner. Thus
while introducing the European law, provision was also made
for the continuation of indigenous laws and institutions;
which was in line with the British policy of indirect rule.
It was explained that the Basotho resented the idea of
incorporation into South Africa very much, but most
important, of course, is the revelation that they still
valued their customs and laws highly as this is shown in
the description that preceded. This tended to make them
oppose British rule, calling upon the words of Moshoeshoe
several times, in an attempt to reaffirm their
independence.
Masupha can be quoted as a clear example of the
opponents of British rule, but even later on, Josiel Lefela
made a statement that clearly revealed the same opposition
towards reforms introduced by the British on the one hand;
while on the other, it shows how strongly attached they
still felt towards the chieftainship and therefore
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determined to protect the chiefs against the British's
endeavour to destroy them and diminish their powers.
Similar trends of hostility can be traced in the debates of
the National Council as well.
Another step towards reform was that attempted in
1929, at the end of which the British administration still
emerged defeated. Because of instigations from the
Lekhotla La Bafo, the Council Sub-committee that had been
formed to consider the Draft Proposals for Native Courts,
reported that the people did not like the Proposals but
preferred the Laws of Lerotholi instead. The British had
always adapted a soft line towards introducing change, they
often met with feelings of hostility and strong opposition
from the Basotho. This attempt towards reform had again
failed.
It is in this sense that it could be argued that it
was only in 1938, that the first steps were taken to check
abuses which had developed in the indigenous system. The
numbers of chiefs and courts were reduced. Further
changes were introduced in the period 1946-9, among those,
two directly affected the existing mechanisms of dispute
settlement and these were: the establishment of the
Basutoland National Treasury and a new system of courts
which as Jones ( 1959 ) described; came to deprive all
chiefs of their former courts (at least in theory), and
which left the appointment of the new courts personnel in
the hands of the Ward Chiefs. Other changes affecting the
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judicial courts, especially those relating to structure,
jurisdiction, procedure and evidence are discussed fully in
the following three chapters. The 1938 and 1946-9 reforms
have been amended several times but still substantially
remain in force as discussed further in the subsequent
chapters.
The Basotho's resistance to the reforms coupled with
the issue of the constitutional status of Lesotho under
colonial rule; continually wrecked attempts towards
reform, even at the time when abuses in the administration
of justice had become an issue of public of debate. On
the one hand, the British appeared to back-down, which
aided to strengthen the opinion of the Basotho that the
British were only there to provide protection. Thus the
Basotho continued to believe that their chiefs were the
ones ruling, and later that the National Council was the
only one which could make laws for the Basotho. At least
that is what practice seemed to convey.
Amidst all these transformations the Basotho continued
to operate mainly on the basis and according to their
customs and laws. Their indigenous system of dispute
settlement remained intact during a greater part of British
rule until 1938. The Proclamation 2B of 1884, for
instance, recognised the powers of chiefs of holding
judicial courts and enforcing their judgements unless one
chose to appeal against his chief's decision which
Burman( 1985) says was an unlikely event in the
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circumstances of the country after the Gun War. Only in
a few specific instances were cases reserved for
magisterial attention.
The changes described above mainly led to the
emergence of what are in this thesis referred to as the
official courts. On the other hand, the chiefs' courts in
their traditional form continued to operate "unofficially"
although their judgements in theory, do not carry the force
of law. The next three chapters give attention to each
set of these structures respectively, and to how they
operate in the present day.
It could prove a futile exercise to go all over the
changes introduced by the colonial administration during
its period of domination in Lesotho. However, the
significance of the above historical events, for purposes
of this work, lies in the extent to which they permitted
the mechanisms of dispute settlement emanating from
different cultures to coexist. Quite clearly, by the end
of the Colonial period, a plural system of courts, other
than a dual system as often depicted in the literature, had
been set up. The operation of more than a dual system of
courts cannot any longer be^down""j5layed, especially in the
light of the experiences of the latter years as described
in the next chapters.
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CHAPTER 3
THE "UNOFFICIAL"1 COURTS ; THE INDIGENOUS FRAMEWORK
FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AMONG BASOTHO
The descriptions in this Chapter focus on the
indigenous machinery for dispute settlement in Lesotho.
This is the system which has existed from times immemorial,
and continued to function unaltered for a large part of the
period of colonial domination. Despite the reforms
introduced by the colonial powers, the Cape Colony and the
British Administrations, during this period, the Chiefs
have continued to play a major role in disputes involving
the Basotho at village level, and it can be argued that up
till the 1938 and 1946 reforms, these were the only forums
for dispute settlement generally known to and accepted by
the Basotho people. Today these courts coexist with the
set of judicial institutions introduced by the colonial
powers in the manner described in chapter two.
Several issues are important to note. First, it should
be pointed out that while some of the characteristics of
these courts are described as the features of the past,
many of them obtain in the present day. These chiefs'
courts, for reasons to be advanced later, have in this work
been termed the "unofficial" courts. The only noticeable
aspects of these courts which have changed as a result of
transformations in the overall legal structures, pertain to
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their jurisdiction. For example, they no longer handle
all cases but are restricted to minor disputes. Other
changes have their roots in the process of development in
which education and full-time employment, are important
aspects. The impact of these on the judicial organisation
of the Basotho is discussed fully in the chapter.
The historical analysis of the legal and judicial
reforms as discussed previously, offers a framework within
which the existence and the present legal status of these
courts can be fully understood. It may, therefore, prove
useful to recapitulate on the main reasons offered in this
thesis, in explaining why the chiefs' courts have continued
to exist, despite efforts to remove and strip the chiefs
of their judicial powers, particularly during the colonial
period.
In the preceding chapter it was shown how efforts to
establish magisterial rule, as suggested by Rolland in his
memorandum to Wodehouse in 1868, fell into disuse. The
system of magisterial control was mainly aimed at dimin¬
ishing the chiefs' powers and at undermining indigenous
laws and the chiefs' courts - making it impossible for them
to enforce their judgements; and providing suitors with
channels for bringing their cases to the magistrates courts
on appeal against the chiefs' decisions. However, the
hostility of the Basotho towards the annexation to the Cape
Colony made it impossible for the Cape administration to
enforce magisterial domination at great length. Coupled
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with attitudes of resentment and the impunity with which
the Basotho disobeyed the new regulations set in opposition
to the indigenous chiefs' courts, the chiefs continued to
act independent of the colonial administration - their
courts still in full operation - commanding the support of
the majority of their people.
A further stage which left the chiefs' courts in a
strong position came with the recommendations of the
special commission on the laws and customs of the Basotho,
set up by Griffith in 1872. The most radical change
brought about by the regulations subsequently drafted is
the one which made provision for the Cape law to apply to
the white section of the population resident in Lesotho.
An exception was made, however, as pointed out in the
historical chapter; for cases where all parties "are what
are commonly called Natives, in which case it may be dealt
with according to native law".2 In this sense, as Burman
(1985) argues, the new regulations had in fact removed the
magistrates from the average Mosotho's life, unless he
chose to appeal from his chief's decision - which was
unlikely in the circumstances of the country following the
Gun War. This means in practical terms the chiefs
continued to hear the majority of cases, except in a few
specific instances where cases were outrightly reserved for
magisterial attention. This would be in matters pertaining
mainly to English and Roman-Dutch law principles. This
state of affairs obtained for most of the colonial period,
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until 1938 when the "administrative" and the "judicial"
powers of the chiefs were separated through legislation.
The questions addressed in this chapter give a picture of
what happened to the old chiefs' courts with the
introduction of the 1938 Reforms; and what position the£e.
courts occupy in the present day.
In general, the chapter deals with the nature of
dispute settlement in the "unofficial" chiefs' courts;
their composition; the ways in which the Basotho people
regard them; especially in as far as their social
significance and appreciation of their rules of procedure
and evidence are concerned. Since the research studied
both the official and the "unofficial" methods of dispute
settlement, the results of the analysis indicate that
official courtroom hearings are quite different in their
procedures and tone from the "unofficial" proceedings.
The argument made is that the differences referred to
above, have contributed to the persisting operation of the
chiefs* courts up till the present day; thus forming a
third element in the overall structure of the courts now
prevailing in Lesotho; I return to this point later on
noting how Ashton (1952); Hamnett (1975), and Palmer and
Poulter (1972) have failed to recognise them as part of the
overall judicial structure.
In addition to the information obtained from existing
literature, I use the data obtained from interviews
conducted during the field research and also descriptions
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provided by some Chiefs3 how the process of dispute
settlement is carried out in the "unofficial" chiefs'
courts. It is against such background that it will be
possible to demonstrate that there have been minimal
adaptation in the procedures and rules of evidence that
were traditionally used, to those that now prevail in the
received law courts.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the existence of
other institutions concerned with dispute settlement such
as "family councils" is recognised. Ashton (1952) for
instance, reports on some of the institutions like "family
councils" handling all cases affecting family relations;
"Mophato" (initiation school) courts, dealing with offences
such as theft and adultery cases, which are contrary to the
ethical code taught to initiates, committed during the
existence of the "Mophato"; and "women's courts",
discussing issues affecting women where misconduct occurred
or where sexual taboos were broken. Explaining this,
Perry and Perry (1975) in the autobiography of Jingoes
point out that in the past, women did not accuse each other
at the men's "Lekhotla" (court) when they had a dispute,
but had a hearing before the headman's or chief's wife in
a special court. However, Ashton (1952) further points
out that most of these courts' decisions could not be
enforced as such, and the only sanction towards conformity
was moral and social pressure as well as the offender's own
good sense.
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In practice this means, therefore, that before any
case could come to the headman's or chief's court; attempt
would have been made for a start, to settle it in these
other institutions. An example from Hamnett (1975) can be
used to illustrate this point more clearly, that when the
judicial courts (that is, of the headmen or chiefs) handled
disputes over inheritance, it was precisely because the
"family council" had not succeeded in establishing rights
over the "lefa" or inheritance. While the significance of
the role played by these institutions in dispute settlement
is fully recognised, especially because they function to
complement the work of the "unofficial" chiefs' courts, the
concern of this chapter is, however, with the latter.
Today the "family councils" are the ones which are still
predominantly utilized,4 as practices such as initiation
("lebollo") have fallen into disuse in other villages, with
Christianity and education gaining a stronghold.
The problems experienced regarding permission into the
"unofficial" courts to carry out observations of their
proceedings were expounded upon in the methodology chapter.
The wealth of the information yielded by and the knowledge
gained from the interviews and the descriptions provided by
the chiefs5 about these courts cannot be doubted. They
provide adequate insights into the place of the
"unofficial" chiefs' courts within the overall judicial
structure, how these courts operate and also about their
social significance especially in relation to the official
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courts and also in dispute settlement in general.
THE EXISTENCE OF THE "UNOFFICIAL" COURT STRUCTURES AND THE
ROLE OF CHIEFS IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The foundations of the present status of the
"unofficial" chiefs' courts as hinted before, lie primarily
in the introduction of the 1938 Proclamations. But the
actual and most crucial changes of their position came in
1946 when the provisions of the 1938 Proclamation were,
effect . With the establishment of the Basutoland
National Treasury, the first real attempt to implement the
provisions separating the "administrative" and "judicial"
powers of the chiefs was made. This led to the reduction
in the numbers of courts leaving the ones that were cut-off
constituting the present "unofficial" chiefs' courts. The
following sections address this point in much greater
detail.
As Hamnett (1975) argues, the 1938 Proclamations
brought a revolutionary change in the structure and the
role of the courts, by specifying that no chief can hold a
court and carry out judicial functions without a warrant to
do so. The Resident Magistrate Mohale, in an interview
with him, pointed out that the 1938 Proclamations were
intended to bring the traditional idea that everything
starts from the chief's place "moreneng" to an end. In
his explanation, they were meant to establish a new
practice instituting the separation of powers with
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guaranteed "checks and balances". To put it in his own
words, the Proclamations provided:
that administrators should
administrate, and that checks and
balances should be there, that there
should be adjudicators who will not
adjudicate, administrate and at the
same time prosecute (Mohale,
30.7.1987).
Under the terms of the Proclamations, the courts of
the chiefs not granted warrants bestowing them with
judicial powers were to function only as "administrative"
courts. Thus the system which had existed up till then,
in which the exercise of both judicial and political
authority were complementary functions was to cease.
Until then, the judicial, political administrative and many
other important functions had by tradition been fused
together and invested in the chiefs. The Sesotho law, as
Ashton (1952) shows, bound every chief to preside over
cases of any disputants, unless by reason of his illness or
otherwise, the disputants were satisfied of his failure to
do so. As Palmer and Poulter (1972) point out, this
principle even came to be stated in the Laws of Lerotholi;
the first version of which was published in 1903.
Thus ordinarily, by tradition, each chief used to have
a court.5 As confirmed in the autobiography of Jingoes
by Perry and Perry (1975), each of the chiefs' courts
performed both "administrative" and "judicial" duties
without any distinction. In practice this is still very
much so even in the present day, because wherever there is
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an "administrative" court established in terms of
Proclamation 61 of 1938 (Native Administration
Proclamation), that court also sits to consider matters
which, in the strictest interpretation of the law, should
be handled by the judicial courts officially afforded such
status through award of warrants. It is on the basis of
this observation that Resident Magistrate Mohale when I
interviewed him, admitted that there is still that "hangup"
from the past, and as he continued:
Some [people] up till now, do not know
the line of demarcation between the
"administrative" and "judicial" powers.
They do not know about these "things"
of separation of powers and checks and
balances. They do not appreciate how
the separation of powers between the
"administrative" and "judicial" should
be put into practice (Mohale,
30.7.1987).
Hamnett (1975) does not only mention that every chief
had his own court, but also affirms the point that
traditionally, there was no distinction between what are
now called "administrative" and "judicial" affairs, and the
chiefs had to discharge a plurality of tasks which were not
segregated into distinct "roles" or "capacities". The
multiplicity of the functions performed by the chiefs
included acting as judges in disputes among their subjects;
adjudicating rival claims to land; maintaining order in
their wards; and punishing those who broke the peace and
disturbed the order, and administrating the fines paid to
them in their courts and so on. It is for these reasons
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that the chief's "khotla" court is still understood in the
indigenous sense as the central place in the village, where
administrative, political, ceremonial events and dispute
settlement are carried out. This view about the chief's
"khotla" has never really changed from the point of view of
the Basotho people, it is still regarded as a place in
which the chief carries out his multiplicity of duties
whether "administrative", "judicial" or otherwise. This
is the "hang-up" which Resident Magistrate Mohale, as noted
earlier on was referring to, in which many people still
believe that everything should be initiated from "moreneng"
the chief's court.
It is worth noting at this juncture that the authority
vested in the chiefs as illustrated in the foregoing
discussion, and also the possibility for recourse to them
on the variety of issues and difficulties is built into
Sesotho tradition and customary way of life, in which
chieftaincy as a long-established institution of power; is
well suited for interpersonal relationships and interests.
For this reason the subjects continue to bring matters
of all kinds to their chiefs. As indicated in the words
of one party7 in a case involving dispute over land:
Chief X would have understood my case
better. After all he allocated me the
piece of land himself. He would know
the boundaries of the land better.
This example is taken from the proceedings before a Local
Court in which a party was failing to give sufficient
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(clear) evidence concerning the boundaries of the land in
dispute. In his Vttuj , the chieffe court would have
been the most suitable place for handling the matter, as
the Chief would already possess knowledge of other factors
pertaining to the land in question, including its
allocation.
For many Basotho people, the purpose of bringing a
dispute to the chief's court and the decision to do so, is
not so much based on whether the matter is "judicial" or
"administrative", nor does it lie in the fact that a
penalty will be imposed, but rather it lies in the trust of
the Chief's court's efficacy to restore disrupted good
relations between the parties in dispute - making no
distinction of whether the matter in issue is
"administrative" or "judicial". This is a fundamental
pursuit of the role of the chieftainship as seen and
expressed by many Basotho, and for as long as their concern
remains as such, and their attachment to the chiefs is
maintained so strong, the "unofficial" courts continue to
have an important part to play in judicial matters as it
is in fact today regardless of the fact that the law says
these courts are legally not recognised.
The "unofficial" courts are an equivalent, at least in
function, of what Comaroff and Roberts (1981) describe as
the body of "all advisers and headmen" among the Tswana,
which periodically8 meets to consider affairs of policy and
administration, but which also has as part of its functions
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the settlement of disputes. The "unofficial" courts in
Lesotho are, however, not legally recognised as part of the
overt official machinery of dispute settlement; at least
theoretically. The practical reality, on the other hand,
reveals a different picture as shall be discussed later on
- their functions are not only restricted to "admini¬
strative" matters as the law prescribes.
The truth of the matter is that when the 1938
Proclamations were implemented, the chiefs' courts never
ceased to exist, they were never eradicated. Even
subsequent reforms, including those passed after
independence, have left the chieftainship still performing
multiple functions in their courts. Ashton (1952) for
instance, states that following the introduction of the
1938 Proclamations, the remainder of the courts, that is,
those that were not awarded warrants bestowing them with
judicial powers; continued to function although as "courts
of arbitration" only. He further points out that the
chiefs continued to preside over these courts, though their
decisions could not be held as final or binding and could
not be enforced by the infliction of fines or any other
sanction. A similar point is made in Palmer and Poulter
(1972) that when reductions were made in the numbers of
courts, the other courts of the original 1,3409 continued
to operate as "courts of arbitrament". Again the point
that their decisions could not be enforced is made.
The real traumatic cuts in the numbers of the courts
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came in 1946, because in 1938 as pointed above, all the
1,340 chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen who were recognized by
identification in the gazette were also granted court
warrants giving them powers to perform "judicial" functions
as well; that is, in addition to their "administrative"
duties. This as Hamnett (1975) notes served to disguise
from the Basotho, the magnitude of the reforms that were to
follow later on. Carrying the argument further, Hamnett
(1975) argues that the 1938 Proclamations (their
implementation) not only left the old chiefs' courts
essentially intact, though limiting them to the
"administrative" functions, but also expressly permitted
the existence of "Arbitration Courts" which he describes as
"informal tribunals" without statutory powers, whose
function is to settle minor disputes if parties involved
are willing. He further says that these courts constitute
a third element in the structure that was expected to
evolve. It is in this light that these courts are in this
thesis termed "unofficial".
If one accepts the foregoing arguments then the court
system of Lesotho cannot be argued to be dual by nature,
but it is rather a plural system consisting of the chiefs'
courts, the officially recognised customary courts, and
finally, the received law courts. Later on, the question
that the "unofficial" chiefs' courts are still operating as
part of the overall judicial system is further addressed.
For this reason as I shall argue, their inclusion in
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forming a complete picture of the mechanisms of dispute
settlement now existent and operating in the country is
essential. Further it is argued that the existing
literature only acknowledges the existence of these courts,
but falls short of seeing them and recognising them as
operating as part of the overall judicial structure. The
following descriptions demonstrate that the official court
structure in practice functions hand in hand with the
"unofficial" chiefs' courts, in particular at the level of
the customary courts.
From the discussions held with various informants
whose descriptions of the chiefs' courts are contained in
the analysis below, it became obvious that the existence of
the chiefs' courts is not worth debating any longer. The
fact that they are there and that they are still operating
is well accepted in the literature as cited above, and it
is also a factor appreciated even in the official echelons
of the judicial system as shall be further demonstrated.
The debate should, therefore, now move towards explaining
and creating a better understanding of the form in which
these courts presently exist, their role within the overall
judicial system, as well as their character or nature of
their proceedings in terms of the procedures and rules of
evidence they employ. This will, in turn, aid us to have
a better appreciation of the reasons underlying their
continuing existence and why they have persisted to
function, despite the fact that Proclamation No.62 of 1938
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rendered them illegal and thus possessing no judicial
powers.
What I established during the field research is that,
the existence of the "unofficial" courts is surprisingly
not disputed even by the legal professionals themselves.
As evidenced from the informants' statements below, legal
professionals are not only aware of these so-called "non¬
statutory judicial" mechanisms of dispute settlement, but
some even regard them as crucial and a necessary part of
the judicial process, for example, the latter point was
made by the Chief Magistrate.10 On the other hand, the
Attorney General confirmed that "Makhotl'a Marena" the
chiefs' courts still prevail, though they have no judicial
powers which he explained as meaning that their decisions
cannot be enforced by the state or law. This point is
similar to the one raised by Ashton (1952); Hamnett (1975);
and Palmer and Poulter (1972); as discussed earlier on.
Furthermore^ the Attorney General explained that the
chiefs still deal with judicial matters despite the fact
that they have no powers to do so, and despite the fact
that their decisions have no force of law. In fact he
pointed out that "many disputes 'likhang' are settled by
the chiefs", implying that they never reach the official
courts.
In response to the guestion concerning the existence
of these "unofficial" courts, the Acting Chief Justice, in
an interview with him, remarked as follows:
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You mean these courts in the villages
"a fariki e jele mokopu, kapa joang?"
(when translated this would mean "when
a pig has eaten [destroyed] pumpkins,
or what?) These courts certainly
exist. (Kheola: 16.2. 1987).
Similarly the Acting Chief Justice admitted that the chiefs
still settle minor cases in an attempt to reconcile the
people, but as he pointed out "if they fail they pass the
case on to the Local Courts".
The role of the chiefs in the "unofficial" courts
remains quite a crucial one. For instance, Hamnett (1975)
indicates that the function of "informal" arbitration is
largely discharged by the chiefs' courts, with the result
that the supposedly "administrative" courts took over the
quasi-judicial function of arbitration. Thus at the
lowest level of the structure, the "judicial" and the
"administrative" roles of the chiefs are still largely
fused, and the chieftainship and the "courts of
arbitration" are continuing to play an important role in
dispute settlement and in judicial affairs in general. For
example, as stated by the Director of Public Prosecutions
"the chiefs are the ones who report to the police any
offence that occurs within the villages", he said this is
a "customary practice and an established procedure".11
This was reiterated by Resident Magistrate Mohale, who
indicated that the chiefs are still generally in charge of
law and order in their respective villages. For him that
gives the people the right to choose to take their disputes
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for hearing before the chiefs' courts if they so wish. As
he expressed it:
the chief is a policeman, he polices
his own society, he is a peace officer
and therefore has powers of arrest.
Let me say in criminal cases, a person
is assaulted or a rape occurs, one does
not immediately rise to the police in
authority, but first reports the matter
to the chief (Mohale, 30.7. 1987).
This is an indication of how in practice the chiefs
functions are still widely varied.
THE HIERARCHY OF THE "UNOFFICIAL" COURTS
The lowest level of the "unofficial" courts functions
at village level where the headman or chief or a deputy
sits as a chief's court together with his council of
advisers, to resolve every kind of issue brought to him by
his subjects, including civil and criminal matters. In
recent years it must be admittedly pointed out that most
of the cases they handle are civil, although minor criminal
offences such as "assaults" or "fighting"12 are still
settled there. This is mainly because the more seriously
regarded assault cases are now more likely to involve
police investigation and hence are referred to the
official13 courts. Hamnett (1975) says from one point of
view, the chief's court can be seen as a clearing house for
a wide variety of matters, those which it cannot settle;
because in the indigenous expression are "too hard" ( "li
thata") for it; are the ones remitted to whatever authority
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or court that seems appropriate.
The hierarchy of the chiefs' courts in each locality
varies in accordance with the territorial ranks or
geographical jurisdiction of the chiefs. The "unofficial"
courts cannot be properly understood unless they are seen
in this context and also in that of neighbourhood and
communal relationships of village life in Lesotho. As the
Acting Chief Justice stated, these courts are best suited
for the rural setting, first because of their close
proximity to the people, and secondly, for the simple fact
they are "personal and informal - no strict rules of
evidence exist, you simply listen to what the people have
to say, so that even hearsay evidence is acceptable".14 As
he further explained these courts are in that sense
advantageous for the mostly uneducated sections of the
population who do not understand the procedures in the
official courts of justice. The main function of the
judicial process in the rural setting is to sustain the
relationships that exist among the people and to restore
them when they are breached. This is achieved by allowing
the people to air their differences in an open manner as
far as possible. The proceedings are conducted before a
local chief or headman who is the authority in the village,
and has a duty to play this role in the eyes of the
community.
The role of chiefs or headmen in judicial matters
differs from one place to another. As the Attorney General
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pointed out in an interview, some chiefs perform their job
meticulously and manage to settle many disputes that come
before them with success. Thus in such cases the chiefs
win the will and command the respect of their people. The
Resident Magistrate Mohale also admitted that there are
some well known chiefs who carry out their duties very
well, who have made decisions upheld to be correct, but
some of the chiefs as he pointed out are "useless".
A similar point is made by Hamnett (1975) who shows
that there is a considerable variation in the assiduity and
conscientiousness displayed by minor chiefs and headmen in
running the lowest level of arbitration courts. Some work
hard and responsibly and command the willing power and
obedience of their subjects; others are lazy, senile,
venal or partisan and if they lack power to enforce their
will, matters that come before them are likely to proceed
to a further court before settlement. This, however,
Hamnett (1978) argues, is unlikely to be the official
judicial courts, because as described earlier, the
arbitration court of the lowest rank is in fact that of
another chief of a lower status in terms of rank or
geographical jurisdiction. Matters not settled there are
usually referred to the court of the chief immediately
superior in rank, and from him it may well proceed to yet
another stage in the supposedly "administrative" hierarchy.
Only then, very often, will the matter be sent to the
lowest level of the customary law courts in the official
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court structure, that is, the Local Courts. The Local
Courts according to Hamnett (1975) are indeed often
considered in local parlance as "courts of appeal"; the
"unofficial" chiefs' courts being considered as the courts
of first instance.
In the view of Hamnett (1975) the litigious passion of
the Basotho is such that, what I have called official
judicial structure in this thesis, could hardly function
were it not underpinned by this "officially invisible"
hierarchy of chiefly tribunals. This was affirmed even
further during my discussions with some of the informants.
For example, the Director of Public Prosecutions said that:
Even before coming to the Police, the
complainant in a dispute must go to
report the matter to his chief. It is
a customary practice that any offence
that occurs within a village must first
be reported to the chief and then he
can call in the police.15 (Peete^
30.1.1987).
The above statement shows that the role of chiefs goes
beyond just presiding over the dispute settlement
proceedings. They are also responsible for reporting cases
to the police,16 presumably where they cannot settle the
matters themselves. A similar point was raised in the
interview with Judge Molai; in which he explained that
"when people wrong each other in the villages, the matter
is reported to the chief, who then takes a preliminary
hearing and then refers the case to a court of law; where
the parties do not agree to the settlement given by the
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chief" .17
From further statements obtained during the interviews
it was illustrated that the "unofficial" courts are, in
fact, regarded as a normal part of the judicial process.
For instance, the Chief Magistrate, expressed that "they
are a necessary process because what they really try to do
is to reach an amicable settlement without having to go to
[into the] task of having to pay court fees". It is along
similar observations that Hamnett (1975) argues that even
the Judicial Commissioners' Court, which before the
abolition of the Appeal Court a t. Matsieng was the third
recognised level of appeal handling up to 500 or 600 cases
a year; could more realistically be seen as constituting
the fifth or sixth stage in the total process of dispute
settlement, since there may be two or more "unofficial"
stages to go through; before the lowest rung of what he
refers to as the "formal" judicial hierarchy is even
reached. Thus when the cases reach the so-called "treasury
courts" ("treshareng or teraishareng") in the local
parlance; which are officially now known as the Local
Courts, they are considered to have reached a stage of
appeal, having gone through the chiefs' courts first, which
does confirm the point noted above by Hamnett (1975).
The Director of Public Prosecutions' statement below
further indicates that the chiefs' courts are regarded to
form part of the whole machinery of dispute settlement, in
practice. As he indicated:
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Even the "informal" structure has got
to be formalised to some extent.
There must be an accepted way of doing
things - you cannot do things in a
haphazard way. There must be somebody
to report to, and a defined way as to
how the report has to be made (Peete:
30.1.1987).
According to him the acceptable practice in this case is
that, all matters are reported through the chief's court,
and as he further continued "it would be very primitive to
say our own practice of doing things is "informal" within
our own society. The traditional structure still exists".
A further point made by Hamnett (1975) is that, while
in theory every Mosotho has a right to initiate a civil
action before the customary Law Courts (Local and Central
Courts), very few people actually believe this. On the
contrary, the practice tends to be that, one cannot "open
the Court"18 without the authority and interposition of the
chief. This seems to be implied in the explanations given
by the Director of Public Prosecutions and Judge Molai,
referred to earlier on. It was found out during the field
research that the people would often speak of taking or
having taken their cases to "khotla" (short form of
Lekhotla) which means court, or to "Moreneng" ("morena"
meaning chief) that is, the chief's place or court. They
made this distinction from when they have put their cases
before the "treshareng" or "teraishareng" ("treasury
courts") which today consist of mainly Local Courts as
courts of first instance. This distinction is important
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for them because they consider the Local Courts as appeal
courts and the chiefs' courts as courts of initial
jurisdiction.
"BANNA BA LEKHOTLA" (MEN OF THE COURT): THE CHIEF AND HIS
ASSISTANTS
In discharging his multiplicity of functions each
chief is assisted by men from the village. This point is
also made by Ashton (1952) who indicates that
traditionally, every authority was assisted by relations
and friends who were senior members of the ward, and
regarded as having a right to help the Chief. He says
that the chiefs had "informal" panels or assistants called
"Banna Ba Lekhotla" men of the court; one of whom unless
otherwise arranged, acted as the president in the chief's
absence. According to Palmer and Poulter (1972) these
panels of assistants were usually drawn from the chiefs'
relations and it was from among them that a court president
would be chosen, with other assistants stepping in where
the president was not able to hear a case himself. One of
the informants simply noted that the chief is assisted by
"banna ba motse" men of the village, in carrying out his
duties.
Ashton (1952) further points out that the organisation
of this panel was loose and variable, in terms of numbers
and attendance at hearings. However, he indicates that
each member had to excuse himself if he could not attend
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for a long period. He points out that in other cases the
assistants helped continuously for short periods after
which others could take their place. Some chiefs had
permanent deputies or close advisers who could, in turn,
call for the assistance of other people as need arose.
According to Damane (informant), the latter was common in
Thaba-Bosui (former royal village) where the King, starting
with Moshoeshoe I, had a standing group of men dealing with
appeals from the lower chiefs' courts, in addition to
assisting in hearing disputes in the area's court of first
instance. Ashton (1952) shows that no strict rules
existed as to who could become assistants. Usually, they
were people who by birth or wealth were influential in the
community. Some were blood relations of the chiefs
without important holdings of their own, others were tribal
leaders of their groups and usually relatives by marriage,
while others were just favourites through personal
qualities which appealed to the chief(s). As he
indicates,those who presided over the courts were, however,
almost always related to the chief either by blood or
marriage, though occasionally they were outsiders of
exceptional authority. Normally all these people lived
under the chief, but distinguished visitors could be asked
to help in one or two cases as a mark of esteem.
It was common procedure that the various persons who
heard cases had to pass on information and communicate
decisions to one another. But as Palmer and Poulter
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(1972) report, this communication was frequently lacking
hence innumerable delays were caused, both in securing the
attendance of witnesses and parties and in enforcing the
judgements. This is supported by Ashton (1952) who states
that the president and his assistants had to keep each
other constantly informed of all that went on and of what
they had done, to preserve continuity and consistency of
action and also because they were supposed to be
responsible for one another's acts. However, he says that
they often failed to do so and even where they did, they
would tend to ignore a ticklish matter previously raised;
by disclaiming all knowledge of it or by referring the
complainant to other colleagues who had dealt with it
originally. Consequently this evasion of duty led to
administrative delays and to grumbling dissatisfaction
among the people. This is one of the main reasons why the
indigenous system of dispute settlement came under attack
during the colonial period.
Another marked feature of the system was that no one
received payments for their services. To some extent, as
Ashton (1952) shows, these symbolised the privileges and
duties of authority of those who occupied positions in the
community. It was an honour and a pleasure to take part
in court affairs, but it was not entirely without material
rewards. For example, the chiefs kept the courts supplied
with meat and other food, and sometimes animals paid as
fines were killed to be eaten by men of the court; while
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occasionally chiefs would hand-over a few beasts to the
court president and others.19 Unclaimed stray stock would
often be used for this purpose. Being close to the chief
also gave one a good chance of obtaining such favours as
allocation of good land, or placement over a ward or
caretaking of one's own after a few years of good service.
However, as Ashton (1952) indicates, with the growing
volume of work, the duties became onerous and the officials
began to claim more definite rewards. The panel system
helped to spread the work and reduce the importunity of
these demands. But where the work made this impossible,
the chiefs had to give in to paying salaries and to giving
honoraria, sometimes out of their own personal incomes.
Again stray stock became useful for the purpose. The
appropriation of fines and stray stock by the chiefs'
courts as discussed in the historical chapter was another
source of the criticisms levelled against the indigenous
system.
At present the gazetted chiefs are salaried, though
not for playing a role in judicial matters, but because of
their role in the "administrative" courts. This is not an
issue for them since the separation of their powers into
"administrative" and "judicial" categories has never taken
root in reality, and in practice they have continued to
deal with both20 without distinction. The issue that in
taking up the quasi-judicial functions, they are doing the
job for which they are not paid for never arises. Those
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who assist them, on the other hand, do so out of loyalty
and allegiance to the chieftaincy, though they quite often
receive certain favours such as those concerning the
allocation of land. Again this is an illustration that
playing a role in the undertakings of the chiefs' courts is
still not assessed in terms of the financial rewards it may
bring, but is taken to indicate a sense of duty towards
one's chief.
As gathered from the interviews conducted during the
field research, it is becoming increasingly difficult in
recent years, to find men; especially from the younger
generations, who can engage constantly in dispute
settlement. The main reason for this is that many of them
are now in full-time employment elsewhere, coming to the
village for short periods only, thus leaving the elderly
and a few unemployed ones assisting the chiefs in running
the affairs of the village. However, as the Chief
Magistrate mentioned, one of the most highly regarded
aspects of the proceedings of the "unofficial" courts is
still that it is not the chief sitting alone, but that he
is with the elders of the village and "the people have a
sense of belonging and respect for such people whose
primary aim is to keep peace whenever the villagers come
into dispute"21 with one another.
From the interviews with some of the informants, for
example, Damane, it also emerged that with the exception of
the chief or his representative and men serving on the
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panel of assistants, the proceedings of the "unofficial"
courts are still commonly attended by ad hoc members of the
neighbourhood who take part in adjudicating upon the matter
in issue. Often these would be constituted of the people
knowledgeable to the aggrieved person who has cause for
dispute against another, the latter would also bring his
party of people usually consisting of relatives and
friends. The rest of the people in attendance would be
those members of the community available or interested in
the matter for one reason or another. Any member of the
community may drop in as there is no need for a special
invitation - the common practice is for the villagers to
attend. In Damane's words, even a "passer-by" ("mofeta-
ka-tsela" ) usually from the neighbouring villages cannot be
denied permission to attend and partake in the
proceedings.22
The attendance at the hearings before the "unofficial"
courts resembles that of the Kpelle Moot which Gibbs (1963)
describes as an "informal" airing of a dispute which takes
place before an assembled group consisting of kinsmen of
the litigants, and neighbours from the quarter where the
case is being heard. It further bears resemblance to the
membership of the "informal" judicial activity among the
Bunyoro of Uganda as described by Beattie (1957); who
notes that the group of people who attend such activity is
ad hoc, varying in composition from case to case. The
descriptions about attendance at the proceedings of
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mechanisms for dispute settlement such as those being
discussed here can only be appreciated by recognising their
importance in relation to the nature of the procedures they
adopt, which are mainly intended to remove a social
grievance through elimination of a dispute (cf Allott,
1965 ). The attendance of the people from the
neighbourhood and their participation in the proceedings
are paramount because as pointed by Beattie (1957) in his
work on the judicial activity in Bunyoro, the main
intention of the dispute settlement process is to:
reintegrate the delinquent into the
community and, if possible, to achieve
reconciliation without causing
bitterness and resentment, in the words
of an informant, the institution exists
"to finish off people's quarrels and to
abolish bad feeling". (Beattie, 1957:
195).
The above statement is similar to that expressed by
the Attorney General, who described the proceedings of the
chiefs' courts as intended "to keep peace without causing
a lot of bitterness, as is often the case in the so-called
judicial courts".23 The same interpretation can be inferred
from the statement of the Acting Chief Justice; that the
chiefs' courts "are more personal ..." (p.158); and
advantageous for those who do not understand the procedures
of the official courts; because in these courts they are
given more hearing, as they are allowed to state their
cases as openly as possible; and in their own words. The
suggestion here is that many cases, including most areas of
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petty criminal offences, are never reported to the police
but are dealt with between parties in a traditional
fashion, and before traditional leaders recognised in the
village setting.
JURISDICTION
A point was made earlier that in the pre-colonial
times the chiefs were adjudicating over disputes of
virtually every conceivable nature among the Basotho, and
were exercising their executive powers concurrently.
Various authors, for example, Palmer and Poulter (1972) do
discuss this point at length. Hamnett (1975) reaffirms
this point by indicating that the chiefs, sitting in court
with their councils of advisors always attempted to resolve
every kind of issue, whether civil or criminal,
administrative or judicial. Even today there is still no
clear-cut distinction made between the matters which the
chiefs' courts can or cannot handle, or between what they
can or cannot do. The foregoing descriptions of this
chapter serve to indicate that the main factor is that
their duties; "administrative" and "judicial", have in
practice remained fused despite the reforms in the law;
and the distinctions between civil and criminal cases is
not as technical or precise as in the received law24 just as
before.
As discussed by some of the informants interviewed for
example, the Attorney General; the Acting Chief Justice;
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the Chief Magistrate, and others, the "unofficial" courts
do still handle a variety of matters including those that
could be termed "judicial". It could, for instance, be
cases arising between relatives such as disputes between
husband and wife; or father and son. Other cases involve
unrelated persons and may, for example, pertain to
guarrels, abuses and assaults, adultery, theft of produce
from the fields, false accusations of other persons and so
on. At present though, the chiefs tend to be much more
restricted in terms of what cases they can handle. These
restrictions arise from the fact that it is now stipulated
by law that their courts are only "administrative".
Therefore, some cases especially the more serious ones are
referred directly to the "official" courts. As Resident
Magistrate Mohale mentioned, there is a section which bars
the chiefs from adjudicating over matters of any kind.
Section 21 of Proclamation 62 of 1938 prohibits any other
person other than a judicial officer to adjudicate, and
makes such act an offence punishable with a fine not
exceeding two hundred Maluti or in default of payment,
imprisonment with or without hard labour for a period not
exceeding twelve months, or to such imprisonment without
the option of a fine, or to both. This is at the
theoretical level, because as shown earlier, the practical
reality is that the chiefs continue to deal with "judicial"
matters, in addition to their "administrative" functions;
as the following descriptions will also further confirm.
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As implied above matters which are regarded as of some
gravity and which often involve police investigation tend
to be referred to the official courts. Matters such as
criminal offences involving murder, culpable homicide,
burglary and others are, therefore never heard in the
"unofficial" courts. It is the civil matters which tend
to form the bulk of the chief's work. However, despite
indications that the chiefs cannot deal with criminal
matters as pointed out by the Judicial Commissioners in an
interview with them, and that assault cases cannot be
settled by the "unofficial" courts as stated by the Acting
Chief Justice, there is enough evidence showing that in
actual practice, the chiefs' courts do get involved with
some such matters which in the strict interpretation of
the law could be regarded as criminal as demonstrated
below.
This is so to some extent,because it appears that the
law and the people appear to adopt somewhat different
conceptions and definitions of what constitutes a criminal
offence and what does not. An example given by Damane when
I interviewed him serves to bring out this problem much
more clearly. He pointed out that cases involving fighting
"li nyeoe tsa ho loana" between persons, are not all
interpreted by the people in the strict sense as "assault"
in the context of the received law. Hence a lot of them
are referred to the chiefs' courts; and many are settled
there and never reach the official courts of law since
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often they are minor by nature and are seldom reported to
the police. Much depends on the sort of injuries suffered
- where they are considered to be minor, the matter is
dealt with in the village, without involving the police and
the courts of law in the official structure.
Palmer and Poulter (1972) point out that during the
traditional times the courts' powers were basically limited
to fines,25 public ridicule and occasional banishment.
Fines used to be paid to the injured party or aggrieved
person; while another part was kept by the court. In an
interview with Damane, he provided a further explanation
that there were certain cases whose fines "likahlolo" went
to the chief directly; which in Sesotho was known as "ho
lefela morena". These included those fines obtained from
cases such as those involving improper use of planted trees
or thatching grass "liremo" and not abiding by the
regulations on reserved grazing land "maboella". As he
explained such cases were regarded as involving damage to
national property and hence their fines went directly to
the chief "moreneng" and were used to feed the people while
at the chief's court for various business including
attendance at judicial proceedings. Furthermore, he
explained that other cases were considered as disturbing
the peace, such as "fighting" in which event part of the
fine would be given to the chief for "disturbing his
peace", and the other part to the injured party as
compensation.26 The same would happen in the case of theft.
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These principles are still regarded as of importance
especially the compensatory element of the fine, some
changes have occurred as discussed below.
Not denying the importance of the penalties referred
to above by Palmer and Poulter (1972), for instance the
deterrent effect they could produce, the primary aim of the
chiefs' courts seemed to have been and still is less that
of punishing a wrongdoer. Rather the main object is to try
and reintegrate him or her into the community and so far as
possible to achieve reconciliation between the parties
concerned. It is for these reasons that the proceedings
of the chiefs' courts always carried a compensatory
element, which as Maema (1985) shows was always incidental
to any proceedings, whether the matter before the court was
civil or criminal. Giving part of the fine as compensation
in Sesotho custom is taken to signify admission and
repentance for the harm done or the injury caused. Where
an injury has been caused to a person such as in assault
case, part of the fine would be given to the injured party
as if to pay for damages or the costs incurred as a result
of such injury, a practice known in Sesotho as "ho rothetsa
leqeba" which Damane talked of in an interview with him.
In a case of theft part of the "fine" would be given to
compensate the stolen property. It is taken to indicate
willingness to restore the good relations.
In the sense described above, compensation can be
taken to perform similar functions to those of the exchange
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of gifts in the Kpelle Moot proceedings; which Gibbs (1963)
describes as signifying that the person who is held to be
mainly at fault is apologetic, and that the winning party
accepting the gifts of apology is accepting and showing his
"white heart" and good will. It is an indication that both
parties have no further grievances and that the settlement
is satisfactory and mutually acceptable - a concrete symbol
of the consensual nature of the solution. This is also
found to be characteristic of the "informal" judicial
activity in Bunyoro in which Beattie (1957) says the joint
feast that follows the proceedings, may be seen as a device
for re-integrating the offender into the community. The
functions of compensation are only meaningful when
discussed in relation to the main object of the proceedings
in the chiefs' courts, which is to reconcile the parties in
dispute and to place the relationship back to normal.
The main point is that the new legal order has made it
difficult for the chiefs to continue using compensation as
a way of promoting reconciliation between parties, because
the chiefs' settlements cannot by law be enforced, except
where the paxties are willing. That is, the law prohibits
the chiefs to exercise judicial powers and in that sense
they cannot impose sanctions except where the parties
themselves are willing to give in to the settlement made by
the chiefs. As the earlier descriptions suggest, in most
areas of petty offences, the people do turn to the
"unofficial" courts, and where parties agree to settling
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the matter by compromise or reconciliation, with payment of
agreed compensation or restitution, no harm is done, the
local sense of justice is satisfied and the matter ends
there. It is still, however, possible to claim
compensation through the official customary law courts in
a separate hearing,27 as such claims are no longer held to
be incidental to the original proceedings whether civil or
criminal as it were in the past.
A further explanation offered by Ashton (1952) is that
the penalty inflicted afforded a criterion of importance,
and various courts had limitations on the sort of penalties
they could impose. Where the lower authorities were in
doubt; they preferred to send the case on to a higher
authority than risk a reprimand for having attempted to go
beyond their jurisdiction. Also the parties would be less
likely to accept the decision where an authority went much
beyond his powers allowed. Where an authority over stepped
his powers, senior authorities had to re^rtj the cases.
From an interview with Damane, this procedure was quite
satisfactory and where any party was dissatisfied he was
allowed to take his appeal to a more senior chief until the
matter reached Thaba-Bosiu, if necessary. As he explained
an appeal could either confirm or dismiss the original
decision as seen fit, the word of the Thaba-Bosiu appeal
court was considered to be final.
Ashton (1952) further points out that certain matters
such as taking up arms against another person were
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specifically reserved for the Paramount Chief's Court.
This was not so strictly observed and some important courts
heard such cases if there was no bloodshed, and especially
if the taking up of arms was no more than a threatening
gesture. Junior courts could not, however, deal with cases
involving the use of a dangerous weapon, they had to refer
them to their senior chiefs' courts.
The jurisdiction of the courts varied widely and also
corresponded with the position of the authority in the
political hierarchy. Under this arrangement, the courts
of the headmen and of other minor authorities could deal
with every kind of cases provided they were not serious,
such as land disputes if they had authority to allocate
land. They could deal with cases of trespass, theft,
adultery, assault, enforcement of marital and financial
duties and so on (Ashton, 1952). In addition he confirms
the point that there was no clear-cut definition of
"seriousness", a case could be said to be serious if the
issues involved were of equal or greater importance than
the headman's position or when damages caused were
extensive.
While clear-cut definitions of seriousness of
different cases can still not be stipulated, some of the
informants interviewed28 explained that at present, the
gravest offences such as homicide, rape, serious theft and
assault would not normally be heard by the "unofficial"
courts but would be taken directly to the appropriate court
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in the official hierarchy. In addition, the latter hear
cases in which either of a party insists that his case be
taken there, or those which the "unofficial" courts fail to
settle. Otherwise as the Attorney General pointed out,
many disputes "likhang" are still settled by the chiefs in
the villages. With evolution of new ideas about different
offences, as dictated mainly by the new system of law, the
Director of Public Prosecutions indicated that the Basotho
people have, to some extent, come to regard certain types
of cases as more serious than others. It can be argued
that it is on the basis of these new notions of
seriousness, that they make decisions as to what matters to
refer to the "unofficial" courts and which ones to take to
the official courts.
The Director of Public Prosecutions, however, further
argued that the imported law has to some extent contributed
to the failure to come up with precise notions of the
seriousness of various offences, and also of distinctions
between criminals and civil matters. He gave an example
of abduction which now, unlike in the past, constitutes a
criminal offence - a "very alien interpretation to the
Basotho and to Sesotho customary rules" - which "clearly
the people do not understand".29 In his opinion abduction
should be struck-off the criminal statute books, where
clear intentions of marriage, as often is the case among
the Basotho, are established. However, he said it should
be maintained as a civil offence, unless, of course, during
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the process of abduction, rape or assault occurred, in
which event a person should be charged with those offences
(rape or assault) and not a Sui generis offence called
abduction.
The geographical limits of the courts, on the other
hand, used to be in line with the political jurisdiction of
an individual authority. Such jurisdiction extended over
all inhabitants domiciled in each chief's area, that is,
men their wives and children, who were registered for tax
purposes under that particular authority, or who had lands
and dwellings in that area. A court could hear cases
within its civil and criminal jurisdiction in which such
people were defendants or accused; whether such matters
arose within that area or not. The courts also had
jurisdiction over persons not domiciled within an area
where matters in dispute arose within that area (Ashton,
1952). The classification of jurisdiction according to
tax registration must have originated from the colonial
period, as taxation was not a traditional feature of
Basotho Society. The boundaries of the courts'
jurisdiction always coincided with those of the
chieftainship wards (Hamnett, 1975). While the system of
taxation (basic tax compulsory for men) referred to above
has been abolished, the other factors delimitating the
geographical jurisdiction of the "unofficial" courts,
mainly the political jurisdiction of individual authorities
and domicil, remain important as in the past.
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PROCEDURE
The rules of procedure and evidence followed by a
court as noted by Maope (1986), are important in connection
with the outcome of a dispute. It is, therefore, crucial
to keep in mind the main purpose of the proceedings in a
chief's court, in order to fully understand and appreciate
the nature of the rules of procedure and evidence used
therein, as they are intended towards achieving a
particular outcome - reconciling the parties in dispute,
restoring the good relationships which have been destroyed,
and also reintegrating the offender into the community.
This is done through a process that allows the parties
concerned to air their differences freely. The following
descriptions about the nature of the rules of procedure and
evidence in the chiefs' courts should be understood in that
light.
In addition, it is important to realise that there are
interrelationships between the jurisdiction, the procedures
and the rules of evidence, so that their discussion under
separate sub-headings is mainly for analytical purposes.
The interconnectedness of these variables is more evident
in the case of the rules of procedure and evidence, as
certain principles of procedure tend to influence the
manner in which evidence is given during the proceedings.
The procedures originating from pre-colonial times are
still highly influential in the "unofficial" chiefs'
courts, as shall be noted in the following descriptions.
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While these are not set down in any written form as is the
case in the official courts structure, it is evident that
there are general guidelines of procedure and evidence
which the conduct of proceedings in the chiefs' courts
follow.
The court procedure varied slightly in different
courts, the smaller the court, that is, in terms of the
rank of each individual chief, the simpler the procedure
(Ashton, 1952). However, as he further explains the
pattern was the same throughout and the differences were
largely those of detail. For instance^ the Director of
Public Prosecutions explained that the details of
procedure in a chieffe court tend to vary with the nature
of the case in hand, such as, whether the case before the
court is that of adultery or assault. The headman's court
is otherwise the simplest and straight-forward, while in
more important courts, as Ashton (1952) notes procedure
"was more complicated and formal". According to him, at
least at the time he wrote, the same procedure was still
forwarded in the so-called "National Treasury Courts" which
constitute the present day Local and Central Courts of the
customary law courts in the official hierarchy.30 With
time, procedure in official customary courts has become
somewhat mixed as shall be described in the next chapter;
with the adoption of some of the more received law
principles of procedure, though this is not in all respects
and appears to be so in theory than in actual practice.
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Another point of procedure which Ashton (1952) points
out is that, the common practice was for the parties to
announce their presence on arrival on the day of the
hearing and then sit to await their case to be called.
Entering the court through its defined entrance, the
attendants would raise their hats and salute the chief or
president, whatever the case might be, and the men about
him. People of some political or social standing would go
to the president and other members of the court, to shake
hands and exchange greetings. This is normally the way
the Basotho greet each other, especially when meeting at
some important gatherings - men raise their hats and hand¬
shaking is very common at such occasions. The defendant
and his friends and witnesses would then go to one side of
the court, where they would sit together, the plaintiff and
his party would occupy another side.
By tradition women were not allowed into the court,
and those involved in a case had to sit outside, near
enough to the palisade to be seen and heard by the
president, and for them to hear and see him. The
exception was at Matsieng, the Royal village, where the
courts were purely places of official business and lacked
the social association of the courts of smaller
authorities. Here, women sat in the middle of the court
while being examined; but had to leave when the
examination was completed (Ashton, 1952).
From the information gained through the interviews it
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can be deduced that the common practice is still that only
men take active participation in the proceedings of these
courts, and that while age is still not an important
criterion for participation, it is increasingly becoming
difficult to find young men in the "unofficial" courts, as
many of them now go to school and others to the mines in
South Africa, a point mentioned earlier on while discussing
attendance xn these courts. In many instances, chances
are also that some of the young men are in employment
outside their own villages of domicile, often in the
districts' headquarters, especially Maseru, the Capital
town.
With everyone settled, the president would then call
upon the plaintiff to state his case, who would then walk
to the centre of the court and proceed to make his
statement, following which he would call upon his witnesses
to speak. He would then be followed by the defendant and
his witnesses (Ashton, 1952). This is equivalent to the
point made by Hamnett (1975) that the practice was for the
plaintiff to make his claim and then invite his opponent
to rebut it.
As a point of procedure, both sides to the dispute
were normally allowed to make their statements
uninterrupted save for occasional interjections by the
president or his assistants' demand for further explanation
or reminder to keep to the point (Ashton, 1952). It is
still common practice to let the parties and their
184
witnesses to outline and explain the facts of their case
freely, accepting a wide variety of evidence as to be
discussed further later on. The parties make their
statements unled, and questioning is left until they have
put their case before the court.31 However, as indicated
by other informants, for example, by Judge Molai "the court
does not hesitate to stop irrelevancies of unduf length
and inconclusive accounts and plain lies".
The practice and procedure of allowing the parties and
their witnesses to state their evidence so freely seems to
be widely acceptable among many Basotho and is even
supported by various Sesotho idioms. The two most famous
ones are "mooa khotla ha a tsekisoe"32 and "moro khotla ha
o okoloe mafura".33 These idioms as Damane explained,
demonstrate the two basic principles highly valued among
the Basotho; namely, "freedom of speech and that all
people must have access to the court". The first one
means that in court everyone present and attending a
hearing in a chief's court can examine and cross-examine
the parties and their witnesses, and even if one makes a
mistake or stumbles the court cannot hold that against him
because he is allowed the freedom of speech and expression.
This is what the free airing of grievances entails. The
second one, "moro khotla ha o okoloe mafura" refers to the
fact that the right to examine the parties and witnesses
does not only belong to the chiefs or their assistants
alone. In Damane' s words "it is not only for those of
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reputable status" to examine and ask parties and witnesses
questions, but it is for all those attending the
proceedings. Thus the freedom of speech in court is not
regarded as a privilege of a few but is a right of all
those present. But this also implies that anyone is free
to bring up whatever evidence may be relevant in a
particular case, as any fact may be brought to bear as
relevant to the dispute in question.
To get a full picture of how the Basotho feel about
the above principles of procedure in court and to get a
comprehensive view of how the freedom of speech is
exercised during the proceedings, one could refer to the
book of Sekese (1980) entitled "Pitso ea Linonyana, Le
Tseko ea Sefofu le Seritsa".34 The book shows how the
smaller birds "linonyana" could place their grievances
openly in court, without fear of further harassment by the
bigger and stronger ones.
Having all spoken and the trend of the case clear, the
parties would be examined one by one, called and recalled
as often and in whatever order desired by the president and
his assistants. The president of the court would be the
one to examine first; followed by his assistants. Then
anyone present could ask further questions (Ashton, 1952).
It is in this sense that one feature of these courts is
identified to be somewhat an "inquisitorial"35 procedure,
marked by the court's involvement in questioning the
parties and investigating the case, and even the "judge"
186
(presiding chief or headman) does not play a passive role
of an umpire. A similar observation is made in Maope
(1986) for instance, that by contrast to the rules of
procedure and evidence used in the official customary
courts which are laid down by statute and are simplified
accusatorial rules; the traditional method of settlement
among the Basotho represented some kind of an inguisitorial
procedure. As he stated:
A problem which has arisen is that the
African litigants, being used to some
form of inguisitorial procedure, do not
appreciate the change, ... (Maope,
1986: 118).
The point about participation by all those present at
the hearing was reiterated in an interview with Damane who
explained that all those in attendance, including even a
"passer-by" is allowed to ask the complainant and his
opponent questions, and according to him there is open
participation by all those in attendance in the attempt to
reach an agreeable settlement. Some of the respondents
interviewed36 were of the opinion that through such open
procedure, the truth is sure to come out, especially
because the background facts of the case would be known by
the time it reaches the court, as the story would have
spread and been widely discussed by the members of the
village. As indicated by Resident Magistrate Mohale, a
lot of information about the case, including hearsay
represented in statements such as:
I heard when I was at "Joaleng" (beer-
place) at so and so's place, that such
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and such happened (Mohale: 30.7.1987).
would have been passed on from one villager to another, and
it is even such information that the villagers would bring
up as evidence. The issue about hearsay evidence is
discussed further later.
Male witnesses giving evidence or replying to guestion
had to do so standing in the centre of the court, women on
the other hand, would remain seated either in court or just
outside. Those questioning witnesses did so standing in
their seats (Ashton, 1952). According to some of the
respondents interviewed such as the Chief Magistrate, for
example, the first witnesses to be called upon would be
those who were present at the scene of the cause for the
dispute; but where there are elders of the village in
attendance, they too would be given a chance to speak on
the matter.37
As Ashton (1952) further describes, normally the
parties did not cross-examine their opponents and
witnesses, preferring to express disagreement by snorts of
indignation and to refute their evidence later by
criticizing or denying it in a further statement, but they
were free to examine their opponents if they wished to. In
a few sophisticated courts such as at Matsieng, wealthier
people used to employ special pleaders ("akhente") to help
them conduct their cases, but as Ashton (1952) points out
this practice was contrary to traditional theory and
procedure which placed on the "judge" (chief or headman)
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and his assistants the main task of sifting the evidence
and arriving at the truth. There could be one reason why
this was not a common practice during traditional times and
this was summed up quite well in the explanations of
Resident Magistrate Mohale, and Crown Counsel Ntsonyana
that many Basotho are eloquent speakers, therefore, it
could be argued that there was no necessity to use special
pleaders to state the case on their behalf. In addition,
the Chief Magistrate pointed out that some of the parties
present their own cases more eloquently and systematically
than some of the younger (fresh)38 legal counsels are able
to do.
At the end of the hearing and examination of the
parties and their witnesses, the party who first adduced
evidence could address the court, summing up his version of
the facts. Thereafter, the other party could do the same
(Ashton, 1952). As pointed above, the engagement of
special pleaders should have come during the period of
colonial domination, with contact with foreign systems of
law and court procedure.
When the parties were through, the president and his
assistants would go into committee to discuss the case,
compare their findings and try to agree on their decision,
on the damages to be awarded or fines to be imposed.
There was no voting, the matter had to be decided by
consensus of opinion. The decision could be reported to
the chief (where he had not be in court himself) for
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information and approval, if it was thought he would be
interested. On the other hand, the decision always had to
be reported to the chief in land disputes and in cases of
assault accompanied by bloodshed as "mobu le mali ke tsa
marena" (soil and blood are for chiefs) and he had to make
the final decision (Ashton, 1952).
The procedure as described by Damane slightly differs
from the above, but is not completely in disagreement.
According to him it is for the complainant and his opponent
to give the court a chance to review the facts of the case
and to consider its decision; once the parties have tabled
their matter and when all questioning has been completed.
To arrive at a decision the strength of the evidence is
evaluated and examined from the side of both the
complainant and that of his opponent as well, pointing out
at various faults committed by the parties on either side.
According to him what is sought is not:
What in English is called a "point of
law", but the "point of fact" as to
whether an act in dispute did in fact
occur (Damane, 13.2.1987).
To illustrate this statement Damane gave an example of a
case involving a fight between father and son, where the
latter has hit the father with a thick stick "molamu",
causing him injuries. Seeing the injuries and receiving
evidence that the son caused them would suffice for the
court to hold the him liable. As he went on, the issue
would not be that the son should defend himself. This was
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an attempt to show the importance attached to "facts" that
a given act actually occurred other than "points of law"
and "proof" as upheld in the western legal sense; like
proving intent and so on. Examining the facts of the
matter in this manner would in fact be in aid of making
both parties to accept their faults, so that whatever
decision would be reached is consensual, and that it would
lead to their reconciliation without causing any bitterness
on either side.
When deliberations were over, the court would
reassemble and the president or one of his assistants,
speaking in the name of the chief, would address, first the
plaintiff and then the defendant, praising those actions
which met with the court's approval, condemning those of
which it disapproved, and finally announce the terms of the
decision. If damages had been awarded or fines imposed,
he would usually mention a date by which they had to be
paid. After the judgement had been delivered, the parties
would arise and either thank the court for its decision and
accept its judgement or bewail their misfortune and ask for
an appeal (Ashton, 1952).
In his autobiography compiled by Perry and Perry
(1975), Jingoes describes how during his days as a young
boy, male children absorbed knowledge about the laws of the
country without conscious effort because from an early age,
they joined the men at the village "Lekhotla" (court) where
they would hear disputes being settled, Sesotho law argued,
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and customs discussed. He says, anyone could put
questions to the disputing parties and their witnesses, and
be
even a boy would never^considered too young to add whatever
knowledge he had about the case before the "Lekhotla".
This is how by the age of twenty, Jingoes says he had come
to have a reasonable knowledge of the law and of procedure
in a chief's court. Palmer and Poulter (1972) in
agreement to the above point discuss that traditionally
anyone present was entitled to examine and cross-examine
the witnesses. Jingoes further notes that anyone present
at "khotla" was free to question or challenge a witness
whose evidence they suspected; bringing even private
knowledge of the case in question to bear, in order to find
out a just solution.
As pointed out by some of the respondents interviewed
such as the Attorney General and the Chief Magistrate, it
is no longer possible to acquire the knowledge about
customary law and its procedures in the manner described by
Jingoes in Perry and Perry (1975). It is with the
realisation of this that the Chief Magistrate called for
more formal training in the area of customary law which
should also be offered to those functioning in the Local
and Central Courts as well. The Attorney General
supported the idea that the personnel in the courts should
be assisted with training in customary law and its
procedures. He pointed out, however, that there is no
staff even at the University of Lesotho to adequately teach
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customary law in such a way that competent personnel to man
even the official Customary Courts can be produced. He
stressed that this is a vital area which needs further
investigation especially in the light of the fact that many
cases including those heard in the official courts seem to
involve questions of Sesotho law and custom. In the
perception of the Attorney General the chiefs are
undoubtedly performing a useful job in dispute settlement,
as he pointed out:
There is increasing support for the
reconciliatory procedures of the
chiefs' courts, as the opinion is that
the so-called judicial courts cause a
lot of bitterness, they have no
friendship and they emphasise on the
point of law only "Ho buuoa molao
feela" (Maope, 16.2.1987).
It is because of the consensual element of the
settlement reached by the chief's court that whatever
decision is made tends to be more acceptable to both
parties and hence more durable for restoring good
relationships. It is in this sense that the significance
of these courts' contribution to the social control
functions and their potential for effecting reconciliation,
need to be examined especially in certain types of cases
such as matrimonial disputes.
Practice and procedure in the chiefi' courts, as well
as the rules of evidence (to be discussed next) should be
understood in the context of the overall object of their
proceedings, which is to express confidence in the man who
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has erred, and to show him that he is still accepted as a
member of the community, by settling the affair within the
community and not outside. Sending a man to the official
courts is usually regarded as signalling the community's
rejection of him. The communities in the villages still
feel that a dispute between neighbours is best settled
within the community. In addition, the familiarity with
the surroundings within the chiefs' courts increases the
chance for community involvement and participation in the
proceedings, and overcomes feelings of uneasiness from the
part of the persons concerned which may inhibit them from
"saying out" what the case is. It provides an opportunity
for an open-airing of issues and grievances. That the
"unofficial" chiefs' courts serve an important function is
indicated in the people's persistence to seek their
assistance in disputes of various kinds.
EVIDENCE
In as far as evidence is concerned, the "unofficial"
courts are guided by principles, which in the literature
have generally been described as vague and variable, for
they are not formulated in any recognised code and their
application is said to vary with the personality of those
presiding over the proceedings.39 The main criticism
against the rules of evidence guiding these courts has been
that they are similarly not written down, therefore,
difficult to follow (apply). However, even in this case,
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it is possible to outline the recognizable features as
discussed below.
One basic principle as Ashton (1952) indicates is
that, great latitude in giving evidence was allowed for
various reasons. First, it was traditional for witnesses
to give their evidence in a round about manner rather than
directly. An example here would be when being asked one's
name. In Sesotho custom the response would not only
involve giving the name as so and so; but it would entail
describing one's genealogical origin, the common way being
to show that "I am the son (or daughter) of so and so".
Family relationships and sorting one's status in the above
manner is important even in dispute settlement processes,
because one is seen not as an individual but a member of a
community even where dispute has arisen. What is crucial
is attempting to restore such relationships where they have
been disturbed as a consequence of a dispute. Further
examples pertain to questions relating to place and time -
where and when the offence occurred, - in which it is
permissible to state, for example that it was behind the
mountain, or that it was during the day and also that the
sun was already up. Many Basotho are still used to
stating their facts in this manner, for instance, without
giving the precise time according to the watch. This is
still common in the official courts as well as shall be
revealed in the descriptions of the proceedings in the
received law courts.
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Secondly, Ashton (1952) says the court was not obliged
to the main issue before it, but could also deal
concurrently with any other wrongdoing, civil or criminal,
that may be brought to its notice during the proceedings.
Thus it could hear evidence which, though irrelevant to the
immediate or main dispute, could bear on any such
wrongdoing. An example would be where a case of
"fighting" before the court has occurred because of a
long-standing feud between two groups of herd boys over
grazing land. Even if the latter is not the point of the
current dispute, once brought to the court's attention, it
could also be resolved.
From the discussions with some of the informants this
wider airing of grievances is facilitated by several
factors. First, the hearing takes place soon after a
breach has occurred, while everyone involved still has the
events fresh in mind and can, therefore recall many facts
easily. This is because police investigations are not
involved; therefore, the time between the breach and the
hearing is shorter than in cases going to the official
courts. Secondly, a feeling was expressed that the
familiarity with the surroundings in which the hearing
takes place, and participation by all people in attendance
does not inhibit nor intimidate the parties from airing
their grievances openly, as might often be the case
especially in the received law courts, where robes, writs,
messengers (who sometimes are uniformed police) and other
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symbols of power subtly remind one of the physical force
underlying the proceedings. Thirdly, since the
investigatory initiatives rest with the parties themselves,
more grievances existing between them are aired and
adjusted, since they know well what the root causes of
their dispute are. Finally because hardly anything
mentioned is held to be irrelevant, this leads to a more
thorough ventilation and sifting of the issues.
As mentioned earlier, those present would also bring
their own private knowledge of the case in question to
bear, in order to find out a just solution. The chief as
well would by question and answer, seek to elicit the facts
of the case and break down false testimony (Perry and
Perry, 1975). This goes back to the point made by Damane
as mentioned earlier, that points of "fact" and not so much
of "law " are the basis of proceedings in the "unofficial"
courts. The main issue is to get evidence revealing
sufficient facts on which to base a decision, rather than
whether certain legal procedures have been followed in
obtaining such evidence, or whether the evidence given
falls within typical rules about what constitutes or does
not constitute acceptable evidence. As pointed above,
nothing brought up in the proceedings of the "unofficial"
court is ruled out as irrelevant. It is this fact which
explains the acceptance of hearsay evidence even in the
customary courts as shall be raised fully in the next
chapters.
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For instance, as pointed out by Judge Molai; "in the
now so-called administrative courts, hearsay evidence is
accepted. People are referred to the 'Courts of Law' on
[the basis of] such hearsay evidence, when they reach
there,they find that such evidence is not accepted." As
he pointed out, this leads to confusion on the part of the
parties. Furthermore, he said that one only has to look
at the papers from the chiefs' courts to find out and to
see how much hearsay is contained; he went on:
You will find that all sorts of what
you would consider inadmissible
evidence has been taken, and that a man
was referred to the Local Court most
probably because of that type of
evidence. It may be that the people
in the villages do not understand why
we [official courts not accepting
hearsay evidence] should operate in
this manner. May be they are right
when they say things have changed ...
especially when you come to the
question of evidence (Molai, 3.3.1987).
Hamnett (1975) also offers an explanation which
affirms the point about the acceptability of hearsay
evidence in the "arbitration courts", especially if the
witness is held reliable. He relates how one village
headman once stated that as the chief's counsellor, he knew
the village's affairs and how this headman's indirect
knowledge of events leading to an act of arson was relied
upon by the court. In addition, he shows how in another
case a judge relied upon his own personal knowledge of a
boundary in reaching his decision in a land dispute, an
indication of the limited role-differentiation in the
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traditional setting; one could be an observer, actor,
leader, all at the same time. In the case referred to
above the chief was a judge and a witness as well.
The evidence of an eye-witness was regarded as the
best (Ashton 1952), hence the procedure, as pointed out by
the Chief Magistrate, for instance, is that the first
witnesses to be called upon would be those who were at the
scene of the cause for dispute. But, however, hearsay
evidence would be admitted, particularly if repeated by
independent witnesses or if the alleged source of the
information was unavoidably absent (Ashton, 1952).
Damane, in an interview, provided illuminating examples
showing how hearsay is commonly accepted in the chiefs'
courts. He said, for example, in a case where a girl has
fallen pregnant, and the young man who is alleged to have
responsibility is denying it, if when questions are put it
emerges there is even a slightest indication that someone
knows the two parties to have been somewhat involved, such
evidence would be held as pointing to the fact that the
young man is liable. As Damane further expressed:
a case could be decided on the basis of
"malume" hearsay only (Damane:
13.2.1987).
But as he further explained, a lot of questions would be
put to the young man, and if hearsay continues to recur,
that would be regarded as sufficient ground for the court
to accept it as viable evidence.
Another kind of evidence often accepted is
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circumstantial evidence. The fact that a man was found
alone with a married woman whom he is known to be fond of,
or was seen coming out of her hut or court-yard, could be
taken as evidence of adultery especially if supported by
other evidence. A special type of evidence was the con¬
fession, and if a person admitted liability on apprehension
or at some time prior to the hearing, his admission counted
heavily against him. If he consequently retracted he would
have to produce stronger evidence to prove his innocence
than he would otherwise have had to (Ashton, 1952).
As mentioned earlier on when discussing practice and
procedure in the chiefs' courts, it is upon the parties
themselves to take up full control and initiative in the
proceedings and in bringing important evidence in their
cases. It was also noted that questions of legal
representation are contrary to customary rules of procedure
as the Basotho believe in the concept of doing things on
themselves as represented in the expression that "ha e
anyese ka mokukutoana, ' Ngoan' a eona a le teng".40 The
point about the absence of legal representation can be
understood as contingent upon the approach to dispute
settlement which Muli (1982), for instance, calls the
"self-help" approach; which she defines as a procedure
whereby the injured party takes the initiative in seeking
redress whenever breaches of customary law occur. This,
as she further explains, can be understood within the
context of the general social fabric in which breaches of
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norms of social behaviour involve the people concerned in
the attempt to solve and control such behaviour. In
addition, it can be understood in a context in which an
offence is a harm against persons rather than as harmful
acts against a legally constituted authority like the
state. The people themselves then, and not the state are
the ones engaged in resolving the disputes occurring among
them, they are also responsible for bringing before the
court all the evidence they feel relevant and also for
obtaining the witnesses.
Thus the rules of evidence and of procedure in the
"unofficial" courts can only be fully understood if
examined as part of the wider social structure, general
roles, relationships and group activities of the Basotho
people living in the villages, who form the majority in the
population. Dispute settlement at that level is not based
on "legal rules" as generally understood, but there is,
however, a systematised way of dealing with disputes and
retaliative sanctions backed by authority based on
tradition and custom (cf Bohannan, 1967). This seems to
be in line with the argument by Roberts (1979) that
responses to disputes vary form one society to another, and
that these are closely related to the values and beliefs
held in a society; just as what constitutes a dispute is
dependent on such variables.
ARE THE CHIEFS' COURTS REALLY "UNOFFICIAL"?
In the foregoing descriptions, it has been
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demonstrated as gathered both from the literature and also
from discussions held with different informants, that while
the popular line of thinking is that the "unofficial"
courts possess no judicial powers in the strict legal
sense, and that as such their decisions cannot be enforced,
in contrast practice reveals that these courts, which
originate from pre-colonial times continue to function, and
that people in various kinds of disputes turn to them to
seek remedy.
Both the literature and the data collected during the
field research show that the "unofficial" chiefs' courts
are still performing an important role in dispute
settlement, however unofficially or illegally. For
instance, Hamnett (1975) says that, these courts are
"without statutory powers" to engage in dispute settlement,
and they only function where the parties are willing to
give in to the settlements given by the chiefs. As Ashton
(1952) also alleges, the chiefs' courts can only function
as "Courts of Arbitration", a point reaffirmed by Palmer
and Poulter (3972) as well. It is in this sense that the
existing literature has portrayed a view, that the chiefs'
courts are "informal"; that is, they are not, in legal
terms, recognised as part of the official judicial
hierarchy. However, the fact that these courts exist and
do operate, is not disputed. The point in argument here
is that, in practice they actually function as an
underpinning system and in close relationship with the
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customary courts, and thus as part of the overall judicial
system. This issue is discussed further in the next
chapter. But the point of departure is that, this makes
the "unofficial" courts less "informal" as often suggested.
The most astonishing fact, however, is that the presence
and persistent operation of the "unofficial" chiefs courts
is accepted even by the legal professionals. In this
light, the purpose of this section is to examine in much
greater detail how this leads to the understanding of how
far these courts can be held as "unofficial" and how
descriptions in this chapter contribute towards a better
understanding of the nature and processes of dispute
settlement currently prevailing in Lesotho.
As also already indicated, provisions rendering the
Chief's courts "unofficial" and unrecognised judicial
institutions, came with the attempt to create a distinction
between the "administrative" and the "judicial" functions
of the chiefs,41 which, as revealed in the foregoing
descriptions, the people up till now can still not fully
comprehend nor appreciate. As a result, they continue to
consult the chiefs' courts whenever they are engaged in
disputes of various kinds with one another, as was the
custom in pre-colonial times. For as indicated by the
Director of Public Prosecutions, and reaffirmed by Resident
Magistrate Mohale, to a large extent, the practice is still
that everything that happens in a village; including
disputes, gets reported to the chief. This as the
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Director of Public Prosecutions explained, is the
traditional way of doing things among Basotho, and as he
further expressed "it would be very primitive" to regard it
as merely an "informal" practice and not an accepted way of
doing things.
The discussions held with various informants42 during
the field research, tended to reaffirm the allegations
that, the decisions of the Chiefs' courts cannot be
enforced, nor can they be held as final or binding, nor be
enforced by the infliction of fines or any other sanctions.
This was in a way a reaffirmation of the opinion that the
"unofficial" courts have no judicial powers and that they
are not recognised by statute and, therefore, that their
decisions have no force of law. Yet, on the other hand,
it became clear from the statements of these informants,
that many disputes are settled by the chiefs' courts and
never come before the officially recognised courts. The
implication is that in such cases, the disputes are
successfully resolved, with the concerned people accepting
the settlements given by these courts. Thus in those
circumstances, the argument about the decisions of the
chiefs' courts having no force of law and so on, is
rendered purely a theoretical speculation.
Quite clearly in strict legal terms, the chiefs'
courts do not exist except in their capacity as
"administrative" institutions. But a wide variety of
information as indicated above point out that, a number of
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people still voluntarily approach the chiefs', courts when
they are in dispute and also give in to the decision made
by them. Thus, in such case, the argument that the
decisions of these courts cannot be enforced by infliction
of fines or other sanctions, does not even arise. Moreso,
it has to be recognised that a "fine" in the traditional
sense as Muli (1982) indicates, is aimed at restoring a
troubled relationship rather than to "punish" in the penal
law sense. Thus what is important is the fact that
whatever settlement is given, it should have the potential
for restoring the relationship between the concerned
parties back to normal. That, for them, is the crucial
aspect than the issue of a settlement having the force of
law. If they are so satisfied, they willingly accept the
settlement, and by such virtue, the decision of the chief's
court becomes final; with no further recourse to the
official courts. The only problem that arises is when a
criminal offence or civil dispute is regarded as too
serious, or when the parties do not agree to settle a
matter before a chief's court, in which event the
involvement of the official courts is unlikely to be
avoided. In fact, many of the informants such as the
Acting Chief Justice; the Attorney General; Resident
Magistrate Mohale; the Chief Magistrate and others;
outwardly admitted that the chiefs still play an important
role in the settlement of minor disputes; mainly civil
matters as most of the criminal jurisdiction has been
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removed from them by statute; although they still deal
with minor criminal offences, examples of which are given
earlier.43
Although it cannot be estimated in exact terms from
the present data, as to in how many cases the parties agree
to the intervention by the chiefs, it is clear as the
Attorney General pointed out that many "likhang" disputes
are settled by the chiefs. With the evidence presented
earlier on there is all reason to conclude that many do
accept settlement from the chiefs' courts; and there is
also enough reason to believe that it is only when the
settlement is not acceptable to the parties as the Acting
Chief Justice explained, that most minor cases are "passed
on to the customary courts".
In trying to explain the fact that the decisions of
the chiefs' courts cannot be enforced by law the Attorney
General said:
The chiefs can only make a
recommendation. If the people are not
satisfied with the manner their dispute
has been handled, the concerned chief
can write a letter, forwarding the case
to a judicial court (Maope: 16.2.1987).
While attempting to show that the chief's court cannot make
a definite decision on a judicial matter, the above
statement at the same time admits to the fact that in
instances whereby the parties are agreeable to the
settlement by the chief, such "recommendation" actually
becomes final; with no need to refer the matter further.
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Further it demonstrates the close working relationships
between the "unofficial" courts and the customary courts
which was mentioned earlier on.
A further interesting observation is that, while it is
generally admitted that the "courts of arbitration" have no
judicial powers, and as Resident Magistrate Mohale put it,
that as such they are debarred from adjudicating on any
matter, of any kind, it appears no action has been taken
against the chiefs taking judicial decisions. Section 21
of the Proclamation 68 of 1938, which makes it an offence
to adjudicate without statutory powers, has thus remained
totally ineffective. Hence the practice of the chiefs'
courts to deal with "judicial" matters in addition to the
"administrative" ones has continued unabated, making the
argument that the "unofficial" courts have no powers to
settle disputes a practical fallacy.
This brings to show that what happens in practice is
obviously quite different from what the law theoretically
prescribes. It is a clear indication that practice does
not fit the law. The point is that whether or not the
chiefs' courts possess any judicial powers; they do in
fact engage in dispute settlement and have been permitted
to do so for various reasons as outlined further below.
This, as shown earlier on, was admitted by the informants
themselves, some of whom are legally qualified
professionals. The Attorney General, for example,
admitted that the chiefs do in practice exercise judicial
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powers and that many disputes are actually settled at that
level. The main reason why this still happens as
discussed earlier is that many people still do not
understand or cannot appreciate the fact that there has
been a separation of powers, and that the chiefs' courts
under these circumstances have no judicial powers. In
practice, therefore, the chiefs continue to play both roles
as they did before, they "administrate" and also
adjudicate. With all the good intentions behind the idea
of "separation of powers" as Resident Magistrate Mohale
discussed,44 the "administrative" and "judicial" functions
of the chiefs' courts remain fused to a large extent.
This is a reality recognised even at the official level.
This practice is not only recognised, but is also
accepted as a normal way of action. For as the Director
of Public Prosecutions stated in his explanation referred
to earlier on, reporting to the chief everything that
happens within the village is an established and
traditional way of doing things in the Basotho Society and
as such, it cannot simply be regarded as an "informal"
practice but as an acceptable way of doing things, which he
called the formalisation of the otherwise "informal"
procedure. But even further as the Chief Magistrate
argued, this is not only an established practice, rather it
is in addition a necessary step which proves advantageous
for the people in a number of respects. According to him,
it is necessary to attempt to settle disputes before the
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chiefs' courts thus employing the cheapest means available;
before coming to the official courts where the people
have to pay expensive legal costs and court fees, for their
disputes to be attended to.
More reasons were offered as to why the people
continue to use the chiefs' courts for "judicial" purposes.
The Acting Chief Justice, noted the close proximity of
these courts to the people, which is an advantage to the
people living in the villages. In addition, he said that
these courts are more "personal"45 and employ procedures
that the common people are able to follow. This was
confirmed by the Attorney General that the chiefs' courts
are much more sympathetic to the people's causes for
dispute. As he put it the chiefs are much more prepared
to listen to their people. The point about the rules of
evidence used in these courts does confirm this statement
because as Judge Molai indicated, various things are
brought up as evidence in the chiefs' courts including even
hearsay which is admissible at that level. It has been
explained why this is acceptable procedure in the chiefs'
courts - it is a procedure for airing grievances between
two parties in an attempt to reconcile them.
A further explanation offered as to why the chiefs'
courts are still in a position to deal with the settlement
of disputes especially with civil matters is that such
matters, more often than not, touch upon aspects of Sesotho
custom, which some of the courts, for example, the
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Magistrates' Courts as Resident Magistrate Mohale pointed
out, are unable to address satisfactorily. As he argued,
the Magistrates' Courts fall short of dealing with the day-
to-day kinds of disputes arising out of the daily lives of
the Basotho people. This point is illuminated by
descriptions indicating the sort of disputes handled in the
received law courts as contained in Chapter 5; which are
of a different kind to those brought to the "unofficial"
courts.
Another illuminating point was offered by the Attorney
General that:
Many disputes are still handled by the
chiefs and the families. I have a
suspicion that people do not go to the
courts [official ones] because they are
scared. The judges have no mercy to
disputants, and that makes them even
more scared "baahloli ha ba na mohau
ho batho, joale ba ba tsabisa le ho
feta." They have no mercy of helping
the disputants and guiding them in how
they should conduct their disputes. A
judge does not care to look at the
evidence presented as regard the cause
of dispute "0 se a kharumela feela" he
immediately shouts at them [parties].
He scares them even more. (Maope:
16.2.1987) .
This adds to a point the Attorney General is noted to have
stated earlier on, that the chiefs' courts, on the other
hand, tend to be more sympathetic and understanding, hence
the people's preference to seek settlements there, wherever
possible.
The foregoing descriptions show that in reality the
chiefs' courts are not as "unofficial" as often portrayed.
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That the claim that they have no judicial powers, seems to
exist largely in theory. In practice, they are recognised
and accepted as part of the overall judicial process.
CONCLUSION
The most obvious conclusion that can be made in the
light of the descriptions contained in this chapter, is
that the study of the "unofficial" courts is relevant to
the general understanding of the social organisation of
justice and judicial processes now prevailing in Lesotho.
There is ample evidence showing that these courts do not
only exist and operate, but that they do so in connection
with the official customary courts. This alone suggests
that these courts cannot be regarded as functioning in an
"unofficial" capacity, rather that they function as part of
the overall judicial system and complement the officially
recognised court structure. In other respects of course,
these courts form a different though not a competing
subterranean system of dispute settlement and peace-keeping
at work in the country. This is quite obvious, for
instance, when one looks at the jurisdiction of these
courts in which they do not compete with the customary
courts but instead, deal with minor cases which often do
not get reported to the police and thus never come to the
official courts.
Thus quite contrary to the picture of the judicial
system of Lesotho which is depicted as dualistic in the
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literature, the "unofficial" courts form a third element in
the courts hierarchy; in addition to the officially
recognised court structures consisting of the customary
courts on the one hand, and the received law courts on the
other. True the literature does accept the existence of
the "courts of arbitration", but their importance and the
crucial role they perform in dispute settlement is not
adequately addressed and emphasised. The explanations for
the continuing existence of these courts lie in the fact
that they are composed of and meant to operate within
different sets of social relationships existing among the
people in the villages. They form a distinct forum with
its own perceptions of justice and its own methods of
securing it which are meaningful in the village. What
this means is that "justice" in Lesotho operates within a
developing system marked by continuing organisation of
alliance and a certain amount of symbiotic relationship
between different values and loyalties, originating partly
from the indigenous ideas on the one hand, and the new
received45 legal order and its institutions on the other.
The two are, however, not always in conflict with one
another as further explained below, and also in the next
chapter.
The "unofficial" chiefs' courts in Lesotho operate
under the authority of traditional leaders (chiefs or
headmen) having "administrative" jurisdiction over their
respective wards in the rural areas still governed by
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indigenous law and custom. These courts operate not
merely as adjuncts to the Local and Central Courts, but
complementary to them, assisting by handling minor disputes
voluntarily brought to them by the people, therefore,
should be seen as part of the overall judicial machinery.
The village form of social organisation provides a general
framework and key to understanding the way justice is
practised and secured there, and should be perceived in
that context. This analysis recaptures the inherent
differences in the social structure surrounding the
"unofficial" courts and the manner in which they operate;
as against the nature of dispute settlement in the official
courts; more so in the received law courts, because the
"unofficial" courts share a lot of characteristics
especially in terms of procedures and rules of evidence
with the customary courts. But the purpose has also been
to show that while the official and the "unofficial" courts
differ in practice they do not work as totally separate
entities, but rather, have developed a kind of mutual
interrelationship and interdependence. For instance
where the chiefs fail to resolve the disputes, they pass
them on to the official courts, through a process described
by the Attorney General as "writing a letter" forwarding
the case to a judicial court.47
There is limited work published regarding how these
courts function. An attempt has been made here to make
use of whatever literature is available and to complement
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it with the information obtained from oral histories and
interviews conducted during the field research, to arrive
at a comprehensive statement and explanation of how
proceedings are carried out and decisions are made in the
chiefs' courts. In this regard they have been found to
mainly adhere to procedures that obtained in pre-colonial
times with some changes in areas such as jurisdiction in
particular. The conclusions reached out of the analysis
suggest that "rules" as such are not fundamental to this
system of justice though general guidelines of procedure
can be summarised. The familiar formal law model;
linking "facts" to rules to deductively arrive at a legal
decision seems not to apply here. Rather decisions about
what rights to enforce on behalf of any party rest heavily
on judgements of individual characters of the parties as
derived from the participants' knowledge and impressions
about the dispute before the court. Dispute settlement at
this level takes into high consideration the relationships
existing between the parties, the relationships which are
likely to continue thereafter by virtue of the parties
living in the same neighbourhood.
As Colson (1974) notes, such assessments of character
as the ones mentioned above, often figure predominantly in
the public sanctioning of behaviour in groups which are
marked by Gemeinschaft values. She notes that the
importance of such judgements of character in adjudication
is related to the primary public concern with not so much
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what a person has done in a particular instance, but
rather, with what kind of person he is and what,
accordingly can be expected of him in the future. The
emphasis on the individual and not the alleged offence as
such; and the central aim of court process, is to prevent
the breaking down of relationships and to make it possible
for the parties to live together amicably and in good
neighbourliness in the future. Therefore, the courts'
function tends to be reconciliatory, striving to effect a
compromise acceptable to all parties and every one in the
audience.48 This is the main task of the chiefs' courts.
It is this task which also tends to influence what can
properly be regarded as being in dispute and what is to be
regarded as relevant and acceptable evidence. The broad
inquiry "airing of grievances" and consideration of the
relations between the parties is, therefore, at the heart
of the proceedings in the chiefs' courts. The courts'
conception of what is of "relevance" is very wide and does
not fit with the refinement of pleadings in the "official"




THE OFFICIAL COURTS 1 : THE CUSTOMARY COURTS STRUCTURE
The customary courts form the first level in the
officially recognised judicial structure. Presently they
consist of the Local Courts, the Central Courts, and the Court
of the Judicial Commissioners.1
The descriptions focus on how these courts emerged, how
their titles, constitution and powers have changed over time,
although on the whole they have maintained the character of
when they were originally introduced,2 for example, in terms
of their structure. The main argument in this regard is that
the customary courts are somewhat different in character from
the "unofficial" chiefs' courts, although consequently this
tends to be so in theory more than in practice.
Attempt is also made to show how the customary courts
operate, and their relationship to both the "unofficial"
chiefs' and the received law courts. These courts in their
original aim were intended to replace (phase-out) the old
Chiefs' courts,3 and become the courts of initial
jurisdiction. Many aspects and the principles according to
which they are meant to function, resemble those of the
western Anglo-American court systems. It will be demonstrated
that there are, however, certain constraints and circumstances
preventing from working as was intended, so that in
practice a lot of features from the "unofficial" courts, as
discussed in the previous chapter, apply in the customary
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courts as well, in addition to some of those obtained from the
western-oriented systems.4 It is therefore argued that
these courts represent a hybrid system in which there is a
blending of features originating from dispute settlement
systems different in character.5 Thus while these courts
can be regarded as "nonindigenous", they are at the same time
they are not totally the same as the received law courts,
although they both form the officially recognised court
structure.
Further this chapter argues that there is a kind of
symbiotic relationship or continuity which exists between the
customary courts and the "unofficial" chiefs^ courts,
represented mainly by the fact that in practice the two appear
to work hand in hand and not as totally separate entities.
For instance, it will be demonstrated that the customary
courts deal with cases which prove beyond the capability of
being resolved by the "unofficial" courts,6 referred to them
by the Chiefs, and in other circumstances by the police.
The chapter begins by focusing on the reasons7 that
formed the basis for the introduction of this court structure.
The descriptions focus mainly on the period 1938 onwards,
although as discussed earlier, the legal and judicial changes
were introduced in stages from 1868 when Lesotho became a
British Protectorate and was annexed to the Cape Colony in
1871. The changes continued subsequent to the handing back
of the Territory for direct administration by the British in
1884, throughout to the attainment of responsible government
in 1966. Since then minor alterations have been introduced
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into the customary courts system, however, without any
significant change to the overall trend prompted by reforms
that took place during the colonial era. The 1938 reforms
remain the main radical changes that set forth extensive
transformations into existing mechanisms for dispute
settlement.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE OFFICIAL CUSTOMARY COURTS
This section traces the beginnings of the customary
courts, focusing on the major changes and areas of difference,
which contrast those known under the "unofficial" system for
dispute settlement. A note should be made that many of the
aspects described here have been maintained in the present
day, although the courts administering the customary law have
now been embellished with new titles.8
The Native Courts Proclamation and the Native Court
Rules9 were intended to deal with the problems that existed in
the old chiefs' courts and to tighten the position of dispute
settlement processes as it had prevailed under indigenous
practice. These two legal instruments transformed even the
structure set up in 1884, in which the imported law was to be
practised only by the courts of the Resident Commissioner;
and his Assistant Commissioners based in the districts, while
the customary law was to be administered in the traditional
courts of the chiefs (cf Poulter, 1979). According to
earlier descriptions,10 even following the disannexation of
Lesotho from the Cape in 1883, provision was made for
customary law to continue being administered in cases between
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Africans by the Chiefs' courts. This position was to change
as a consequence of the Proclamations mentioned above.
The first,11 brought about the need for immediate
reorganisation of the existing courts in terms of structure,
recognition and jurisdiction. A new title of Native Courts
was conferred on them. The Native Courts System was divided
into three classes: the Paramount Chief's Appeal Court at
the apex, followed by the chiefs' courts (Class A), and at the
lowest level were the courts of first instance (Class B).12
In addition, under this Proclamation, the recognition of these
courts was through warrants and their powers in terms of what
cases they could and could not handle, as well as the
penalties they could and could not impose, and their
geographical jurisdiction were stated in the same. The main
aim was to distinguish the powers of the chiefs in dispute
settlement, leaving the rest of the chiefs' courts only as
"administrative" institutions, in accordance with the
provisions of the Native Administration Proclamation No. 61
of 1938. What is important to realise is that it was no
longer the chieftainship but award of a warrant by the
Resident Commissioner which established and conferred judicial
authority over a court. However, as Hamnett (1975)
indicates, the granting of warrants to all the 1,340 chiefs
and headmen in 1938, served to obscure the basic principle
that actually administrative recognition by warrant
bestowed authority to engage in judicial functions. The
Resident Commissioner, as stated in Palmer and Poulter (1972);
in addition, exercised control over the number of the courts,
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as well as the personnel in them. In accordance with the
Native Courts Proclamation of 1938, he could suspend or even
dismiss the members of the courts, with the approval of the
High Commissioner.
As pointed out by Bereng in an interview, when the Native
Courts System was first set up with appeal courts in each
district headquarters, it "brought a great deal of relief to
the nation as a whole",13 as it assisted in relieving the
problem of delays which had become a marked phenomenon
especially in the Paramount Chief's court at Matsieng.14 In
addition, it meant the people no longer had to travel the long
distance to Matsieng«
As already pointed out above, at the beginning all the
1,340 chiefs and headmen whose names appeared in the first
official gazette15 were granted warrants to act as judicial
courts as well; so that the year 1946 saw the initial
reduction in the number of courts, as the first real attempt
to separate the "administrative" and "judicial" functions of
native authorities was effected. These courts were then
reduced to 121 (Ashton, 1952; Bereng 1987; Hamnett, 1975;
Palmer and Poulter, 1972). In 1949 the number was further
reduced to 106 (Ashton, 1952; Palmer and Poulter, 1972).
This time, as noted by Bereng, consideration was no longer
taken that the distances people travelled to the courts should
be kept short, attention was on maintaining what he called 'a
reasonable number of courts' ,16 in order to keep the costs of
running them minimal. By 1964, there were only 56 lower
courts which together with a dozen appeal courts made up a
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total of 68, by this time the system had been entirely
detached from the chieftainship, although as before, many
chiefs were still acting as presidents (Hamnett, 1975).
This suggests that the practice was still to some extent
in contradiction with the 1958 Basuto Courts Proclamation
which actually disgualified the chiefs from serving as
presidents of the courts. The relevant section read as
follows:
No principal or ward chief shall be
appointed as the President or as a member
of office of any Basuto Court; and no
chief or headman shall be appointed as
the President or as a member or officer
of a Basuto Court the area of which,
falls within the area under his
administrative control [sec. 18,
Proclamation No.23 of 1958].
The reduction in the numbers of judicial courts in 1946,
came subsequent to the establishment of the Basutoland
National Treasury.17 Palmer and Poulter (1972) point out
that the setting-up of the National Treasury necessitated a
careful scrutiny of the number of customary courts the
country could afford. According to Bereng (informant), the
Treasury started operating on 1 April 1946; with its
headquarters at Matsieng, and brought with it new trends in
the functioning of the Courts. The proceeds from the fines
"likahlolo" collected in the newly established courts were to
be deposited with the Treasury, and so were all funds
collected from the sale of stray stock, which were to cease
being the property of the chiefs. The presidents of these
courts were public servants18 paid salaries and so were their
clerks. The higher paid officials belonged to the Paramount
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Chief's Court. To facilitate the work of the Treasury, the
accountants in the districts were, in addition to their
normal duties, charged with the duty to check on the monies
brought by the clerks from their respective courts each month
end. The court clerks were, on the other hand, given
register books for civil and criminal cases as well as
receipt books. As Bereng further indicated, these funds
were to be used to pay the salaries of the court personnel,
and for other purposes in the Paramount Chief's Government.
This was intended to reduce the presidents' dependence on the
fines collected in their courts; a criticism raised against
the chiefs' courts.19 The Treasury ceased to exist on 31
March, 1960; as constitutional reforms in preparation for
independence (self-government) began.
The Native Court Rules, of 1946, which appeared as Part
IV of the new edition of the Laws of Lerotholi, on the other
hand, were largely based on existing customs to which they
had given greater precision and definition, and added new
formalities such as fees and writs (Ashton, 1952). For
example, the Rules provided that the plaintiff must pay a fee
of 5 shillings to "open the court"; another for summons to
each witness; and also for each day a court messenger is
used. The new rule was that only having paid these fees,
could the day for the hearings and summons be sent out, the
former by the clerk of court and the latter by the messenger
of court. The details of how much is paid in the present
day do not matter so much, what should be recognised is the
spirit behind the whole practice, mainly that justice was no
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longer to be free as accustomed in the indigenous system.
The new practices, as pointed out in the autobiography
of Jingoes (Perry and Perry, 1975), created much confusion
since, for instance, many chiefs who could not read nor write
fell behind in their work, and were bewildered by the new
instructions which accompanied the radical changes in court
procedure, whereby statements and answers to questions had to
be recorded in writing, and monthly reports had to be
submitted by each court. As indicated by Bereng in an
interview, on several occasions when the clerks of court
deposited funds collected and submitted their books for
checking by the accountants, they were found "not to
balance", because of the misappropriation of funds by some of
the court officials, whom as he expressed it "used to lend
themselves part of the "fines" and "compensation" funds
collected in their courts".
Another new aspect in these courts, as already hinted,
was that the presiding authorities were no longer chiefs but
court presidents, and those chiefs elected as presidents were
deliberately appointed to courts outside their administrative
wards; so that the two no longer coincided.20 Even the
commoner presidents were not usually expected to hold a court
within the wards of their own chiefs. In 1946, the
presidents, two assessors, two clerks of court and
messengers21 of each recognised court came to be paid a salary
which varied depending on the importance of each court.
According to Ashton (1952), the system of assessors was
actually meant to stabilise the traditional practice of
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panels; with the hope that together with the paid presidents
this would affect the flexibility of the old system,22 and
discourage voluntary attendance of local leaders who used to
share the responsibility of conducting court business,
hearing and deciding cases. The system of assessors as
shall be pointed out later on, has fallen out of practice23
except in the Judicial Commissioner^' Court.
Through the Native Court Rules, the clerks of court were
also vested with the duties to write out orders for the
appearance of witnesses, to keep records of cases, to check
payment of fines and carryout the general clerical routine of
court work. As Ashton (1952) reports, the clerks rarely
took part in the actual hearing of cases, except to record
evidence. In the smaller courts, however, they occasionally
helped to try cases. As he further points out, the clerks
were occasionally helped by one of the "banna ba lekhotla"
men of the court and even by the president. Allowing
assistance by the "banna ba lekhotla"24 can be interpreted as
representing an element of continuity in practical terms,
between the customary courts and the indigenous system.
The jurisdiction concerning sentencing powers and the
type of cases to be handled at each level of the court
structure came to be defined, to exclude offences in
consequences of which death is alleged to have occurred, or
which are punishable by death or life imprisonment, such as
murder, rape, treason. Civil cases dealing with marriage
other than marriage "Contracted in accordance with Native Law
and custom, except wherein and in so far as the case concerns
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the payment or return or disposal of dowry", fell out of
these courts' jurisdiction. Also excluded was all law other
than Native law and custom, "not repugnant to justice or
morality or inconsistent with the provisions of any law in
force in the territory" . The High Commissioner was given
the discretion to confer upon a court, jurisdiction "to
enforce all or any of the provisions of any law" . An
example here would be that by 1949, the Native Courts had
been empowered to try cases of tax default arising out of the
Native Tax Proclamation, and infringement of the Regulations
for Compulsory Dosing of Sheep and Goats.25
As stated by Maema (1985) the "repugnancy clause"26
referred to above; actually implied that customary law was
allowed to operate under the moderate supervision of the
colonial government, and the machinery which had for a long
time served as the traditional apparatus that incorporated
the customs and norms regulating social behaviour; was put
under scrutiny by people of a different cultural background.
Under the circumstances the customary law could not be held
to be in its original character, but one infiltrated by
aspects deriving from supervision by the colonial power and
thus different from the one that existed in the traditional
times, or even as understood and practiced in the
"unofficial" chiefs' courts. The relevant section presently
reads as follows:
Subject to the provisions of this
Proclamation a Central or Local Court
shall administer (a) the native law and
custom prevailing in the Territory, so
far as it is not repugnant to justice of
morality or inconsistent with the
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provisions of any law in force in the
Territory.27
This, as Resident Magistrate Mohale explained, means that the
customary law cannot, therefore, be administered as it
prevails but can only be administered if it is in harmony
with the colonial standards of justice and/or morality as
directed by the received law. It means, therefore, that
both the received law and the customary law are not at par.
The latter is subjected and restricted within the rules and
principles dictated by the former. These arguments, carry
a similar message to that raised in Comaroff and Roberts
(1981), relating in general, to the issue about the
appropriateness of judging the character and function of law
and of dispute settlement in non-western societies, using
definitional standards derived from western legal models;
which has been the tradition in legal anthropology.
The foregoing descriptions also, raise a question
whether the relationship between the customary courts and the
received law courts can adequately be described as marked by
parallelism.28 In order to comprehend the relationship
between the two, it is necessary to place it into historical
perspective. First, it is crucial to note that the General
Law Proclamation29 which was pronounced following the
disannexation of Lesotho from the Cape Colony, provided that
the Law to be applied in the Territory would be "the same law
for the time being in force in the Colony of the Cape of Good
Hope". A simultaneous provision was made, for indigenous
law to continue applying in two instances. First, in
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matters between "natives", and secondly, in all matters in
the "native courts". Commenting on this position Palmer and
Poulter (1972) said:
It may therefore be stated categorically
that so far as the African inhabitants of
Lesotho are concerned, African law stands
basically on an equal footing with the
common law. In no sense is the
customary law placed in a fundamentally
inferior or subsidiary position as it is
in some other African countries, e.g.
Botswana and Swaziland (Palmer and
Poulter, 1972: 99-100).
However, as indicated by Maope (1986), the contention by
Palmer and Poulter (1972) above is not absolutely correct.
As he argues further, at the original negotiations for
"protection" by the British prior to 1868, the Basotho had
wished to keep internal matters within the Territory governed
by indigenous law, and their wish persisted throughout the
period of British domination; as the system of "indirect
rule" assisted the application of customary law by the
chiefs' courts. This, as Maope (1986) also observes, came
to be recognised even in the 1966 independence constitution
which recognised the "law" of Lesotho recognised as including
the customary law of the land, with the result that in
Lesotho; customary law is a legal system and not just a
system of rules to be applied occasionally. This position
has not been altered even under subsequent legal provisions
following the suspension of the 1966 Constitution in 1970.
This, however, as Maope (1986) argues, does not mean that the
customary law is in competition with the received law. They
are not parallel to each other at all. Rather since with
227
the reception of the Cape law was received the British system
of government, the English Constitutional and administrative
law consequently came to be the law of Lesotho, the
institutional framework and concepts for the administration
of justice included. The received law predominates, while
the customary law operates within the terms of reference and
framework of the received law.
The predominance of the received law courts over the
customary courts becomes evident in examining the procedure
for appeals, and also the jurisdictions of the various
courts; the received law courts having wider powers
covering wider geographical areas and powers to impose
harsher punishments. The High Court possesses powers to
review cases from the highest customary court which is the
Court of the Judicial Commissioners. The Magistrates
Courts, on the other hand, have revisionary powers over all
decisions of the Central and Local Courts.30
Other characteristics which demonstrate the supremacy of
the received law courts over customary courts, can be picked
from the Basotho Courts (Practice and Procedure) Rules of
1961. These Rules provide that practice and procedure in
the customary courts shall be regulated in accordance with
Sesotho custom and law, and also in accordance with the
Rules. However, in the event of any inconsistency between
Sesotho custom and the Rules, the latter must prevail.
Certain specific directions of procedure came to be laid down
to include among others, first, that the president and every
assessor shall apply his mind to the question under
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consideration, and every president shall come in good faith
to a genuine decision thereon. Secondly, that no court
president shall delivery judgement in a case in which he
personally did not hear evidence. Thirdly, that these
courts shall not act unlawfully in contravention of Sesotho
law or any other law. Finally, that the proceedings in
every court shall be conducted in such a way as to give fair
hearing to all litigants, including the accused person and
the prosecutor in criminal cases; and all such litigants
shall have the right to call, examine and cross-examine
witnesses and to address the court on the merits or demerits
of the matter before the court.
The Native Courts were to apply customary law, and where
such could not apply, matters had to be passed on to the
courts administering the received law. The Native Court
Rules (1946) for instance, made provision that:
Any dispute in which European Law or
trade usages are involved which in the
opinion of the court, it is unable to
adjudicate upon properly because the
facts are not covered by native law or
custom ...
had to be referred onto the District Commissioners' Courts.
The Rules also laid down penalties31 for adjudicating without
authority.
According to Ashton (1952) the limitation of the Native
Courts to only three classes;32 of which two were principally
appeal courts, meant that in effect the junior courts of B
Class, were able to deal with all cases falling under their
jurisdiction. The truth of the matter is that the
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"unofficial" courts also continued functioning and clearing
a number of disputes especially on the civil side. The
Native Courts had to observe limitations in respect of civil
disputes and could not handle cases of claims exceeding £200
for class B; and £500 in Class A courts. There were
limitations in respect of criminal cases as well. For
example, such serious criminal cases as theft, or assault
after a preliminary hearing by the Native Courts, had to be
sent to the District Commissioners' Courts for trial, and on
occasion they would be remitted back to the Native Courts.
The Native Courts could not try cases which had been
investigated by the police unless remitted to them by the
local police officer or by the District Commissioner. Civil
claims for damages arising out of matters dealt with as
crimes by European law based courts such as homicide or rape,
could be referred to the Native Courts for settlement.
According to McClain (1962) substantial changes set up
by the 1938 Native Courts Proclamation, were only effected by
the 1958 Basuto Courts Proclamation.33 As he explains these
courts were given no jurisdiction over any person other than
Africans, or jurisdiction to try civil or criminal cases
where any of the parties or witnesses are not Africans
[Sec.26]. The Local Courts had no appellate jurisdiction,
while the Central Courts were given authority to hear appeals
from the Local Courts [Sec.112(1)] in addition to hearing
cases as a matter of first instance. The Native Courts
established in accordance with Proclamation No.62 of 1938
were actually pronounced closed; with effect from the date of
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commencement of Basuto Courts Proclamation No.23 of 1958, and
their warrants were cancelled. With the 1958 Basuto Courts
Proclamation, one sees a further tightening of the judicial
system, with the intention to remove it even more from the
system that existed traditionally.
The Proclamation, however, left the headquarters of the
Central Basuto Courts at Matsieng (the Royal village), which
aided to foster the association of this court with the
Paramount Chief, and thus making it difficult for the people
to realize that the Paramount Chief's Court was by law only
"administrative" and no longer possessed any "judicial"
power, also that there was now a president in charge of the
Central Court charged with the latter. A statement
(comment) overheard from one of the two people attending the
proceedings during the field research; suggests that the
Central Court at Matsieng has still not lost this image - its
association with the chieftaincy. The comment went as
follows:
I will end up at Matsieng to Masupha
"ke tla be ke eo kena le eena Matsieng ho
Masupha"
The translated version of this Statement as given above
does not portray the precise meaning. However, what the
comment implied is that the case was going to be carried on
up to the Central Court at Matsieng on appeal. But then it
went on to connect that Court with Masupha, who is the
present Chief of Matsieng and not the president of the court
in question. As demonstrated in Hamnett (1975) in the past,
the Paramount Chief himself and his advisers could not
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appreciate the change either. The examples from Hamnett
(1975) as shown later34 serve to illustrate that on the whole
the people and the chiefs could not recognise the effects of
separation of powers of authorities into "administrative" and
the "judicial" functions, and that the Paramount chief had in
the circumstances lost power over judicial matters. So
that in practice things continued to operate as they had
prior to the 1938 Proclamations, with the Paramountcy
engaging in both roles. This factor is important as it
influences the manner in which the present customary courts
function, especially in the sense that, they are largely
viewed as an extension, or rather, a higher level of the
judicial structure above the "unofficial" chiefs' courts.
Thus not as a system that was meant to replace the old
chiefs' courts.
The 1938 Native Courts Proclamation has been amended on
several occasions over the years, but is still substantially
in force under a different title of Central and Local Courts
Proclamation which now regulates the recognition,
constitution, powers and the jurisdiction of the courts of
warrant. Similarly the Native Courts Rules have undergone
various amendments, but the main principles remain the same
as those described in the preceding sections. The original
tripatriade structure35 has been maintained over the years,
with only a change of title in respect of the lower courts
from the Native Courts to Basuto Courts36 at one time, and now
to the Central and Local Courts. The Judicial Commissioners'
Court now forms the apex of the customary courts, instead of
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Paramount Chief's Appeal Court or the courts of the District
Commissioners.
Thus the subsequent amendments have left the structure,
recognition and jurisdiction of the customary courts
basically the same as when they were first introduced.
Hence, for example, Maema (1985) has argued that the basic
legal system of Lesotho may be fairly described as a colonial
inheritance.37 Mokoma (1984/85) on the other hand, takes the
argument to an earlier period, observing that, the criminal
justice system which was established by the Cape Government
in Lesotho in 1868 on the recommendation of Emile Rolland, is
still prevalent to date. An argument along similar lines
with that of Maema (1985) is raised by Poulter (1979) who
points out that the prevailing criminal justice system is
rudimentary and does not differ much from what it was during
the colonial rule. The attainment of independence has not
brought major changes to the judicial system first introduced
during colonial rule.
The implementation of the new system as Hamnett (1975)
argues was as rapid as the authorities chose to make it, and
this corresponded to the outline of changes in the courts
structure, powers and functions as described above. He
further explains that when further changes were introduced in
subsequent years, it became the duty of the Judicial
Commissioner to try and conscript them into reality. As he
further notes, the legal interest of the 25 or 30 years
following the intentions of the 1938 Proclamations, lies in
the evidence revealing the continuing impetus; within the
233
new and supposedly "judicial" courts, of forces whose roots
lie deep in the old system. Although programmes of re¬
education were set up and training courses for court
presidents eventually instituted, they have not done much to
change the attitudes within the Customary Courts even half a
century after the establishment of these Courts.
Some of the most illuminating evidence of the
persistence of the "chiefly" practice within the courts, as
Hamnett (1975) observes, was found in the Court of the
Paramount Chief.38 He points out that for a long time after
1938, it remained the practice for the Paramount Chief to
"confirm" the decisions of the judicial court at Matsieng,
and although this was intended by legislators to be a mere
formality, and tolerated by government as a gesture of
respect to the Royal Office, it was not so regarded by her or
(frequently) by her advisers. Hamnett (1975) says that as
late as 1945, the chieftainess' judicial court stated in no
uncertain terms that: the Paramount Chief has the authority
to cancel or confirm or alter any judgement as she saw
proper. It is also reported that she would also confirm a
judgement and then, some years later, reverse the decision
administratively. Although there was some institutional
separation, in terms of personnel between her "judicial" and
her "administrative" courts, the chieftainsess herself
believed that she equally superceded them both.
Hamnett (1975) gives further examples showing that the
line of demarcation between the "judicial" and
"administrative" duties could not be clearly visualised.
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For instance, he says that other chiefs and courts shared the
same view with that of the Paramount Chief's Court. He
cites one major chief - the head of the Molapo Cardinal house
who once recalled the days when chiefs had powers even to
alter judgements freely. In addition, he reports how in
1952, a Basotho Court declared that, the chieftainship had no
limits on orders it could give. In yet another case,
Hamnett (1975) reports that the Paramount Chief's Court is
said to have stopped a hearing, declaring that the case could
not proceed because it caused the chief displeasure.
While some of the examples quoted above represent some
departure from the judicial ideal, and while it could be
argued that some of them are abuses or contrary to natural
justice and unacceptable in judicial terms, they are quite
appropriate to the traditional position of the chief. But
even more, they reveal problems that emerged in the course of
the implementation of the new system. The examples reveal
that the period of transition from the indigenous to the new
judicial system was not as smooth as it may be thought, the
main problem still being failure on the part of many people
to recognise what the separation of "judicial" from
"administrative" functions actually meant.
The next sections focus on examining the organisation of
these courts and their functioning within the overall
structure. The intention is to make a description of how
these courts presently operate; as acquired mainly from the
observations of ongoing courtroom proceedings and also from
the interviews held with various categories of informants,
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about the features and the nature of proceedings in the
customary courts today.
The Central and Local Courts, unlike the "unofficial"
chiefs' courts are statutory, and this has given rise to
changes in their basic nature and features as institutions
administering customary law; one of which is their complete
independence from the chieftainship. They are staffed by
different personnel and, in addition, as Perry (1977) notes,
the procedure in these courts no longer reflects the
traditional, community-oriented based consensus and debate,
that characterise the indigenous courts. This last point is
elaborated upon further on.
THE CUSTOMARY COURTS AT PRESENT : ORGANISATION, STRUCTURE AND
JURISDICTION.
Like their predecessors39 these courts administer
primarily the Sesotho law and custom, but as noted earlier
on, they also administer a limited number of statutes as may
from time to time be determined. According to the Acting
Chief Justice, the jurisdiction of these courts is limited to
the application of few statutory matters, precisely they are
not well equipped to deal with statutory provisions and
questions relating to the interpretation of legal statutes.
As he explained "a layman like a court president cannot
really interpret a statute".40 The whole point is that the
court presidents have no legal training to do so, nor to know
what the process of the interpretation of statutes involves.
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The term "customary courts" is in this case used in the
context of the primary law administered by these courts.
While, in addition, the following descriptions contain a
notion that these courts are a creation of colonialism
^Twining (1964); Chanock (1978); Snyder (1981); Woodman
(1983)), a further definitional problem about them is
revealed. This is demonstrated in how in their operation,
these courts draw their identity from both the "unofficial"
chiefs' courts, and the received law, combining them in a
C.
highly complex process of interaction.
The Local courts are first instance courts for all cases
save murder, treason, sedition, robbery, assault with intent
to do grievous bodily harm, rape, and housebreaking with
intent to commit a crime. They are also denied power to
handle certain civil matters such as those relating to
marriage contracted under civil rit<L£ except where it
concerns the payment or return of the "bohali" bridewealth.
It is worth noting, however, that cases of marriages
dissolved in the High Court, are rarely taken to the
customary courts to claim the "bohali", bridewealth. Again
this could be associated with the people's lack of knowledge
that the dissolution of marriage and the claim of "bohali"
ought to be undertaken in different proceedings, where the
marriage was contracted according to civil rights. The
Central Courts come immediately above the Local Courts, and
while they primarily hear appeals from the latter, they are
also empowered to hear cases as a matter of first instance.
The Judicial Commissioners' Court as already mentioned, forms
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the apex of the customary courts' structure and acts as an
appellate court for cases from the lower courts. From
there, appeals lie to the High Court. Every effort is
provided for in the customary courts to counter delay, and in
cases of unreasonable delay the concerned parties may apply
to a higher court which may direct that a speedy hearing of
the case concerned be made. This was the case in
CO/9/JCCQ/JCS/4.6.87 in which the Judicial Commissioner noted
that there had been several interjections by the magistrate.41
Similar intention could be inferred from the advice of the
magistrate in CO/8/JCQ/JCCS/4.5.8742 Also where there are
sufficient grounds that injustice may occur, the advising
court may hear the matter itself, or make any such
recommendation as it sees fit.
THE JUDICIAL COMMISSIONERS' COURT
This level of the customary courts was first established
in terms of Proclamation No.16 of 1944, and later it came to
be governed by Proclamation No.25 of 1950. This Court
replaced the District Commissioners^ Courts, which were also
preceded by the Paramount Chief's Appeal Court.
The original jurisdiction of the Judicial Commissioners'
Court has been upgraded from that of the First Class
Magistrates43 to that of the Resident Subordinate (Magistrate)
Courts.44 However, still no civil suit or action or other
civil proceedings can be commenced in the Judicial
Commissioners' Court. As the Director of Public
Prosecutions, pointed out, this court is an appellate court
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and not a court of original jurisdiction. The decisions of
the Court of the Judicial Commissioners, as noted by the
Acting Chief Justice are, however, not reviewable by any
other magistrate but go straight to the High Court for appeal
or for review, if necessary.
The Judicial Commissioners' Court is, in addition,
empowered to state a case for consideration by the High Court
on a point of law, especially where there is a conflict
between the customary law and the received law. The Chief
Magistrate in an interview said "unless something like a
point of law arises", the Judicial Commissioners' Court can
be taken as the ultimate authority under the customary courts
hierarchy. As the Judicial Commissioners indicated, most
cases in which points of law as described above arise, are
those in which legal practitioners appear representing the
parties. The interesting guestion is why such points seldom
arise in cases where there is no legal representation. The
argument which will be advanced later is that, as observed
from the proceedings of this court, in the absence of
lawyers, the tendency is to strike a balance between
customary law principles and the received law. This is one
reason why it is argued in this thesis that the customary
courts in practice represent a compromise between the
"unofficial" and the official received law procedures so that
in practice the two seldom conflict as often portrayed in the
literature.
At present there are two Judicial Commissioners in post.
They are itinerant "magistrates" travelling from district to
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district although they have a court in Maseru (capital town).
This is a situation different from the colonial times, when
the Commissioners' courts existed on permanent basis in
various districts. Today the people have to travel to the
districts' headquarters,when the court of the Judicial
Commissioners is on circuit in their respective districts.
What this means is that, appeals from the Central Courts in
the districts have to wait for a period of approximately a
year before they can be attended to. As indicated by the
Judicial Commissioners in an interview, their court sits only
once a year in each of the districts, with each session
lasting for approximately two weeks, and after every session
in a given district a report is prepared of cases dealt with,
those outstanding, and so on. As further indicated by the
Judicial Commissioners, the numbers of cases vary from
district to district. In their observation the District of
Leribe comes second to Maseru in the rate of appeals coming
to court. The main complaint they raised is that there is
not enough time to fulfil all the duties required of them,
and even report writing becomes extremely difficult within
the limits of the time available. The conclusion that can be
drawn here is that the work is too much for two Judicial
Commissioners.
Because the Judicial Commissioners' Court is empowered
to administer primarily the customary law, the Judicial
Commissioners are usually people who have both an interest
in, and some knowledge and experience of that law (Palmer and
Poulter, 1972). This is despite the fact that the rules of
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procedure and evidence in this court have changed
tremendously, especially because of the right of audience the
legal practitioners are given at this level of the customary
courts.45 Thus the Judicial Commissioners' Court has to
apply customary law while making use of procedures and rules
of evidence which are not of the same origin. The result of
this in practice is that a close relationship has been
fostered between the customary and the received procedures as
to be demonstrated later, producing a complex system, built
on a compromise between the two, in an attempt to cope with
the conflicts that arise. This in a way further illustrates
the argument that the indigenous principles for the
settlement of disputes and the received ones are not
operating as totally separate entities. While, tensions
occur in practice, as a result of the coexistence of
customary law and the received procedures and rules of
evidence, again the observations carried out in this court
reveal that such tensions are more evident in cases where
legal representatives appear, since they are more inclined to
apply the received law procedures on which their training is
mainly based.
In carrying out their duties, the Judicial Commissioners
are assisted by assessors, whom according to Palmer and
Poulter (1972), can be of invaluable assistance. This is
confirmed by the statement from Thompson (1968), once a
Judicial Commissioner in Lesotho, that he had tremendous
advantage of sitting with assessors, specially chosen for
their knowledge of customary law. He states that the
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assessors were well experienced in deciding customary cases,
and were seldom at loss on a point of law at issue, and in
making decisions. From the interview with the Judicial
Commissioners, they expressed that the use of assessors which
still prevails, arises purely as a practice from colonial
days when the court was presided over by Europeans. At that
time, as they pointed out, the assessors were helpful in
determining and advising the Judicial Commissioners with
regard to Sesotho law and custom, but today the practice is
obsolete. One Judicial Commissioner commented:
When I have an assessor, as a Mosotho,
what advice regarding custom can he give
me which I am not familiar with? The
magistrates are there, and they sit
alone, without being assisted by
assessors (Sennane: 7.5.1987).
From courtroom observations . • .. 3 carried out in this
court, I discovered that the assessor is in fact seldom asked
to give his opinion or ask questions. Perhaps the reasons
for this are evident from the statement of Judicial
Commissioner Sennane as cited above. Looked at in another
way, the use of assessors in the Judicial Commissioners'
Court, could be interpreted as a way of legitimizing this
court to the people, by maintaining the indigenous element of
having advisers as practised in the "unofficial" chiefs'
courts. But it could also be aimed at reducing the conflict
that could otherwise arise; in the event when the presiding
officers lack the knowledge of the customary law principles.
In addition to assessors, the Judicial Commissioners have
court clerks who accompany them on their sessions in the
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districts as they are ordinarily stationed in Maseru.
The bulk of the work of the Court of the Judicial
Commissioners consists of hearing civil appeals from the
Central Courts, a factor which becomes obvious from the
statistics of the proceedings of cases observed during the
field research as summarised below. This was further
confirmed in an interview with the Judicial commissioners, in
which they pointed out that, first, they hear appeals from
the Central Courts as no appeal can come to them directly
from the Local Courts. Secondly, that most of the cases
they attend to, relate to civil disputes on land "masimo"
(fields) and "lijarete" (gardens). The observations carried
Cje>ur+
out in thisA revealed that other appeals involve civil
disputes over reserved pastures, stray stock, and trespass by
animals on fields. Other causes for appeal pertain to
dissatisfaction with the manner in which cases have been
handled by the lower courts (e.g. unfair charges), as well as
unfair "compensation" orders and other judgements. The
Judicial Commissioners admitted that sometimes they hear
criminal appeals such as those involving common assault,
however, these are extremely rare.
In Quthing while the Judicial Commissioners Court was on
circuit there, a total of 34 proceedings of cases on appeals
were observed. All of the observed proceedings concerned
civil appeals of the type of matters described above. They
ranged from disputes on land to claim of "bohali" bridewealth
(1 case); and claims for compensation. In all of these,
legal practitioners appeared in 13 cases, among which both
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parties were represented in only 4. In 6 cases in which the
parties ought to have been represented, the legal counsels
were not in court - they made no appearance. In 17 cases,
there was no legal representation, thus the parties were
appearing on their own behalf or represented by a non-legal
representative; such as a relative. All cases were
completed and judgement was c\£if-€.rTed in only 1 case. 2
cases were remitted to the Central Court and 3 to the Local
Courts; on grounds of failure to abide by procedure as shall
be discussed later.46
Another important factor is that the proceedings before
the Judicial Commissioners' Court do not take the form of a
complete hearing, instead the court relies on the records
handed over from the lower courts. There are a number of
problems that emerge as a result of this procedure, mainly
because of incomplete record-keeping prevalent in the Local
and Central Courts, as this task is in the hands of clerks
who are not properly trained and prepared for the job.
Other problems are discussed under the sub-heading of
"Procedure and Evidence in the Customary Courts", showing how
some cases often have to be remitted to the lower courts for
fresh hearing as a result of inaccuracies in procedure.
This applies to 5,47 of the cases as given in the statistics
of cases observed in the Judicial Commissioner's Court, 2 of
which were sent back to the Central Court and 3 to the Local
Courts.
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THE CENTRAL AND LOCAL COURTS.
The Central and Local Courts48 are the officially
recognised Customary law institutions possessing judicial
powers, as against the chief courts which are not officially
recognised as such. Because of their close association with
the Basutoland National Treasury,49 these courts became
popularly known as the "treasury courts", a title still
employed by some people even today. Sometimes the label
"Basotho (Central and Local) Courts50 is also employed.
The extent of these Courts' jurisdiction and powers are
spelt out in their respective warrants, with certain
categories of cases especially on the criminal side, removed
from their powers.51 Questions relating to the jurisdiction
of the cases these courts are entitled to deal with, seldom
become an issue in the proceedings and so are matters
relating to their geographical jurisdiction. However, the
Cctf<*ct
possibility of such issues being raised,^be totally ruled out
especially where legal representatives are involved.52
For example, one day before the commencement of
proceedings in the Roving Stock-theft Central Court,53 I was
having discussions with one defense counsel who was to appear
in one of the cases, and he mentioned to me that, he was
going to raise a point about the territorial jurisdiction of
the Court as a defence. According to his argument the
concerned matter ought to be heard in the Teyateyaneng
district, and not in Maseru. He claimed that the summons
showed his client as belonging to Maseru, which he said was
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incorrect and claimed to have evidence to prove this. In
his explanation the Court could not hear a case out of its
two miles jurisdiction. Without going into the details of
the arguments of the defence in this particular case, the
description does show that issues about the geographical
jurisdiction can sometimes be raised. It also shows the
importance attached to technical formalities of procedure,
which is not present in the "unofficial" chiefs' courts.
The Roving Stock-Theft court referred to above is a
Central Court which rotates from district to district. It
differs from the courts of its cadre in that it has
jurisdiction eguivalent to that of the Resident Magistrates'
Courts, although its cases are reviewable by the First or
Second Class Magistrates, who have less jurisdiction. As
the Chief Magistrate explained in an interview, because of
this abnormality, this court was once abolished but has since
been reactivated. The Chief Magistrate referred to it as a
"police Court" because it has its own president who is
assisted by the Stock-theft Division Police, but also
because, as he stated, the police like it since as a Central
Court it is easier to get a conviction there than in a
Magistrate's Court, where technical aspects of procedure are
highly emphasised. The main issue is that the police have
no training in the received law procedures employed in the
Magistrates' Courts, hence prefer the Central Courts
environment where these are not strictly observed.
The Central and Local Courts Proclamation No. 62 of
193854 is the one that now regulates the recognition,
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Constitution, powers and jurisdiction of the courts of
warrant. Various amendments have been introduced, for
example, the jurisdiction of these courts was enhanced in
1979 and in 1981. In the latter, the Central and Local
Courts were given powers to administer the Dog Tax
Proclamation No. 36 of 1948. This gives an indication of
the type of matters relegated to the Customary Courts
generally. They are given powers over matters which are
relatively unimportant. No one believes in the taxation of
dogs in Lesotho; therefore this extension of the powers
remains largely irrelevant and inapplicable. It seems the
idea is that these courts cannot be given jurisdiction over
the more important and serious matters; both on the civil
and the criminal side. However, the practical reality
reveals that the customary courts sometimes handle matters
considered to be beyond their powers. As noted by the
Director of Public Prosecutions in an interview, the issues
considered in making decisions about which court a case must
be referred to, are themselves still confusing. He pointed
that, however, the police decisions for referral to a large
extent depend on the injuries caused. He said "if injuries
are judged to be quite bad, or if the destruction to property
is quite extensive, they [police] usually refer [cases] to
the Magistrates Courts. But if they are petty squabbles,
they refer them to the Local Courts".
The point made by Acting Chief Justice is that, the
Central and Local Courts "are important because they deal
with small claims, so that the superior courts are not
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burdened with unnecessary things". A similar point was made
by Judge Molai, that the Local and Central Courts administer
"basically custom and petty statutory offences" examples of
which he gave as the use of abusive language ( "mahlapa a
tala" ); and disputes over boundaries of land; disputes over
ownership of land; tree plantations; fights between
children and sometimes even adults too. However, he
recalled how while he was the Chief Magistrate, he came to
realise to his surprise that the Local Courts sometimes do
handle serious cases which under normal circumstances and by
law should be referred to the Magistrates' Courts.
It was the 1938 Native Courts Proclamation [Sec. 9]
which initially made provision for these courts to
administer, first the general law, which includes any
provision as authorised by order of the High Commissioner and
also provisions of all rules or orders made by the Paramount
Chief, Chief, Sub-Chief or headman under the Native
Administration Proclamation No. 61 of 1938. Secondly, they
were authorised to administer the Native Law and custom
prevailing in the Territory, subject to the "repugnancy
clause" as described earlier on. These and some other
provisions guiding the Central and Local Courts remain
largely the same as stated in the 1938 Proclamation from
which they originated, with, however, some minor
modifications, in recognition of the titles of officers who
received authority at independence, for example. These
courts are today recognised under the hand of the responsible
Minister, (no longer High Commissioner or Resident
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Commissioner) acting in concurrence with the Chief Justice.
The customary law that they ought to administer now includes
rules or orders made by the King or a chief, sub-chief or
headman as provided for under the Chieftainship Act.
As in the previous Proclamations, these courts still
have no jurisdiction to try cases in which a person is
charged with an offence in consequence of which death is
alleged to have occurred, or which is punishable by death or
life imprisonment. They also cannot try cases in connection
with marriage other than marriage contracted under or in
accordance with the customary law, except and in so far as
the case concerns payment or return or disposal of "Bohali"
(bride-wealth). Thus in more general terms these courts can
deal with issues of marriage constituted in accordance with
Section 34 of the Laws of Lerotholi.
The civil and criminal jurisdiction of these courts is
spelled out in their respective warrants. In broad terms,
such jurisdiction is based on the cause of action having
arisen in, or the "defendant" being ordinarily resident
within the court's area in civil actions; and on the offence
having been committed therein in the case of criminal
proceedings. The warrants also contain certain financial
limits for jurisdiction in civil proceedings, and the maximum
punishment that may be imposed by each court in sentencing in
respect of criminal offences. In addition, there is
provision for any person aggrieved by an order or decision of
a lower court to appeal to a Central Court, provided that
this is done within 30 days from the date of such order or
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decision.
Furthermore, the customary courts have powers to
imprison offenders, unlike the old chiefs' courts which were
limited to "fines", public ridicule and occasional
banishment. Another difference is that fines are now paid in
cash, and these go to the state and no longer to the chiefs.
It is also provided that the customary courts may inflict
any punishment authorised under customary law, for as long as
it is not repugnant to natural justice and humanity.55 The
courts have to observe that punishment must in no case be
excessive but they should ensure that it is always
proportional to the nature and circumstances of the offender.
All these principles bring these courts closer to the rules
guiding proceedings and sentencing in the received law
courts. Where the punishment to be inflicted proves greater
than the court has powers to inflict, it may commit the
offender in custody pending sentence by a higher court.
However, the point made by Resident Magistrate Mohale is
that, whenever a Central or Local Court sentences a man to a
term of imprisonment, the committal warrant has to be signed
by a magistrate who may invoke his revisionary powers.56
The overlap between civil and criminal sanctions which
existed in the indigenous system has to some extent been
maintained. The rules permit a customary court to direct
that any fine or part of it; be paid to the person injured
or aggrieved by the act or omission, in respect of which the
fine is being imposed. If such agreement is accepted, a
person cannot thereafter bring any civil proceedings in the
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received law courts to recover damages in respect of the same
loss or injury.
It would not be possible to give an overview of all the
Op-
changes brought by the introduction^the customary courts in
one work, but the foregoing descriptions do provide
sufficient evidence showing the major differences between
these courts and the "unofficial" judicial mechanisms as
discussed in the previous chapter. So far, the descriptions
have focused mainly on the theoretical aspects of the
customary courts, as against what happens in practice. The
latter is dealt with in the next section. However, before
doing so, it would be of interest to go over some of the
issues raised by the informants during the interviews
regarding the customary courts; as they tend to have a
bearing on the practices in these courts.
Several points were raised by various informants about
the organisation, structure and jurisdiction of the courts.
The Attorney General, for instance, said that the process of
appeal in the customary courts, is too long. From the Local
Courts, which are first instance courts, up to the Court of
Appeal which is the ultimate court of law, it takes five
stages - the Local Court through to the Central, Judicial
Commissioners; the High Court; and finally to the Court of
Appeal. This is regarded as unsatisfactory especially
because on the side of the received law courts, it takes only
three stages from the Magistrates' through to the High Court
and to the Court of Appeal. The process is even longer in
view of the fact that, some of the cases would have been
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before the "unofficial" courts prior to reaching the Local
Courts.
On territorial jurisdiction of the customary courts the
Attorney General pointed out that, the position of these
courts is satisfactory in that the people know which court to
go to when they have disputes. The Acting Chief Justice on
the other hand, raised an important point that the
territorial jurisdiction of the Central and Local Courts,
unlike that of the "unofficial" Chiefs' courts, is not
allocated according to villages but on a regional basis,
with the Central Courts covering wider areas of jurisdiction
and each having several Local Courts under its responsibility
(Appendix B). One advantage of these courts according to
him is that they are much widely scattered and better
distributed within the country, and thus are more accessible
to the people they serve, than the received law courts.
Furthermore, he contended that the number of the Central and
Local Courts is quite satisfactory, but recommended that, the
jurisdiction of the Local Courts territorially be increased,
and then the Central Courts be abolished to shorten the line
of appeal, which as expressed by the Attorney General, is too
long at present.
Another point raised by the Attorney General concerned
the jurisdiction of these courts in terms of the nature of
disputes they are entitled to handle. His opinion is that
the problem is not so much with the numbers of courts, but
with the allocation of jurisdiction between the received law
courts and the customary courts,in terms of matters that each
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system of courts can deal with under the law. He implicitly
suggested that the jurisdiction of the customary courts could
be increased; to reduce case-loads for the received law
courts. At the same time, as noted earlier, there is still
a view that these courts are not well equipped to deal with
matters of a serious nature and with numerous cases arising
out of statute law.
Further points, concerning the jurisdiction of the
customary courts in terms of the nature of dispute, were
raised by Judge Molai. These relate to the fact that the
decisions of the Local and Central Courts are reviewable by
the Magistrates. He first pointed at the prevailing
uncertainty about what matters should be referred to the
Local Courts, and which ones fall directly under the
jurisdiction of the magistrates. The uncertainty is more
reflected in the practices of those who make the referrals -
the chiefs and the police. As Judge Molai pointed out, it
is still pretty unclear as to what factors influence the
referrals of cases to the courts. He stated:
The Chiefs themselves are not certain
about these things. You may find a case
which you may regard serious enough to
need referral to a Magistrate court,
referred to a Local Court (Molai:
3.3.1987 ) .
Some of these abnormalities occur because there is only one
Magistrate Court in each district but several Local Courts,
and the former may be very far from the Local Court and from
the people. So instead of travelling long distances to a
magistrate's court or police station, a chief would be more
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inclined to take the matter to a nearby Local Court, thus if
he does not hear it himself. Although the Local Court
president can hear the case in question, he may at the end of
the day find that it is beyond his jurisdiction. If the
Local Court does not hear the matter, the people are then
subjected to travelling long distances, to find a police
station or a Magistrate Court. These circumstances lead to
situations whereby cases which ought to be brought to
Magistrate^Courts ending up in the Local Courts.
Judge Molai, in addition, pointed out that some of the
serious cases are referred to the Local Courts by the police
themselves. He gave an example of what happens in the
township of Maseru in which a special Local Court has been
established purely for the convenience of the people living
in the area, in which he expressed:
For instance, we have got a Local Court
here in Maseru, next to the Charge Office
[police station]. You go there, you may
find that cases which you would not
regard to be all that minor are taken to
that court. (Molai: 3.3.1987).
As he added, in the township of Maseru, when an offence is
committed it is most invariably reported to the police and
not to the reserve headman (chief); and then the police make
appropriate referrals. As he further explained, the police
just like the chiefs, cannot differentiate between serious
cases which should be properly referred to the Magistrates'
and not to the Local Courts. Even when the referrals have
been made the Local Courts sometimes redirect some cases to
the "unofficial" courts.57 This is described further on, as
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one of the illustrations of continuity between the
"unofficial" court structure and the "official" judicial
system. But also this shows that the customary courts
rarely address themselves to technical aspects of
jurisdiction; as it emerges in the descriptions in the above
paragraph.
Judge Molai went on to demonstrate the problems that
arise when such inappropriately referred cases,58 come for
review in terms of Section 26 as cited earlier. As he put
it:
The only problem is that as a magistrate,
you've got to review some of these cases
under certain circumstances and when you
review them your feel that, No! this
person was given too light a sentence for
an offence like this (Molai: 3.3.1987).
In these circumstances, the magistrate has a right to revise
the decision of the Local Courts. But as Judge Molai
indicated, in practice; it is only when one feels strongly
that questions of jurisdiction have been extremely
overlooked, that he would order the proceedings of the Local
Courts to be quashed, and then refer the matter to an
appropriate court. However, this is not often done, because
as Judge Molai explained if it were to happen frequently, "it
may not be nice to one of the litigants; he has been through
the mill and his case has been heard by a court of law and
disposed of. Now you are making an order that it should
start all over again. So it is not a thing a magistrate
will do very lightly. You do it in exceptional cases where
you feel that this was too serious an offence, and it should
255
have been brought before a magistrate. But [in] 99 per cent
we let them pass, simply because a man has already been
through court process and he thought his case was over. It
would not be fair on review, to come up with a decision that
this thing should start all over again". The review powers
which the Magistrates possess, and their powers to revise
decisions of the Local and Central Courts, reaffirms the
superiority of the Magistrates Courts.
The above descriptions provide evidence of issues that
arise in the day-to-day operation of the customary courts.
Others are discussed later. One would have assumed that by
now questions such as those pertaining to jurisdiction would
have become matters of simple routine easily observed. Yet
even 50 years after the introduction of these courts, they
are still not easy to abide by, in all instances. It is
against the background of the descriptions made so far, that
other practices in the customary courts must be understood.
PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE IN THE CUSTOMARY COURTS
The emergence of the customary courts, with their
different organisational structure and jurisdiction, was
accompanied by transformations in the rules of procedure and
evidence for conduct of proceedings. Unlike in the
"unofficial" courts, practice and procedure, as well as rules
of evidence in the customary courts, are generally, inclined
towards the adversarial approach. This becomes particularly
prominent when looking at the operations of the Judicial
Commissioners' Court and the Roving Stock-Theft Central
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Court, in which legal practitioners appear much more
frequently than in the Central and Local Courts, thus
changing the outlook of the proceedings in those courts.59
In addition to describing the rules of procedure and
evidence, this section explores how far and to what extent
the new rules of adversarial procedure have taken root in the
practice of the customary courts at present. The Central
ate.
and Local Courts, as revealed by the data used.still much
A
removed from the adversarial rules of trial for reasons
explained further on.
The shift towards the acW£ c S ctrial procedures and rules
of evidence in Lesotho is explained well by McClain (1985) in
which he recognises the substantial contribution the English
law has made to the South African criminal law. The latter
was generally transferred into Lesotho by the 1884 General
Law Proclamation which dictated that "the law for the time
being in force in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope", shall
also be the law of Lesotho. Since then this provision has
continued to apply; also making the English procedure of
trial a permanent feature of judicial proceedings in Lesotho.
While in addition, there is provision for customary law to
continue being applied to "Africans" (generally understood to
refer to the Basotho people), it was mentioned earlier that
in the event of conflict, the legal principles and rules of
the received law must prevail.
The purpose is not so much to spell out all the
principles of either the civil of criminal law procedure and
evidence, but to make broad descriptions about their nature,
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and also to examine how they have been implemented over the
years. An attempt is also made to say how much the
functioning of the official customary judicial structure is
different from that of the "unofficial" courts, at the same
time determining whether it bears any resemblance to that in
the received law courts. The observations and interviews
carried out during the field research covered both aspects of
the civil and criminal procedure and evidence. So the use
of examples of civil cases in the descriptions that follow
arises simply from the fact that, with the exception of the
Roving Stock-theft Central Court, the bulk of these courts'
work consists of civil disputes. For instance, civil claims
arising out of matters dealt with as crimes by the received
law courts such as homicide or rape, are referred to the
customary courts for settlement. In addition, the courts
deal with a variety of other civil disputes, examples of
which were given earlier on in the chapter. In the main, the
issue is that the criminal jurisdiction of these courts is
limited to very few matters as pointed out earlier.
Generally speaking, the observations revealed that, there is
a high tendency to institute civil proceedings claiming
compensation either for injuries suffered or damage to
property, even in cases where there is a possibility of a
criminal case. There is one possibility though, that the
matters observed, had already been before the received law
courts for criminal proceedings; in the manner explained
above.
The Central and Local Courts (Practice and Procedure)
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Rules60 which now govern the proceedings in these courts have
their roots in the former Native Courts Rules of 1946 and the
Basuto Courts Rules of 1961. The Rules provide that
practice and procedure in the customary courts shall be
regulated first, in accordance with Sesotho custom and law,
and secondly, in accordance with the provisions of the
Rules.61 But as mentioned once before, where conflict afises
between the two, the latter must prevail. The main point is
that these courts are statutory, and while they are empowered
to administer the customary law, they are not as traditional
nor are they as customary in the sense used in the context of
the "unofficial" courts. This is confirmed by the fact that
they are not exclusively governed by customary procedures and
rules of evidence. The Rules set for the guidance of these
courts, provide for a movement away from purely customary
ways and procedures of dispute settlement, to a more
legalistic approach, a trend which was initiated during the
colonial times. As Judge Molai stated, questions of
administering customary law have now been complicated by the
advent of the received law and statutes. So that while
"unofficially" recognised courts and the official court
structure are sufficiently different at the theoretical
level, at certain times, they share certain characteristics
manifested more profoundly in the practice of the customary
courts. Hence while in describing the theoretical
characteristic of these courts and their coexistence with the
"unofficial" chiefs courts, an element of conflict between
the two surfaces, in practice the customary courts system is
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a synthesis of various systems, most apparent in considering
the rules of procedure and evidence they employ.
Furthermore, as provided for and facilitated by the
Rules, there has been a standardization of procedure and
practice in the customary courts, to a certain extent
assimilating their procedure and rules of evidence with those
of the received law courts. It is in this light, that Maope
(1986) recognised the former as statutory courts of a special
kind - applying customary law, but through procedures arising
not purely from custom; while at the same time they are not
exclusively regulated by statute either.
The application of the adversarial principles of
procedure and evidence in these courts at the practical
level, must be understood within the context of the
relationship they have with the "unofficial" courts, and also
in the light of the characteristics alluded to distinguish
the two from each other. The first one is that the
personnel in the customary courts no longer necessarily
consists of chiefs. This is of course as a consequence of
the attempt to draw a dichotomy between the "judicial" and
"administrative" duties, which was traditionally both
institutionally and conceptually absent. As already
mentioned, each of the Local and Central Courts now has a
president, and also a court clerk. The latter takes care of
all the clerical routines of the court, but also acts as a
prosecutor in criminal cases, although he does not advise the
president either on points of law or procedure. The clerks
also undertake other odd functions here and there as they may
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be requested. For instance following the proceedings of the
Roving Stock-theft Central Court; the prosecutor asked the
Court Clerk to step-in for him until the president announced
the next date of the hearing for Case RSTCC/3/M/30.4.87.
The former had to attend to another case at the Magistrates'
Courts. In the Judicial Commissioners' Court, the clerks
also act as interpreters in cases where legal practitioners
appear, as they often tend to conduct proceedings in English.
The difficulties associated with the use of court clerks as
interpreters are dealt with in later.62 It is in the light
of similar observations that Perry (1977) comments that the
court personnel no longer reflects the stable relations of
the Village, as the presidents and their clerks are normally
outsiders to the villages in which they work.
The difference of these courts from the "unofficial"
courts is further confirmed by the existence of a court
messenger who, in addition to his ordinary duties, maintains
the decorum of the court; which is adhered to with great
variance at this level of the judicial process. The
observations from case RSTCC/3/M/30.4.87 can be used as an
example here. One case had just been completed, and the
prosecutor was talking to a group of people who were entering
the court; trying to establish which ones were witnesses in
the case above. He indicated that one small boy's name did
not appear on the list of witnesses, but went on to check the
papers. One of these people indicated that they had all
received summons, including the boy. The court clerk at
that point came into court, and was asked by the prosecutor
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whether this case was on the roll of that day. The clerk
could not find the papers for the case. At this point I was
wondering whether the proceedings were in progress. A
decision was made that the matter be postponed, and the
president announced the next date of the hearing as the
1.7.1987. The court had never been called to order
following the discussions of the prosecutor with the
witnesses, and later on with the clerk. The president then
stood to leave the court without adjourning the proceedings.
In any case, I thought the issue about postponement was over,
when I heard the prosecutor saying to the president "I was
saying that, since the papers for this case are not there,
the proceedings be postponed," to which the president just
responded "I'm coming right now". By this time I was
standing in amazement at what was happening. The president
emerged, everyone was told to stand up, thus calling the
court to order. Having announced the next date of the
hearing for the second time; on this occasion the court was
accordingly dismissed.
In addition to issues of the decorum of court, the above
observations reveal the unpreparedness with which
proceedings in these courts are handled. The papers for the
case were not available, yet the people concerned in the
matter had been summoned to come to court. Even the boy
whose name the prosecutor could not find on the list of
witnesses, as one of these people revealed; had received a
summons. Such occurrences are not rare at all in the
Central and Local Courts, despite the rule that cases should
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be properly scheduled.
The fact that the personnel in the customary courts no
longer come from the villages in which they work,63 does not,
however, seem to make them ignore all aspects of dispute
settlement relevant in the village context as reflected in
practice. The contention of the Attorney General is that,
while the presidents and other personnel may not come from
the villages in which they are stationed, they know about
village life, and, therefore, still give considerable regard
to various aspects important to the villagers, such as, for
example, the status relationships of the father to a son.
He noted that family status relationships are viewed as an
important element in dispute settlement processes, in the
Judicial Commissioners' Court as well. This indicates of
how these courts still fall back onto traditional practices.
It also represents an element of continuity with the
traditional system whereby customary values become
influential in proceedings which are otherwise expressly
regarded as official; and different in approach from those
in the "unofficial" courts. As a further proof that the
status relationship between the father and the son are still
upheld, in CO/MSLC/4/28.4.87, the court clerk said to a
witness "don't look your father in the eyes like that you".
This was a case involving payment of "Bohali" bride-wealth,
and the son was here being cross-examined by his father.
Because the prosecutor-clerk of court does not advise on
points of law and procedure, but also because of the
influence of adVf S burial principles, the president reaches
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his decision on the basis of his knowledge and experience.
The same position obtains in the Judicial Commissioners'
Court where the decision of the court is not influenced by
the assessor or any other adviser. This contrasts with what
happens in the "unofficial" Chiefs' courts in which the
decision is made jointly by the chief and his men of the
court.
The personnel in the Central and Local Courts, however,
are not trained legal professionals, and therefore lack
knowledge of the received law. As a result, they do not
stick by the procedures as written down. For example, as
stated by the Chief Magistrate, the presidents are people who
have been clerks in the same courts, and have now been
promoted on the basis of their experience and exposure to
court practice. A similar observation was made by the
Attorney General, who added that under the circumstances, the
presidents cannot be expected to have a full grasp of rules
of procedure and evidence, nor to have a full understanding
of what they mean and how they ought to be applied. So that
"if mistakes are being made, they will continue indefinitely,
as the system has devised its own internal mechanism of
producing its personnel."64 Similarly the point about the
educational standard of court presidents was raised by Acting
Chief Justice. He said that the Local Courts presidents do
not like the new procedures because of their low education,
but rather prefer and "are happy" with the simple procedures.
In his words:
So if you introduce something a little
complicated they do not even understand
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it. This is why we are careful that all
statutory offences - most of them at
least - should not go to those courts,
but should come to the Subordinate
[Magistrates] Courts. It is only the
Land Act which provides for cases to be
taken to a Local Court, most statutes
don't (Kheola: 16.2.1987).
The above, clearly demonstrate that there is full awareness
that the customary courts do not work according to the rules
set for them. This is explained and justified in terms of
factors such as the low educational standards of the
personnel in them, but also, from the statement of the Acting
Chief Justice, there is conscious effort to prohibit statutes
making provisions for the customary courts to handle things
that fall out of their understanding and their capabilities.
According to the Chief Magistrate even the Judicial
Commissioners cannot be held as trained in the received law
and its principles. They have only been trained in what he
termed "Local Law", which he described as a kind of in-
service or on-the-job training. As he further noted with
regard to the clerks of court, most of them are very young
women, whom he said "without prejudice, in their upbringing
do not take much notice of custom", yet suddenly they find
themselves confronted with situations in which they have to
meet complex customs and thus have to learn on the job, under
the guidance of other personnel who often also have little
understanding of how things ought to be done; in accordance
with the new procedures. The customary courts personnel, as
he pointed out, are offered no training in the customary law
and its procedures either. He expressed that the occasional
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training courses run by the Training Officer from the
Ministry of Justice, are simply inadequate to redeem these
courts from the manner in which they presently operate. He
said that "they are literally crawling in the darkness". In
considering the application of accusatorial rules by the
customary courts in the context of Lesotho, therefore,
caution must be exercised, as in practice many of the rules
are modified to suit the circumstances of the courts presided
by "judges" not professionally trained in law, but also the
suit the economic and social circumstances of the populations
served who are neither familiar with these new rules.
As the Attorney General stated, in theoretical terms,
(as against what really happens in practice) the rules of
evidence and procedure in the customary courts are similar to
those applied in the received law courts, the differences
being only of detail. This is particularly so in criminal
proceedings. The Acting Chief Justice reaffirmed this by
stating that customary procedures are no longer in use. The
trial in a Local Court, he said, has to be presented in a
proper way as in any other court.65 For example, he
indicated that hearsay evidence is unacceptable even in these
courts. At the same time it is important to take into
consideration the point made by the Judicial Commissioners,
that the customary courts, unlike the received law courts are
not so bound to work on strict technicalities of the legal
rules. This statement of the Judicial Commissioners, is
important because it tends to explain a lot about the
practice in the customary courts, whereby rules as such are
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still not taken very seriously, as the observations conducted
in these courts revealed.
For example, the Judicial Commissioner in CO/4/JCCQ/JCS/
3.6.87 noted his recognition that procedure had not been
followed in the first instance court, - a witness was allowed
to give evidence after both sides had closed their cases.
But then he went on to state that, however, even the High
Court has recognised that such "things" (mistakes) do happen
in the lower courts. He said this is understandable in view
of educational standard of the personnel manning these
courts, the result of which is that the accusatorial
procedures are not exclusively enforced. In agreement, the
Attorney General stated that the customary courts, do not pin
people down to the technical points of procedure but rather,
place emphasis on the facts of a case.
The point admitted here is that these courts have ceased
to be regulated exclusively by traditional rules. At the
same time, the new rules of procedure are not strictly
adhered to, because of recognizable constraints. While
Palmer and Poulter (1972) indicate the movement towards more
modern practices (that is, towards the received law
practices) has been generally welcome over the years; on
close examination of the manner in which these courts operate
there exist certain conditions which prevent the full
application of the accusatorial principles at this level of
the judicial hierarchy. These circumstances include the
level of training of the personnel, and the lack of
understanding and knowledge about the acWe.r£ ex rial procedures
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among the Basotho people generally. It is on the basis of
facts revealed by the information gathered through interviews
and observations that the thesis argues that in practice the
customary courts represent a compromise between the
procedures and rules of evidence of the "unofficial"
mechanisms of dispute settlement and those of the received
system as the following descriptions indicate.
While in certain instances it is evident that the new
rules have become influential, in practice, even in the
Judicial Commissioners' Court; no convictions or any other
judgements are ever set aside purely on the basis of
technical defects or omissions of the rules of procedure or
evidence. This is exemplified in CO/4/JCCQ/JCS/3.6.87.23.66
However, undue regard to technicalities is generally not
encouraged. The court has to satisfy itself, irrespective
of such defects or omissions, that the party concerned is
wrongly convicted. In cases whereby conviction or judgement
is set aside, it has to be considered whether a new trial
should be ordered. In some instances, particularly where
legal practitioners are involved in the proceedings, rules of
procedure and evidence are strictly applied.
The following example serves to illustrate how in other
respects, the new rules have gained a greater strength. In
CO/6/JCCQ/JCS/3.6.87, there was an intervention by the
Judicial Commissioner directing that "justice must be seen to
be done". The assessor was requested to recuse himself,
because one of the decisions relating to the matter, had been
made while he was president of the Central Court concerned -
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the dispute dated back to 1980. Thus because of his prior
knowledge and involvement in the matter he could not be
allowed to partake in the current proceedings, otherwise
justice would not be seen to have been done. This contrasts
sharply with the position in the "unofficial" courts whereby
people become involved in the proceedings of a court,
precisely because they possess prior knowledge about the
dispute, and it is such knowledge which they can bring forth
as part of the attempt to arrive at a just solution.
In other areas, however, procedure reflects that used in
the "unofficial" courts, and is thus very different from that
prevailing in the received law courts. Right through the
system of the customary courts one finds this blending of
procedure and rules of evidence which are of different
origins; producing a process which is neither traditional
nor purely based on the received law rules. So that the
whole system can be described as a new legal system in the
making. The next descriptions provide examples which confirm
this allegation further. A good example demonstrating that
in practice, these courts still incorporate a lot from the
procedure of the "unofficial" courts pertains to swearing or
taking an oath; which is still not a practice in the
customary courts as in the "unofficial" courts. As indicated
by Judge Molai:
In the Local Courts, people are not
sworn, they are simply warned to tell the
truth, which I have always said is
simpler than what we do here, in this
[High] Court (Molai: 3.3.1987).
This was further confirmed in an interview with the Judicial
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Commissioners who stated that, in the customary courts people
are simply admonished to speak the truth, and do not take an
oath as is done in the received law courts. Regardless of
his statement as quoted above, Judge Molai added that
procedure may not be as simple as often stated. He said
that for instance, in the Local Courts procedure is more
sophisticated than in the "unofficial" courts. As he put
it:
The accused must stand in a certain box
you call a dock, and it is one fool at a
time. It is not simply anybody who can
stand up at any time (Molai: 3.3.1987).
The Judicial Commissioners urged that procedure in these
courts should be kept simple, so that it remains
commenstruate with the people's understanding. In practical
terms this seems to imply, the application or use of more
customary procedures as against the more sophisticated and
complex ones brought by the advent of the received law.
At this juncture it is important to reflect upon the
provision that the customary courts are to follow customary
rules of procedure and evidence, except where some other
rules are laid down. The fact is that, as pointed out by
Maope ( 1986), the rules meant for the guidance of these
courts are laid down by statute, and they appear to be
"ordinary simplified accusatory rules" and not customary law
procedures. In the interview with him, however, the
Attorney General, pointed out the practical reality to be
reckoned with is that the focus of procedure in the Central
and Local Courts is on the facts of individual cases, rather
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than on technical issues of the law and procedure. He
stated how because of this simplicity of procedure, many
business concerns in Maseru, for example, take matters
against their debtors to the Special Local Court; and he
further pointed out that the process is quick. As he
indicated:
One is simply asked whether he does owe
the business concerned, and if the answer
is in the affirmative, one is simply
asked to pay (Maope: 16.2.1987).
As I observed the proceedings of these courts, I
realized that even principles of framing a charge do not
apply. The parties simply state the issues in dispute in
their own words and by themselves, or sometimes through a
non-legal representative, such as a relative. As the
Attorney General noted; the simplicity of procedure is
maintained by the fact that:
You are sued for something you [know] see
and you hear [understand]. You are told
that you once purchased a dress, yet you
have not yet paid. That is all (Maope:
16.2.1987) .
The cause for dispute is stated in simple terms, not
presented as a sophisticated legal claim, requiring special
proof as defined, for example, in the received law of
evidence. The Acting Chief Justice made a statement
reaffirming the simplicity of procedure in the Local and
Central Courts. He stated that the pleadings are simple.
A litigant in a case, simply goes to a court and tells the
clerk that he should issue summons and indicates that "I'm
suing X, he has taken by car or anything " as the cause might
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be. As he further explained:
It is as simple as that, and then when
they [litigants] come on the day of the
trial; they don't have formal pleadings.
They just go into the "witness box" and
give evidence. (Kheola: 16.2.1987).
In concluding this statement, the Acting Chief Justice
mentioned that, in this way it may be said practice in the
Local Courts is not the same as that in the superior courts,
where, among other things, a case ought to be filed
accordingly and appropriate papers have to be drafted through
services of a lawyer.
Another interesting example illustrating the
appreciation of the simplicity of procedure, came up during
the interview with the Attorney General. He began by
stating that people who do not know much about court process
believe that the "quality of justice, in terms of getting a
speedy and satisfying solution, is at the Magistrates'
Courts"; yet it is not necessarily so. To demonstrate this
he gave an example of a case involving two lawyers - one
Motlamelle and another Monaphathi. The two had a dispute
over a type-writer. They took the matter to Mat"aL& Local
Court and not to the Magistrates "because they were aware
that the process would be fast, and that they would get what
they want". The matter was heard and Monaphathi lost the
case. Within two weeks, he had taken an appeal before the
Matsieng Central Court; but he lost again. As the Attorney
General stated:
The process was quick. At the
Magistrates' Courts, it would have taken
months or even a year. Here the matter
was set before the court, and Monaphathi
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was served with the summons. The date
of the hearing was set and on that day,
the matter was heard and completed.
Then an appeal was lodged, within a short
time it was over. (Maope 16.4.1987).
An explanation offered by Judge Molai, is that, people tend
to believe that there is an "association between the standard
of education and the quality of justice". They tend to
assume that because the personnel in the received law courts
are better educated, they offer a better quality of justice.
As he put it:
But everybody is clamouring that the
magistrates courts are better, because
they believe people who have been to
school know better than a person who has
never been to school. I agree on a
number of issues, but what about custom?
Do you need to learn it in school? ... I
have studied customary law in school but
I don't think I am better off than an
ordinary Mosotho in the village.
They've got a lot of things they know and
those are the better people . . . People
who go there [customary courts] are
Basotho, and they understand what they go
there for. (Molai: 4.3.1987).
The Rules guiding these courts furthermore provide that,
the statements made by the parties and witnesses should be
recorded verbatim during the hearing. Several difficulties
emerge in practice from the implementation of this
requirement. First, the parties and witnesses often have to
be reminded several times, to allow the presidents enough
time to finish writing down the evidence. Secondly, purely
practical problems are experienced by the presidents
themselves in recording the proceedings verbatim, and this
often causes delays. In RSTCC/2/M/30.4.87, for example, a
lengthy debate ensued between the prosecutor and one of the
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witnesses on the one hand, and the president and the defence
counsel on the other. The argument was over the number of
items (in the form of cattle) the witness had so far stated
in his evidence. The former two claimed that 8 items had
been counted, while the latter argued that they had recorded
only 6. When the witness went over his description of the
cattle for the second time, 8 of them were mentioned. The
president and the defence counsel this time concurred. This
shows how difficult it can sometimes be to take every piece
of detail in the evidence down verbatim, but furthermore the
length of even an average trial could be doubled.
Together with the provision that statements should be
recorded in a narrative form, it is stipulated that
statements must be read back to the party or witness
concerned, and then signed by him. However, as established
from the discussions with the Judicial Commissioners this
rule is not strictly adhered to. Some of the courtroom
observations carried out during the field research confirmed
this. On several occasions during the observations of
courtroom proceedings in the Special Local Court in Maseru,
and also in the Roving Stock-theft Central Court, I saw
witnesses being asked to sign for their statements, although
these had not first been read out to them. Perhaps all
this, is with the aim of saving on time. But the problems
posed by such short-cutting of procedure are brought to light
in the proceedings of the Judicial Commissioners' Court,
which as already mentioned earlier, base themselves on the
case-records from the lower courts. The following examples
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come from some of the observed proceedings, in which something
wrong was spotted regarding the records brought before the
Judicial Commissioners' Court. Some of the defects or
omissions in procedure could perhaps be avoided, if the
statements of the parties or witnesses could always be read
out to them before they signed for them.
In CO/7/JCCQ/JCS/4.6.87, for example, the appellant
disputed that the statements which he was being referred to
by the Judicial Commissioner were his, although he could not
substantiate his claim. As it emerged as the proceedings
continued a peculiar situation had occurred, when the case
was on appeal before the Central Court. The Judicial
Commissioner revealed from the record that the concerned
party had not at any point been allowed to speak for himself
at the Central Court. Thus he could not have signed for any
statement. As the Judicial Commissioner pointed out to the
appellant:
You did not give any statement in your
own defence, you only asked [your
opponent] questions. There is no record
that you ever spoke . . . You did not say
anything; therefore, your case was not
heard, you were cheated. Your case was
never stated, therefore you were never
asked to sign at the Central Court.
The matter was referred back to the Central Court for another
hearing, as a result of this inaccuracy in procedure. The
appellant did not raise this technical point of procedure in
his own defence - his only concern being his dissatisfaction
with the judgement - the point was raised by the Judicial
Commissioner instead. In addition, it confirms the argument
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made earlier that certain omissions regarding set procedure
are not overlooked or condoned.
In CO/8/JCCQ/JCS/4.5.87, there was an argument regarding
the content of the records. The appellant disputed that he
ever admitted to having plougheda. field " tsimo" before the
Central Court. He stated:
I said I ploughed a garden "jarete".
The Judicial Commissioner pointed out that, what the
appellant was saying was not what was stated in the record.
The record said the site in dispute was a field. When
questioned, the appellant agreed to having signed for the
statement, but said it was not read out to him before he did.
In fact he mentioned that he did not know that it ought to
have been read to him before he could append his signature.
The reality of the whole situation is that, the proceedings
are conducted under the laws and rules which most people have
never even read before. That is, besides the point that
most of them are written in English which most people are not
much conversant with.
In Poulter (1976) it is stated that in the Local and
Central Courts, the evidence of the parties and their
witnesses is recorded verbatim in Sesotho during the
proceedings, but that when an appeal is lodged to the
Judicial Commissioners' Court, a full transcript of the
evidence together with the judgements of the lower courts and
the appellant's grounds of appeal, is forwarded to the
Judicial Commissioners' Court where it is translated into
English. The practice of translating the transcripts into
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English for appeal in the Judicial Commissioners' Court has
fallen into disuse since these officials are now Basotho
conversant in the Sesotho language. In the matter above it
was not possible to work out what had actually happened;
especially because as the Chief Magistrate confirmed, the
records from the lower courts are today still in Sesotho when
they come to the Judicial Commissioners' Court; and are only
translated into English, if a matter proceeds further to the
High Court. Thus the words "j arete" garden and field
"tsimo" cannot have possibly been mixed up during the
translation process. What is obvious from this case, is
that it is possible to lose the whole context of the dispute
through bad recording of proceedings about what was actually
said. Because of other inaccuracies established in the
manner this particular case had been handled by the lower
courts, it was ultimately decided that it should go back to
the Local Court for fresh proceedings. From the
observations of other proceedings, it seemed that language
inaccuracies of similar nature recur as problems during the
trials. For example, in RSTCC/2/M/30.4.87, there was an
argument between the prosecutor and a witness over the
concepts "morena" chief, and "ramotse" headman. The former
claimed that both refer to the same, to which the witness
could not agree. Some of these language problems could be
avoided if all statements were read out to the parties or
witnesses for verification, before they are requested to sign
for them in the lower courts, and this could counter
innumerable delays in the administration of justice.
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In CO/9/JCCQ/JCS/4.6.87, yet another aspect relating to
the keeping of records in the customary courts was revealed.
In this case the respondent revealed that he had submitted
further papers as proof of his ownership of the cow in
dispute. He mentioned that the papers had been presented to
the Central Court and added that the record ("docket") had
gone missing at some point. The Judicial Commissioner
discovered that the papers were not included in the file
before him, but even more than that, the president made no
mention of the loss of the record. As he further pointed
out, the case appeared to be muddled, the reason being that
it was a longstanding matter, dating back to 1983. There had
been several interjections by the Magistrate as well. He
also noted that "justice would appear not to have been done
if the said papers were not included as exhibits". The
papers included one letter from the police and another from
the chief. Both contained evidence concerning ownership of
the cow in dispute. Therefore, the matter was referred back
to the Central Court, with an order that the papers mentioned
above be accepted, and that a different president should hear
the matter.
The cases described above, reflect upon the variety of
problems existing in the Local and Central Courts with regard
to taking down of evidence and keeping records. Some of
these become more evident when the records are scrutinised in
the Judicial Commissioners' Court. One prominent reason for
the faulty recording is that, the personnel engaged in this
work are not properly trained for the kind of task they have
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been put in charge of.67 They seem not to fully appreciate
the importance of proper record-keeping, and the consequences
that may result where decisions are based on inaccurate
records. The foregoing descriptions further reflect that
the proceedings in these courts are completely different
processes from the ones in the "unofficial" courts. It
further reaffirms what Perry (1977) for instance, argued that
the proceedings in the Local Courts are now marked by a
greater degree of formality than those in the chiefs' courts
as noted earlier. Palmer and Poulter (1972) too, make a
similar observation that the procedure that used to obtain in
the past has been modernized and is now much closer to that
in the other courts, meaning the received law courts.
The above examples further reveal that while it may be
thought that procedure in the customary courts is still very
simple as mentioned by the Acting Chief Justice, and also by
the Attorney General, in practice some attempt is made to
abide by the new rules, and that where this does not happen
the presiding officer is expected to act accordingly. For
example, he can or is expected to refer the matter back to
the court where the observance of procedure was overlooked.
Further provision is made in the Rules, that regular
hours of hearings should be kept, and that cases should be
efficiently scheduled and handled. From the observations
carried out it appeared that while cases are to a large
extent scheduled, a lot of negotiations take place as to when
particular cases should be called, often at the convenience
of legal counsels. Thus those who are not legally
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represented have the disadvantage that their cases may be
heard last. Sometimes also, the documents of scheduled
cases would not be ready or left as some other office. An
example here would be in RSTCC/3/M/30.4.87 in which the
prosecutor could not find the name of one of the witnesses
summoned on his list - the name did not appear at all. The
same case could not proceed because the clerk of court could
not locate the papers for the proceedings. Therefore, the
matter was postponed, the witnesses had to return home.
From what I understood later on, the witnesses could not
leave on the same day as the buses to where they came from
had already left; which meant they would have to wait until
the following day. The situation became even more
complicated and desperate, when one of the clerks of court
declared that these people could not receive their allowances
immediately, because the court had not collected any funds
that day. To this the prosecutor remarked:
Does this mean in this court witnesses
receive allowances only when fines have
been paid?
Thus not all scheduled cases are handled on the date set for
their hearing. This arises out of many different
circumstances, such as failure to secure the attendance of
witnesses. In the circumstances delays in the
administration of justice are encountered.
Another frequent feature appeared to be failure to begin
proceedings on time. A good example of this was on
28.4.1987, when I was to observe proceedings in the Roving
Stock-theft Court in Maseru. The proceedings ought to have
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started at 8.00 in the morning, yet the prosecutor himself
did not show up until 9.20, and the president arrived at 9.30.
During the period of awaiting these officials, I was able to
record several statements of dissatisfaction. One comment
for instance, came from one of the counsels who was to appear
in one of the matters. At one point he was talking to one
of the court officials, whom I believed to be a clerk asking
as to where the president was. The Counsel complained:
When it is us [understood to be referring
to Counsels] failing to attend, you find
that you push our cases through with
undue justice.
In response the clerk merely replied "that is not justice".
Later on, the same counsel made a further comment, this time
speaking to two policemen who were waiting outside the court:
This is not a fair administration of
justice. When people are late, that is
taken to be contempt of court without
taking the reasons for their lateness
into account. While it is the court
staff who do not observe time, nothing is
done.
On 10.8.1987, I had gone to observe the proceedings of
Maja Local Court. On arrival at 10.55 the people who had
cases to be heard were waiting, but there was no president.
In the office were two court clerks who informed me that
there would be no proceedings that day and for the whole
week, as the president would be engaged at another court.
When I walked into the office, a quite elderly-looking woman
was talking to the court clerks about her case. She was
complaining about the expenditure she was incurring - coming
to court only to find that the matter would not be
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proceeding. Similar delays were revealed from the
observations in the Judicial Commissioners' court. In
CO/8/JCCQ/JCS/4.6.87 for example, it appeared from the record
that at one point when the matter was to be heard, one party
was, on arrival, directed by the Local Court to go to the
Central Court. But on arrival there, he discovered that his
witnesses had, on the other hand, proceeded to the Local
court; where he too had been summoned. The case had been
called several times prior to that. On the first occasion,
he stated that they had again been summoned, but on arrival
at the Local Court, the president was not there. On the
second, the summons had different dates. On the third he
was alone, and his opponent absent. On yet another occasion
subsequent to that, when he arrived he found the court clerk
drinking beer sitting with his opponent. On that occasion
he went directly to the magistrate who then proceeded to the
court immediately. The magistrate then advised him to make
a request that his case be heard by the Central Court as a
matter of first instance, since the Local Court had failed to
serve him. This indicates some of the complications arising
out of the implementation of the new rules. Many of these
instances are a common phenomenon in these courts.
Another aspect of the Rules stipulates that the courts
ought to draw distinctions between what is acceptable or
admissible evidence, and what types of evidence are
inadmissible or cannot be acceptable as valid for decisions.
In other words, the courts ought to draw sharp distinctions
between categories such as hearsay and primary evidence, and
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so on. They also have to distinguish between the firmness
of the evidence of an eye witness and the difficulties
attendant on determining guilt or liability by circumstantial
evidence. From the observations carried out, however, it
became clear that these requirements are still not fully or
adequately understood by the people generally. The Acting
Chief Justice noted that the rules directing that hearsay
evidence is not acceptable; apply equally to the customary
courts and the Magistrates Courts. Judge Molai on the other
hand pointed out that, the practical reality is that the
people do not understand rules such as those pertaining to
hearsay, so that in his explanation, people see the new
procedure as complicated. As he put it:
they say if he was told [this
evidence] by his father, why should the
court refuse his evidence. (Molai:
43.3.1987) .
This statement further shows the importance attached to
father-son relationships in the traditional setting. But
what Judge Molai said confuses the people even more, is that
in the so-called chiefs' "Administrative" courts, hearsay
evidence is acceptable. Such sharp distinctions between the
types of evidence are not made in the "unofficial" courts in
which as stated in Allott ( 19 6 5 ), 58 no person's opinion would
go unregarded or any fact be overlooked.
What emerged from the observations of CO/4/JCCQ/JCS/
3.6.87, is that distinctions between what does and what does
not constitute hearsay evidence cannot be so easily drawn.
This was, according to the respondent's statement, a case of
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dispute over land dating back to 1968. As the Judicial
Commissioner noted, the claim was with regard to the right to
inheritance of land and not concerning the allocation. The
counsel for the appellant instead seemed to be questioning
the allocation itself, because he claimed that according to
the evidence of the respondent, the said land had been
allocated to him by the chief's assistant. The logical
conclusion he was drawing from the evidence was, therefore,
as he said, that all the chief knew of the allocation and the
disputes ensuing therefrom, constituted hearsay. The chief
in his view failed to give evidence showing direct knowledge
of the allocation. The Judicial Commissioner on the other
hand,said that the allocation (which he stressed was not at
issue here) was quite normal and in order; as the chiefs do
not always allocate land in person, but receive reports of
allocations made, thus the chief's evidence in this matter
could not be held to be hearsay. Two points arise here.
First, there is the argument whether the chief's evidence
constituted hearsay. But secondly, the debate shows the
counsel's failure to keep to the cause for dispute, which
concerned the right to inheritance and not the allocation as
such.
The lay people as well, do not understand how decisions
about hearsay evidence are reached. For instance, they do
not comprehend how information given to the son by the
father; as illustrated in Judge Molai's statement quoted
above,69 can be regarded as hearsay. The father in their
perspective, is an important figure in relation to the son,
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and they do not understand how information passed from father
to son can be regarded as hearsay. The standards of
parental respect and authority, figured more prominently in
the proceedings of some of the observed cases. For example,
in case MSLC/4/28.4.87, where the court clerk reprimanded a
son, for looking the father straight in the face. In
Sesotho custom that is generally taken to be a sign of
disrespect. This case was in the Township of Maseru, a
clear indication that the forms of authority prescribed by
custom, are still not easy to shed even in a community
otherwise considered to be urban, and supposedly free of
traditional norms and values.
The problem confronting people with regard to selecting
what evidence to present to the court does not only arise
with the principle of hearsay. Another widespread tendency
is to include in the evidence, issues which are not directly
connected to the matter presently before the court, and which
are therefore not of immediate relevance to the case the
court is to resolve. In CO/8/JCCQ/JCS/4.6.87 for instance,
the respondent, in justifying his action for taking the
matter to the Central Court following advice given by the
magistrate, failed to state that it was because the Local
Court had failed to offer him assistance. Instead his
reason was that, he had another matter before the Local Court
already, and for three months nothing had happened. The
Judicial Commissioner had to remind him several times to
address himself to the current dispute, in stating his
grounds why he had wanted the Central, other than the Local
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Court to hear his case as a matter of first instance. In
addition, the respondent was told that in taking the matter
to the Central Court, he had not informed his opponent
accordingly, as required in terms of Section 31 of the
Central and Local Courts Proclamation No. 62 of 1938.
Therefore, the Judicial Commissioner decided, it was wrong
for the matter to have been brought to his court on appeal,as
Section 31 above had not been observed. He, therefore,
referred the matter back to the Local Court. In Case
CO/13/JCCQ/JCS4.6.87; the respondent raised an issue
relating to "maboella" reserved pastures. The Judicial
Commissioner told him that, the matter in court concerned a
claim for damages not reserved pastures, and that the
respondent had to address himself to the cause of dispute.
Problems such as these are not peculiar to the customary
courts, but are common phenomena in the received law courts
as well, as shall be indicated in the next chapter.
Another crucial aspect in the rules of procedure and
evidence in the customary courts pertains to the manner of
presenting evidence. The question and answer method of
eliciting evidence from the concerned parties and their
witnesses, is a new phenomenon to the Basotho, and it
accompanied the advent of the more legalistic and inflexible
rules of evidence and procedure. According to the Rules,
the two parties come to the court as formal litigants, and
have to run the case for themselves. They are responsible
for all questioning and cross-examining and cannot rely on
the court for this, because the court only puts questions to
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clear up vague points for itself. The whole procedure is
built upon the assumption that the parties come to court as
equal contestants or adversaries, having the knowledge of the
law and procedure of eliciting relevant and acceptable
evidence, to strengthen their positions in the cases.
As argued in the autobiography of Jingoes (Perry and
Perry, 1975), the procedure above is beyond the grasp of the
average peasant, who has no legal experience of this nature.
The point is that the people are used to telling their story
unled, and not to the question-answer method used in the
official courts. They find in them, nothing of the
"unofficial" courts' procedure in which the parties are
allowed to speak out, even about things which might at first
appear irrelevant, but may later turn out to be crucial. As
discussed previously in regard to CO/8/JCCQ/JCS/4.6.87, for
example, the parties still find it difficult to address
themselves only to the details of the case before the court,
and in many cases, several reminders often have to be made
that they should keep to the disputes before the courts. In
MSLC/2/23.4.87, for instance, one party made reference to one
Mokopela, and the president told him not to speak of people
not concerned in the case. In case RSTCC/2/M/30.4. 87, one
witness included, even the cattle not involved in the case,
in giving the descriptions of the items to the court.
As observed in the proceedings before the Maseru Special
Local Court, the parties were given a choice, by asking them
whether or not, they liked to lead their witnesses with
questions in eliciting evidence. Often they chose not to;
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preferring to let the witnesses tell their own story of their
own accord. This is another indication of how traditional
practices are still prevalent in the customary courts.
Where the choice to lead the witnesses with questions was
taken, several difficulties often emerged. A reminder
should be made that the parties would often be carrying out
the questioning themselves, as legal practitioners seldom
appear at this level, with the exception of some proceedings
in the Stock-theft Central Court and the Court of the
Judicial Commissioners.70 In MSLC/1/23.4.87, the respondent
had to be reminded not to interrupt the complainant, but to
give her time to finish whatever she wanted to say, that is,
before asking her another question. Even where the
witnesses were to be led with questions, they sometimes
proceeded to recite their evidence. This was the problem in
MSLC/2/23.4.87 with one of the witnesses. The court clerk
finally had to warn him not to recite "se ka qoqa".
In MSLC/1/23.4.87 also; it emerged that the complainant
had problems of asking questions - ran into the problem of
formulating them as statements sometimes, which prompted the
respondent at one point to state:
You are now telling me [that there was
M90.00] and yet it was said you should
ask me questions.
At that point, the complainant became blank and could ask no
further questions. In case MSLC/2/23.4.87, on the other
hand, the respondent had a problem of asking too many
questions all in one go, and of repeating himself. At one
time one of the complainant's witnesses had to say to him:
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"could you ask your question properly". The respondent also
had the tendency to make statements instead of asking
questions. In RSTCC/2/M/30.4.87, when the prosecutor
reminded a witness that he is compelled to answer questions,
the witness responded "I too say you should ask them in a
manner I will be able to reply to them."
In certain instances it seemed the people did not know
what would follow next. A witness in case MSLC/2/23.34.87
for instance, wanted to leave the court immediately before
being cross-examined, but was told to wait. She appeared to
be confused as if she did not know that she ought to be
cross-examined.
As also observed from some of the proceedings, in being
questioned, the parties or witnesses would answer, but
frequently they would want to elaborate by giving further
explanations about their responses. In case
RSTCC/2/M/30.4.87, the prosecutor had wanted to stop a witness
from giving further explanation; and said, "you have not
answered me, I don't want those reasons "mabakanyana" of
yours". In retaliation, the witness responded:
Me too, my statement should be noted as
of some strength ( "e tsoanela ho behoa
matla a mang").
Later on another argument broke between the same witness and
the prosecutor. The witness had wanted to indicate that the
chief and headman were different people. The prosecutor
said:
When I speak of the "morena" chief, I
actually mean the same "ramotse" headman.
It is the same thing.
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As described earlier, the witness could not be convinced by
this explanation. As a result the prosecutor wanted to give
a further explanation, only to be stopped by the president
who said they should address themselves to the case in
question.
Another kind of difficulty arose in cases in which a
relative would be representing a party, or assisting him to
conduct the case. Often these relations gave evidence as if
they were the parties themselves. On the principle of the
hearsay rule, such evidence is usually excluded on appeal to
the superior courts and, if it were the only evidence, the
party would be bound to lose the case on appeal, particularly
where he was the plaintiff. But of course the people are
not aware of the full implications of this; and of the
attendant consequences. In CO/24/JCCQ/JCS/10.6.87 for
example, the appellant was represented by his wife. In
giving the grounds for the appeal she said "I do not
understand to pay compensation for . . . " . Before she could
even complete her statement, the Judicial Commissioner
interrupted saying:
You are not the party making the claim.
You are simply appearing on his behalf
though you suffered injuries, which were
confirmed by a doctor, in person.
In this case, although the woman in court was the one who had
suffered the injuries, as a married woman, she could not make
the claim on her own behalf because she is by law a minor.
On the defence side, the husband was the one in court,
although there was a counsel.
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A peculiar situation occurred in CO/26/JCCQ/JCS/
10.6.87. The respondent was not in court in person71 but
represented by someone. The Judicial Commissioner asked the
representative "why are you [the one] appearing, are you a
lawyer?" The representative claimed they were cousins with
the respondent. The Judicial Commissioner proceeded to read
out the provisions of Section 20 of Proclamation No.62 of
1938, and then asked the representative again:
Where do you fall? You are not husband
to the party, nor guardian, nor servant.
The Judicial Commissioner then called for the letter the
representative was holding. It was from the chief, but the
former said it did not state that he was a cousin to the
respondent. When the appellant was asked whether he agreed
to the representation, he stated that the two were mere
friends, and further mentioned that it was understandable how
the letter presented to the court had the chief's stamp - it
(the stamp) is kept by the respondent himself. The
appellant requested that the opinion of a more senior chief
be sought, otherwise he was not agreeing to the said
representation. The Judicial Commissioner was aware that
the respondent had been in court earlier, he summoned for
him. In the meantime he whispered to the assessor "this is
an obstruction of justice". After a brief adjournment while
the respondent was being looked for, the court resumed. The
respondent was told that he would speak for himself as the
appellant claimed his representative was not recognisable
under the law. He finally lost the case. This raises
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serious thoughts about how many of such irregularities, occur
at the lower structure of the customary courts and go through
without detection. It is also a crucial factor in the light
of the reality that, only very few cases ever reach the level
of appeal before the Judicial Commissioners' Court.
Examples and descriptions of what happens in the
customary courts in real practice, cannot be dealt with in
one piece of work, but the ones given in this chapter should
suffice to demonstrate the main features of the customary
courts, and the extent to which changes in the organisational
structure, jurisdiction and the law of procedure and evidence
have been effected, 50 years since the 1938 reforms were
proclaimed. Taking the argument that legal changes in
Lesotho actually date back to 1884 or even to 1871 (Burman
1976, Mokoma 1984/85), it is in fact over a century since
such changes were introduced; yet various complications
fostered by factors in the social environment within which
these courts operate, predominate the proceedings in these
courts as the descriptions demonstrate.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing descriptions strongly suggest that, a view
which deals with the customary courts without linking them to
the "unofficial" chiefs' courts, presents an incomplete
picture of dispute settlement processes operating in the
country today. In other words, it confirms the assertion
that the omission of either, or rather failure to recognise
that there is a kind of harmony or concord existing between
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the two; leads to an incomplete picture of the actual
judicial processes.
The descriptions also lead to the conclusion that the
adversarial rules have not gained a stronghold, instead they
are redefined at the advantage or convenience of both the
court personnel and the Basotho people in general. Within
this process of redefinition, much regard is still given to
indigenous judicial practices. Thus the operationalisation
of many aspects of the ad.vZ. CSctrial principles, within the
context of the customary courts structure in Lesotho, merits
careful consideration. The question is whether these
courts presided over by "magistrates" not professionally
trained in law are in any way different from the "unofficial"
courts in the manner in which they operate. Whatever the
response may be, what is most apparent is that what is
happening in these courts is not similar to the position
prevailing in the received law courts either. The system of
customary courts instead, represents a hybrid or composite
system resulting from the cross-functioning of principles
deriving from the indigenous mechanism of dispute settlement
on the one hand, and those originating from the principles of
the received law on the other.
To some extent, the customary courts represent a system
with attributes of a western adve,fs atrial system. In
theory, they have to apply customary law only within the
confines of the received law; also insofar as it does not
conflict with the latter, and if not inconsistent with the
rules set for their guidance. The extent to which these
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principles apply, has resulted in an oddly skewed and
truncated version of the law. The ad Ctrial rules and
statutes operating in the customary courts, are of a fashion
very different from those in the received law courts. This
is because the expectations and ideas that the people bring
to bear in the practice of the customary courts, are based on
their experience of a different form of dispute settlement,
and these affect how they make sense of the transplanted
(received) model. On the whole what they know is the
indigenous process for dispute settlement used in the
"unofficial" chiefs' courts. Thus what we have in reality
is a system composed of aspects of western-oriented law,
which has implanted into it; practices deriving from the
indigenous system. In between them, is a fringe where the
two interpermeate in a highly complex process of interaction.
At the same time, the customary courts cannot either be
held to be performing in exactly the same manner as the
chiefs' courts in the "unofficial" judicial structure.
Rather the customary courts, as some of the interviewed
informants uneguivocally indicated, are far more formalistic,
and much of the flexibility of the "unofficial" courts cannot
be recaptured because of differences inherent in the social
structure surrounding the two. Certainly the flexibility of
the chiefs' courts may not continue to be effective in
securing justice, when the "judges" in the customary courts
are no longer selected from among the local communities, and
are thus no longer conversant with the people in their
respective villages; with the customary law and daily
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practice, and with what the people expect from the courts.
If people less knowledgeable and less interested in
reconciling parties are appointed (as represented in the
powers given these courts to even imprison), the same
looseness of procedure may not be conducive to justice and it
may be necessary, therefore, to lay down strict rules.72
With the implementation of the 1938 Proclamations over
the years, the position of the customary courts in relation
to the "unofficial" courts structure has been quite an
interesting one. There is what may be termed a "continuity"
between the two; which becomes obvious when examining the
way they function. Jurisdictionally, the responsibilities
of the "unofficial" and the official customary courts seem to
converge. For instance, the Acting Chief Justice pointed
out that in all minor criminal matters, people ought to be
referred to the Local Courts under the law. However, he
further explained, that in practice:
. . . When you later claim compensation you
may go to the chief, and then if a man
says I offer R30, Well you [he] may hand
it over in front [the presence] of the
chief, and that is the end of the matter.
If you say R30 is not enough and the
other [party] says that is the only thing
I can offer, then it will have to go to
a court of law ... (Kheola: 16.2.1987)
The chiefs quite obviously manage to settle a lot of these
matters, out of the official courts of law.
Further suggestions concerning this "continuity" are
pointed out in Hamnett (1975). He indicates that, many
court clerks refuse to register cases, unless the litigant
produces a letter from his chief. This, as he points out is
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illegal, but is a practice connived at by both the courts and
chiefs, and where, as often is the case, a disputant is not
sufficiently literate to cope with the formal side of his
case, the chief and the "arbitration court" perform an
essential function in helping him to complete the formal
procedure and prepare himself for the hearing.
In the present day, as confirmed by the Director of
Public Prosecutions and Resident Magistrate Mohale, the
practice of asking people coming to the Local Courts whether
they have letters from their chiefs, still persists despite
its "illegality". In addition, the acceptance of the
practice as a necessary way of doing things by the Director
of Public Prosecutions and Chief Magistrate, raises doubts
whether it is in reality regarded as "illegal" and even
"unofficial". A more revealing observation was made in the
Maseru Special Local Court on 27.4.1987. Before the
proceedings started for the day, a woman was discussing a
matter involving some money which had been brought to the
court. As it emerged from the discussion, she was owing
someone an amount of M5.00, and had been unable to pay, so
her lender was suing her for non-payment. The woman was
indicating to the court clerks that she now in a position to
pay. The court clerks advised her to go back to the Chief
(Mabote) to discuss the matter, and settle it out of court.
She was told that she could indicate to the Chief that she
wanted the matter to be settled before him and not be brought
to the Local Court again. This is evidence of encouragement
by official court personnel, advising a member of the public
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to pursue her matter (already before the courts of law) and
settle it in an "unofficial" structure, which is, under the
law, not supposed to exercise judicial powers.
Once the case is before the court, the chief's
responsibilities do not cease. He could make sure that
witnesses are cited, and decisions reached by the court
should be communicated to him, so that he ensures that their
terms are understood and followed through. In criminal
matters, the evidence of the chief is often a decisive
element in the case, and he is frequently an important
witness in civil actions as well, not least of course in
matters concerning the allocation of land. The role of
chief in the administration of justice is thus an important
one even at this level, and in various ways (Hamnett 1975),
pointing further to the element of "continuity" between the
chiefs' courts and the customary courts.
From the observation of the operation of the customary
courts proceedings, and from the interviews that were carried
out, another conclusion that can be drawn, is that the
procedures followed are not formalistic to a large extent,
but are in fact so discretionary that, as said once before,
they amount to a process of a new law in the making. Not
only are the received law standards of procedure and evidence
frequently overlooked, as demonstrated in some of the cases
cited in the preceding sections, but in addition, principles
of the indigenous law and procedure are resorted to whenever
felt necessary and convenient, because the presiding officers
have inadequate legal training, hence they lack an
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understanding of the received procedures and evidence rules.
The people too are comfortable with the old ones. This
suggests that "rules" as such are not fundamental in the
Customary Courts. The familiar formal law model of linking
"facts" to "rules" to deductively arrive at a legal
decision, does not necessarily seem to apply here.
It is clear that in the operations of the customary
courts structure, there exists a combination of norms and
practices emanating from the chiefs' courts and the received
law courts respectively, exerting pressure upon and
influencing the manner in which the adv£.<~SCtrial rules of
procedure and evidence are put into force. This pulls the
practice in these courts in different directions; producing
a system built on compromise and blending of various
procedures. However, it cannot be denied that the change in
the nature of the judicial process as set up by the colonial
administrations, has been a relatively profound one. It has
meant loss of flexibility and informality in the proceedings
to some measure, making the present customary law and its
system of courts an amalgam of traditional and many imported
factors, especially as regards their structure and
philosophy. These have had an enormous impact, not only on
customary courts, but in dispute settlement in general.
Therefore, any accurate portrait of the judicial system must
take all of these factors into account.
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CHAPTER 5
THE OFFICIAL COURTS II : THE RECEIVED LAW COURTS
The received law courts structure forms the second level
of the official courts' hierarchy. It is composed, first, of
the Subordinate (Magistrates) Courts at the lowest level,
above which stands the High Court, and finally, is the Court
of appeal at the apex. The descriptions in this chapter are
in the main restricted to the first two, although in
describing the structure of these courts, the court of appeal
is included.
The chapter first deals with the issue of the
relationship between the received law courts and the customary
courts, both of which as mentioned once before constitute the
officially recognised judicial structure. But in addition,
attention is given to the argument that the received law
courts represent the more adv e,rscurial structure, than appears
to be the case with the customary courts. The analysis of the
relationship between the two sets of courts, starts off with
the descriptions about the organisation and the jurisdiction
of the received law courts. Certain characteristics
determining the relationship between the two are discussed.
These include such aspects as geographical jurisdiction, and
jurisdiction in the terms of both offences and punishment.
In this regard it shall be illustrated that the received
courts possess more wider- powers than the customary courts and
that in that respect they occupy a position of seniority.
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A different line of thinking from the one currently-
depicted in the existing literature, which views the official
courts structure not only as dualistic; consisting of the
customary courts and the received law courts, but also sees
the two as functioning parallel to and in conflict with one
another is offered. What comes out of the descriptions made
in this section is that while here one may not necessarily
talk of the "blending" of procedures accruing from processes
of different origin, even at this level of the official
courts one finds a hybrid system whose character is highly
influenced by cultural determinants operating in the
"unofficial" and the customary courts. What will be argued
is that the received law courts appear to be adversarial in
theory more than in practical terms. Examples of courtroom
observations are used to validate this argument, pointing at
a number of factors that prevent these courts from operating
according to the ad ve. rS. cgrial rules.
The next area of focus in the chapter pertains to the
nature of proceedings of the received law courts and the
question of how these are closely linked to their counterparts
in the western world. First, the point that the proceedings
in the received law courts differ from those in the customary
courts and even more from those of the "unofficial" chiefs'
courts shall be made. This, it will be argued, is primarily
evidenced by the fact that the received law courts proceedings
place high emphasis on rules contained in legal texts. Also
that these rules are inclined towards western legal theory and
the ad,Ve."fS.&Tial model. To this extent, it is argued that it
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would be possible to draw some comparisons between the
received law courts and how the advgfS ctrial model has been
found to work in other parts of the world. The degree to
which such analysis is possible would prove valuable for
purposes of comparative legal study. Reference is made to the
trend set in the Sociology of law studies which Abel (1979:
167) has termed "the genre known as impact studies, or studies
of law in action". Included here are such works as those of
Blumberg (1967; 1969), Carlen (1976), Bottoms and McClean
(1976), McConville and Baldwin (1977), McBarnet (1981), and
Ericson and Baranek (1982), just to mention a few. But as
shall be concluded, while these studies may be of relevance
in this case, their findings cannot be applied without further
elaboration and qualification.
The following descriptions also make use of the data
obtained from the conducted during the field research, to
demonstrate what goes on in the practice of the received law
courts other than at the theoretical level. The next chapter
also shares a similar focus - mainly the received law courts -
but deals mainly with aspects relating to legal
representation. Hence they may be an overlap between these
two chapters.
THE RECEIVED LAW COURTS: STRUCTURE AND JURISDICTION.
The label "received law courts" is employed here in the
sense of the primary law administered by these courts.
However, in terms of its unlimited jurisdiction, the High
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Court applies both the received law and the customary law, and
so does the Court of Appeal. In practice though, the
majority of matters of custom tend to be confined to the
customary courts as described in the previous chapter. The
fact is that only a minute percentage of appeals against
decisions of the Judicial Commissioners' Court ever reach the
received law courts, namely the High Court and the Court of
Appeal.
This is so despite the fact that as Maqutu (1981)
observes, 99 per cent of the people of Lesotho are Basotho to
whom Sesotho custom and law can apply. He further alleges
that the Magistrates Courts in general terms avoid custom;
even at this time when these courts are entirely staffed by
Basotho. To some extent, the same could be said of the High
Court more so because at the time of the field research, all
of the judges who were in office were Basotho.1 As things
stand, the magistrates deal with customary law cases only when
they review them in terms of section 26 of the Central and
Local Courts Proclamation. The High Court on the other hand,
deals with Sesotho customary law matters only when they come
on appeal from the Court of the Judicial Commissioners,
despite its unlimited jurisdiction to hear all matters;
including those involving the customary law. The point to
be remembered is that the Magistrates Courts are creatures of
statute, and thus in the absence of any specific provisions
giving them jurisdiction over cases arising out of the
customary law, they cannot deal with disputes of the kind
handled by the Central and Local Courts. Consequently, the
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courts that primarily apply to the customary law are quite
distinct and set apart from those applying mainly the received
law, although they are both officially and legally recognised
as the institutions possessing judicial powers, as against
"unofficial" chiefs' courts. This implies that the most
senior courts of the land are inaccessible, in the sense that
matters of custom, which affect the majority of the people,
cannot be taken to them. Hence it would be correct to
conclude that the superior courts of the land are reserved
mainly for cases arising out of the received law.
The Subordinate Magistrates Courts hear cases as a matter
of first instance. They are so entitled, because they are
subordinate to the High Court and it would, therefore be
correct to view them as "forming the bottom of the common law
courts" as stated by Judge Molai. In this thesis they are
referred to as the Magistrates Courts because this is how they
are referred to by the Basotho - " ha' maseterata" (at the
magistrate's) is the term used in the local parlance - the
reference title of Subordinate Courts being employed mainly
within legal professional circles. The Magistrates' Courts
stand subordinate to the High Court hierarchically and
jurisdictionally, and above is the Court of Appeal, the
latter two being appellate courts, for cases from the 3 ower
courts of all jurisdictions including the customary courts.
As stated by the Attorney General, these courts are
numerically fewer in comparison with the customary courts.
Additionally the Acting Chief Justice Kheola stated that the
most serious factor is that the "formal" courts (in particular
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the received Law courts) are located too far away from the
people they serve. Thus the received law courts are
inaccessible to the people in another sense too, which is that
they are not in close proximity to the people.
In terms of geographical jurisdiction, the received law
courts possess powers that extend over wider areas. In
addition, their jurisdiction with regard to judgements they
can impose, such as amount of fines and the length of term of
imprisonment they can give, tend to be greater and harsher.
In general they are also empowered to take on matters
considered to be of more serious nature than the customary
courts. That the received law courts occupy a position of
seniority than the customary courts, is further confirmed by
the fact that the Resident Magistrates have powers of control
and review over what happens in the Central and Local Courts,
for instance, in the event where a Customary court has given
a prison sentence. In addition, the High Court and finally
the Court of Appeal (where and as need arises) have powers to
resolve appeals coming from the Judicial Commissioners' Court,
which can in a way be considered as the highest in the
customary courts structure.
THE MAGISTRATES COURTS: THE ORIGINS OF THE MAGISTRACY.
The first attempts to establish the magisterial system
date back to the period of colonial rule. With the division
of the country into districts2, the Cape government placed
each under the jurisdiction of a magistrate who was in turn
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answerable to the governor's agent. The magistrates were part
of the plan to abolish customary law and practices, except
that in their view this objective was to be introduced
cautiously and not hurriedly, to avoid confrontation with the
Basotho chiefs and their people.3 In terms of Proclamation
No. 51 of 1871 each of the Resident Magistrates in the
established districts had unlimited jurisdiction both
geographically and in terms of powers. The Governor's Agent
was the Chief Magistrate (Lagden, 1909; Crawford, 1969).
Offences for which the death penalty could be imposed were to
be tried before these magistrates or their assistants.4 With
the Cape's policy of direct rule, an attempt was made to
bring all matters of some seriousness within the jurisdiction
of the {Magistrates Courts. This struck a blow at the roots
of the indigenous system for the administration of law and
justice. The chiefs' courts were, however, still afforded a
good measure of toleration (Hailey 1953) and appeal lay from
their courts to the courts of the Magistrates.
In 1872, the position of the magistrates was reinforced
and strengthened through the introduction of a police force.
The Cape government argued that magistrates provided a more
effective way of settling disputes than the chiefs did.
Within the courts, a flexible approach was adopted towards
the Cape rules of evidence, in order to decrease the people's
feeling of unfamiliarity with the new courts procedures.
During this period the magistrates gained enough support from
the people in settling most of their cases, despite initial
opposition from the chiefs. Such success led to the decision
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to extend the scope of the new regulations on the
recommendation of the special commission of 1872, which was
appointed to inquire into the Native law and customs of the
people of Lesotho and also into the operation of the
regulations established for their government (Burman 1985).
Through the recommendations of this commission the Cape
law for the first time came to apply in Lesotho except where
parties was "Natives" meaning, the Basotho. The proceedings
of disputes between the Whites and the Basotho were to be, as
near as possible, the same as those in the courts of the
Resident Magistrates in the Cape Colony [sec 24] but a fair
amount of discretion was allowed the magistrates to decide how
rigidly to apply colonial procedure. The result was that the
received law came to be applicable to all the inhabitants,
while the indigenous law was, in addition, to remain applying
to the Basotho people. Such rapid and radical
transformations, generated considerable unease and
discontentment among the people as they impinged upon various
aspects of their life. In the context of this thesis the
main issue is that a new system of law and the administration
of justice was introduced. Recognition should be given to the
fact that the Basotho had before this known no other system
of law and justice than their own. The efforts encompassed
in the new rules were a direct cause of the rebellion by
Moorosi and his sons which finally culminated into a revolt
that shook the balance upon which the whole system of the
magistracy rested. The pursuit of the disarmament policy
was the last straw - it led into the famous Gun War (1880-
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1881), and brought the magisterial authority to a point of
collapse.
The second stage of the magisterial rule came following
the disannexation of Lesotho from the Cape by Act 34 of 1884.
The British ruled through the Resident Commissioner for South
Africa. The system originally introduced by the Cape Colony,
was, however, not significantly altered as magisterial rule
was also revived run by District Commissioners. The British
government's policy since "the Gun War and the conquest
retrocession of Lesotho to Britain" (Crawford,1969) was to
leave the chieftaincy very much to its own devices, leaving
customary law to continue being administered by the chiefs
courts in cases between Africans, a policy consistent with
indirect rule. The relevant provisions made no significant
change except to give the chiefs jurisdiction over minor civil
and criminal cases. Their judgements were, however, made
subject to review and scrutiny by the Commissioners. The
courts of the colonial administration concerned themselves
very little with African matters except in the case of
serious crimes. This tends to suggest that the lack of
interest in the matters of Custom by the received law courts
is a feature inherited from the past.
Many of the aspects spelt out above were maintained in
subsequent years, as would certainly be obvious from the 1938
Proclamation No. 58, which instituted the Subordinate
(Magistrates) Courts in the manner described below.
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THE MAGISTRATES' COURTS AT PRESENT.
The present phase of the Magistrates' Courts has its
origins in the Subordinate Courts Proclamation No.58 of 1938.
Then the system was based on a few legally qualified
magistrates,Supplemented to a large extent by administrative
officers. The Subordinate Courts were divided into, ranks
called classes. The Senior District Officers and District
Commissioners could hold Courts of First Class; whereas
junior District Officers could hold Courts of the Second
class; and the Cadets those of the Third class. Most of the
Magistrates then possessed no legal training whatsoever, and
they performed both administrative and judicial functions.
A few of them were borrowed from South Africa, and as the
Chief Magistrate pointed out in an interview the first "Black
[Basotho] magistrates came into service after Independence,
and these were offered some local in-service training". With
the realisation that "local law" training is inadequate,
agreement was reached with the University of Lesotho to launch
a Diploma in Law course in order to upgrade the standard of
the legal education for the magistrates.
One major change that has so far been implemented is that
the judicial powers that Administrative Officers used to
possess have now been taken away. So that the system now
operates through full-time magistrates all of whom are now
Basotho. The current position of magistrates in office as
summed up by the Chief Magistrate is contained in Appendix E.
There are Magistrates' Courts in each of the 10 District
Headquarters and each can be manned by several magistrates of
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various ranks. As indicated by the Acting Chief Justice
there are more magistrates in the busy districts, that is,
where there are higher caseloads. But as further explained
by the Chief Magistrate Matete, it is thought necessary to
have a Resident Magistrate at least in each district, but due
to shortages of qualified manpower this is at the moment not
possible. In those districts which have no Resident
Magistrates, the duties are met by those from the
neighbouring districts.
To this day many people still regard the magistrates as
still performing both the administrative and judicial roles
without any distinction this can be illustrated by an incident
which occurred while I was temporarily employed in the High
Court as a student-assistant, whereby a couple came to the
offices and said they wanted to have their marriage
solemnised. I recall quite vividly one of the High Court
interpreters telling them that "Here, we do not solemnize the
marriages, we dissolve them". The couple was then directed
to the relevant office where the could obtain the service they
required.
In an interview Judge Molai stated that, one often hears
people saying "we had our marriages solemnised at the court
or at the magistrate's" ( "ha' maseterata" ). As the Judge
further pointed out:
When we talk of marriages we talk of
dissolving them. Because marriages are
solemnized at some other place not at
court, although our people commonly say
"we are going to solemnize the [the
wedding] at the magistrates". The
magistrates don't solemnize marriages,
that is administrative. The courts come
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into the picture when the marriages are
to be dissolved . . . Civil marriages are
solemnized at the District Commissioners
Offices or at Church. Their dissolution
is done only by the High Court (Molai :
6.3. 1987)
The argument that follows from the above statement is that
these courts are specialised, in the sense that their sole
purpose is to administer the received law in the context
of disputes brought before them, a specialisation reinforced
by the fact that proceedings before them are conducted in
places not used for other purposes.
The Subordinate Courts Proclamation referred to earlier
has been amended several times. For example, in 1964; the
constitution of the Magistrates Courts was altered, but this
arrangement was subsequently left unchanged by the
Independence Order of 1966. The arrangement made provision
for 5 (ranks) classes of courts namely: the Resident
Magistrates; First Class; Second Class; Third Class; and
Special Class Magistrates.5 At the present moment the
arrangement remains largely the same,6 and while there is one
Third Class Magistrate in service, the Special Class
Magistrates are still non-existent. As far as the Chief
Magistrates could recall, the only time when there were
Magistrates Courts of this class was following the employment
of the first graduates of the Diploma in Law Course.7 Their
functions were similar to those of the Third Class
Magistrates. Judge Molai recalled that at some point in the
past there was a magistrate of this class in the district of
Teyateyaneng and his explanation for this was as follows:
I think there was no magistrate in T.Y.-
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there were no sufficient magistrates in
the country and probably that [District]
was without a Magistrate and before a
Magistrate could be appointed work had to
be done. (Molai: 6.3.1987).
There is still provision for the courts of this
classification; and it is the duty of the Chief Justice to
prescribe or create this class of courts if and when he feels
necessary. However, there are serious considerations to
scrap both the Third Class and a Special Class ranks of the
Magistrates Courts.
The Resident Magistrates may exercise powers and
jurisdiction conferred on any magistrate of another class,
and their jurisdiction and powers extend over the length and
breath of the country. Other Magistrates exercise only such
powers and jurisdiction as may be specified in their
respective appointments, and as may from time to time be
prescribed by the Chief Justice. The Magistrates Courts in
the first instant administer the received law and statutes.
They have summary jurisdiction first, over all criminal
offences except treason, murder and sedition, though this
category of exception may be enlarged in respect of the
Special Class Courts. There are also limitations on the
punishments the different classes of the Magistrates Courts
may impose. That is, as explained by the Acting Chief
Justice, the sentencing powers of Magistrates of different
ranks varies in accordance with statutory limits prescribed
for respective Classes, and as he continued; "that is why
they are called courts of limited jurisdiction". Where
sentences have exceeded the given jurisdiction, the decisions
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ought to be reviewed.8
Briefly, their criminal jurisdiction as stipulated in
the t»aw sets out the nature of the offence, the area within
which it is alleged to have been committed, and the maximum
punishment that may be imposed, the review of and appeals
against convictions or sentences of individual courts, and
the manner of the enforcing orders and sentences of a court.9
All Magistrates, except those of the Third Class also have
power to give corporal punishment, and the statutes state how
much strokes the various ranks of Magistrates are empowered
to give. As Judge Molai expressed it:
Why the Third Class Magistrates are
excluded here, it has never been clear to
me, because the Local Courts administer
custom, and in our custom they do
administer corporal punishment (Molai:
6.3. 1987).
Apart from their summary jurisdiction in criminal
matters, the Magistrates Courts may have cases remitted to
them for trial or sentence. The remittal may be under the
ordinary jurisdiction of the court or under increased
jurisdiction. In the same manner they may transfer
proceedings commenced in them to a Central or Local Court, if
in the opinion of a Magistrate's Court the matter would be
more conveniently and appropriately dealt with in such court.
In addition, they hold Preparatory Examinations10 to determine
whether or not an accused should be committed for trial by
the High Court; this would be in the cases of murder, treason
and sedition. That involves taking all the evidence and
making a decision as to whether there is a case to be heard
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in the High Court or whether there is no case to answer. In
the event of the former, necessary arrangements are made for
the case to proceed to the High Court, while in the latter
decision can be made to discharge or dismiss the matter.
Once a criminal case has been investigated by the law
enforcement agencies - police - it has to be tried in a
Magistrates Court in the first instance. However, as stated
in the previous chapter, the local Police Officers have the
discretion to refer certain matters to the customary courts,
and while such referrals ought to be with respect to "minor"
offences, it was also pointed out that sometimes cases so
referred, appropriately fall under the jurisdiction of the
Magistrates' Courts. This is why the Acting Chief Justice
pointed out that:
All statutory offences have to come to
the Subordinate Court. It is only the
Land Act which provides for cases to be
taken to the Local Court, most statutes
don't. If a person has contravened a
statutory provision then he has to be
taken to a subordinate court, because it
may involve the interpretation of that
Act (Kheola: 16. 2.1987).
The argument of the Acting Chief Justice was that the
personnel of the customary courts is not well qualified to
deal with questions concerning the interpretation of
statutes, nor are they entitled to do so under the law.
However, as said earlier on, some exceptions are made where
it is felt that some offences are of minor nature, in which
event the customary courts are let to proceed with them. As
Judge Molai confirmed some cases that ought to be heard by
the Magistrates are referred to the Local Courts and
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similarly he attributed this to the police discretion.
An additional point which emerged from the interviews
with various informants11 is that most cases that come before
the Magistrates are criminal ones. The Chief Magistrate,
pointed out that the rate and form of the criminal offences
vary from place to place. In the mountain areas, such as
Thaba - Tseka, Mokhotlong and Qacha's Nek, stock-theft cases
appear to be top on the list. The point that stock-theft is
very high in Qacha's Nek in particular, was confirmed by the
Attorney General, who in addition mentioned that these are
difficult to resolve because the area is not easily
accessible for investigation of the crimes and they tend,
therefore, to accumulate. In the urban centres, the Chief
Magistrate said house-breaking is one of the most common type
of offences. Furthermore, he noted that rape (highest in
Mafeteng) rises during certain seasons, "when people get into
the festive mood" (e.g. Christmas time). During the winter
months house-breaking into shops was mentioned to increase,
with people stealing such commodities as blankets and food
stuffs. Ordinary shoplifting on the other hand increases
during Christmas times. The Chief Magistrate, in addition,
stated that homicide is high in urban areas which he
attributed to the high incidence of mobility of people in and
out of these areas, and also to the availability of a variety
weapons including firearms.
Traffic offences seem to be very high especially in
Maseru, (the capital), and the vicinity. As mentioned by the
Attorney General Maope, there are many outstanding traffic
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cases which have not been heard for years. In Maseru in
particular, because of the increase of traffic cases, a
separate court now known as the "Traffic Court" has been
established for organisational purposes and for
administrative convenience. This is not a special court but
is a Magistrate Court of Maseru, and different Magistrates in
the area preside over it in turns. The prosecutors too
exchange with the crown counsel(s) from the Law Office coming
into play in the most serious cases, otherwise the traffic
police take on the prosecution of the traffic cases.
The civil jurisdiction of Magistrates also differs
according to rank.12 The Resident Magistrates' Courts and
the courts of the First and Second Classes have civil
jurisdiction over actions founded upon liguid documents,
actions relating to the delivery of property and other
actions, within certain financial limits. The Chief
Magistrate, Senior Resident and Resident Magistrates cannot
take civil matters in which the claims involved are in excess
of M2.000; for the First Class Magistrates the maximum limit
is Ml.000 and M500 for the Second Class Magistrates, while
the Third Class Magistrates have no civil jurisdiction at
all. The special Class Courts may be allotted such
jurisdiction as may be specified in their establishment. So
that the choice of proper forum to which court an individual
takes his civil cases depends on the amount of the claim
involved.
Certain civil matters are excluded from the jurisdiction
of the Magistrates Courts13 and these include dissolution of
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marriage, or separation from bed or board or goods of married
persons; the validation or interpretation of a will or other
testamentary document, the ascertainment of the status of a
person in respect of mental capacity (except as provided by
any law in respect of mental health); matters where a decree
of specific performance of an act is sought without an
alternative payment of damages (except the rendering of an
account or the delivery or transfer of property^were a decree
of perpetual silence is sought, and also where provisional
silence is sought. These fall under the jurisdiction of the
High Court.
The Chief Magistrate indicated that it has come to a
stage where it is necessary to separate civil from criminal
work in the Magistrates Courts of Maseru. Therefore, Fridays
have been set aside for this purpose. This seemed to
confirm the point made by Crown Counsel Ntsonyana that, while
most cases that come before the Magistrates and the High
Court consist mainly of criminal proceedings, it seems people
are becoming increasingly aware that "they can bring
proceedings [sue] for other things as well". She was
referring mainly to civil matters here, which, however as she
further explained often come to be settled out of court.
These are "mostly commercial cases". In the words of the
Chief Magistrate they include:
... companies, where dispute arises.
Perhaps a company is suing a bank, or
owing another company. Insurance claims
are not so many. The reason why we don't
[deal with them so often] is that in
terms of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act,
it is easier to settle out of court.
Once you have submitted your claim and
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they are satisfied that they are liable;
they just pay ....some lawyers just
specialise on that, because it is not
difficult to submit a claim. (Matete:
18.5.1987).
Among civil matters which appear to be on the increase
in the Magistrates Courts, the Attorney General mentioned
maintenance claims which he said result from the numerous
divorce proceedings. In his opinion, though, these do not
exceed traffic offences. The main issue with regard to the
former is that:
...There's reluctance to handle them.
Because you find they're family disputes,
and obtaining sufficient evidence in this
regard is difficult. Therefore, they're
accumulating; many of them are
outstanding. (Maope: 16.2.1987).
Since Magistrates Courts exist in all the 10
Administrative District Headquarters of Lesotho, the
advantage of bringing an action in them than in the High
Court, is that less delay is encountered before trial. Also
the scale of costs is relatively lower in the Magistrates'
Courts. But in the opinion of Judge Molai, the proceedings
in the Magistrates Courts are still expensive because as he
stated "the lawyers are very expensive". This is particulary
true when one considers that in the customary courts the
people mostly appear on their own; incurring no expense of
acquiring services of a legal practitioner.14
The above, in addition to describing the organisation
and jurisdictions, also gives a brief overview of the kind of
cases that will commonly be brought to the Magistrates
Courts in real practice. This is further demonstrated in
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the examples analysed later.
THE HIGH COURT.
The first provision for the High Court came in
Proclamation No.57 of 1938. Prior to that the Resident
Commissioner's Court exercised similar functions and
jurisdiction, which dated back to 1884 when Lesotho was
restored to British rule. The Court of the Resident
Commissioner was vested with unlimited jurisdiction in both
civil and criminal matters, and it applied rules similar to
those of the Resident Magistrates Courts of the Cape. Over
the years various Proclamations reforming the constitution,
jurisdiction and powers of this Court have been introduced
including the change of title to the High Court. In 1954,
with the constitution of the Court of Appeal; the 1938
Proclamation was replaced by Proclamation No.19 of 1952.
During most of the colonial period Botswana, Lesotho and
Swaziland, shared a common High Court with a common
personnel. But in 1965, separate appointments were made for
the office of Chief Justice. At Independence, the High Court
of Lesotho became constituted under the 1966 constitution,
which also latter became consolidated and amended through
various enactments.15 But many of its original
characteristics including its unlimited jurisdiction were
left unchanged, and remain the same as they existed under
1938 Proclamation.
The High Court administers first, the received law and
secondly the customary law. As described earlier in the case
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of the latter it mainly hears appeals from the Court of the
Judicial Commissioners. With regard to the former it has
unlimited jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil and
criminal proceedings, involving among other things claims
relating to fundamental human rights and freedom.16 In
addition, it deals with questions as to the interpretation of
the law and statutes arising in the Magistrates Courts and
the Judicial Commissioners' Court, determining any persons
interests and rights over property that has been compulsory
taken possession of, or whose interests and rights over
property have been compulsorily acquired, and so on.
This is also a court of first instance in murder,
treason, sedition and divorce (in civil marriage)17 cases. As
stated by Judge Molai, criminal cases constitute the bulk of
the High Court's work. This would be in cases which
magistrates have taken a Preparatory Examination and have
committed an accused for trial before the High Court. In
this instance, the High Court sits as a court of first
instance and as such will hear all the evidence. However,
not necessarily all people or witnesses who were heard by the
Magistrate Court, in a particular case, are called to appear
and give evidence. The Crown counsel from the Law Office
(not a public prosecutor attached to a Magistrate Court)
looks at the witnesses who testified before a Magistrate
Court at the Preparatory Examination and having read their
dispositions, selects those he feels would be needed to
establish the case before the High Court. The defence is
also given an opportunity to call whatever witnesses he wants
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to summon.
According to an explanation offered by Crown Counsel
Ntsonyana, many (actually the majority) civil cases such as
divorce matters for instance, often end up being settled out
of court by agreement of the parties concerned, who do not
want to speak out "ho pepesa" about matters of their private
life in public. This is an issue similar to that raised by
Merry (1979) that is disputes of a domestic nature, people
are usually reluctant to involve law enforcement agencies as
this may cause long-term disagreement between the parties to
emerge. She also stated that as a Crown Counsel from the Law
Office dealing with civil work, she only appears in cases
where the Government is a party, and that in most cases where
it is pretty obvious that the government is at fault; the
matters get settled out of court, thus avoiding the cost of
litigation. Otherwise, private claims concerning members of
the public are taken on by private legal firms or the Legal
Aid Office where applicable. As the Director of Public
Prosecutions indicated, lawyers who do criminal work in the
High Court are from the Law Office as well. The same
applies in civil cases in the Magistrates' Courts. In
criminal cases before the Magistrates Courts on the other
hand, the prosecution is carried on mainly by the police and
public prosecutors who are attached to these courts.
This was confirmed by Judge Molai, who indicated:
It is not the public prosecutor [from the
Magistrate's Court] who appean before me
[in the High Court], but a senior man
from the Law Office. He is a Crown
Counsel, a man educated in law (Molai:
6.3.87).
320
Usually the police prosecutors and the public prosecutors
possess no legal training and do not appear in the High
Court. In Maseru there are a handful of prosecutors who
hold Diploma in Law qualifications. In the Traffic Court,
a Crown Counsel with more senior qualifications prosecutes
only in more serious cases.
This indicates that the personnel who prosecute in
criminal proceedings are not of equivalent standards, in
terms of their knowledge of the law and training. This
tends to suggest that the Crown Counsels "the senior man
educated in law" appear in the High Court which deals with
matters considered as of outmost seriousness, thus leaving
the not-so-qualified public prosecutors to carryout duties in
the Magistrates Courts. From the observations carried out
during the period of the field research, it was discovered
that a vast majority of criminal prosecutions in the
Magistrates Courts are in fact police prosecutions with other
public prosecutors appearing in a minority of cases. In
proceedings of traffic offences, house-breaking, rape, it was
often the police prosecutors appearing. The implications of
how this affects the course of proceedings in real practice
are dealt with later on, when looking at how the received law
courts operate in relation to the rules of procedure and
evidence set down for their guidance.
The Chief Magistrate confirmed that criminal cases,
especially murder proceedings, form the bulk of the matters
that come before the High Court. While the Director of
Public Prosecutions agreed with the point that the most
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common type of proceedings in the High Court involve cases of
murder, he further pointed out that an additional fact is
that murder trials tend to take much longer. As he put it:
A criminal [murder] case takes about eh
... we start on Tuesdays and it goes on
until say about the following Tuesday of
the next week (Peete: 30.1.1987)
As observed during the fieldwork, sometimes the proceedings
in murder cases continue for 2 weeks; and almost every week
there are at least 2 murder trials in the High Court. As
the Director of Public Prosecution further indicated, the
whole situation is complicated by the fact that from the time
of the commission of an offence such as a fraud case, it is
very difficult to get the police to obtain sufficient
evidence to enable the prosecution to take a decision to
prosecute. A further example provided by the Director of
Public Prosecutions is that of ritual murder cases which he
said are also difficult to investigate. This is a point
similar to the one referred to earlier on, in which the
Attorney General pointed out that stock-theft cases are
difficult to resolve because the area in which these offences
occur are not easily accessible, most of them being in the
mountain areas. To a certain extent this also explains why
there is a backlog in some of the cases that need
prosecution.
In addition, the High Court has appellate jurisdiction
on decisions given by any Magistrate Court with respect to
any civil or criminal proceedings. Such appeal is of right
unlike the cases from the Xudicial Commissioners' Court where
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appeal is on a Certificate issued by a Judicial Commissioner.
Even appeals from the Third Class Magistrates' Courts come to
the High Court in a similar manner - as of right. As
expressed by Judge Molai:
You don't have to apply for a certificate
if you are not satisfied with the
conviction or sentence [of a Magistrate
Court] or both. You can appeal (Molai:
6.3.1987).
As an appellate court ,the High Court has power to vary
and reverse all judgements, decisions or orders made by any
Magistrate Court in civil or criminal proceedings through
various courses of action. One is that a new trial may be
ordered with a directive, where necessary, that such new
trial be heard in the High Court. Alternatively, it may
send a case back to be heard and decided in a Magistrate
Court; with such instructions as deemed necessary.18 In
these matters if appeal subsequently becomes necessary, it
lies to the Court of Appeal, not as of right, but with leave
from the Judge concerned. As pointed out by Judge Molai:
If I feel there is something which needs
to be straightened out by the Court of
Appeal [leave is granted]. But if I
feel you are trying to waste the Court of
Appeal's time and there's no prospect of
success, I can say I don't allow it.
But if you're not satisfied with my
answer, you are entitled to approach the
Court of Appeal and apply that you be
allowed to take appeal against my
decision of "NO". The same thing would
apply to the Court of the Judicial
Commissioners.19 (Molai: 6.3. 1987).
The Director of Public Prosecutions indicated that most
appeals before the High Court arise out of criminal cases in
matters of stock-theft, assault (G.B.H) and culpable
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homicide. Since these appeals are just arguments out of
cases tried before the Magistrates Courts, the Law Office does
not lead evidence.
Under its unlimited jurisdiction, the High Court has the
prerogative to sentence a man to death or a term of
imprisonment of any length or to impose any other sentence .
Even its Civil jurisdiction, with regard to what order or
award for damages may be issued, is just as unlimited. Judge
Molai, for example said:
If you want to sue a man for a million
(maluti) or 10 you can bring it here, and
we'll see what we can award you (Molai:
6.3.1987).
In a further statement, Judge Molai said the High Court's
decision is not limited by anything. He added, "where we
sat as a court of first instance, the appeal lies to the
Court of Appeal as of right, you just go to the Registrar and
lodge an appeal".
There is only one High Court and this is situated in
Maseru, the Capital. Palmer and Poulter(1972) however,
point out that the High Court may sit elsewhere if the Chief
Justice so decides but as they observe, this provision is
never exercised. The Attorney General expressed the view
that the received law courts are too few in number,
considering the caseloads they have to deal with; many of
which as he pointed out are still outstanding. He suggested
the need for establishment of more "High Courts",20 since in
his conviction:
The main problem is not with the
jurisdiction of various courts as such,
that is, in terms of what type of cases
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the various courts can handle, it is
because the cases themselves are too many
(Maope 16.2.1987).
However, the Attorney General accepted that the High Court in
particular is overburdened, and that this arises primarily as
a result of its overall unlimited jurisdiction, in accordance
with which it can even prohibit the lower courts from taking
on certain cases, while those over which it has jurisdiction
are already too many. He pointed out that at the moment the
High Court is greatly assisted by the lower courts21 in
relieving itself of the caseloads.
Finally, it should be noted that the High Court
possesses review powers over decisions of the Magistrates
Courts. For instance, in the event whereby the sentences
given are in excess of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate of
the particular class, Its confirmation bt^ the High Court is
required. This forms the other bulk of the work of the High
Court judges and thus adds to the point raised above that the
work is too much to be coped with by a single-handed court as
further indicated below.
In his report for the year 1986;22 the Acting Chief
Justice admitted that the High Court cannot cope with the
amount of work, and that being only three23 the judges of the
High Court are presently overworked and as a result have
little time to do proper research before writing their
judgements. He suggested that the appointment of Acting
Justice Lehohla24 on permanent basis would bring immediate
relief from the pressure of work in the High Court. The
report further suggested that if the policy of government is
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to take services to the people, there is urgent need to
undertaken a feasibility study on the need for the
establishment of circuit courts, as the practice of bringing
many witnesses to Maseru for long periods is also
consistently giving rise to a series of problems and
disadvantages. First, the issue of the subsistence
allowances received by witnesses, was raised. The
allowances are held unrealistic since they do not take into
account the cost of living. In addition, it was mentioned
that there is no proper accommodation for these witnesses and
the concrete floors on which they have to spend the nights
are regarded to be a punishment, especially during the cold
winter months.
Reference was made to the High Court statistics of cases
filed and disposed of in 1986 in comparison with those of
19 8 5 . 25 The figures show an increase of 257 cases from a
total of 1,570 cases filed in 1985; to 1,827 in 1986. The
number of cases disposed of in 1986 was 821 as compared to
799 cases in 1985. The number of automatic reviews on
decision of the Magistrates' Courts rose from 629 cases in
1985, to 727 in 1986. These represented substantial
increases despite the fact that for a greater part of the
year there were fewer judges in office than was the position
in 1985, thus more work was done in 1986. It would be
interesting to carryout a survey of how these figures compare
with those of cases dealt with in the Magistrates Courts and
the Customary Courts.
Finally, it is important to point out that the High
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Court is a superior court of record, and thus has inherent
authority to fine and imprison for contempt of its authority.
It also cannot be directed by orders of mandamus and
prohibition; nor can it be called for review. The point
that the High Court is a superior court of record was
reiterated on several occasions during the observations of
its proceedings. The nature of the issues that arose from
this shall be dealt with in full later on when discussing how
the received law courts work in practice.
THE COURT OF APPEAL
Following the suspension of the 1966 Independence
Constitution, the Court of Appeal came to be reconstituted in
accordance with the Court of Appeal Order No. 17 of 1970.
Now this court is governed in accordance with the Court of
Appeal Act of 1978.
Prior to Independence, Lesotho shared a common Court of
Appeal with Botswana and Swaziland, which was first
established in 1954. Before then appeals went direct from
the High Court, or its predecessor, the Resident
Commissioner's Court, to the Privy Council.26 Crawford
(1969) points out that it had been difficult for the
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to support their own, or even
a common court of appeal on the lines of the East or West
African States. At Independence, Lesotho established a
separate court although the personnel of this court is still
shared to a large extent with Botswana and Swaziland.
The Court of Appeal has appellate jurisdiction as of
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right in respect of among other things; final decisions from
the High Court in any civil or criminal proceedings, arising
from questions such as those relating to the enforcement of
the fundamental human rights and freedoms; the rights of
persons whose property is compulsorily acquired; final
decisions in proceedings for dissolution or nullity of
marriage, etc. It also has limited original jurisdiction on
questions relating to succession to the throne and the
regency. Decisions made under the latter are not subject to
Appeal.
The decisions of the Court of Appeal are binding to all,
and it alone can reverse them. As indicated by Judge Molai:
The Court of Appeal, and not the High
Court nor the Judicial Commissioners'
Court, is rightly the last tribunal of
the land. Therefore, once it has taken
a decision; you've got no right anywhere.
So their word is more difficult [to
reverse] than ours27 (Molai: 6.3.87).
The above completes the description of the organisation and
jurisdiction of the received law courts. What is obvious is
that the structure represents a much more complicated system
in which even the jurisdiction in terms of the kinds of
matters to handle and sentencing are clearly distinct and
allocated relative to rank of each individual authority in
the structure. All these are guided by written rules, but
it is when rules of procedure and evidence, as described
below, are taken into account, that these courts emerge as
even a more complex structure, much more distant in character
from the courts considered in the last two chapters.
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THE RECEIVED LAW COURTS AND EMPHASIS ON RULES.
One fact evident is that such extensive and elaborate
rules setting out technicalities of procedure and evidence as
those employed in the received law courts, are absent in the
customary courts, and more so in the "unofficial" Chiefs'
Courts. The descriptions in the following sections are not
exhaustive of all the principles along which proceedings in
the received law courts ought to be conducted, but they do
embody the elementary characteristics of the rules employed.
The main issue here is that the rules of procedure and
evidence are far more complicated and "formalistic", and they
reflect the characteristics of the adv-e. rsorial approach more
than is in the customary courts.
One major point to be reckoned with is that in the
received law courts, civil procedure is very distinct from
criminal procedure. In civil proceedings, the rules and
statutes govern the process of bringing matters before the
courts and how to deal with them once that has been achieved.
These rules set out in detail and set time limits within
which each stage in the process has to be accomplished.
Other rules specify requirements of what should be done, for
instance, about ways of bringing necessary action; what
papers to file and in what format, order and so on. There
are rules governing proceedings in the High Court and those
governing procedure in the Magistrates' Courts as limited by
statutes.28 In the case of the Court of Appeal there is the
1980 version of the rules29 to govern proceedings before it.
The rules state the various ways of instituting civil
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proceedings namely, that it can be by application or
alternatively by action. In the former, the parties consist
of the applicant who is the complainant seeking relief and
who brings the application, and on the other hand, is the
respondent who defends himself against the applicant. In
action proceedings there is first the plaintiff who is the
complainant who seeks relief and asks for a remedy by issuing
summons, and on the other side, is the defendant who defends
himself against the plaintiff's action. These aspects are
important as they ultimately determine what relevant papers
are to be drafted. Furthermore, the rules specify
variations in the event whereby the complainant chooses to
institute proceedings by application. First, this can be
done ex parte and, secondly on motion. In each case it is
spelt out as to what papers to file: founding affidavits, and
replying affidavits; as well as the time lapse allowed in
each stage. The court has the discretionary powers to allow
further affidavits, again within specific limits.
Other rules specify what should happen once the matter
is before the court, such as those relating to pleadings:
their functions, terms, forms. Likewise there are different
rules for the High Court and for the Magistrates Courts.
The types of summonses are also spelt out in the rules. It
is also stated, for instance, that a declaration must be made
and this should contain a statement of full particulars of a
claim setting forth its nature, the conclusion of the law
which the plaintiff is entitled to from the facts stated;
and a prayer for the claimed relief. The plaintiff should
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deliver a declaration within 14 days, after service upon him
of entry of appearance;30 a further illustration to the
effect that each stage should be accomplished within specific
time limits.
In criminal proceedings similarly, there are always 2
parties. On the one hand is the prosecutor, prosecution or
complainant, and on the other hand there is the accused or
defendant, who may be represented by a private counsel. All
criminal proceedings are nominally at the suit of the Crown,
but the proceedings are in his name only when they are
brought by his law officers, namely the Attorney General, the
Director of Public Prosecution and their staff. This, as
stated by the Director of Public Prosecutions, is in almost
all the cases. He indicated as follows:
I can't think of any reason why [we can
decline to prosecute]. But I'd say in
most instances we take cases to court;
we never decline to prosecute (Peete:
30.1.1987 ) .
There is, however, provision for private prosecutions in
which an individual member of the public may institute
criminal proceedings against the perpetrator of a criminal
offence, whether or not he is directly aggrieved thereby.
This would include such persons as a husband, legal guardian,
a wife or children of a deceased person (PART III of the
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act of 1981). Taking into
consideration the statement of the Director of Public
Prosecutions quoted earlier, matters of private prosecution
are, however, extremely rare. This evidence contrasts
sharply with what happens first, in civil proceedings whereby
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most cases are in fact matters of private litigation; the
state, as Crown Counsel Ntsonyana stated, only coming into
the picture where the suit is against the Government.
Secondly, it contrasts with the position in the customary
courts where proceedings, both civil and criminal, are
brought to court by individuals on their own behalf.33
Generally speaking, criminal proceedings may be brought
at any point, without any limitation as to time. Much
depending, of course, on the police investigations and
findings, except where there is a prescription that
prosecution may be barred by lapse of time. As described
earlier, investigation for certain types of offences such as
stock-theft, murder; including ritual murder, are difficult
to conclude to enable the prosecution to proceed with its
duties. But as one Magistrate34 disclosed in my discussions
with him, sometimes the process of justice is delayed because
the police neglect their duties unduly. To demonstrate this
he referred to an incidence in one district in which he in
person ordered for the release of several people who had long
been remanded in custody while awaiting trial.35 This
Magistrate further pointed out that such avoidance of duty on
the part of the police is very common. As a result, many
people stay in remand for long periods of time pending
investigations. This occurs despite the provision that
people are to be brought to trial without undue delay (PART
X (A) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, 1981,
Section 141). As shall be discussed more later, there is
quite substantial evidence to the effect that several cases
332
are brought to trial on incomplete investigations thus
causing further delays.
Criminal proceedings before the received law courts are
regulated in terms of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act
of 1981. Strictly speaking, some parts of the Act belong to
the law of evidence rather than to criminal procedure, but
the two appear to be so intimately bound with the work of the
criminal courts, that it was perhaps viewed appropriate, to
contain them under one legal instrument. It contains for
instance, the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Courts (PART
I); provision that prosecutions are at the public instance
and set out the powers of the Director of Public Prosecutions
(PART III); provision for offences which shall not be barred
by any lapse of time such as murder (PART IV); provision
relating to Preparatory Examination before the Magistrates
Courts (PART VII) and so on. In addition, the Act contains
elements pertaining to the law of evidence in criminal
proceedings. Included here are such elements as those
relating to securing the attendance of witnesses, duties of
witnesses to remain in attendance, compelling witnesses to
attend and give evidence, payment of expenses of witnesses,
taking of evidence on commission, examination of witnesses by
parties, Courts' powers to decide on competency, oaths and
affirmations, admissibility of evidence and accomplices,
sufficiency of evidence, documentary evidence, privileges of
witnesses. Furthermore, it refers to special rules of
evidence in particular criminal cases such as treason,
perjury or subordination, incest, infanticide or concealment
333
of birth, counterfeit, receiving stolen goods and so on (PART
XII).
The rules of evidence in both civil and criminal
proceedings tend to be generally similar. For example,
hearsay rules apply to both civil and criminal proceedings
without distinction, and so do other principles laying out
what constitutes acceptable and sufficient evidence and what
does not. The hearsay rule simply means that if you don't
hear it, see it, smell it or touch it yourself, you cannot
testify about it (Cohen, 1961). The aim of this rule is to
keep out unreliable testimony from being accepted in the
trial - the whole idea being to ascertain the truth by
examining a witness who has first-hand knowledge of the facts
to which he is testifying. Wootton (1963), on the other
hand, argues that the whole legal process of examination,
cross-examination and re-examination can hardly be rated
highly as an instrument for ascertaining the facts of past
history. However, there are exceptions to the hearsay rule,
and these are stated in the rules - they include certain
documentary evidence such as copies of public documents,
statements made by deceased persons and the like. There are
in addition, principles relating to other exclusionary rules
of evidence, relevance and admissibility, exception to the
hearsay rule, admissions and confessions, the burden of proof
and so on.
Furthermore, the rules of evidence set out the
mechanisms of presenting evidence to the court. They deal
with the circumstances in which the court may receive
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evidence given before the trial, principles governing the
order of calling witnesses, taking the oath, examination in
chief, cross-examination, re-examination, impeachment of
credit of witnesses, the admissibility of evidence tendered
out of its proper time, and so on. The rules of evidence
are held to be justified only, and in so far, as they assist
the court to reach a just determination in the matter upon
which it has to adjudicate.
The above is just a sample of rules of evidence and
procedure in the received law courts. Their main
characteristic nature is that they originate from the
principles of the adversarial model of trial. which, as
mentioned before, was introduced during the period when
Lesotho was under British rule. This factor becomes a
crucial element in understanding how the received law courts
system functions in practice as shall be described later.
First aspects of the link between the received law courts and
the adversarial system are addressed.
THE RECEIVED LAW COURTS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE ADVERSARIAL
SYSTEM
The work of Packer (1968) has been selected to provide
a frame of reference in the attempt to demonstrate the link
the received law courts have to the adversarial model.
This work has been found to be most appropriate in this
regard, as it best spells out the fundamental elements of
this model. The argument put forward at this point is that
the rules that ought to govern proceedings before the
335
received law courts, reflect elements of ad V-e fSQrial
systems. The argument is extended further later, to show
that at the practical level, however, these courts present a
somewhat different picture from what the adversarial
principles prescribe.
For a moment we deal with descriptions indicating that
the rules of the received law courts reveal features of the
adverse*, rial model or what Packer (1968) has termed the Due
Process Model. Then we proceed in the next section to
demonstrate common practices in the world of reality of these
courts, which as to be argued reflect the fact that these are
western courts in a non-western setting, and as such the
patterns of behaviour found in them are different from those
that have been argued to prevail in the western countries.
The Due Process Model in this context is used to provide
details about how the system of the received law courts is
designed to operate, as against what really happens in
practice. The prescriptions about the rules of evidence and
procedure described here, have earlier been argued to set the
received law courts system even further apart from the
customary courts and the "unofficial" Chiefs' courts in terms
of ideology. The descriptions in this section are intended
to built-up a background against which the functioning of
these courts will later be judged.
As Packer (1968) acknowledges, the prescriptions of the
Due Process Model which he speaks of only refer to
constitutional and statutory provisions about how the process
ought to operate, and do not reflect nor say anything about
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what subsequent patterns of behaviour become; or some
important problems that the system encounters in the real-
life world of the process. His analysis deals with value
choices of conduct which are of priority to the model, merely
affording a convenient way to talk about the operation of the
process whose day-to-day functioning involves a constant
series of minute adjustments, depending on the demands and
claims the system is confronted with. The Due Process Model
is underlined by a complex of values, whose components are
demonstrably present in the preferences made by those who
operate it.
Among the complex assumptions embraced by this model,
Packer (1968) speaks of: "the adversary System";
"procedural due process"; "notice and opportunity to be
heard"; and "day in court". All these are noted to contain
the notion that the alleged criminal is not merely an object
to be acted upon, but an independent entity who may, if he so
desires, force the operators of the process to demonstrate to
an independent authority, that he is guilty as charged.
Through this, the model permits, but does not require the
accused, acting by himself or through a counsel to play an
active role in the process. By virtue of this prescription
the process becomes or has the potential to become a contest
between, if not equals, at least independent actors.
The other principles underlying this model refer to
stronger or weaker notions of how this contest is to be
arranged, in what cases it is to be played, and by what
rules. For instance, the presumption of innocence as Packer
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(1968) indicates is a normative and legal principle which
sets the direction of how the officials are to proceed. But
the adversary aspect is the one which is very central and it
is embedded in the other presumptions upon which the model is
founded.
In its overall outlook the Due Process Model is
presented as an obstacle course with each of its successive
stages designed to present impediments to carrying any
further along the process. Its ideology is far more deeply
impressed on the formal structure of the law, whose accurate
strands though, are strangely difficult to trace, so that
only its approximation is possible (Packer, 1968). In a
similar manner, Baldwin and McConville (1981) have pointed to
the English acli/e.rs, o.rial system's emphasis upon formal,
combative trial proceedings in open court, with a jury acting
as an independent adjudicator of guilt and innocence and the
judge ruling on questions of law and ensuring that procedural
rules are followed.
It is in this sense that Jacob and Wheatcroft ( 1966)
also observe that the court is this context, is supposed to
act as an umpire and to see to it that the parties play the
game of litigation according to rules and at the end to give
an answer to the question of who the winning party is.
Principles such as those raised by Lord Denning in the case
of Jones v National Coal Board (Court of Appeal, 1957) only
serve to reinforce the above. For instance, Lord Denning
emphasised that the judge does not have to investigate the
facts, he is not an inquisitor but sits to hear and determine
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issues raised by the parties and not to conduct an
investigation or examination on their behalf or of society at
large. The judge only asks questions when it is necessary
to clear up any point that has been overlooked or left
unclear.
As an illustration, Section 13 of the High Court Act No.
5 of 1978 (of Lesotho) can be seen as having the same
intentions. The provision prescribes that pleadings and
proceedings in these courts shall be in the open, save as
otherwise provided in the Act, or as a judge may find it
necessary to exclude any individual or class of persons from
the proceedings. However, in the absence of a jury in the
case of Lesotho, the judge is left to perform all the roles.
He becomes the sole controller of the proceedings with the
duty to ensure that the rules are followed, also he decides
on admissibility of evidence and its evaluation. In
addition, he has the duty to give judgement. Thus he
decides on questions of law and determines the guilt or
innocence of persons concerned as well.
Due process rejects the reliability of fact-finding
processes which place heavy reliance on the ability of
investigative and prosecutorial officers, acting in an
informal setting in which their distinctive skills are given
full sway, to elicit and reconstruct an accurate account of
what actually took place in an alleged event. In its place
it substitutes a fact-finding process that stresses the
possibility of error, which takes into consideration the fact
that people are poor observers of disturbing events, in
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particular. In this several factors are brought to bear.
It is reckoned that the greater emotion-arousing an incident
is, the greater the possibility that recollection will be
incorrect. In addition, the possibilities that confessions
and admissions may be physically and psychological induced
while in police custody, are all taken into account. Hence
the insistence on formal, adjudicative, adversary fact¬
finding processes in which the factual case against the
accused is publicly heard by an impartial tribunal, with the
evaluation following only after the accused has had a full
opportunity to defend himself. The scrutiny of facts can
continue for as long as there is an allegation of factual
error that has not received adjudicative hearing. Thus in
this context, insistence is placed on prevention and
elimination of mistakes to an extent possible, and short-cuts
around that principle are rejected. This is where the aim
to protect the factually innocent as much as to convict the
factually guilty comes in.
The above leads to a further crucial value as far as the
model is concerned. This can be expressed in the concept of
the primacy of the individual and the complementary concept
of limitation of official power. The combination of stigma
and loss of liberty which the latter has power to afflict, in
addition to being coercive, restricting and demanding, are
viewed as the heaviest deprivations to ever be permitted to
operate without checks and control. It is reckoned that
this can be achieved through the doctrine of legal guilt,
according to which one cannot be held guilty on probabilities
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based upon reliable factual evidence alone, instead his guilt
can be held if, and only if, these factual determinations are
made in a procedurally regular fashion, and by authorities
acting within competences duly allocated to them. The main
concern is that the rules designed to safeguard the integrity
of the process, should be given effect. The convicting
court must possess rightful jurisdiction both in terms of
venue and power to deal with the kind of case; the case must
be committed before too long an elapse of time, and the
person concerned must fall within the category of persons who
can rightfully be sued or not legally immune from conviction,
whatever the case might be. Any adequate competence of
effecting these factual determinations depends on the
tribunal's awareness about them and its willingness to apply
them.
The above requirements have nothing to do with factual
issues whether the person concerned is liable for the conduct
in question, but rather are connected to the concept of legal
guilt which in turn relies on the doctrine of the presumption
of innocence. The latter simply means the guilt is yet to
be determined by legal doctrines that serve to limit official
power through certain substantive and procedural
regularities. Hence in this manner the state is forced to
prove its case in an adjudicative context, thus bringing into
play, all qualifying and disabling doctrines that limit the
use of sanctions against an individual, while enhancing his
opportunity to secure a favourable outcome. What Cohen
(1961) points out is that in a criminal case, the prosecutor
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must convince the court of the defendants' guilt "beyond
reasonable doubt", while in civil proceedings the plaintiff
and his representative must sustain the "preponderance of
evidence" in order to be awarded damages on the basis of
facts revealed to the court. The vital difference between
the trial of a criminal case and that of a civil case as Gair
(1961) notes, lies in the nature of the burden of proof that
is required of the adversaries, in the manner shown above.
The presumption of innocence opens up a procedural situation
that permits the successful assertion of defences, having
nothing to do with factual guilt. In that sense, it upholds
the proposition that the factually guilty may be legally
innocent, and should under the circumstances be given the
benefit of such factor. The doctrine of legal innocence is
viewed as the appropriate chance for the process to correct
its own abuses, and putting pressure to induce conformity
with the set standards.
One final complex of attitudes underlying this model is
the idea of equality. The ideal of equality holds that
"there can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has".36 The most
outstanding factual predicament underlying this assertion, is
acknowledgement of noting the gross inequalities in the
financial resources of defendants in the adversary system,
and also that as a consequence large proportions of
defendants are denied defence by virtue of their lack of
means to acquire services of a lawyer. Issues connected to
the legal representation of parties in the received law
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courts are left until the next chapter.
The thrust so far has been that the requirements of the
rules of procedure and evidence in the received law courts
reflect the ideology and doctrines that underlie the
adv^S-Ci-rial model, whose features have just been described.
Further requirements such as those relating to the role of
the judge to see to it that legal counsel behave themselves
and keep to the rules laid down by law; to exclude
irrelevancies and discourage repetition; as well as to
ensure by wise intervention that he follows the points that
the counsel are making and that he can assess their worth
(Lord Denning,1957), serve as elaborations of what has been
stated already, about the character of the model. Similar
strands were mentioned during some of the interviews
conducted while on field research. For example, Crown
Counsel Ntsonyana explained how the judge has to ensure that
the atmosphere of the trial is proper. She mentioned that,
for instance, the judge has got to protect people from the
"ridiculing" and "harassment" by the counsel, which she said
occurs mainly during cross-examination. In a similar
manner, the Chief Magistrate stated that the judge has the
duty to protect individuals from "harassment" by lawyers.
Furthermore, are requirements pertaining to the powers
of the court to call witnesses in certain cases and in
accordance with other legal specifications (JUSTICE, 1965);
about allowing objections only on grounds that testimony is
immaterial, irrelevant, incomplete, hearsay, or possibly not
responsive; and the role of the prosecutor to construct or
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build a case through the evaluation of all facts and
circumstances which can possibly illuminate the incident;
and of the counsel to tear-down, pick apart, rip-holes in the
finished product of the prosecutor (Cohen, 1961), All these
serve to reinforce the idea that this model is adversary, and
very much like an obstacle course consisting of successive
stages of fact-finding, which Bloom-Cooper (1963) equates to
pieces of a puzzle, each of which is fitted into a framework
which is delineated by the nature of trial - an accusation on
a specific charge; against a specific person, with all else
excluded. The rapier of the prosecution, Bloom-Cooper
(1963) further argues, is to thrust out; the defence's task
on the other hand is to parry it, with no concern other than
that the prosecution's should not strike home. In his
conviction, the constriction of the English system of trial
does mean that the rule of the game are well defined and that
an accused can prepare himself for it.
HOW THE RECEIVED LAW COURTS OPERATE.
Having considered the organisation and the model upon
which the received law courts system is founded, we now
proceed to examine the operation of these courts at the
practical level. The descriptions so far have concerned
themselves mainly with the ideal form, and have nothing to
do, as mentioned once before, with what finally happens at
the operational level or about the constraints which may be
encountered.
In the west, from where the ideology of due process has
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originated, many studies examining how the ad[Vf CSLQ rial
modelled courts work in practice have been performed, and
their findings point in one direction that the adversarial
model does not work in practice. Generally speaking, these
studies have focused on the point that there is a gap between
the law in books and the law in action, although various
studies have taken different starting points from which the
"gap" between the rhetoric of the law as reflected in the
advSXSArial model and its practice is presumed to originate.
Several of these studies have been selected to demonstrate
the main trends in their findings. Starting with Carlen
(1976) for instance, the gap between the rhetoric and
practice is traced to the emergence of "informal rules" which
she argues are produced by negotiatory practices of court
actors who are structurally invested with power. Among
these she includes the magistrates, lawyers, police and
probation officers. These Officials, as she points out,
operate the system in a manner that specifically excludes the
defendant, particularly the unrepresented one, from the
proceedings. She suggests that in this way, the notion of
the "Rule of law" is thus not achieved in practice; and that
the "informal rules" of the above participants serve to
maintain the inequalities of a capitalist society by
coercion.
By contrast to the emphasis on "informal rules",
McBarnett (1981) argues that the gap between the rhetoric of
law and its practice, is not only due to informal rules
originating in the day-to-day negotiatory procedures of the
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court-room, but instead can be explained by reference to the
form and content of the law itself. In this she points,
among other things, at the police procedures following the
apprehension of a suspect; the prosecution system; and the
rules of procedure and evidence; which she argues are all
designed to secure conviction. This according to her,
contradicts the rhetorical claim of due process, that an
individual suspect is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
The works of Blumberg (1967; 1969) which were
forerunners to the above two, start the argument from a
different angle. For example, Blumberg (1969) begins by
pointing out that sociological analyses in trying to provide
explanations of how the adversarial model functions, have
tended to ignore the important variable of the organisation
of the court, yet it is a priority that exerts a higher claim
in the operations of the courts, than the stated ideological
goals of "due process of law". The latter, he claimed is
often inconsistent with organisational goals. He noted that
such organisational goals as discipline and strive for order,
for example, impose a set of demands and practices on various
personnel, in the course of which commitments to the ideology
of due process and professional service to the client are
abandoned. Similar expositions to the ones cited here are
to be found in other works as well, although as mentioned
earlier, the variables focused upon vary from one study to
another.
With the resemblance the received law courts have been
shown to share with the western courts, the basic presumption
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one could make is that it would as well be possible to arrive
at parallel comparisons as far as their practices are
concerned. That is, one would expect to find practices
similar to those identified as common manifestations in the
operations of the western courts, so that similar conclusions
such as those postulated in the works above and others,37
would also be applicable in the case of the received law
courts. This presumption, of course, underlay my thinking
about how the received law courts operate when I went into
the field for data collection.
While the above works serve as a ground from which to
start in unravelling how the received law courts function, by
virtue of the fact that the latter also have their basis in
the advertorial model, their findings cannot be used without
qualification and without obscuring issues which seem to be
of fundamental importance and of utmost relevance in this
context. The most crucial point to remember is again that
we are dealing with legal institutions equivalent to what
Abel (1979) referred to as "western courts in non-western
settings". Thus it is important in seeking explanations and
making descriptions about what goes on in these courts, to
bear this in mind in addition to the theoretical, ideological
and technical properties they share with the western courts.
Furthermore, consideration should be given to peculiar
circumstances given rise to by this factor, as they
contribute highly to the manner in which the adlv^rSctfial
model performs in this case. The descriptions that follow
indicate that the situation at the practical level of the
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received law courts is much more complex, marked by an
interaction and interplay of a multiplicity of factors and
constraints which together exert influence on their
practices.
The intention is to demonstrate from the data obtained
during the field research that the above studies, with their
stress on the development of informal rules and manipulation
of formal ones, may not be adequate in explaining what
happens in the received law courts. In this case, it is not
simply a question of informal rules displacing the formal
ones, rather the main issue is that the ac}V£- rsqrial model in
this context is on the whole "foreign", working under certain
constraints and in conjunction with "customary"38 processes in
the midst of which completely different kinds of behaviour
patterns from those observed in the western settings are
produced. In other words, the system in this case does not
work for other reasons than simply because of the gap between
the rhetoric and practice. Thus to be applicable, the
findings of these studies would need to redefined in the
light of the circumstantial reality and constraints
confronting the practice of due process in this context.
The literature from the west falls short of capturing and
bringing to the forefront the kind of practices that appear
dominant here.
In giving the descriptions of how the received law
courts structure works in practice, I would like to begin
from a point which was raised several times in interviews
conducted during the field research. What was repeatedly
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stressed is that, there is a difference between the customary
courts and the received law courts in terms of their approach
to dispute settlement. Additionally, it was also mentioned
that the two systems employ different rules of evidence and
procedure. In this the informants, seemed to imply that the
recognition of this difference should form the centrepoint in
an effort to explain and to promote a better understanding of
what goes on in the received law courts. In other words,
any exercise aimed at describing the conduct and practices in
the received law courts should also start from the same
stance.
Furthermore, what seemed to be suggested is that the
differences in approach and rules of procedure and evidence
between the customary courts and the "unofficial" chiefs'
courts on the one hand, and the received courts on the other,
is a major determining factor underlying the manner in which
the latter set of courts operate; and about how the
ac| ve-TScx-fial rules are employed in practice. Put in another
way, the contention here is that with the realisation of the
dissimilarities among the various court structures, means
that many aspects of the ac^vELf&cyrial system merit careful
consideration within the context of the received courts and
their practice. The reasons for this contention are
demonstrated in the following sections.
The most outstanding dilemma to be reckoned with as
pointed out by the Acting Chief Justice is that, the Basotho
people generally do not understand the nature of proceedings
in the "formal"39 courts. As he further explained, even
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those who are a bit enlightened about the rules used in these
courts, only have a superficial knowledge of them. This
point was reiterated by the Attorney General who said:
The procedures, all of them in various
courts puzzle "li tsietsa" the people
(Maope: 16.2.1987).
In a further explanation, the Attorney General similarly made
it clear that he was specifically speaking of the received
law courts, although as he mentioned to some degree the same
could be said of the customary courts, in which attempt has
been made to move towards adversarial procedure. However,
as already discussed elsewhere, in practice the ac|u'£-rsc\ rial
procedure seems to have had minimal effect on the practice of
the customary courts. The explanations offered by other
informants made similar suggestions, but proceeded to point
out that the rules in the received law courts are "foreign"
and that the customary law procedures and rules of evidence,
are better understood, because they are embedded in the
culture of the Basotho and intrinsically different from those
of the acW-e-H>c\jrial approach, with its intensive emphasis
upon the English modes of trial.
The point about the people's ignorance of the rules of
procedure and evidence and what goes on in the courtroom has
been raised in such works as those by Carlen (1976), but in
the present work the argument is that it is not only
ignorance about the rules but as shall be demonstrated, the
real issue is that the rules in the received law courts are
alien and have different cultural context from those in the
customary law, but even more, there is no conceptual
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knowledge and sufficient equipment to cope with them as the
examples discussed in the following sections reveal. What
seems to complicate issues more in this case is the people's
knowledge of something else - "customary law" processes -
which they often carry into processes of the received law as
well, expecting that the two work in a similar manner.
The Chief Magistrate categorically stated that "indeed
the people are baffled" by the rules of procedure and
evidence used in the received law courts. In the same
context Resident Magistrate Mohale concluded that "in actual
fact these courts [received law courts] are not the [Basotho]
people's courts", in that the procedures and rules of
evidence they adopt are too complicated and the people
generally are not familiar with them. What is contended is
that it is not simply that people do not understand the
received law rules, but also that such rules have different
cultural foundation unknown to the Basotho. This was
confirmed in the explanation by Judge Molai, noting that the
received law courts' procedure is removed from that which the
people are accustomed within the village setting, that is, in
the "unofficial" chiefs' courts and in the customary courts
too. Pointing to one aspect of procedure in the received
law courts he stated:
We start swearing people by God, but we
don' t even ask them whether they are
Christians and whether by swearing by God
they are bound to tell the truth, I don't
know (Molai: 4.3.1987).
The above statement shows one of the technicalities vital to
the received law procedure and yet is absent in the customary
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courts.40 Finally, Magistrate Nkhereanye intimated that, he
is totally dissatisfied with the courts and the whole
administration of justice including the structure of the
judicial system, the procedures and rules of evidence, because
as he expressed it, the new procedures cannot be applied or
are unenforceable. The meaning of this statement becomes
clearer as difficulties encountered in the use of the
adv^S-rs c\ rial rules are discussed.
The exclamation of the presiding Magistrate in
CO/9/MCQ/MM/8.6.87 that
You see, these procedures of the English
people! They annoy me "Li'a ntena".
Now you're simply protecting your child
instead of stating the facts of your
case.
goes to illustrate the extent of frustrations experienced in
the application of the acl v e.r£q rial rules. In this case the
court was sitting as a "Children's Court" in terms of the
Children's Protection Act of 1981. This statement was
directed to the mother of the boy who was before the court
for use of abusive language - "insulting an elderly man".
The mother, instead of assisting the son to cross-examine the
complainant, largely made statements which indicated she was
on the side of the boy. The magistrate several times
pointed out that he could not get where the woman's questions
were leading, as they were not useful to her claim that the
boy did not insult the complainant. The boy was
consequently asked to carryout the cross-examining on his own
behalf. This example demonstrates the nature of
complications that arise in cases where parties are not
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legally represented.
The above example does illustrate the point made
earlier, about the general lack of understanding of the rules
made use of in the received law courts, and it does sustain
the point by Magistrate Nkhereanye that the rules are
difficult to apply. In this case the woman could not
realize that in cross-examination she ought to substantiate
her claim that her son had not abused the complainant.
Also, the statement of the magistrate as cited above,
demonstrates the point made earlier, about extreme
consciousness that the received law courts are not indigenous
to the Basotho, the implication being that hence their rules
are problematic to enforce. Further examples of the same
kind are provided further on; and as shall be indicated the
problems in handling the rules are not only peculiar to the
members of the general public, but are experienced by the
court personnel as well.
In demonstrating that the people do not understand the
rules governing proceedings in the received law courts, the
Attorney General stated:
The person who is suing ought to produce
evidence and so does the defendant.
A lot of people fail to do this,
basically because they have no
understanding of what evidence is and how
it is to be obtained. Because of their
lack of knowledge of the law, they don't
know what evidence is (Maope: 16.2.1987).
What seemed to be most disturbing is when the Attorney
General mentioned that, in the circumstances a number of
people decide not to bring cases including criminal offences
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to the courts of law, simply because they cannot handle the
procedures required. As the Attorney General further
argued, not being used to exclusionary rules of evidence
under the customary law of procedure, the people do not know
what constitutes relevant and acceptable forms of evidence
within the rules. This causes further predicaments which
manifests themselves in the course of courtroom proceedings.
Sometimes there is a tendency to exclude or overlook
certain important elements of evidence when presenting and
adducing evidence to the court. For example, in
C0/3/HC/JM/12.2.87, the judge raised a question about the law
under which the marriage for which divorce proceedings had
been instituted had been solemnised, as it was not stated in
the papers before the court. In response the counsel for
the applicant stated that it was a civil marriage. In this
context this factor constituted a valuable and relevant
element of evidence because it determined whether or not, the
High Court had jurisdiction to hear the matter. In the
event whereby it could have been a customary marriage, which
was a possibility, the customary courts would have been the
proper choice of forum.
A problem of the same kind surfaced in C0/6/HC/JK/
9.3.87. (divorce proceedings). The applicant in the matter
(wife), claimed that she had proof of adultery between her
husband and the woman ("concubine") he was now staying with.
But she went on to state that the two were in no position to
produce any children, because in her explanation, the woman
was too old. The judge warned that the latter point in the
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evidence was an overstatement of facts, as the plaintiff had
no proof that the woman could not bear children any longer
due to her age. The judge said:
You cannot say that in absolute terms.
You are no expert [medical doctor] in
such matters. You can only indicate
your strong suspicions concerning
adultery between the two, but your claim
about children cannot be held to be an
actual fact.
This points to the lack of knowledge about what to include or
exclude from the evidence adduced on the principle that it
cannot be accepted as valid for a judicial decision. To the
ordinary person choices about what constitutes acceptable
evidence are not too obvious. Again, the main issue here is
that such kind of testimony would not have raised query in
the customary courts or the "unofficial" courts, where people
are allowed to state whatever facts they think necessary.
It is not suggested, however, that such testimony would have
been accepted but rather, that it would simply be ignored as
an overstatement of facts.
In CO/83/HC/JK/ 9.3.87, the plaintiff had been hit by a
vehicle and had in consequence suffered injuries. The
plaintiff was suing for costs and he had submitted a medical
report being proof of the injuries sustained and a receipt41
for medical fees showing an amount of M40.00. The claim the
plaintiff was submitting amounted to M10,000 in respect of
the injuries and costs of the proceedings plus the M40
Medical fees. The judge said the medical report showed that
injuries caused were only temporary and not permanent. The
implication was that the claim of M10,000 was too high for
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the kind of damage suffered. The plaintiff appreciated the
explanation, which he showed by thanking the judge. By this
time the counsel for the plaintiff appeared highly amused -
actually he laughed loudly. In this instance, it seemed the
plaintiff was not properly informed that the claim had to be
substantiated either by showing that the expenses incurred in
terms of medical fees or the extent of the injuries justified
the amount claimed. The plaintiff failed to sustain the
"preponderance of evidence" (Gair, 1961) in order to be
awarded damages at the scale requested. The facts presented
to the court were held not to be sufficient and only M6,000
was awarded.
In CO/8/TC/MM3/24.3. 87, a problem arose with regard to
one of the counts in the charge. The accused was charged on
3 counts, first, culpable homicide; secondly, no licence and
thirdly, "hit and run"; in which the accused knocked down a
school girl with a vehicle killing her. As the prosecutor
stood up and was already giving a summary of what the
prosecution evidence would reveal, the magistrate asked him
to elaborate on count (ii) of the charge - whether it
referred to failure to produce a licence when required to;
or that the accused did not possess a licence at all. At
this point, the prosecutor appeared not to be sure of the
facts. He, therefore, requested for an adjournment to allow
him time to check on the facts of count (ii) and the relevant
section of the Road Traffic Act No. 8 of 1981 which had been
contravened. This is another instance in which a case was
brought to the court without a full and clear or
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comprehensive statement of the facts involved as required by
the rules. Again while these may be the kind of
inadequacies one finds in any court, the issue in this case
is the extent to which this occurs in the proceedings.42 In
addition, here it is not that the personnel want to
manipulate the system rather such contravensions occur
because of their inadequate grasp of how the rules ought to
work. The fact is that most of the prosecutors in the
Magistrates Courts have no legal training.
In an interview, Crown Counsel Ntsonyana raised a
further point regarding the received law rules. Her main
contention was that the method of leading people with
questions as to what to say during the proceedings; and how
to state the evidence, causes a series of difficulties. The
first point in this is that, the rules determine what should
be taken as constituting relevant and acceptable evidence,
and how evidence should be given. As she put it:
there are rules which prevent one
from stating certain facts as part of
evidence, for example, hearsay
(Ntsonyana: 17.3.1987).
This point goes back to what the Attorney General, as
mentioned earlier, stated that people are not familiar with
such exclusionary rules of evidence as the hearsay rule, and
some of the examples43 already provided do demonstrate this
point. An additional point is that such exclusionary rules
do not operate in the customary courts and the "unofficial"
Chiefs' Courts, and people tend to think the same applies in
the received law courts as well. The second point Crown
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Counsel Ntsonyana raised concerning the question-answer
method of obtaining evidence in court is that, it tends to
handicap the people mainly because, as she pointed out, "when
you ask a question, I may respond in a manner I have
understood it". In addition, she said she would personally
prefer a method which would allow people to "speak out"
telling their own version of the events from which a
selection of relevant facts in a particular case would then
be made. The issue about the kind of problems that crop-up
during the proceedings as a result of the question and answer
method, was also raised by the Chief Magistrate. In his
explanation he stated that often what happens is that "when
you ask a question, he [party/witness] thinks you should have
asked a different one instead", in which event many people
fail to give appropriate responses to the questions put to
them.
The problem here as it emerged from the observed court
proceedings is two-fold. First, the failure to cross-
examine is greater whereby parties appear on their own,
simply because ordinary people do not know nor possess the
skills of the exercise. The fact that the proceedings are
in English like in the High Court tends to make matters even
more complicated. The next examples demonstrate the nature
of the problem in detail. In CO/2/MCM/MM1/9.3.87, which was
a Preparatory Examination on a charge of murder, the
magistrate asked the accused: "how are your questions
relevant to what you're charged with?" The following are
the questions which the accused had so far put to the
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witness: " 'M'e [mother] do you know me? Where do I live?
On the day in question ...whose field was being ploughed?
Was it in the morning? What time was it? How many people
were on the field?" It was only after the magistrate had
directed the accused to address himself to the charge against
him that the accused put questions which had a direct bearing
to the charge which is: "When did the deceased arrive [on
the field]?" and then, "since my arrival, had I shown any
signs of being in a fighting mood?"
In CO/4/MCM/MM3/16.3.87, the accused (unrepresented) was
reminded by the magistrate that he should not raise questions
more than once. This is because on several occasions, the
accused tended to repeat himself in cross- examination, but
also as the magistrate at one point indicated, his (accused)
questions were not "specific" and were "ambiguous". The
underlined words were said in English, yet the proceedings
had been in Sesotho. The point is whether the accused
understood what the magistrate meant by them. In
CO/15/MCM/MM4/1.4.87 too, the magistrate reminded a witness
to be more specific and elaborate in her description about
the place of the incident and not to assume that she (the
magistrate) knew the place. Again in C0/11/MCM/MN1/1.4. 87
several reminders that responses should be made more specific
were made. The accused was unrepresented and he was charged
with assault with intention to rape. In one instance the
magistrate also made a reminder that the accused should not
repeat his questions in cross-examining a witness. In an
intervention by the prosecutor, the accused was told that he
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could not cross-examine the witness on the facts she had not
raised on her examination-in-chief. The accused was
questioning the witness on the facts raised by another
witness in the case. The prosecutor stated that the latter
would answer for himself on those facts. Similar reminders
about repeating questions, asking irrelevant or inappropriate
questions, etc. were repeatedly made in other proceedings,
especially in cases where the accused appeared unrepresented,
which is a common phenomenon in proceedings before the
Magistrates Courts, more so in criminal matters. This
reaffirms the point which was made earlier on in which some
of the informants alleged that the rules of procedure and
evidence in these courts cannot be handled by laymen who
possess no legal training. As indicated in the examples
already discussed even the prosecutors in the Magistrates'
Courts, all of whom (except a few) have no legal training, in
many instances fail to abide by the provided rules.
The second dimension of the problem concerning the
question-answer method as contained as stated by the Chief
Magistrate and Crown Counsel Ntsonyana is that, the answers
given to the questions raised in cross-examination, are
usually not appropriate or fail to add any weight to the
evidence already given; or put in another manner, they fail
to inform the court better. But as observed from the
courtroom proceedings, the problems also arise because the
questions themselves are either wrongly constructed or
ordered, so that it may not be clear as to what evidence they
are seeking. The variety of problems involved here is shown
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in the examples discussed next.
In CO/1/MCM/MN1/26.2.87 for instance, the accused first
said he had no questions to put to the complainant. He was
being charged for sexual assault. When the Magistrate asked
whether he was in agreement with all that had been said of
him, the accused responded in the negative; then proceeded
to ask: "how was your assailant dressed?" The complainant
gave the description. That was the only question that the
accused ever asked and it was not even followed to any
logical conclusion. Such questions, quite clearly, add no
weight to the evidence the court already has. The response
of one witness in CO/3/MCM/MM2/9.3.87 to the defence
counsel's question: "how did you see the Shoe of Accused 1?"
that "because I have eyes", could have been similarly useless
only that in a further explanation, the witness was able to
substantiate it when the counsel later said: "yet a while
ago you stated that you could not see!" to which the witness
replied: "I said I could not remember, not I didn't see.
The witness was able to state his facts in a logical manner,
and thus undermining the counsel's attempt to confuse him -
a technique which as described elsewhere is commonly employed
by some of the legal practitioners. The witness referred to
here was a University student and he appeared to have a good
command of English and responded well to the defence
counsel's questions.
In C0/3/HC/JM/12.2.87, a different kind of problem
emerged. The applicant confused the children's birthdates.
In the evidence contained in the papers, one of the children
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was said to have been born in 1969; but in testifying before
the court, the applicant said it ought to have been 1970;
because as she explained;
I know the date of birth [of the boy]
because 1970 was the year my husband was
released from detention.
Thus there was contradiction in the evidence presented to the
court.
Failure to be specific about certain elements of the
evidence appeared to be quite a common phenomenon. In
C0/4/HC/JM/12.2.87, for example, in relating the events of
the day in question, the plaintiff kept on using the
reference "we"; for instance: "we were taken to the police
station". It was only after the judge had asked for
clarification on this, that it was stated that the plaintiff
was "chained" (handcuffed) together with another boy and were
being chased "driven" by men on horse-back. In
C0/17/MCM/MN1/1.4.87, the magistrate asked the witness: "who
did you say you were with?" The response was simply that:
"I was with my mother". The magistrate then said: "should
I write 'm'e [mother] down here?" The witness then gave the
name of her mother. In the same case, when the same witness
was asked by the accused about what time the alleged offence
had been committed, she responded: "It was in the evening
"shoalane"." The question was asked again and this time she
said: "It was at night "bosiu", but I had not yet gone to
bed". The accused then asked as to which statement ought to
be taken as stating the truth. To this, the witness replied
that the two (evening and night) are the same, and when the
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accused asked in what way they are similar, she said: "I
don't know". It is such responses as this one which add no
value to the evidence given to the court.
In CO/11/MCM/MM3/1.3.87, one of the prosecution
witnesses was a member of the Lesotho Paramilitary Force,
detective section. He was being led through the evidence
regarding what action he took having received a report about
some stolen property; to which he responded: "having got
the report, I proceeded to Ha Tsosane55(name of a village).
Then the magistrate intervened: "What does that mean?"
This was followed by a question from the prosecutor: "Where
[exactly] Ha Tsosane?" The witness then replied: "not
knowing the place well ..." The prosecutor interrupted
before the statement was even completed asking: "At whose
place [home] Ha Tsosane [there]?"44 But it was in
CO/18/MCM/MM3/22.4.87 where it emerged clearly that such
personnel as the policemen could also dismally fail to
respond to questions put to them in cross-examination.
Below is a brief statement of the encounter between the
defence counsel and the police witness (Prosecution witness
9 [PW9]). This was a case on a charge of stock-theft.
There were 10 accused persons, represented by two defence
counsels separately.
Defence Counsel: Do you know thvs» person? (referring to
A10).45
PW9 : (Silent, then mumbled something).
Defence Counsel: I have asked whether you know him (in an
angry and loud voice). Then to
Magistrate: Instruct this person to
respond to questions, I haven't come here
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to play. (To PW9): How come A10 has
been charged on this count relating to
EXHIBIT 1?
Later on PW9 was asked to show the court the papers which
would substantiate his evidence, but he did not have them
with him.
PW9 : There will be other policemen who will
come and give evidence in that respect.
Defence Counsel: You're not responding to my question, why
did you leave them [papers] behind? My
questions are simple but you don't want
to respond to them.
PW9 : Maybe I don't understand them.
Defence Counsel: (to Magistrate) "Ntate" [father] tell
this person to respond to questions.
Magistrate : The question is, in your knowledge, how
come this person (A10) has been charged
on the count pertaining to EXHIBIT 1?
PW9 : I think ...
Defence Counsel: I don't want you're opinion. You don't
know how this person has been charged on
this count.
Then the prosecutor requested the magistrate to ask the
defence counsel not to be angry in his cross-examination.
The defence counsel finally remarked in astonishment,
pointing out that PW9 had completely failed to respond to his
questions despite his long service in the police force.
In the proceedings of the same case, because there were
two defence counsels, the witnesses were cross-examined
twice, sometimes on the same points. This seemed to confuse
the witnesses. One of them actually refused to be cross-
examined by the second counsel, until the Magistrate
intervened.
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Further indications showing people's lack of skills to
carry out effective cross-examination were demonstrated in
their tendency to ask more than one question at a time.
These problems were sometimes coupled with the tendency of
the people to narrate their evidence during cross-
examination. In CO/6/TC/MM3/24.3.87, one of the prosecution
witnesses (PW1) tended to fall into this trap several times
and the prosecutor had to warn him: "Stop right there". At
another instance it was the magistrate who told him not to
narrate the facts of the evidence "Se ka qoqq. litaba
kaofela".
A further kind of observation common in the proceedings
of the received law courts pertains to the exhibits, which
often go missing especially in criminal cases. In
CO/70/HC/JK/ 3.3.87 for instance, it was mentioned that one
of the exhibits had gone missing. The weapon belonging to
A2, had been confiscated but could no longer be found. In
CO/104/ HC/JK/17.3.87 also, another exhibit being a navy
handkerchief which had contained some money, had also gone
missing. In CO/15/MCM/MM4/1.4.87, at one point the
prosecutor requested for an adjournment to allow her time to
look for the exhibits. The magistrate reminded her that it
was her duty to see to it that exhibits are in court, even
before the proceedings start. Then the prosecutor indicated
that the exhibits had been brought to court on the previous
day of the hearing, but that the police were now claiming
that they could not be located. The court having been
adjourned, I overheard two people conversing about the issue.
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One pointed out how the court personnel were
misappropriating various payment funds made through the
courts; such as maintenance fees, and so on. He went on to
intimate that the missing exhibits had possibly been
exchanged or sold off for cash.
Furthermore, in CO/101/HC/JK/18.3.87 too, the defence
counsel, pointed out that when the matter went on Preparatory
Examination before the Magistrate's Court, some of the
contents of EXHIBIT 1; being shells of the gun alleged to
have been used in the killing by the two accused, did not
include the "box" (now before the High Court), but only an
envelope had been presented. The defence counsel was
actually insinuating that the exhibits now brought to the
High Court, could no longer be held as those on the basis of
which the case had been referred to it in the first place,
and thus could not be accepted. In C0/10/MCM/MM1/1.4.87,
one of the witnesses, a policemen, having described the
"molamu" (big stick) that had been used in the crime,
revealed that the same had been misplaced; following his
transfer to another duty police station.
Another common observed feature with regard to criminal
proceedings pertained to medical reports submitted to the
courts as evidence. For example, in C0/4/HC/JM/ 12.2.87, a
long debate ensued concerning the medical report that had
been presented to the court. The judge complained that in
the first place, the photostat copies were not legible. In
addition, it emerged from the explanation by the defence
counsel that, the police had lost the original copy of the
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said report. To this the judge pointed out:
The police ought to have been notified
that the report was needed for purposes
of proceedings in this Court (High
Court); which is entitled to the best
evidence.
Implicitly this statement was a reminder that the High Court
is the highest court of record. The judge went on to show
that the defence counsel should have pressed for a legible
b
report, alternatively he ought to have supoenaed the police
to come and give evidence on the illegible report or refusal
to release (provide) originals. What was even worse, it
further emerged that the doctor involved in the case was not
in attendance, though he had been summoned. Hence the judge
indicated that the doctor should have also been subpoenaed
and/or sent a warrant of apprehension to prison for contempt
of court. In what sounded an angry voice, the judge stated:
Doctors have been requested to attend at
their own convenience, but personally I
have never endorsed that; therefore, I
don't take it as a fact. It is stated
that everyone has to appear [to testify]
before the High Court and leave
everything aside. This Court is entitled
to the best evidence, therefore, best
reports should be submitted.
When the defence counsel stated that he could not have
subpoenaed all these people because the expenses involved
would have been too high, the judge responded pointing out
that justice could not be sacrificed because of money. A
similar complaint was raised by the judge in CO/83/HC/JK/
9.3.87, that the medical report was not legible.
The failure by medical practitioners to attend the
proceedings surfaced more frequently than the few instances
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mentioned above. In CO/107/HC/JM/18.3.87 for example, it
was stated that the doctor was not able to attend because she
was out of the country. In fact the crown counsel argued
that the Director of Public Prosecutions being an officer of
the law, could not mislead the court by giving false
information concerning the availability of a witness whose
evidence is so crucially needed. The judge on the other
hand, raised a further issue in the matter that, it did not
appear as if the doctor had testified at the Preparatory
Examination (PE) either. This was questioned especially
because despite the doctor's failure to testify at the PE,
his report had been submitted in evidence. The judge
claimed that procedurally that report could not be accepted
for trial. As he put it:
It is not fair that the doctor was not
called to be challenged at the PE. The
report cannot be accepted as evidence in
the trial, since the post mortem report
has not been put to test. If he [the
doctor] had been present at the PE, the
picture of the case could possibly have
been changed.
At this juncture it was mentioned that the concerned
doctor had left the country for good. The question was then
what could be done in the circumstances. The judge strongly
held to the view that the report was not acceptable "without
further facts", since there was no evidence either, that the
statement of the doctor had been made under oath as required
in terms of Section 27 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence
Act, which would render the report acceptable under the
circumstances. At that point, the crown counsel made
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indications that he wanted to abandon the case, and the
defence counsel, in that event, proposed that he would put in
an application for the accused to be discharged. The judge
pointed out that it would first be necessary to look into
whether the prosecution had been successful in establishing
a prima facie case against the accused. Thus the mere fact
that the doctor could not testify would not be sufficient to
dismiss the case altogether. This factor, the defence
counsel had overlooked as a matter of procedure - that it
would be necessary to establish whether other evidence in the
prosecution's case, was utterly useless - which would not
require proof beyond reasonable doubt as would be the case
under normal circumstances.
Similarly, in C0/17/MCM/MN1/1.4.87, the prosecutor
stated that he had failed to get the doctor who had examined
the complainant to come to court. The doctor according to
the explanation had gone overseas till June. A request was
made for the case to be remanded till a precise date could be
arranged. In CO/10/MCM/MM1/1.4.87 too, it was mentioned
that the Indian doctor who had performed the post mortem had
since left the country.
Further complications revealed from the observations
pertained to estimations as to time, place, weather and
distances. Almost invariably, parties and witnesses had
problems in responding to questions involving the above
variables. In C0/11/MCM/MM3/1.4.87 for instance, when a
witness (PW5) was asked to estimate the distance between her
own home and the one that was burgled, she responded: It is
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a distance from here to the end of that other house, outside.
This statement was ambiguous and necessitated the defence
counsel to further ask: at the back of it [the outside
house]? The witness agreed. The prosecutor gave an
estimation of 50 paces, to which the defence counsel reacted:
Roughly so, it doesn't matter. Later on, the witness was
asked to give a description of the weather on the day in
question. The defence counsel questioned her: what were
the weather conditions like? was there any moon? The
response indicated: No, it was just dark, since it was
winter. But I was able to see because of the passing cars.
The statement was meant to show that the passing cars had
their lights on, although the witness herself did not clearly
stipulate this. As discussed earlier with respect to
CO/I5/MCM/MM4/1.4.87;46 the magistrate reminded a witness to
be more specific and elaborate in her descriptions of the
place of the incident. In C0/17/MCM/MN1/1.4.87, confusion
arose because a witness first claimed it was at dusk
"mantsiboea" but then later said it was at night "bosiu".
The confusion became even more profound when she argued that
the two are the same. When further cross-examined by the
accused: what do you mean, they are similar (closest
translation of "li 'tsoana ha li fihla kae?"), she responded:
"Ache" [oh well], I don't know.
In CO/79/HC/JK/3.3.87, one accused was asked to estimate
the distance from which he was shouting at another. He
looked through the courtroom window and said: A distance
about to that red car. There were two red cars outside and
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they were parked not quite adjacent to each other, and I
personally was not sure which one the accused was referring
to. The counsels agreed to the estimated distance in paces.
In this instance, the cars in question were not so far apart
from each other, but had they been the accused's statement
would have been inadequate.
USE OF ENGLISH IN THE RECEIVED LAW COURTS
A further observation concerns the use of English in the
received law courts which is mainly connected to the fact
that these courts were introduced by the British during
colonial rule. In the Magistrates Courts there seems to
variations, most magistrates choosing to conduct proceedings
in Sesotho because many people who appear before them are not
represented and do not know English. In fact unlike in the
past, provision has been made47 for criminal proceedings to
be conducted in Sesotho. In the High Court on the other
hand, the proceedings are invariably in English perhaps
because some of the judges are not Basotho, but may be also
in view of the fact that from here appeal lies to the Court
of Appeal, which is presided over by foreign judges. When
asked to comment about this, the Attorney General could only
say "I don't know, that is simply a scandal". However,
Judge Molai had the following to say on this issue:
It is an awkward thing. I have been [I
was] a magistrate for many years, I used
to write my record in English; while
everybody was speaking in Sesotho. The
people have to speak in English [in the
High Court] and I've got to provide an
interpreter. What for, I don't know
(Molai: 6.3.1987).
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As he further pointed out, in the past there was a time when
the High Court had only one Mosotho judge,48 in the
circumstances it was only plausible to have the proceedings
conducted in English for the benefit of the non-Basotho
judges. In his concluding remarks, the Judge said:
But I personally do not like it. It
looks awkward ... If you go to England
you won't find a court conducting
proceedings in Sesotho or Setswana, etc.
We are disadvantaged. I do not know
English [well] myself, so I have to
stammer all the time (Molai: 6.3, 1987).
Among the proceedings observed in the Magistrates'
Courts all but two were conducted in Sesotho, except of
course where arguments on points of law arose, in which event
the presiding magistrate and the legal counsel(s) would often
converse in English. However, it was observed that the
magistrates and the counsels have a tendency of throwing in
English words here and there, even when proceedings are in
Sesotho.49 But as expressed by the Chief Magistrate:
What I find to be most annoying here at
the Magistrates' [Courts], an issue which
we have brought up many times, is the
provision that the record of the
proceedings shall be in English (Matete
: 8.5, 1987).
Thus when people require the records for purposes of civil
litigation in the customary courts, e.g. for compensation
claims, they are given these in English. This causes a lot
of predicament, for many of them do not have an extensive
knowledge of English, let alone the legal language. It is
even more difficult because civil litigation in the customary
courts is conducted in Sesotho, the court personnel at that
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level, itself not being highly educated to be able to
understand and handle records written in English.
The relevant Section Under Order No. 3 of 1973 provides
that "... proceedings in civil cases and the record of
proceedings in civil as well as in criminal cases, shall be
in the English language." Thus in civil matters, provision
is that English shall continue to be used, on the
understanding that the parties shall be represented by legal
practitioners; since the "papers ought to be filed in
English and in certain standard formats. Even when he [a
party] knows English he can;t do this on his own; because he
must have the standard forms".50 However as the Chief
Magistrate further explained:
On humanitarian grounds we let the
parties to speak in their own language
[Sesotho] but the records are always in
English (Matete: 8.5.1987).
Usually, as the Chief Magistrate further indicated, this is
done in the interests of time. The main difficulty, as he
noted is that, cases end up in the Court of Appeal, which is
still presided over by foreign judges only. But in his
opinion this should not constitute a serious complication
because the records can always be translated into English
when necessary for purposes of litigation in the Court of
Appeal as it happens when cases from the customary courts
proceed on appeal to the High Court, the records from the
Judicial Commissioners' Court are translated accordingly.
What is crucial to note are the practical complications
that occur during the proceedings due to the use of English.
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From the observations that were carried out, the most
specific problems concern interpretations made from English
into Sesotho; and sometimes vice versa. In
CO/79/HC/JK/3.3.87, the interpreter translated the word
"mantsiboea" as afternoon when it should actually be evening.
The judge even questioned whether a correct translation had
been made. In the same proceedings, a witness made a
statement which the interpreter translated into English to
read: Since she saw me in the area, she believed ... When
the judge finally gave the translation himself it was reading
as follows: Because she had merely seen me in the area ...
Also the word "molamu" was translated simply as a stick
instead of a thick stick, (often used for fighting).
In CO/104/HC/JK/17.3.87; a witness stated: I was asked
whether I could identify them ("ke ile ka botsoa hore na nka
ba supa" ), which was translated into English as: I was asked
to identify them; rather than: I was asked whether I could
identify them. The judge in this event had directed the
interpreter several times to give the correct translation "e
behe hantle ntate, ka Sesotho". Again the judge finally had
to make the translation himself. Additional problems
occurred when witnesses made expressions that have no direct
English equivalencies, yet without the right translations
their testimony would lose strength. For example, in the
above case a witness was asked how many people were in the
identification parade, to which she responded: "ka ntate, ha
nka ba ka ba bala". The nearest translation of this could
be: [I swear] By my father, I did not count them. The
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interpreter simply translated it to read: I did not count
them. The point at issue is that, wrongly translated
statements could sometimes distort, if not change the content
or version of testimony; or even make certain elements of it
to conflict.
DELAYS
Another common feature as observed from the proceedings
in the received law courts relates to the numerous delays
that are caused as a result of various factors. Examples
taken from the Motion Roll cases before the High Court on
23.2.87, can be used to demonstrate this point. All cases
from CO/5 to CO/IO/HC/JK/23.2.87 were postponed and so were
cases CO/10 and CO/12. The main reason was incomplete
filing or serving of papers. In C0/9/HC/JK/23.2.87, it was
stated that opposing affidavits had not yet been filed;
while in CO/IO/HC/JK/23.2.87 it was mentioned that the
respondent had not yet signed the affidavits. But when the
judge probed deeper into the matter, it was disclosed that
actually the affidavits being referred to, were not yet ready
- that is, it was not just a question of the respondent
appending her signature. In CO/16 to CO/22/ HC/JK/23.2.87
then CO/27, 28, 34, 39, 40, 46 and 52 and
C0/61/HC/JK/23.2.87, replying affidavits had not been filed.
In C0/19/HC/JK/23.2.87, a divorce case, the matter was 10
years old and it had passed through so many hands (lawyers)
that for a moment, it was not clear as to who was now
appearing for the applicant. Another divorce case
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CO/80/HC/JM/3.3. 87 was also about 10 years. All the above
cases were postponed in one single day, with the exception of
the last matter. Similar postponements were quite common on
other Motion Roll days in the High Court.
As illustrated in various cases discussed so far, many
matters are brought to court on insufficient or incomplete
information. This would be relevant in cases where medical
reports submitted were unclear or illegible, and where
medical practitioners do not turn up to testify before the
court. But further aspects were observed. In
C0/10/MCM/MM1/1.4.87 in particular, it became quite obvious
that the case had been brought to court on inadequate
evidence. First, the police witness (for the prosecution)
arrived late for the proceedings, and the magistrate
reprimanded him for that. He confirmed that the accused had
informed him that the deceased (a brother's wife) had died of
stroke; and when he investigated the case, it appeared that
no post mortem had been done. He said in trying to find
out, he could not get an explanation for this irregularity.
However, later he said the accused had told him that he
found the deceased already dead at the mortuary. Under
cross-examination, the witness stated that he would agree
that the impression he had been given was that the deceased
died in the mutuary; although he could not say how she had
got there in the first place. Earlier evidence heard by the
court had disclosed that the deceased had first been taken to
hospital by her children. The magistrate pointed out at the
gaps in the evidence, and responding to the request made by
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the prosecutor that the investigating officer be given one
last chance to find out what happened, the magistrate said
the matter ought not to have been brought to court, without
complete evidence and thorough investigations in the first
instance.
The defence counsel then said "justice must not only be
done, but must be seen to be done". He stated that the
questions he had put to the witness had clearly revealed that
no investigations had been carried out. The prosecutor then
declared that he had not yet closed his case and stated,
therefore, that "my learned friend cannot object. I am still
on the floor". However, the defence counsel continued to
point out that the court could not order fresh investigations
to be done, as its duty is to consider evidence adduced before
it. The magistrate did not appear to be totally in
disagreement with the statement, and as he stated:
It is evident from the evidence what had
happened, the accused had incurred
injuries before she fell at the water-
well. The problem is that while she did
not go to the hospital immediately after
sustaining injuries, it is not clear what
happened when she [finally] did get
admission. In the interests of justice,
the request for further investigations
into the case to enable a just decision
to be reached is justified. I am aware
that time has been wasted. The matter
should not have been before the court
with the said inadequacies. I would
accept that this could be a disadvantage
on one side, but I believe this is
necessary.
The proceedings were postponed to June 2nd. The defence
counsel was not satisfied, and the court having been
adjourned he said in his argument to the prosecutor, "the
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first witness did indicate that the deceased was brought to
the hospital by her children, therefore she could not have
died of stroke when she fell at the well, nor was she just
found dead at mutuary". The argument was that there must be
some explanation as to why the deceased was taken to hospital
in the first instance, which would explain the cause of the
death.
In C0/11/MCM/MM3/1.4.87, the prosecution witness (PW6)
revealed that the person who was before the court was not the
one he had pressed charges against. The stolen property in
question, had been released through the directive of one
senior police officer. But it was not clear how the alleged
criminal had been released, and how the man presently before
the court was now being charged instead. But the statement
of the prosecutor to the defence counsel that "there'll be no
conviction at all", suggested he was aware of the gaps or
weaknesses in the evidence. The prosecutor actually
intimated that the defence need not even have cross-examined,
because it was clear that the accused before the court was
not being rightfully charged for the property in question.
This statement was made during an adjournment.
There were many more observed cases, and the issues
drawn from them point out to similar complications as those
already described. It would not be possible to discuss all
of the cases and use them as examples in this work.
CONCLUSION
From the descriptions contained in this chapter two
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major conclusions can be made. One deals mainly with the
idea that the received law courts represent a totally
different judicial structure from the customary courts and
the "unofficial" chiefs' courts. The other relates to the
link between the received law courts and the adV€.t~SQrial
model in comparison to its practices in the western world.
First, with the introduction of the received law courts
came a totally different framework of dispute settlement
which the Basotho people had never come into contact with
before. The received law courts contrast sharply with the
indigenous system now largely operating in the "unofficial"
Cniefs' courts, and to a large extent in the customary
courts. The received law courts are set apart from the
latter two sets of courts in a number of respects, mainly in
ideological outlook and approach. The organisation of the
received law courts, as described in the beginning sections,
is much more complicated as evident in examining, for
instance, the jurisdiction and powers of the magistrates of
various ranks as well as the ways of bringing cases to the
courts and processes of dealing with them once they are
there. There are separate processes for civil and criminal
cases with their distinctive rules pertaining to time limits
allowed between each of the stages, parties involved, powers
of different courts with respect to various causes of
dispute, sentencing and so on. All of these are backed-up
by law.
The above suggests a degree of separateness between the
"unofficial" chiefs' courts and the customary courts on the
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one hand, and the received law courts on the other. This
becomes further illuminated in considering the kinds of
matters that come before the received law courts, most of
which do not involve customary law. At the practical level,
however, the various sets of courts do not operate as
separate entities but rather function as a continuum, with
various courts sharing powers in terms of what cases each of
the structures can handle depending on the jurisdictions they
are afforded. Thus in this regard the view that the
judicial system of Lesotho is dualistic is rendered
inadequate, and the fact that the various court structures
including the "unofficial" chiefs' courts perform
complementary functions; indicates that the courts operate
in an hierarchical order, and this dominates the practical
reality of all these courts. An additional point is that
the received law courts in general possess wider powers, with
the Magistrates Courts having revisionary and powers of
control over the customary courts, and the High Court and the
Court of Appeal forming the appellant structure for all cases
including those from the customary courts. Further to
demonstrating that the received law courts occupy a position
of seniority over the others, this shows that the idea about
the parallelism of various court structures cannot to be held
correct either.
The second strand of argument in the chapter was that
the received law courts have a close link to the adtv€LTSa-rial
model of trial both in ideological and technical form. In
theory they ought to work according to adve^rsfccrial rules,
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however, at the practical level the application of the
a4ve.fS>Cprial model in this context meets with a series of
constraints, produced by a constant interplay of factors
determined mainly by the circumstances surrounding the
existence of these courts, having to do with the fact that
the model in this case is alien.
The constraints referred to above pertain to such
factors as lack of adequately and suitably qualified
personnel to deal with aspects of the received law like the
interpretation of statutes; the lack of comprehension and
appreciation of the meaning and how the ad v-€.f£qrial rules
are to be applied. For example, the majority of prosecutors
in the Magistrates Courts have no formal legal training.
That is in addition to the fact that, some Magistrates
themselves are not legally qualified, while others are not
sufficiently professional. These are coupled with the lack
of appropriate cooperation from other supporting services as
reflected in the police failures to carryout effective
investigations, failure to provide adequate documentary
evidence such as legible post mortem reports, loss of
exhibits and the doctors' failure to attend proceedings.
Further to the above, are constraints caused by the use of
English in the proceedings, lack of legal representation in
the Magistrates Courts51 especially, concentration of legal
practitioners in the Capital, Maseru, inadequate numbers of
established legal firms and so on.52 But added to these is
the fact that the Basotho people generally have a different
notion of how justice is achieved as founded in the other
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coexisting mechanisms of dispute settlement. In this
regard, complications are caused by people's tendency to
bring notions of different justice processes into the
received law courts proceedings, which frustrates the
application of the adversarial rules even more.
On the basis of the above constraints it is argued that
the adversarial model does not work in the context of the
received law courts either, although it is reckoned that in
this case, it is principally for different reasons than those
offered in the works of Carlen (1976); Blumberg (1967, 1969)
McBarnet (1981) and others. Here it is not just the
people's lack of knowledge about the ad V tCScijrial model, nor
is it simply the manipulative practices of the court
personnel which lead to the displacement of formal rules and
emergence of "informal" ones. In the received law courts,
the issues involved make the situation much more complex than
that which has been observed in the courts in the Western
world. Consequently, practices such as extreme delays, a
series of postponements and adjournments53 become the most
prevalent when looking at how the overall structure of the
received law courts operate leading to a conclusion that they
represent a creaking system of the adversarial model.
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CHAPTER 6
THE COURTS AND LEGAL REPRESENTATION
In this chapter, I examine issues related to legal
representation in the courts of Lesotho. I begin first ,
by addressing general issues; which include looking at the
historical aspects pertaining to legal representation, and its
provisions in the various courts. Later, the analysis turns
to practical issues, mainly concerned with how the
adv^-rc,Q,rial principles are handled in cases where parties
are represented by legal practitioners.
The idea is to further demonstrate the kind of
constraints under which the acA V£ r^Qrial model in this setting
has to work. The constraints considered in this regard
include for example, that there are few qualified legal
professionals, shortages of sufficiently experienced legal
practitioners, the inequitable distribution of legal
practitioners and well established legal firms within the
country. Furthermore the descriptions deal with provisions
for legal aid as a measure that could improve on legal
representation. The state of the legal aid scheme as shall
also be indicated, is not satisfactory. By and large, the
issues of legal representation, as discussed in this case, are
connected to the fact that the concept is itself alien, and
that it accompanied the introduction of the received law and
its system of courts.
In general terms, the legal profession and questions
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relating to legal representation of parties in Lesotho, as
illustrated in the following descriptions, are not yet as
developed as in the Western countries. One of the main
indicators to this effect as argued mainly by the Attorney
General and the Chief Magistrate is that, there are inadequate
numbers of qualified lawyers. Previously a lot of them came
from the Republic of South Africa. More serious endeavours
to train locals as lawyers have been undertaken in recent
years, but these have to be shared by all sectors which need
legal services and skills. These include Magistrates, Public
Prosecution, and other state and private sectors.
The state of the legal profession in Lesotho contrasts
sharply with that in the western countries. For instance,
in the study of the London area, Zander (1973) while admitting
the static position of the legal profession at the beginning
of the century, demonstrates that from 1960 onwards there has
been an extraordinary growth in numbers of both Solicitors and
Barristers. Which he notes could, to some extent, be
attributable to the expansion of the legal aid service. The
number of Barristers rose from 1,919 in 1960 to 4,076 in 1977;
including 366 women representing an increase of more than a
100 per cent. For Solicitors with practising certificates,
the figure rose from 18,438 in 1960 to 31,250 in 1976 i.e.
an increase of 69%. While figures of the legal professionals
in Lesotho are not available, the overall impression is that
the numbers are very small relative to the functions demanded
of them. In addition, in terms of distribution, there is a
high concentration of lawyers and legal firms in the capital,
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with most professionals staying there. The truth is, at
district levels, legal firms are almost absent. And legal
practitioners only go to the districts, when they have cases
to represent.
Before going any further, it becomes necessary to look
at the development of the concept of legal representation in
Lesotho by setting it in an historical perspective. First
it is important to recognise, as already hinted earlier, that
legal representation is not a feature of the indigenous system
for dispute settlement; and that it only came with the
introduction of the received judicial system. It is in
this manner that while Ashton (1952) indicated that in the
Paramount Chiefs' Court wealthier people did employ special
pleaders, he recognised that this practice was contrary to
traditional procedure and theory. The absence of legal
representation in the indigenous setting, can be appreciated
in the context of how dispute settlement processes were
organised. In the same manner, this will assist to explain
how legal representation is still not practiced in
"unofficial" chiefs' courts.
One has to appreciate that in the "unofficial" courts
the parties themselves play a major role in bringing all
important evidence to the court. Thus they are responsible
for stating their case, calling witnesses and for asking any
questions that make their dispute clear to the court.
However, this is supplemented to a large extent by the role
played by other participants in the proceedings, in the manner
described in chapter 3. The proceedings are attended by
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parties to a dispute, their kin and supporters, as well as
other interested villagers. Together they attempt to settle
disputes through conciliation, negotiation and appeal to
applicable norms, other than merely ruling on the overt
dispute brought to court. It is for this reasons that
everyone present is allowed to bring forward whatever evidence
they think relevant in a particular case; and also to ask any
such questions they believe will clarify the issues involved.
But even more crucial is the fact that, the role of the
presiding authority in this context, is not only of a judge
refereeing a contest between the parties but also, - together
with his assistants or men of the court, - he has the onus
to discover the truth about the matter before them.
Therefore, they are also entitled to call upon and examine
disputants and their witnesses; in order to elicit facts
relevant in a case, and to breakdown any false testimony.
In this process, everyone raises challenges to any witness
whose evidence is suspected. Everyone, including the chief,
can bring his own private knowledge to bear on the case in
question, in order to find out the facts, and to arrive at a
solution acceptable to both sides.
In addition, the lack of representation in these courts
should be appreciated in terms of the purpose of the whole
process of dispute settlement. The process is based on the
notion of reconciliation and conscience. This, it is
believed, could occur or be achieved by allowing disputants
to talk out their grievances in an open manner, and in a way
most suitable to them. It involves a full exploration or
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understanding of the roots of the contention concerned, which
is believed will promote or give rise to a feeling within the
village that, it will finally assist to ease strained
relationships and prevent matters getting worse.
The above are the kind of characteristics encouraged in
the conciliation, mediation and neighbourhood justice schemes
developing in the modern western systems.1 In these
acknowledgement is given to the positive role of informal
justice and its success in resolving minor interpersonal
disputes quickly, effectively and in a way that satisfies
disputing parties, which the formality of the courts, their
adherence to the due process model, their strict rules of
procedure and adherence to adjudication are noted to fail
achieve.2
The characteristics spelled out in the preceding
descriptions are embedded in, and contingent upon the Basotho
social structure, in which relationships among the people are
multiplex and continuous; disputants and their supporters
being bound to one another by cross cutting-ties (Cf Gluckman,
1969). The absence of legal representation in the
"unofficial" Chiefs' courts and the customary courts is
largely viewed in this light. It is in the context of the
community-oriented nature and approach to dispute settlement
in the village where the majority of the Basotho people live,
and where relations mentioned above are still particulary
strongly held, that the absence of legal representation should
be understood. In another way, the above descriptions,
serve to explain how even today, there are still people who
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do not know much about the law concerning the right to legal
representation, how to exert it if they need to, and about
legal aid services as well.
What the Attorney General pointed out in an interview
is that, the idea of legal representation starts by making
certain presumptions. First, it usually presumes that
representation by a legal practitioner is the best - that with
legal representation one's case would be competently and
efficiently put across, leading to expectations about a
better and more satisfying outcome. Secondly, it assumes
that there are lawyers, sufficient enough to carry out the
service. The argument of the Attorney General was that,
these assumptions may not match what actually exists in real
situations. The second one has been already explained,
pointing out that there are not enough trained lawyers in the
country. I expound on this point further later on. With
regard to the former, the Attorney General said that the main
cause of concern is that "lawyers are mechanical", by which,
as further explained he meant that they often would not
provide people with proper worth while advice in incidences,
for example, such as where an individual does not have a
strong case or no case at all. To demonstrate this the
Attorney General stated:
A lawyer cannot advice you that you
are going wrong [that you have no strong
case], but will take your case to court.
Nor would he call the two parties
together for a talk They [lawyers]
are one sided (Maope: 16.2.1987).
In this the Attorney General was noting the stress the
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lawyers in Lesotho place upon their role of advocacy in the
courts, and their disregard for the advisory function of the
legal profession. This emphasis, as indicated later on is
reflected in both the provision for legal representation and
legal aid provisions. As further expressed by the Attorney
General, this explains why in many cases; lawyers concentrate
on trapping each other on technicalities of procedure, other
than arguing on the facts of the case. He also raised an
opinion that legal representation should include an element
of competence, in the sense that, anybody who may not even be
a lawyer, but is held competent should be allowed to
represent another in a case. This, by implication, suggests
practising the kind of representation operating in the
"unofficial" chiefs courts and to a large extent in the
customary courts.
From the explanation offered by the Attorney General
above, it seems that many cases in the courts of Lesotho are
decided mostly on the basis of technicalities of procedure.
What becomes most frustrating to the people, Judge Molai
stated, is because:
People in the villages, when there is a
case, many of them know whether or not
the offence has been committed. But when
the case comes to court, people are
discharged on technicalities. We look at
things like hearsay evidence, which
people regard as important part of
evidence and discard them. People in
the villages do not understand these
technicalities (Molai: 4.3.1987).
This demonstrates that the facts of the matter are often not
argued. What Judge Molai further indicated is that this
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causes loss of confidence in the legal profession. In
addition, it explains a point noted earlier where the
Attorney General expressed that, some decisions of the
official courts cause a lot of bitterness among the people,
hence other people seek recourse to the "unofficial" Chiefs'
courts.
The next section addresses the position with regard to
legal representation today. First, legal representation is
viewed as having accompanied changes in the overall judicial
system as contained in the preceding chapters. Hence it is
a concept which can be discussed in relation to the customary
courts and the received law courts, which together form the
official court structure, brought in_-to operation during the
colonial period. However, as shall be realised, legal
representation applies in varying degrees in these courts.
PROVISIONS FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION
This section examines the provisions for legal
representation but also looks at how far this principle is
upheld in practice. These descriptions should be understood
within the context of what has been already said of the
official courts in the last two chapters.
With regard to the customary courts, we have already
noted that in both civil and criminal proceedings, procedure
and rules of evidence have, to some extent, become far more
complex, although they still bear much resemblance to those
in the "unofficial41 courts. For instance, principles such as
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hearsay which apply in the received law courts also operate
in the customary courts. In addition, as revealed by some
of the informants3 in criminal cases particularly, cases
before the customary courts have to be conducted along the
lines set for the received law courts. A similar view is
portrayed in the works of Palmer and Poulter (1972); Perry
(1977); Hamnett (1972) and others, noting the more
formalistic and complex rules in the customary courts. On
the basis of these arguments alone, one would agree that
legal representation is justifiable. But even more, whereby
people are not familiar with the procedures and do not
comprehend the manner in which proceedings are conducted by
the court, such as in this event where the rules employed are
of foreign origin, then legal representation becomes
extremely necessary and vital.
A point raised by the Attorney General regarding the
rules for civil litigation in the Magistrates' Courts, for
instance, is that "the written procedures are intended for
legal practitioners and are very complicated "li thata". He
that
further stated^no individual person, therefore, can lodge a
claim on his own behalf in these courts, without the
assistance of a legal practitioner. The same would apply
with regard to the High Court Rules of course regarding which
the Attorney General said:
In the High Court it is worse. No one
can go there without a lawyer. Those
who do try cheat. They request the
lawyers to draft papers for them; but
they have often been disclosed (Maope:
16.2.1987) .
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What the Attorney General emphasised is that the rules of
procedure and evidence at this level of the judicial process
are very complicated not only to the lay man but to the
people generally, including the educated. In a further
statement he explained that this means that, people have no
access to the highest courts of the land because of
complicated rules. As he put it:
... it is not just the majority, it's
absolutely everybody. An educated
person, for example, if I give him the
High Court Rules and say he should
proceed on his own, there's absolutely
nothing he can do (Maope: 16.2.1987).
The Crown Counsel Ntsonyana reiterated that civil procedure
in the received law courts has to be done strictly on paper,
and no ordinary Mosotho can draft all the documents which
have to be filed in the required manner.
The result, as argued by the Attorney General, is that
people are forced to seek services of legal practitioners,
but as he further stated what is particularly disturbing is
the reality that many just give it up. In his own words he
said:
But often, people seek no relief of the
courts "ba lahla feela tjena" so that you
find the law is contravened, but many of
such actions never reach the courts
(Maope: 16.2.1987).
He further intimated that with additional constraints
surrounding the legal profession people just give up because
they do not know how to institute proceedings.4 This became
clear from an example he provided of a man who had approached
the Law Office requesting it to take up a matter on his
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behalf because he not only lacked skills of advocacy, but
also had no means of acquiring services of a legal
practitioner.
One evident fact, as to be indicated below, is that
while there has been a shift towards the accusatorial
approach in the official courts, legal representation has not
yet been introduced at all levels of the judicial system.
For the customary courts, it was provided at the beginning
that no advocate or legal practitioner would be allowed to
appear or act for any party before a Native Court.5 A new
provision was later made, in which legal representation was
allowed only in criminal cases, though it made an alternative
that parties could also defend themselves.6 This provision
is the one that currently applies, and it states as follows:
Every person who is charged with a
criminal offence in the Central or Local
Court should be permitted to defend
himself before the court in person or by
legal representative of his own choice
who shall be a legal practitioner
admitted to practice in the courts of
Lesotho. In civil proceedings no party
may be represented by a legal
practitioner, but shall appear himself,
provided that the court the husband or
wife, or guardian, or any servant, or the
master, or any inmate of the household
of any plaintiff or defendant, who shall
give satisfactory proof that he or she
has authority in that behalf, to appear
and act for such plaintiff or defendant.7
Taken from one point of view, this provision reflects a
further shift towards the received law principles, in that it
introduces the concept of legal representation into the
Central and Local Courts, leading to even more blending of
procedure as earlier described. In addition, by law, legal
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representation is made not to apply in the majority of cases
heard in these courts,8 namely the civil cases. As similarly
pointed out in Palmer and Poulter (1972) despite the shift
from the inquisitorial to the adv£TJ»Arial system legal
representation has not been introduced in civil matters
before the Central and Local Courts. The point is that the
bulk of the work of the customary courts generally, consists
of civil disputes, and that criminal proceedings are a rare
phenomena. This was confirmed in the statements of the
Judicial commissioners, and was evidenced by the fact that no
criminal proceedings were observed while I carried fieldwork,
except in the Roving Stock-theft Central Court. Thus in the
majority of these courts' proceedings; the people appear on
their own except where assisted by those people included in
sec. 20 as quoted above. This is an additional reason why
in many respects, proceedings are carried on in a fashion
similar to that in the "unofficial" chiefs' courts.
The surprising thing was to discover that despite the
shift towards the due process model, the absence of legal
representation at this level is actually a welcome factor
even among legal professionals. First, it is argued that
it saves people from costs of having to pay for lawyers;
whose services are very expensive.9 Secondly, it is held to
be a good measure not to insist on legal representation for
all courts, bearing in mind the insufficient numbers of legal
professionals in the country. In the circumstances, the
delays which could have otherwise been encountered if people
had to appear represented, have been avoided. However, in
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considering the whole situation, it was admitted that in the
light of changes that have occurred in the conduct of
proceedings in the Central and Local Courts, denying lawyers
the right of audience in civil cases may occasionally result
in some injustices.10
But as raised in some of the interviews11 that were
conducted; even where criminal cases are concerned, legal
practitioners seldom appear in the Central and Local Courts.
Such reluctance was explained to be connected to the fact
that these courts are not regarded as a proper legal ground,
since proceedings in these courts are run mainly along
procedures similar to those in the chiefs' courts, and as
such have no place for legal professionals. In another
sense, cases that come before the Central and Local Courts
are regarded as not involving much law, to require extensive
legal expertise or advocacy. These allegations reaffirm the
arguments made in Chapter 4 that, while in theory the conduct
of proceedings in the customary courts generally ought to be
advert atrial, there is a general awareness that in practice,
they work in the manner not very different from that employed
in the "unofficial" chiefs' Courts. This of course could be
attributed to the kind of personnel in them, who possess no
legal training. With the absence of legal representation
procedures of the chiefs' courts become employed even more.
Judge Molai confirmed that procedure in the Local and
Central Courts "is not complicated", but "is simple". So
that one "does not need a lawyer" and can appear on his own.
As he further stated:
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No lawyers are called upon to bring in
complicated issues of law. You are two
Basotho, arguing your case. You get a
decision without involving yourself into
many expenses. Whereas in the
Magistrates courts it is more expensive.
Lawyers are very expensive. Trained
legal personnel would introduce things
which do not really belong to custom ...
because the confusion [problem] is that
they are going to create confusion there.
People who go to the Local Courts, do
so because they know what they want.
They do not want lawyers who introduce
complicated points of law. They just
argue simply, and at the end of the day;
they understand (Molai: 6.3.1987).
A view similar to the above was mentioned by the Chief
Magistrate. He confirmed that in the Central and Local
Courts, people are not allowed legal representation. He
then continued to say:
^ We want them to work out their matters
in Sesotho as they wish to do, which is
less expensive (Matete: 8.5.1987).
On this basis, one could argue that the absence of legal
representation at this level is largely a conscious effort,
to let these courts operate in the manner people are
accustomed with in the "unofficial" courts. The fact is
op.
that it fosters the continuity spoken^earlier.12 However,
the argument raised in Maqutu (1982) is that disallowing
lawyers the right of audience in the Central and Local
Courts, causes protracted litigation in the sense that cases
often have to be tried due to procedural irregularities. By
implication, this means such situations could be avoided if
legal practitioners are engaged from the beginning. The
real issue is that the customary courts are a hybrid system,
mixing customary law procedures with those of the received
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law, hence both positive claims and counter-claims for
introducing legal representation at this level can be raised.
In the Roving Stock-theft Central Court, legal
practitioners appear with a much higher frequency. This
could perhaps be explained in terms of the fact that, this
court holds the jurisdiction equivalent to that of the
Resident Magistrates' Courts. Thus stock-theft proceedings
can be taken as the only kind of criminal cases which tend
to attract the attention of legal practitioners in the whole
customary courts structure. Another way of explaining this
situation would be by assuming that because at one time this
court was abolished, and then stock-theft cases were heard in
the Magistrates' Courts; legal practitioners became
accustomed to appearing in their proceedings and have
continued to do so even now that this court has been revived.
In the Judicial Commissioners' Court, legal
practitioners are allowed to appear even in civil
proceedings. Thus at this level, legal practitioners are
granted the right of audience equal to that they have in the
Court of Appeal, the High Court and the Magistrates' Courts.
As pointed out in Chapter 3, the bulk of the work of the
Judicial Commissioners consists of hearing civil appeals from
the Central Courts. Some of the problems encountered in
this court in connection with legal practitioners were
mentioned earlier (Ch. 3), and they partly arise due to the
fact that this court sits from district to district. As
observed during the field research, legal practitioners are
in many cases late for the hearings or request for
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postponements; often too late. On other occasions they
fail to turn up at all; and this happens frequently when the
court is on session in the outer districts. Explanations
for this are sometimes connected to the distances they have
to travel to the districts. The fact is that they would
also be having cases in the fiJagistrates' Courts and the High
Court in the Capital, and thus unable to fulfil the
commitments of their tight schedules.13 On the other hand,
it is because of their lack of ^enthusiasm to appear in the
customary courts, giving preference to the received law
courts, in particular, the High Court.
The above can further be demonstrated by what the Chief
Magistrate said in an interview, that because of the scarcity
of legal firms, the majority of those legal professionals
thought to have sufficient working experience are overloaded
with cases. As he further explained "legal practice has
become more of a business than a service to the people" .
Hence the already established practitioners prefer to work
alone. In the words of the Chief Magistrate:
You'd find that in Maseru alone, in one
day he's got so many [cases]. The
people have paid him and their cases must
proceed. Others are remanded in
custody; some have got problems
perhaps it's matters of "support" - but
he can't do them all at the same time.
You'd find that his, schedule for the
month is packed, not only here in Maseru,
but for Mohale's Hoek, Mafeteng and so
on. That is the most painful thing
(Matete: 8.5.1987).
This was confirmed by observations during the field research,
that it was often the same lawyers appearing in the majority
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of cases heard in the High Court, or the Magistrates Courts,
or the Judicial Commissioners' Court, or the Roving stock-
theft Central Court.
In the circumstances spelt out above, those people in
the district are often the ones to suffer. For instance,
from the observations obtained while the Judicial
Commissioners' Court was on circuit in Quthing, only in 4
cases were both parties represented. In 6 cases in which
parties ought to have been represented, legal counsels were
not in court. In 17 cases, there was no legal
representation, there the parties were appearing on their own
behalf. These figures are given from a total of 34 observed
proceedings. These contrast sharply with the fact that in
all 173 recorded courtroom proceedings, involving both civil
and criminal matters, observed in the High Court, the parties
were always represented. While comparative figures cannot
readily be provided for the fA^gistrates Courts the overall
impression is that legal practitioners appear at a higher
degree in criminal cases before them and in almost all civil
cases for reasons offered later on.14 But in the main this
goes to demonstrate that legal representation in Lesotho is
not a general feature as in the western courts.
To demonstrate what actually happened in some of the
above cases; a few examples from the Judicial Commissioners'
Court are described. On one occasion, this was on 3.6.87,
the assessor asked a party in one case whether his counsel
had arrived. The answer was in the negative. The Judicial
Commissioner then asked who the concerned counsel was. The
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assessor whispered something in response, and then I
overheard him saying that the counsel had sent a message that
he may be available that afternoon at 2.00 o'clock, as he had
another case in the High Court. The court had to be
dismissed.
On 4.6.87 in the office, an elderly lady asked the court
clerk: hasn't he rung yet? The court clerk in response
asked: who ' m' e (mother)? The old lady said: Ramodibedi
(one lawyer's name). The response was in the negative. The
lady then remarked: it seems I'll have to fetch him in
person from Maseru? A further example was obtained from the
proceedings of CO/9/JCCQ/JCS/4.6.87. The court clerk
appeared in court and handed over a piece of paper to the
assessor, who in turn passed it over to the Judicial
Commissioner. It came out that the respondent's counsel had
rung to say that he was on the way. The appellant was
requested to sit down, as the Judicial Commissioner wanted to
find out whether the respondent wanted the court to await the
counsel. The respondent replied that if the counsel was
available he wanted him. The Judicial Commissioner asked
him to state what exactly he wanted, noting that "he's
[counsel] not yet here". The respondent then said the case
should proceed.
Following a brief adjournment in CO/13/JCCQ/JCS/ 4.6.87,
the Judicial Commissioner asked the appellant: Where is your
counsel? In response, the latter said he did not know. He
was then directed to go and look for the Counsel. On the
morning of 9.6.87, both parties in the matter that was
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supposed to proceed were to be represented, but their
counsels were not in court. The assessor remarked: "these
counsels do not take their job seriously". At about 10.30,
the two counsels showed up, and the Judicial Commissioner
reprimanded them that when they come to court; they have no
other business to attend to. He then proceeded: "you start
in my court at my time, not your own". The counsels
apologized.15
The procedures in the received law courts, as described
in Chapter 5, are even more ac{V<g rsQrial than in the
customary courts. One criticism often raised against the
rules employed in the received law courts is that they
disadvantage many of the Basotho people (Palmer and Poulter,
1972), mainly because they are not used to the technicalities
and formalities involved. In this instance, as shall be
indicated in the next section, the situation is made worse
because it is not only the ordinary people who cannot follow
the rules, but legal practitioners as well tend to experience
similar problems. For instance, the Attorney General, as
quoted earlier, insisted that "it is not just the majority
who do not understand the new procedures. It is absolutely
everybody". Examples taken from some of the court
proceedings observed during the field research will be used
to demonstrate that to some extent, legal professionals also
have to struggle to cope with the demands of received
procedures and rules of evidence.
One of the most prominent causes for the above
situation, as demonstrated by the explanation given by the
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Chief Magistrate during an interview is that, fresh legal
professionals newly admitted to the Bar, lack the necessary
experience for courtroom work. This problem is further
compounded by the limited number of legal firms, which means
that the newly admitted practitioners more often than not;
cannot be absorbed in already established firms, but rather
have to stand on their own and fend for themselves. Hence
they learn how to handle the procedures on the job. As the
Chief Magistrate further stated, in many such instances,
people's cases are not well presented or defended, causing
a lot of dissatisfaction. This perhaps clarifies the point
raised by Judge Molai that people look to the received law
courts with suspicion. This is how he put it:
... you find that people think that they
are going to be cheated before this
court. So instead of concentrating on
what you are asking them, they start
thinking of other things. I don't know
why they should have that feeling in the
Local Courts. But in the Magistrates
Courts and this court [High Court], it is
because they see lawyers. It is a long
standing belief that lawyers are crooks,
and people who come to court are cheated
(Molai: 4.3.1987).
This could be tied to the point about cases being mostly
decided on technical issues of procedure and also to the
Attorney General's point that decisions of the official
courts often cause bitterness among the people.
Going back to the descriptions about legal provisions
for representation, in the received law courts legal
practitioners are given the right of audience in both civil
and criminal proceedings. For the High Court and the
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Magistrates' Courts, legal representation is provided for
under Section 171 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act
of 1981. This section only refers to a person who is being
charged. This is a general feature for Lesotho in which all
provisions for legal representation do not go as far back as
the time of arrest and beyond conviction. Further to the
above provision, Part IV of the Subordinate Courts Rules,
Proclamation No. 58 of 1938 states that a person may appear
and conduct his case in person, or through an attorney or
advocate duly instructed by an attorney.16 Part V of the
same Rules concerns Pro Deo applications, whereby a person
who desires to sue or defend as a pauper may apply to the
court. If the court satisfies itself that the applicant
does not have sufficient means or earnings to pay the court,
it may order that the process of the court be served free of
charge, alternatively, it can direct the appointment of an
attorney to act for such an applicant. The Pro Deo system
works mainly in murder and treason cases. What this means
is that in criminal cases before the High Court; most of
which are murder trials and in others carrying corporal
punishment, legal representation is guaranteed. The system
has been said to cause some problems because the counsels so
appointed, are only paid for appearance in court and not for
making investigations, interviewing the clients and
witnesses. Thus this kind of work is not very popular, as it
is seen as a disadvantage since it cuts on the resources a
counsel would otherwise make.17
As indicated by the Chief Magistrate, in many other
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criminal offences coming before the courts of the
magistrates, a lot of people appear unrepresented. As he
stated, while some people obtain the services of lawyers;
there are many other criminal proceedings, including very
serious ones, "where one has to go it alone, because he has
no money". Another thing the Chief Magistrate noted as
complicating matters further, is that it appears there is no
control of fees charged by various lawyers. As he put it:
Everyone charges what he likes.
Sometimes someone who has acquired a
lawyer, when you look at his case, you'd
find it didn't [really] require services
of a lawyer (Matete: 8.5.1987).
In his conviction, lawyers do not appear sufficiently enough
in the Magistrates courts, and things could improve a bit if,
in practical terms, the Magistrates could also be allowed to
grant Pro Deo and Legal Aid as in the High Court. An
assessment of the legal aid scheme at the moment is given in
the next section.
The problem of unrepresented parties in the Magistrates
Courts, is particularly common in the districts; as many
lawyers reside in Maseru (the Capital), only travelling to
the districts when they have cases in which to appear. This
point was raised earlier, but it supplements what the Chief
Magistrate was noted to have said regarding lawyers who, in
addition, take on too many cases than they can possibly fit
within their schedules. In consequence, people at the
district level are made to suffer; due to the failure of
their counsels to turn up for proceedings, thus causing
numerous postponements, adjournments and delays in the
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administration of justice.
The position with regard to civil proceedings before the
Magistrates Courts and the High Court is quite different.
For, as explained by the Chief Magistrate, in these matters
people have no choice but to obtain legal practitioners'
services. He noted that one would have a very difficult
time trying to represent himself, because the proceedings and
the standard formats to be prepared are complicated and
written in English. Without representation, people would
thus not be able to bring up a case in the first place,
because they would not know how the papers have to be
drafted. Hence they are forced to pay for the service,
especially where matters concerned are of utmost importance
to them. The Attorney General, in an attempt to demonstrate
the magnitude of the above problem, stated that in certain
instances because of the people's lack of the knowledge of
the law and technical procedures, also because of lack of
sufficient means to acquire legal assistance, some of them
decide not bring their cases to court. Thus even in
criminal matters, one finds that offences are committed but
are never dealt with accordingly. In his conviction this is
a very disturbing situation.
LEGAL AID IN LESOTHO
As hinted earlier the legal aid services in the country
are still very much unsatisfactory, hence the contention that
the system is still in its early state of development. The
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arguments made in this section are based on the view that the
provisions for legal aid can have influence on legal
representation, assisting to reduce the large numbers of
people appearing before the courts on their own especially in
most serious cases. For comparative purposes, the Hughes
Report (1980) which focuses on the Scottish legal aid system,
is the one mainly referred to here as it has been found to
contain background facts similar to those summed-up with
regard to the position of legal aid in Lesotho.
The scheme was established in terms of the Legal Aid Act
of 1978, and only came into operation in 1979. This
contrasts with the position in Scotland as noted in the
Hughes Report (1980) in which civil legal aid was introduced
in 1950, but even prior to that the Scottish legal profession
had long accepted the representation of the poor without a
fee as a professional duty. In 1424, provision had been
enacted for the court to appoint an "advocate" in civil
cases. Then in 1525, two advocates for the poor were
appointed and received a stipend from the Treasury. During
the 17th Century the practice of appointing members of the
Society of Writers to the Signet as agents for the poor in
the Court of Session developed. This was formalised by an
Act in 1784 which set out procedure for admission to the
"Poor's Roll". It marked the beginning of a system where
the means of an applicant, and merits of his case are first
examined before legal aid is granted. Since 1825, local
schemes for providing representation for the poor were
modified several times but the "Poor's Roll" remained
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substantially the same until 1950, when major reforms were
made as a result of expressed feelings for the need for
change.
The 1978 Legal Aid Act in Lesotho, provides for
assistance to persons who have insufficient means to obtain
services of legal practitioners to represent them in their
trials. As in the case of provisions for legal
representation, legal aid emphasizes the need for
representation only in court process. In England and
Scotland legal aid consists not only of schemes for
assistance in civil and criminal proceedings, but extends to
provision of advisory assistance (Hughes Report, 1980).
Thus in the case of Lesotho emphasis is placed on what the
Report on Legal Services in Rural Africa18 termed "traditional
legal aid", according to which concentration is upon
providing defence lawyers in civil and criminal cases,
without the concomitant advisory service.
The provisions in the Act recognise that it is in the
interests of justice, that people without sufficient means be
provided legal representation in the form of the Chief Legal
Aid Counsel and his assistants, to undertake the defence of
such persons as if they were legal practitioners instructed
by them. Such assistance is provided for in criminal cases
committed for trial by the High Court,19 and in criminal cases
before the Magistrates Courts, provided the offence a person
is charged with is that of a class specified by the Minister;
and provided that the particular court is presided over by a
Resident Magistrate.20 In other criminal matters to which
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the above sections do not refer, if satisfied that "for
special reasons it is in the interests of justice that" a
person "should have legal aid at his trial" and that "such
person has insufficient means to enable him to obtain
services of a legal practitioner to represent him at his
trial",21 a Legal Aid Counsel may undertake to appear in
defence of such person as if he were duly instructed. While
in accordance with the Act the Minister may, by notice
published in the gazette, specify such criminal offences for
which legal aid is applicable in the courts of the Resident
Magistrates, such schedule of offences has not yet been
produced. Thus legal aid remains inapplicable in these
courts, hence indications by the Chief Magistrate that legal
aid is not yet available in the Magistrates Courts in which
circumstances, even people with serious criminal acts still
appear unrepresented in a number of cases.
In Civil cases, legal aid is provided for in causes or
matters instituted or intended to be instituted in the High
Court, or a Magistrate Court; again only if presided over by
a Resident Magistrate.22 In these instances any prospective
party may apply to the Chief Legal Aid Counsel for him to
undertake the representation. Upon receipt of an
application the counsel should satisfy himself that, first,
the applicant has sufficient grounds for instituting or
defending the proceedings in question; secondly, that it is
in the interests of justice that legal aid needs be provided
for purposes of those proceedings; finally, that the
applicant has insufficient means to obtain services of a
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lawyer of his own account. Only then can a Legal Aid
Counsel undertake the representation of an applicant. The
civil causes and matters to which the above section applies,
however, exclude those within the jurisdiction of the Central
and Local Courts and "such other classes of causes or matters
as shall be specified by the Minister by notice published in
the gazette."23 With regard to the Central and Local Courts,
it could be assumed that the intention is to keep in line
with the provision that no legal practitioner may appear on
behalf of a party in civil proceedings before these courts,
a very confusing provision taking into consideration that by
law these courts have to apply adversarial rules, and that
the majority of cases they hear involve civil disputes.
This is a further indication that it is officially known and
accepted, that the Central and Local Courts are in practice
not adfc,Curial, despite what is theoretically upheld.
Provisions for legal aid extend to appeal cases;
including those before the Judicial Commissioner's Court, and
this applies whenever a person seeks to appeal from a
conviction or sentence imposed by any court in a criminal
case, or from any final judgement or order in any civil cause
or matter, on application. In the latter, the Legal Aid
Counsel must satisfy himself on the points mentioned earlier
- that the applicant has sufficient grounds, that it is in
the interests of justice, and that the applicant has
insufficient means.
To ensure that all attempt and effort is sought to
assist poor persons, where the Chief Legal Aid Counsel is
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unable, either personally or through a Legal Aid Counsel
under him, to act on behalf of any person who gualifies under
this Act, or if for any other reason he is satisfied that the
need for justice so requires, he may instruct a legal
practitioner to act instead and pay him such fees as may be
prescribed. In respect of such proceedings the legal
practitioner is subject to the instructions of the Chief
Legal Aid Counsel.24
The statistical returns of cases taken up by the Legal
Aid Office do not easily render themselves to analysis, for
one, the methods for their compilation are inadequate. Some
assessment is made below, to determine areas in which legal
aid is mainly supplied. The figures of cases handled in
1984 and 1985 as appended25 are used as a sample of tables
obtained from the office. The data, however, are
insufficient to enable one to draw meaningful conclusions.
For example, the statistics do not indicate the distribution
of cases by district, nor do they tell us anything about how
many private legal practitioners were used, how many cases
were rejected and so on. From the figures for 1984 and
1985, a general increase in the number of cases reported to
the Legal Aid Office can be noted. This is more evident
when one looks at the motor-vehicle accident claims which
numbered 59 in 1984, and rose to 107 in 1985. The highest
figures were of claims for maintenance ("non-support").
Also the tables reveal that more civil than criminal cases
were reported and that matrimonial matters - divorce,
maintenance claims, judicial separations - predominate. The
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proportions of both matrimonial and non-matrimonial cases
together show an increase, though not so dramatically
considering that the scheme has been in operation since 1979.
Some of the reasons for this may become obvious in the
following descriptions.
The Legal Aid Office is not a fully fledged department,
but a division (unit) within the Ministry of Justice. The
Minister responsible possesses powers to appoint the Chief
Legal Aid Counsel and as many Legal Aid Counsel, as may from
time to time be necessary. Thus the Ministry of Justice
exercises all control over the unit. For the whole country,
the unit in Maseru is the one in charge of cases referred for
purposes of legal aid. It is in this sense that the Acting
Chief Justice named the Chief Legal Aid Officer as the most
popular lawyer, because he appears in cases all around the
country. This would mainly be in appeals in the Judicial
Commissioners' Court which sits from district to district.
The position described here is different from the one in
Scotland, for instance, where the administration of the legal
aid system is the responsibility of the Law Society, but in
practice, the fund and various schemes are administered by a
number of committees, with the Society's Legal Aid Committee
making policy decisions in relation to the future of legal
aid. The Legal Aid Central Committee consisting of
solicitors, advocates and laymen, generally oversees the
administration of legal aid including various schemes, and
also prepares annual reports on the administration of the
schemes, and prepares estimates of expenditure for the
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Society to submit to the Treasury. There are in all 16
Legal Aid Committees in Scotland and they deal with
applications for civil legal aid in the Sheriff Courts, while
the Supreme Court Committee in Edinburgh handles applications
for legal aid for cases in the Court of Session, and in
criminal cases on appeal (Hughes Report, 1980). Another
notable feature of legal aid in the western world which is
absent in the case of Lesotho is the variety of alternative
measures26 for provision of legal services. These include
alternatives such as legal expenses insurance, contingency
fees, duty solicitor schemes, legal aidj all of which could
be described in the words of Bankowski and Mungham (1976) as
forming part of attempts to bring the law and lawyers to the
people. The existence of the welfare rights lawyer, as
described in the work of Marcuse (1969), could be viewed in
the same light.
In an interview with him, the Chief Legal Aid Counsel
mentioned that at the moment the unit operates under extreme
personnel and budgetary constraints. As he stated, the
professional staff in the unit is insufficient. There are
only two lawyers - including the Chief Legal Aid Counsel
himself. Thus the amount of work they have is appalling.
They do the bulk of the office work as well, including
drafting court process, summonses and pleadings, interviewing
clients and appearing in court. They have to attend to
client's files and their own diaries, as the supporting staff
is also inadequate and not well trained for the duties. It
is surprising that in the light of increasing numbers of
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applications received, there have been no corresponding
increases in professional staff. With regard to finances,
the Chief Legal Aid Counsel said it is difficult to
understand how they are expected to cope under the stringent
budgetary provisions. He mentioned that even with the
contributions their clients are expected to make towards the
costs involved, they find it difficult to function, and each
year some cases have to be postponed till a later time, when
finances become available.
Since the Act makes no provision for anything of the
kind of Legal Aid Board to consider applications, the two
counsels having interviewed the clients have to decide on
which cases are to be allotted the assistance. The Chief
Legal Aid Officer stated that with the means test setting the
limit of Ml, 000 in order to qualify for legal aid, the
exercise is extremely difficult and often they have to use
their discretion, since things like livestock, which
according to the regulations have to be counted in
considering an individual's means, are difficult to assess.
First, it is not easy to know when one owns or does not own
stock, but in addition, it is difficult to assess its amount
and evaluate it.
One important issue is that the people do not know about
the service. For people in the districts the problem is
even bigger, with the location of the Unit in Maseru. The
Chief Legal Aid Counsel himself mentioned that the scheme is
not well publicised and that it would be unethical for them
to advertise themselves employing commercial publicity
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methods; just as it is for any legal firm. When the
program was initiated it was announced regularly over the
national radio station, but he expressed doubts whether that
was sufficient. The most revealing statement in this regard
came from an interview with the Chief Magistrate when he
stated that, if people knew about the service, they would
perhaps make use of it in cases such as those pertaining to
maintenance claims which often cause problems in the
Magistrates Courts due to the parties' failure to produce
worthwhile evidence as in support of their claims.
As the foregoing descriptions indicate, the situation
with regard to legal aid is no brighter. One finds in it,
a series of constraints. Consequently it means the state of
legal representation cannot be improved, as the legal aid
scheme itself is staggering. Thus those who cannot afford
services of legal practitioners have to do without, sometimes
defending themselves against opponents who might be
represented.27 The High Court seems to be the only place
where legal representation is guaranteed, with Pro Deo and
Legal Aid employed where parties cannot afford it. However,
problems still exist with those people who are not adequately
informed.28
LEGAL COUNSELS IN PRACTICE
The descriptions made above, serve to confirm what
has already been said in the earlier chapters. For instance,
they reaffirm that at the practical level, the customary
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courts are influenced by principles similar to those working
in the "unofficial" chiefs' courts. With regard to legal
representation, we have noted how in both the customary
courts and the Chiefs' courts the principle is not practised.
Not only that, in respect of the customary courts, the
absence of legal representation is actually justified as a
preferable situation. Thus re-emphasizing the point that
there are some similarities, and more than that a kind of
continuity between these two court structures. This can be
measured in terms of the characteristics, as well as
practices common to both.
Within the received law courts as we have seen, legal
representation is practised, although not to a very
satisfactory degree and within certain constraints or
limitations. What is important is to recognize that such
constraints pertain largely to the peculiar circumstances
under which the courts are functioning. These, as mentioned
once before, include shortages of trained legal personnel,
limited numbers of legal firms, lack of sufficiently
experienced lawyers, and the people's lack of knowledge about
legal representation. In the main they arise from the fact
that the adversarial model and the idea of legal
representation in this case, are basically of foreign origin.
The circumstances of the judicial system in Lesotho, and the
social environment make it somewhat difficult for legal
representation and for lawyers to function in a manner
similar to their counterparts in other adv e,nsqrial systems,
especially in the Western world. This point is followed up
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below, providing some examples of what legal practitioners
do and how they operate in practice.
To highlight some of the practices common in proceedings
where legal practitioners are involved, some examples picked
from the courtroom observations made during the field
research are used. The main argument to be portrayed is
that the circumstances within which the official courts
structure as a whole exists, tend to influence the manner in
which the system, as well as legal practitioners, function.
One factor which influences practices of legal practitioners
in court is namely that, they have to operate among people
who are otherwise not aware of the role of legal
representation. The Basotho people generally, as already
noted, are not familiar or accustomed with the received law
rules of procedure and evidence. But even more than just
the issue about lack of awareness about the role of legal
representation, the point is that they have a totally
different perception of how justice is to be obtained. At
the back of their minds, they still have the idea that one is
allowed to put forward his case in court, and that he is
given a chance to explain the facts involved as he sees them.
A close look at the following example, provides a
clarification for the above argument. Although the example
was taken from the proceedings of the "mock trials"29 it
represents the thinking of the majority of the Basotho
people; about why cases, or rather why parties and witnesses
have to appear in court in the first place. On this
occasion, it was the mother of one of the accused persons who
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was giving evidence. She brought up an issue that she had
not included in her original statement. When asked why she
had not mentioned it before, she responded that she never
regarded the action as signifying that her son had "stolen
the peaches, because he was very young when this happened".
The judge asked why she had not previously included this
fact together with the explanation she had just given, to
which she stated: "I knew I was going to come to court, and
then I would explain to you everything". The issue is that
even with legal representation, people still believe they are
to be allowed to state their side of the story, and to
elaborate on other evidence they may have supplied their
counsels with. For them legal practitioners are there only
to assist, or as a kind of support to the parties and
witnesses, not as agents who totally take over the whole
proceedings. They do not appreciate the fact that legal
practitioners make presentations on their clients' behalf,
and as such have to be thoroughly instructed.
The above descriptions can be looked at from another
angle, that legal practitioners by virtue of their training
in the adversoirial principles, have a much better conceptual
view and understanding of how the model should work. But
the fact is that in practice their knowledge of, and attempt
to work according to adve.rsq.rial rules of procedures and
evidence, are counteracted by factors prevailing in the
overall social structure within which they are functioning.
The other issue is that the people generally have a
different conceptual framework of how justice processes work
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and fail, for example, to cross-examine, answer to questions
and so on. In the end what lawyers do, is influenced by
these factors. What one sees in their practice, as
reflected in the examples below, are consistent endeavours to
cope with the rules of the adv-£.r&Qrial model, in a totally
different non-western environment. What legal practitioners
rely on is what they have learnt in their training, and as
shall be indicated in the descriptions that follow, they run
into problems of not complying with the prescribed rules.
This whole situation should be understood in the light of the
circumstances that surround their work as already described
in the earlier sections.
One of the most vivid features that comes out in
observing the proceedings in which legal practitioners
appear, particularly in the received law courts, pertains to
the amount of delays experienced in the administration of
justice. This was noted as a common factor in cases coming
on motion before the High Court; many of which are civil
matters. It was illustrated that these delays occur for a
variety of reasons including failure to compile necessary
documents, incomplete service of papers to the other parties,
failure to provide the court with necessary documents, and so
on. The following examples serve to demonstrate the nature
and magnitude of the problem in greater detail.
In C0/8/HC/JK/23.2.87; it was revealed that the counsel
for the applicant had just been served with opposing
affidavits. In C0/9/HC/JK/23.2.87, opposing affidavits had
not yet been issued, therefore, a request for postponement
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was made. In CO/IO/HC/JK/23.2.87, while the initial claim
in requesting postponement was that the respondent had not
yet signed the affidavits, it later appeared that the
concerned counsel had in fact not yet prepared them. That
is, they were not ready for signature. In C0/17/HC/JK/
23.2.87, replying affidavits had not been filed. In
CO/25/HC/JK/23.2.87, it was the notice for intention to
defend which had not yet been received. While the counsel
for the defendant claimed papers were ready, it later emerged
that they had not been properly served. Another request for
postponement was made.
A complaint was lodged by the applicant's counsel in
CO/128/HC/JL/5.5.87, that he had filed his own papers a long
time ago. Although the judge noted his sympathy for the
above complaint, the matter was postponed to the following
week. In another matter, CO/129/HC/JK/5.5.87, the papers
were not complete. The counsel for the applicant noted that
the matter had been postponed once before, in order to allow
the respondent time to file relevant documents. In
response, the latter's lawyer claimed he could not see what
the applicant's counsel would suffer, by allowing the matter
to be postponed. The judge indicated that costs are
involved. Then the respondent's counsel stated that the
question of costs should be considered alongside with the
merits, "you see we're challenging the merits of the case.
My learned friend is running away from something deeper".
The judge in return indicated that, that was for the court to
decide. The fact is that even if the merits of the matter
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were to be challenged, that ought to be achieved within time
limits specified in the rules. In CO/130/HC/JL/5.5.87,
another request for postponement was submitted and it was
granted. In C0/131/HC/JL/5.5.87, the matter was postponed to
15 June, as there had been no return of service. In
CO/134/HC/JL/5.5.87, when a request for postponement was
made, the judge asked as to what had become of the urgency
that was being claimed. No response was given. The judge
then noted that he was reluctantly granting the postponement.
Some of these postponements were arranged in court,
while other proceedings were in progress. One such instance
was observed on 27.4.87, where 4 counsels were involved in a
discussion as to whether one matter was to be postponed. I
overheard one of them saying, "... unless you postpone the
matter, I have no objection to that". They then all
laughed. From the information obtained from the interviews,
the main reasons offered to explain this situation relate to
shortages in qualified legal practitioners which contribute
to lawyers taking on too many cases, and then subsequently to
their failure to cope with the work, or to appear in some of
them thus causing delays, requests for adjournments and
postponements. To this could be added problems of newly
qualified lawyers having to take cases on their own without
practical experience, due to lack of legal firms that could
employ them, which in turn leads to failure to make adequate
representations.
In CO/139/HC/JL/5.5.87, the counsel for the respondent
showed that he was compelled to request postponement by a
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week. He claimed that he had made certain investigations
concerning the matter, and he would need to reflect the true
facts. He made reference to additional documents he had
submitted. But when the judge looked through his file, he
could find no such papers. To this the applicant's counsel
remarked, "No further facts have been revealed, Good
Heavens!" In C0/173/HC/JL/5.5.87, the applicant's lawyer
said: "I don't know whether Your Lordship has had time to
read my heads. They were filed rather late." What he did
not actually mention is that the papers were filed only that
morning. When the judge replied that he had not, the
Registrar passed the papers to him.
In addition to cases in which requests for postponement
would be submitted, several other requests would be made for
cases to be removed from the roll (Motion Roll).
Frequently, this would also be because necessary procedures
concerning papers, would not have been completed. It is
important to recognise that this happens despite the fact
that according to the rules, once the proceedings have been
initiated, the subsequent stages must be completed within
stipulated time limits. Thus the examples above indicate
more practices which are inconsistent with the rules.
Many more examples could be provided to illustrate
instances where proceedings could not carry on. But another
significant dimension concerns the diversity of the reasons
that led to the delays. For instance, in CO/67/HC/JK/
23.3.87, uncontested divorce proceedings, the plaintiff had
been in court for the whole morning. In the afternoon, the
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court was informed the marriage certificate was yet
unavailable, and that the law office had been requested to
issue a copy of the original. From what I gathered, the
certificate had been misplaced by the counsel in charge or
rather his office.
In a further example, C0/71/HC/JK/23.2. 87, it emerged
only in court that the matter was being opposed. The
counsel for the applicant was arguing that no papers for
intention to oppose had been filed, and he was urging that
the matter be proceeded with. He was in fact noting that he
was unaware that the matter was being contested. The
counsel for the respondent on the other hand, was arguing
that in matrimonial matters involving such serious issues as
divorce, cases cannot be allowed to proceed by default. He
requested postponement of the matter by a week, to enable him
to file the necessary documents. The counsel for the
applicant went on to point out that his client works in the
Republic of South Africa; and had requested leave of absence
from duty in order to attend the proceedings. His further
point of concern was that the case had been instituted in
November 1986. By this he was intimating that there had
been ample time for the other side to file its intention.
In the circumstances, the applicant was allowed to give his
evidence, since he was to return to his place of work.
Requests for postponement also occurred as a common
feature in cases where the parties (usually one of them) are
working in South Africa. In many of these cases,
proceedings could not carry on due to delays encountered in
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the service of papers. In C0/142/HC/JL/5.5.87, for example,
it was noted that the notice of intention to defend was
received on 30.4.87. It was argued that extra time was
needed, in order to correspond with the defendant in the
Republic of South Africa. The counsel for the applicant on
the other hand, indicated that his instructions were now to
request for the decision of judgement on the matter. In yet
another case, C0/144/HC/JL/5.5.87, request was made for
postponement to June 22, as the defendant was mentioned to be
possibly somewhere in the Transkei, and he would need to be
served with papers.
Almost similar instances to the above often occur in
cases in which applications for bail are made. In
CO/154/HC/JL/5.5.87, the defence counsel in stating the
factors to be taken into account in considering the
application for bail, mentioned that his client is married,
with two children and that the family was largely dependent
on him for support. He further argued that consideration
should also be given to the fact that his client was acting
in self-defence. The offence the accused was being charged
with, occurred while he had come home for Easter holidays
from the mines in South Africa. The judge asked the counsel
whether he was aware that the application was actually going
to free the accused from the jurisdiction of the High Court
of Lesotho - "is that not difficult?" the judge asked. The
assumption here was that if the bail was granted, the accused
would return to South Africa. In response the counsel said:
t
"I hope my learned friend will be sympathetic to this course
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and not oppose my request, and let the children starve and
the woman die". The crown counsel then raised the issue
about the passport. It was finally agreed that an amount of
M300 would be paid as surety for the passport and to
guarantee that the accused would return to be present at the
hearing.
In another matter involving application for bail,
CO/163/HC/JL/5.5.87, the crown counsel indicated that the
office of the Director of Public Prosecutions had Sympathy
with the case, and understood that the accused's means of
livelihood were on mining. But he stated that surety was
needed that the accused would attend the trial. Again in
CO/164/HC/JL/5.5.87, the accused was noted to be the sole
breadwinner for the family. The crown counsel in a similar
manner noted that they had no problems with the application
for bail, but went on to state, "my learned friend is,
however, silent about the surrender of the passport to the
Roma Police". The judge ordered payment of M100 for bail
and surety of the passport. The issues raised in
CO/160/HC/JL/5.587 were along similar lines. The crown
counsel noted first that the amount permitted for cash bail
is M100 not M50, but proceeded to say, however, "Mr Mda is
also silent on the issue of surrendering the passport".
These observations reveal the same trend in which one basic
issue of passports is invariably not mentioned in the papers
for bail applications, yet the counsels know it would
unlikely be overlooked.
The issue of the passport also arose in
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CO/23/TCM/MM2/11.8.87 . In this matter, the hearing having
been postponed to a later date, the crown counsel indicated
her reluctance to hand back the passport to the accused.
Thinking that the proceedings were over for the day, the
magistrate asked what that was all about. Then the defence
counsel said he was to make a formal application that the
accused's passport be released, to enable him to carry on
with his business. According to the counsel, his client's
business activities had been strongly curtailed since 1986
when the case started. Further he noted that the accused
was due to go to Botswana shortly, which would not be
possible without a passport. He said the accused would not
abscond. The magistrate, despite the crown counsel's qualms
about the application, said "attempt should be made to
balance the facts of life - employment and so on - with other
factors, where people have to work in South Africa, not
because they choose to. " He then ordered that the accused
should be lent the passport.
As illustrated in the following examples, in quite a
number of instances, legal practitioners absconded from court
proceedings in which they were to appear. For example in
CO/80/HC/JK/3.3.87, the case could not proceed because the
counsel for the accused was not in court. The judge warned
the witnesses to attend the court on 11 August, as no
messenger of court would serve them again. In
CO/101/HC/JK/16.3.87, the case also had to be postponed
again. The matter had been postponed on two previous
occasions already, and on the second occasion, it was
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mentioned that only the appellant attended. Now it was the
counsel for the defendant who was not in court. The matter
was postponed by a week. The same happened in
CO/12/MCM/MM2/1.4.87, where a case had to be postponed
because the defence counsel could not be found.
Furthermore, in CO/172/HC/JL/5.5.87, the defending counsel
and his client were not in court. Postponement was arranged
with costs awarded the applicant.
In yet another case, C0/118/HC/JM/27.4.87, one of the
counsel was not in court when it was called to proceed; yet
he had been in attendance earlier. The one in court
explained that the other had said nothing to him that day,
"he ignored me". The judge asked him whether he had talked
to the other counsel himself. It then emerged that the
counsels had previously agreed to request for postponement to
this date (27.4.87), in the meantime they would meet to
arrange a settlement. The judge's concern was whether that
settlement had been reached at all. As he put it:
I appreciate [your saying] that you
cannot afford to run behind your
colleague. But what will you say to your
client?
An explanation followed that several appointments had been
set to try and attempt to reach a settlement, but there was
no success. The counsel proceeded to say "I'm spending so
much money on telephones, and so on. Yet I have no problem
with the matter, he's the one who's opposing it". The judge
indicated that he was not interested in the costs being
incurred. By this time the other lawyers in court were
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laughing. The judge concluded, "what I do not like is the
attitude of lawyers who are not able to talk to each other".
He urged that the opposing counsel should have at least
remained in court to explain his position "he cannot hold
this court at ransom". The matter was postponed by a week.
In C0/133/HC/JL/5.5.87, the respondent's counsel noted
that, in view of the fact that the other counsel was not
properly dressed, they were requesting for postponement.
This was followed by laughter from other members of the Bar.
The judge indicated that he hoped in future, the counsel
concerned would "decide whether he's coming to a court of
law" or some other place. But then what is surprising is
that later on, the same counsel appeared dressed in
CO/163/HC/JL/5. 5. 87. This time he was appearing for the
applicant. My conclusion was that he was not prepared for
the other case.
In C0/171/HC/JL/5. 5.87, the only case of forgery that
came up during the period of my field research, the counsel
for the accused was not in court in the afternoon, yet like
in one of the cases cited earlier, the counsel had been in
attendance for the morning session. In addition, to the
absence of the defending counsel, the case could not proceed
for a further reason. The crown counsel stated that because
of reasons beyond their control, his colleague, who had
formerly appeared in the matter, was also not available.
Furthermore, he noted that because of the nature of the
offence, there were no witnesses. It also emerged that no
hand-writing expert had yet been obtained for the case, the
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only indications being that one from South Africa would be
engaged, though he would only be available in December. The
matter was, therefore, postponed to 1.12.87.
In addition to absences, legal practitioners would
sometimes turn up late for the proceedings. A good example
here would be from CO/23/TCM/MM2/11.5.87, in which the
defence counsel was absent for the whole morning, only
turning up for the afternoon session. The fact is that this
counsel did arrive in the morning, but when he found the
Magistrate and the crown counsel had not shown up yet, he
decided to go away to attend to some other business.
However, he went away leaving a message that the crown
counsel should ring him on arrival. As the crown counsel
was being given this message; the Magistrate overheard the
discussion. He, therefore, enquired as to who was the
defending counsel. When he was told who it was he
immediately remarked, "God the Father, he'll say he's busy".
This tended to suggest, perhaps not only with regard to this
particular lawyer, that often such excuses are common for
legal practitioners. The crown counsel did not ring the
defence counsel in this instance, she only made a complaint
saying: "This is just like them [lawyers] . They like
setting dates for their cases, and later turn to claim they
are busy". Finally the magistrate decided he would ring the
defence counsel himself; because he felt it unfair on the
witnesses who were in attendance as duly summoned. The
descriptions about what happened when the defence counsel
finally arrived in the afternoon are made later.30
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In addition to the above observations, I was able to
record instances which suggested that legal practitioners are
themselves not so able to handle the rules of procedure and
evidence, as it may usually be assumed. In the following
examples, one sees the legal practitioners facing problems in
using the rules. In CO/107/NC/JM/18.3.87 as mentioned
elsewhere,31 the judge and the defence counsel had illegible
copies of the post- mortem report. What complicated things
even further was that the judge was resistent to accept the
facts stated in the report as valid evidence, because from
what emerged, the doctor who had performed the post-mortem
had not appeared at the Preparatory Examination. That alone
was an instance of failure to abide by the rules, not to call
one of the chief crown witnesses to court. But it was the
indication of the crown counsel that he would abandon the
case, which raised the debate pertinent in the present
descriptions. The counsel for the crown intimated that he
would not follow the alternative procedure suggested by the
judge, which was to obtain a sworn statement of the doctor.
When the defence counsel heard this, he immediately proceeded
to make an application for the accused to be released. As
noted earlier a long debate ensued between the two counsels,
until the judge intervened, showing what correct procedure
would be under the circumstances. He stated that it would
not be necessary in this instance, for the crown to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty of the
offence. Rather what would be looked for would be whether
the crown had been successful to establish a prima facie case
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on the basis of other evidence presented; despite the non¬
availability of the doctor's statement. In other words, the
case would not be automatically dismissed because the
doctor's report would not be accepted. Thus the application
of the defence that the accused be discharged was premature
at this stage.
In CO/155/HC/JL/5.5.87, it was noted that no opposing
papers (notice of intention to defend) had been filed. A
request for summary judgement on the value of M3,000 claim;
plus interest and costs was, therefore, submitted. But the
counsel for the party against whom the claim was being made,
indicated that they (him and his client) were requesting
postponement until the case of Mr Masoabi (client) as
Attorney had been dealt with. This as it was revealed,
pertained to whether Mr Masoabi was to be struck-off the Roll
of Attorneys; never to be allowed to practice. The judge
pointed out that, "we're not here to determine Mr Masoabi's
fate at this juncture". The judgement was granted as
prayed. The point is that the counsel for the respondent
was confusing issues relating to two different cases. The
matter before the court at the moment was in respect of the
claim referred to above. That was what the court would
presently address. A similar fact was picked from the
proceedings in the Court of the Judicial Commissioners. In
CO/4/JCCQ/JCS/3.6.87, the counsel for the appellant was not
arguing about the right to inheritance, which was the cause
of dispute in the matter before the court. Rather he seemed
to be questioning the allocation itself.32
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A further example relating to the argument about legal
practitioners' uncertainty about the rules of procedure and
evidence, was observed in CO/173/HC/JL/5.5.87. It appeared
that there were two applications as contained in the founding
affidavits and the counter-affidavit, and the suggestion was
that the two be merged. The judge having listened to the
applicant's lawyer, pointed out at a number of difficulties
in the affidavits. For instance, the judge said it was
difficult to work out who the various respondents were from
the affidavits. He noted that there were two supporting
affidavits to the counter-affidavit. Finally, that the
counsel for the applicant was said to be raising too many
technicalities in the affidavits. Basically, there was
confusion in the manner that the affidavits had been
prepared. Having spoken on the various difficulties, the
judge proceeded to ask the defending counsel whether she
wanted to respond. She replied in the affirmative; going
on to point out that she wanted to raise points "in limin£",
before she could carry on to the arguments concerning the
facts of the case. On hearing this the judge asked: "what
gives you the impression that we will proceed to the merits
of the case?" That was followed by an argument concerning
the dates on which the various papers were filed. The main
cause of concern was that, not enough time was given for the
return of service. In addition, the counsel for the
respondent noted that no resolutions were attached to the
founding and counter-affidavits. In return, the applicant's
counsel stated: "a well prepared resolution is only half A4
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size sheet, as opposed to the voluminous paper that my
learned friend has prepared".
In C0/3/HC/JM/12.2.87, the problem concerned the way the
case was presented to the court. Again the relevant papers
had not been drafted properly. While one would expect that
such a problem would occur mainly where the applicant is
appearing on his/her own, in this event the applicant was
represented; yet the papers did not bring out all essential
facts to the court's notice. This kind of problem appeared
phenomenal in a vast number of proceedings that were
observed. But as reflected in C0/6/HC/JK/9.3.87, the
problem is not only with how to draft the papers correctly
and with what facts to include, but where people are not
represented it is also with what papers to file. In this
matter (divorce proceedings) when the plaintiff (wife) was
called, a man, whom as it latter emerged, was the husband
(respondent) also stood up. The judge asked him who he was
"joale uena u mang?" The man explained himself, making a
statement that he wanted to oppose the matter, but the point
is that he had not filed the opposing affidavits. Although
it latter appeared that the man had done the same on a
previous occasion when the matter was before the court, and
that he was offered advice to seek the assistance of the
legal aid, he might have genuinely not known how to handle
the situation. He argued that he had not been informed on
that occasion about how to acquire legal aid assistance.
The man was finally told to sit down and the judge ordered
the proceedings to continue pointing out that the defendant
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could apply for a recision later on. This was said in a
very low voice, I doubted whether the man heard it. But the
point is that even if he did, it is doubtful if he would have
known what to do.
In CO/23/TC/MM2/14.5.87, the accused was charged with
culpable homicide. The magistrate had just finished reading
the charge in Sesotho, when the crown counsel indicated that
she had not followed the reading of the charge properly.
Then the magistrate read it over again, this time in English.
The crown counsel then requested the court's permission to
make an addition, or to amend the charge. The magistrate
said the proceedings had not actually begun, and since the
accused had not even pleaded, he supposed the defence counsel
would not object to the amendment. At this point, it
emerged that the defence counsel did not even possess a copy
of the charge sheet. When the adjournment had been allowed
for the prosecution time to amend the charge, the magistrate
made a comment to me in private, that similar requests are
very common and that often this offers the defence a good
chance of arguing the case on technicalities of procedure.
He went on to say:
As I was reading the charge, I could see
the prosecutor shrugging "a ntse a
tsitsipana". That is why I decided to
read it in English.
The amended charge gave 3 counts, one of which read:
"Failure to produce a licence to authorities". The
magistrate asked: "who are they? The police, I believe
so". Then he went on to state his annoyance at the delays
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that had been caused in the proceedings of this case. He
complained angrily of the defence counsel's failure to turn
up for the morning session, and also pointed out that the
prosecution had also taken extra time, with its request to
amend the charge sheet. There was not sufficient time left
to complete the case on the same day, and the matter was
postponed to July 13th, 1987. It appeared the matter had
already been postponed several times prior to this.
The overstatements about the facts in the evidence are
not only confined to the ordinary people. In CO/3/TC/MM2/
14.5.87, the proceedings having been postponed to a future
date, the defence counsel made an application for the
accused's passport to be handed back to him in the meantime,
since the accused's scope of business had been strongly
curtailed since 1986 when the case started - without a
passport he could not engage in business outside Lesotho.
The Crown Counsel appeared not to be in favour of this
application, pointing out that a police should be asked to
release the passport, as she would not personally do so. In
addition, she mentioned that the accused had on previous
occasions failed to come on remands, and that she also had
received ("heard") information that the accused had been to
the Republic of South Africa. This last point appeared to
constitute unsubstantiated evidence. The request of the
defence was honoured.
In CO/6/TC/MM3/24.3.87 the problem was with the manner
in which the question itself was constructed. The defence
counsel asked: "this place next to Makhotsa's, is it a place
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you know?" The magistrate said he was not clear as to what
the question was in aid of, he then proceeded to rephrase the
question himself33 as follows: ... is it a place you are
quite familiar with? This is a further indication that
problems regarding such rules as those pertaining to cross-
examination are not only peculiar to the ordinary man,but are
faced by the court personnel too; including the lawyers who
could be presumed to be more familiar with the received law
and its rules of procedure and evidence by virtue of their
legal training in them. The examples provided below
demonstrate this problem even further.
In CO/79/HC/JK/3.3.87 for instance, the defence counsel
was warned several times by the judge not to ask leading
questions. The judge repeated this warning on several
occasions. In the same proceedings, the crown counsel
raised an objection that the defence counsel could not let A4
correct what A2 had said in his evidence regarding the order
in which all accused persons left the police station. In
C0/104/HC/JM/17.3.87, the judge on several occasions asked
the defence counsel to rephrase his questions. The same
counsel also confused A1 as A3, thus consequently confusing
the witnesses during cross-examination. On another
occasion, the crown counsel on examination-in-chief asked PW4
to identify the exhibits (weapons) that were alleged to have
been used in the offence. The judge stated that it would
first be appropriate to find out (establish) from the witness
whether she could describe the weapons before asking her to
identify them. These few examples do point out that even
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the legal practitioners themselves face difficulties in
making use of the received law rules of procedure and
evidence. In CO/6/TC/MM3/24.3.87, the magistrate had to
warn the defence counsel to ask "one question at a time". It
also appeared that the counsel was being too fast for the
magistrate who had to write the proceedings in longhand.
A further observation concerning the failure of legal
practitioners to comply with the rules was revealed in
CO/104/HC/JK/17.3.87, whereby the crown counsel having called
two of the witnesses for examination, intimated to the judge
that it was already 12.35 and that it seemed they had run out
of time. The judge pointed out that the lunchbreak only
starts at 12.45. At that juncture the crown counsel
revealed that actually he wanted an early adjournment because
he needed time to interview other witnesses. As he
explained the witnesses had arrived late the previous day and
he had had time to interview only two.34 But the judge
pointed out to the prosecutor that:
You don't need to interview them. You
ought to have been briefed. You do have
their statements, don't you.
The crown counsel agreed, however, he added that he needed
"to get further explanations on some of the issues. I need
to talk to them first." The judge then said: "I don't like
these explanations". The question here is whether the
advocate here had been adequately and accordingly instructed
by the attorney as the rules provide. But the description
above also raises the question whether the crown counsel was
actually prepared for the case.
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From the descriptions made so far, it is obvious that
most of the examples discussed come from the proceedings of
the received law courts. This is because legal
practitioners appear more at that level of the court
structure. In another sense, this could be taken to
represent a feature distinguishing between the received law
courts on the one hand, and the customary courts and the
"unofficial" chiefs' courts on the other. The observations
concerning practices of legal professionals as discussed
above, are not so characteristic of the latter two sets of
courts. However, it is important to demonstrate what
happens in the Judicial Commissioners' Court; where as
mentioned once before, legal practitioners to some extent
appear more than in the other customary courts.
One of the arguments referred to earlier, is that many
of the informants whom I interviewed,35 hold that it is
preferred that legal practitioners should not appear in the
customary courts, despite the fact that the law provides for
legal representation in criminal cases. As illustrated by
Judge Molai, for example, the fear is that legal
practitioners might introduce complicated aspects of the
accusatorial procedure and rules of evidence, which the
people and the customary courts personnel are not familiar
with. Consequently, it is held that, this would cause
confusion in those courts. The idea, as argued by the Chief
Magistrate, is that the people should be left to settle their
disputes as they see fit; without introducing complex
concepts of legality into the customary courts. The
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implication is that if legal representation becomes practised
in the customary courts lawyers would tend to bring in
complex issues of the law and procedure, which, as discussed
earlier, are not central to the proceedings in these courts
even in the present day. In fact, as also already
demonstrated, legal practitioners themselves are reluctant to
appear in the customary courts because they recognise that
proceedings in these take a different approach from that
prevailing in the received law courts, towards which their
training is tuned. Hence the perception that the customary
courts are not proper grounds for trained lawyers.
From one viewpoint, the next examples support the
allegation that where involved, legal practitioners tend to
introduce complex technicalities of law and rules of
procedure and evidence into the proceedings of the customary
courts. This becomes evident when one looks at the kind of
questions raised by lawyers, most of which centre on points
of law, which seldom feature in the proceedings of the
Central and Local Courts. In another sense, these examples
reveal what has already been stated regarding common
practices that surface in cases where legal representatives
appear.
These descriptions focus on the fact that in cases where
legal practitioners are involved, proceedings in the Judicial
Commissioners' Court are often conducted in the English
language. With regard to the High Court and the Magistrates
Courts this point was discussed at length in the previous
chapter.36 Again, the issues discussed with regard to the
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use of English in the proceedings is connected to the fact
that the procedures of the ac(v-ef-S^rial model are, in this
context, of foreign origin. The point is that many Basotho
people are not adequately conversant in the English language,
let alone with the legal language; which has concepts the
ordinary people are not familiar with. The latter raises a
similar point to that made in the works of Ericson and
Baranek (1982); Mueller (1970); Carlen (1974); Berger and
Luckmann (1966); Atkinson and Drew (1979) and others, that
legal discourse contains concepts that are not included in
the everyday language of the people. In this event as
already pointed out, the situation is complicated even
further by the use of a foreign language - English. Of
course, this adds on to the fact that the adversarial
approach being of colonial heritage, the rules of procedure
and evidence and the law generally are written in English.
The complications that result from this are discussed in the
context of examples taken from court-room observations in the
Judicial Commissioners' Court.
One of the distinct features is that, while in the High
Court full-time interpreters are employed, in the Court of
the Judicial Commissioners, the court clerks are the ones who
undertake the role of translation, in the proceedings where
legal practitioners are involved. In CO/4/JCCQ/JCS/3.6.87,
the counsel for the appellant went on for a long time
outlining the "thrust" of the case. At some point, the
Judicial Commissioner interrupted asking whether the counsel
did not mind going on without his client hearing what he was
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saying. This was because the counsel had carried on for a
long time, not allowing the court clerk to interpret what was
being said into Sesotho, mainly for the benefit of the
appellant. When later, issues were raised about the
confusion regarding the number of witnesses who had appeared
before the Local Court, discussions between the Judicial
Commissioner and the Counsel went on in English, as they
referred to the papers before them. In referring to the
appellant before the Local Court, the court clerk called him
the "appellant", and was corrected by the Judicial
Commissioner saying "it should be 'plaintiff' because I am
referring to the first instance hearing". The use of Latin
phraseologies also seemed to confuse the court clerk. For
example, she failed to translate "res judicata", and finally
had to be assisted by the counsel for the respondent who
pointed out that it refers to "ho tsosa nyeoe sepoko
(bocha)". Several of these Latin phrases were used in the
proceedings of this case, and each time they seemed to
confuse the court clerk even more. She had to be helped to
translate "locus standi" into Sesotho as "boemo [ba motho]
nyeoeng". At another point, the court clerk wanted to
translate what the counsel for the respondent had said in
Sesotho into English, for the benefit of the other counsel.
The Judicial Commissioner stopped her, saying that the
counsel was following the argument. In other instances, the
court clerk would simply repeat the words used in the English
version. Such applied to words like "findings" and
"principles". With regard to the former, she had to be
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corrected several times, the Judicial Commissioner indicating
to her that it refers to "liphumano" in Sesotho.
One other interesting aspect that arose during the
proceedings of the above case, was when at one juncture the
counsel for the appellant raised the point that the case had
been dealt with by a layman (i.e. at the court of first
instance), and that as qualified professional lawyers
themselves, they had to argue the points of law. However,
the other counsel intervened pointing out that "my friend
should respond to my arguments and not raise a fresh
argument". This was equivalent to pointing out that the
appellant's counsel was now getting out of procedure. The
counsels then engaged in a long debate. Finally, the
Judicial Commissioner warned them that each had been given a
chance to make submissions, and that all they had to do now
was to respond to such.
In CO/5/JCCQ/JCS/3.6.87, to begin with the counsels were
not sure as to which one of them was appearing for the
appellant, and which one for the respondent. One of them
in the end noted that he had not actually touched the file,
since he was not aware that the matter would be dealt with
on that day. On the concurrence of both counsels, agreement
was reached to postpone the matter to 8.6.1987. Similar
delays were noted to be phenomenal in the received law
courts, in particular the High Court.
In CO/6/JCCQ/JCS/3.6.87, the respondent was not
represented and in her own words she stated: "Ke mohlolohali
oa Molimo ea senang mang oe" . By this the woman was
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acclaiming her status as a widow with no one to turn to for
help, and by implication also suggesting that she could not
afford the costs of employing a lawyer. The counsel for the
appellant started his argument on a point of law. He said
it appeared there was confusion over when the 1979 Land Act
actually came into operation. His conviction was that it
began to work in 1981. In addition, he raised the issue
whether the respondent's husband had in fact died, and if
that was the case, he wanted to know exactly when he died.
In this, the counsel was trying to assess whether the
respondent being a woman, had the legal right to be appearing
in the matter. Furthermore, the counsel claimed that
EXHIBIT A (a letter) did not show that the Principal Chief
was chairing the land allocation committee, as its rightful
chairman. He stated that there was no evidence to prove
this fact, and complained further that the records from the
lower courts were not clear.
During the proceedings of the above matter, or at the
beginning rather, the assessor had been asked to recuse
himself due to his previous involvement in the matter at the
time he was still President of the Central Court concerned
here. The counsel for the appellant had actually
appreciated the Judicial Commissioner^ move to exclude the
assessor from the current proceedings. But then as they
carried on, the counsel kept on making reference to the
"assistant" of the Judicial Commissioner. Ultimately the
latter had to indicate that "I have no assistant". Because
the discussions for a long time had been between the Judicial
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Commissioner and the counsel, at one juncture the former had
to explain to the respondent that what they were arguing
about were points of law. He mentioned that he did not
quite know how he could explain the whole argument to her,
but said where necessary he would attempt to do so.
The points raised by the counsel, as described above,
were strictly on points of law and procedure. Without legal
representation the respondent found it difficult to address
herself to them. Instead she went on to relate that the
matter dated back to 1980, and how the chief had taken part
of the field. She also talked about the "Form C" which she
said she had no knowledge of, and so on. I believe it is
because of the circumstances concerning the respondent's lack
of representation, by virtue of which she failed to respond
to the points of law the appellant's counsel had raised, that
the Judicial Commissioner decided to act cautiously and
remanded judgement for a later date to be arranged.
In CO/13/JCCS/4.6.87, again only the appellant was
represented. The court clerk who was doing other duties in
the office, was called in for translation. However, before
she could accept, she asked who the counsel concerned was.
Having been told who it was, she remarked: "since when
doesn't he know Sesotho?" When finally the court clerk did
turn up, the counsel had been going on attempting to speak in
Sesotho; but he consistently mixed it with English. For
example, he would say: "automatically liability ha e tie"
(liability does not automatically follow); "ha ho na le
suggestion feela" (when there is a slightest suggestion);
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"conditions tsa sekete"; and "ke beha case for recession to
the court of first instance" (I submit that the case be
receded to the court of first instance). Most of these also
possessed legal technical connotations. This explains why
when the respondent stood up to make his submission, he
started by specifically stating that he would only respond to
the "things" he had heard; "others were said in English, and
I do not know the language". The Judicial Commissioner at
that point gave a summary of the arguments raised by the
appellant's counsel, noting that the suggestion was that the
case be remitted to the court of first instance, because it
had not been adequately proved at that level. There was
conflicting evidence in the statements of the party (now
respondent) and those of his witnesses.
CONCLUSION
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the main
aim was to make an assessment of the position with regard to
legal representation in Lesotho and to examine how the
adver^cvrial principles are applied in cases where legal
practitioners are involved.
From the descriptions that have been made, it is quite
evident that the provisions for legal representation which
currently apply, fall short of ensuring that the majority,
if not all, of the people who appear before the courts and
possess no knowledge of the law and no skills of advocacy are
represented. The legal provisions themselves do not make
legal representation a general feature of all the courts; so
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do legal aid and Pro Deo provisions, the latter only being
available for cases in the High Court. For the Central and
Local Courts, justifications have been that the proceedings
in them do not require much legal expertise and skills of
advocacy. This seems to work against the allegation that
the official courts are adue_rsa^rial, which also confirms
that this exists more in theory, than in practical reality.
The real fact is that legal representation is not a common
feature in the customary courts, though some people do appear
represented in the Judicial Commissioners' Court and the
Roving Stock-theft Central Court, but even then this is to a
lesser extent than in the received law courts. At the level
of the received law courts, according to indications by the
Chief Magistrate, even in some of the most serious criminal
cases processed through the Magistrates Courts, a good number
of people still appear unrepresented, so that it is in the
High Court where legal representation appears guaranteed.
The main assumption from which I was working, is that
in view of the changes that have occurred with regard to the
rules of procedure and evidence mainly, legal representation
would be justifiable, and legal practitioners by virtue of
their training in the received law principles; would assist
in ensuring that the advft<*SC^rial rules are adhered to.
However, as the descriptions in the foregoing sections do
indicate, the issue is not as simple as that. The examples
of legal practitioners in action as described in the last
section reveal their failure to abide by the rules, pointed
at by their absconding from proceedings, turning up late, not
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dressing properly and so on, and these are coupled with their
duplicitas behaviour in which many of them do not give
serious consideration to responsibility towards the client.
In addition, instances revealing legal practitioners' failure
to abide by rules are represented in failure to present the
facts of cases properly and adequately, failure to draft
papers appropriately, not preparing papers in time, which in
turn leads to delays in the service of papers, consequently
to postponements, adjournments and cases being struck-off the
roll.
But in general, it is the delays which become the
prominent feature in cases where legal practitioners are
involved. The view expressed here is that other than these
constituting manipulative practices, they are more connected
to practical conditions relating to the position of the legal
profession in the country, which give rise to a number of
complications, and defeat the aim of implementing the
accusatorial rules. These include shortages of qualified
lawyers, insufficient numbers of well established legal
firms, the concentration of legal professionals in the
capital and engagement of inadequately experienced lawyers in
courtroom proceedings, as a result of the reluctance of
established firms to employ newly qualified practitioners.
As witnessed from the courtroom observations, in the majority
of cases the lawyers who appear are almost the same every
time. This happens for all the various courts. These are
the ones who are already established, sometimes with their
own legal firms. What happens is that these lawyers have
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too many cases than they can possibly handle, consequently
the experienced lawyers get all the work than they can
thoroughly prepare for, draft all the necessary papers,
contact their clients, liaise with fellow practitioners and
so on. As the Chief Magistrate indicated, the legal
profession has become more of a business than a service to
the people. In addition, the inexperienced lawyers work on
their own, without supervision or guidance of practitioners
who have done court work for some time.37 This does not mean
that the latter are always conversant with the rules either,
in some of the examples used in this analysis, they also time
and again failed to work according to the prescribed
guidelines.
Finally, it can be argued that even with legal
representation, the rules of the adve. rsc\rial model are still
not fully complied with, principally because again we are
dealing with the application of the model in a non-western
setting, where the prevailing conditions within the judicial
system and the social environment, are of a different kind.
On the whole, the descriptions pointing to the delays, touch
upon the issue of an insufficiently developed legal
profession, which in itself is connected to the fact that the





I began this thesis by introducing the reader to the
history of legal and judicial development in Lesotho, in an
endeavour to explain how the present complex system of
dispute settlement processes, including both the
"unofficial" Chiefs' Courts and the official courts came
into being. The descriptions in this regard (Ch. 2) may
seem to have been rather lengthy, but my intention was to
provide an analysis of the events that accompanied the
introduction of an alien system for the settlement of
disputes because it is my belief that such kind of
knowledge would lead to a better understanding and
appreciation of the coexistence of mechanisms of various
origins and how they operate in the present day. Snyder
(1980) asserts the necessity of historical understanding of
the organisation, concepts and processes of contemporary
legal systems especially in studies of legal pluralism.
The descriptions contained in this thesis have worked
at two interrelated levels. First at the constitutional
level, spelling out the character of existent judicial
processes and exploring the organisation, ideology and
philosophy of the various methods of dispute settlement,
assessing whether the notion of a dualistic and parallel
judicial structure brings us closer to understanding all
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the intricacies involved. Secondly, at the level of
describing how dispute settlement is carried out in
practice. The two are interrelated in the sense that the
latter is approached through the conceptual framework
acquired in the first. My intention now is not only to
summarize what has gone on before, but also to reflect a
little upon the significance of my arguments, extending
some of the issues to show what effect they have had on the
developments attempted in recent years.
In the historical context, we saw how attempt was made
by the colonial administration to d€^»nue the chiefs of
judicial powers which they had been exercising concurrently
with the administrative, political and other duties. For
many years the Basotho resisted any kind of reform that
threatened their form of organisation and methods of
dispute settlement. However, as time went on the laws and
customs of the Basotho and their indigenous mechanisms for
dispute settlement were made to apply only in limited
circumstances. This includes efforts such as the
introduction of Magistrates' Courts during the period while
Lesotho was under the Cape Colony, which in any case left
many kinds of disputes except the most serious ones in the
hands of the chiefs. When the British took direct control
over Lesotho in 1884, they revived the system of
Magistrates though as we have seen the chiefs continued to
deal with disputes of various kinds involving their people
as they had before. From 1938, however, the customs and
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laws of the Basotho people came to be recognised only if
enforced within the newly established customary courts
structure whose creation became entangled with the colonial
administration, and this invariably meant their sudden and
bewildering enmeshment into the received law and judicial
ideology and philosophy. Similar historical developments
have been observed in other African societies, for example,
by Mlott ( 1984, 1985); Woodman ^1985^; Roberts (_197^;
Chanock (_1985) and others.
The customary courts structure as argued earlier was
supposed to replace the courts of the traditional
authorities - chieftaincy - as they existed under the
indigenous system. But the evidence that has been
presented demonstrates that the latter were only relegated
to
zian "unofficial" status, though in practice they function in
close relationship with the official customary courts.
With perhaps the exception of jurisdiction in terms of
types of cases handled, the "unofficial" chiefs' courts
maintain principles which guided the courts of traditional
authorities in pre-colonial times.
The symbiotic relationships and the complementary
fashion in which the "unofficial" chiefs' courts and the
customary courts have been demonstrated to function, lead
to the conclusion that at the practical level, the former
are not as "unofficial" as may be presumed. This
perception becomes even stronger when taking into
consideration indications by members of the legal
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profession in the received law courts; recognising the
validity and crucial role of processes in the chiefs'
courts in promoting reconciliation, others even going
further to show the chiefs' courts as a necessary and
acceptable way of doing things. If the "unofficial"
chiefs' courts constitute the normal way of doing things,
then it means they form an additional set of courts to the
ones presented as part of the dualism; namely, the
customary courts and the received law courts. Thus the
assumption that depicts dispute processes in Lesotho as
consisting of two streams is not only insufficient but
serves to entrench the legal centralistic notion
(Griffiths, 1979; Galanter, 1981), mentioned in the
introduction.
The relationships between the customary courts and the
"unofficial" chiefs' courts are so strong such that the
procedures and rules of evidence in the latter have become
very influential on the proceedings of the former. What
I have argued is that this contradicts the allegation that
the customary courts are adv£LTS>Arial, except perhaps in
terms of the fact that the presiding officers are
appointed, that they have court clerks and messengers and
that they have to keep records of proceedings and observe
regular working hours. The issue is that there are rules
of procedure and evidence written down for the guidance of
these courts which as Maope (1986) noted are simplified
adve.'GSA rial rules. However, in practice these are not
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adhered to in the Central and Local Courts, a situation
facilitated by the simple fact that the personnel have no
knowledge of principles of the aciversocial model. An
additional factor is that the personnel and the people in
general are more acquainted with the conduct of proceedings
in the "unofficial" courts, and for most of the time these
are the ones that influence conduct in the customary
courts. To borrow from Werbner (1980), it is the
expectations and ideas of the clients' experience of
something else that they bring to bear, making the
customary courts work along principles of consent,
consensus and reconciliation - seeking processes as it
happens in the "unofficial" courts of the chiefs.
In other words, there is an interaction of norms
across boundaries of the various forums, so that the norms
that operate them are not confined to a particular system,
but are drawn from a number of sources (cf. Griffiths,
1987) producing a fusion of values drawn from both the
"unofficial" courts and state-recognised customary courts.
Also this represents the vision of Von Benda-Beckmann
(1985) of how within village contexts the villagers'
normative systems are reproduced in a way that makes them
meaningful to the everyday activities and processes of
decision-making in the village - in this case dispute
settlement processes - producing systems different in form,
structure and content from those that were being created.
The most influential factor in this "reproduction" process
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is the importance attached to the maintenance of harmonious
relationships among neighbours within the village context.
This makes it less possible for one to push his
individualistic claims, as it would be in an industrial
society. This, in turn, influences the expectations of
people even in dispute settlement processes, those within
the village being predominantly community-oriented and
viewed as relevant by most Basotho, as against the
individualistic approach of the received law.
That the Central and Local Courts do not work
according to adiV-C rsqrial rules seems to be a widely known
and accepted fact, further confirmed in that provisions for
legal representation in these courts are made in respect of
criminal offences only, at the exclusion of civil cases
which form the majority of matters heard by them. But
even where criminal offences are concerned, legal
practitioners are not enthusiastic to appear in these
courts with the exception of cases coming before the Roving
Stock-theft Central Court. This occurs for similar
reasons as those advanced in Werbner (1980), that the
interpretation and application of western state law by
villages is not regarded as a proper legal process. The
whole situation is justified by arguing that proceedings in
these courts should be maintained simple to keep them in
line with the level of understanding of the personnel and
people who make use of them. In addition, arguments that
the numbers of qualified legal practitioners are
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insufficient have also been used. Thus exposing them more
to influences of procedure adapted -from the "unofficial"
courts.
- The position in the Judicial Commissioners' Court is
somewhat different though not to any significant extent.
At this level of the customary courts structure as we have
seen, more consideration is given to the ad\J-€. f"S qrial
rules. But the process is complicated by the fact that
this is an Appeal Court relying mainly on records from the
Central and Local Courts, which as we have realised are
usually not well written. Recognition is usually given to
the fact that under the circumstances pertaining to the
kind of personnel in those courts, proper recording of
proceedings cannot be expected; implying also that it has
to be excused. The point being argued is that this,
however, frustrates the attempts of the Judicial
Commissioners' Court to enforce the rules of the
acAj2.CSa.rial model. Since at this level of the customary
courts structure legal practitioners are given the right of
audience in both civil and criminal proceedings, where
parties appear represented the proceedings do tend to take
a different trend signified by legal practitioners'
tendency to raise points of procedure and of law quite
often. Again this happens in a minority of cases and
results in a number of complications as demonstrated in the
examples picked from some of the proceedings that were
observed in this court, pertaining to delays, failure by
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legal practitioners to attend the proceedings, their
tendency to use the English language and so on. On the
whole, the conclusion that can be reached here is that one
sees a system failing to work according to rules meant to
guide it, instead the procedure of the ad 'UO'SAtrial model
is consistently redefined within the context of prevailing
constraints.
At this juncture it may be useful to reflect on the
impact the practices summed above have had upon attempts
undertaken to reform the customary courts structure in
recent years. In the main, the descriptions that follow
reveal some uncertainty about the direction in which the
customary courts have to be developed. Despite widespread
evidence about practices in these courts over the years,
attempt was made to draw the Central and Local Courts even
more into the ad-U ^-CSdrial model. The need for perhaps
more strict rules and the move to change the "traditional"
outlook and personnel in these courts has been generally
supported both on professional grounds, and on the demand
that there is a need for the integration of the court
system as a whole in the interests of effective
administration of justice and of national unity. The need
to unify the court system and to codify the laws was
mentioned, for instance, by the Director of Public
Prosecutions. The initiative along these lines came in
the early 1970's from the Ministry of Justice, through
which several of the lower customary courts were elevated
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to the status of the Magistrates' Courts. For example,
the Acting Chief Justice in an interview stated the Tsifa-
li-Mali, Matsieng and Maqhaka Local Courts were upgraded in
this manner. As he further explained, these courts
actually came to operate like Magistrates Courts. People
from the village who came to the court saying that they
wanted to sue were told to get the services of a lawyer.
The people could not understand and an individual would for
example say:
No, I can't do that. I haven't got
money for a lawyer. This is a simple
thing [matter] . I want this - this
field belongs to my grandfather, I know
it, so why do I need the services of a
lawyer (Kheola: 16.2.1987).
In the words of the Acting Chief Justice, the attempt
"failed hopelessly. In fact it never started. They put
magistrates there; but no single case went there except
criminal cases". The integration attempt failed because
the procedure which was introduced became too difficult for
the people, and different from that they are accustomed to
in the Central and Local Courts.
The Chief Magistrate stated that the above attempted
reform caused serious problems for the people "because
they were denied their custom and practice they are
familiar with". The following is an example of what would
happen as given by the Chief Magistrate. In a dispute
about a chicken, for instance, a person would be asked what
its value is. If it costs M10, the court fees alone would
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amount to more than that in terms of revenue stamps. In
his own words:
Where would you get a revenue stamp,
supposing you are at Ha Marakabei,
because you can only obtain it at the
sub-accountancy? (Matete: 8.5.1987).
The above example goes to show the extent of complications
that would result, if the customary courts were to be
abolished in the manner it was intended as part of the
effort towards the integration of the judicial structures.
As the Chief Magistrate further stated, the attempt would
end up in "messing the customary law system". It is
important to note that the attempt was only concerned with
the official courts structures, and while there is a wide
recognition of the existence and functioning of the
"unofficial" courts structure, no attention was given to
them.
The contention here is that the major reason for
failure to take the "unofficial" chiefs' courts into
account in the above reforms, lies in the reluctance to
come to terms with the practical reality that first, a
number of disputes never come to the level of the customary
courts. Similar observations that most disputes,
including both civil and criminal matters, which under
rules (of the United States) could be brought to the courts
are never placed on the agenda of any court are made in
Galanter (1981). Secondly, that in the eyes of many
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Basotho, the "unofficial" courts still represent the proper
forum for dispute settlement additional to the official
courts. The "unofficial" chiefs' courts constitute a
distinctive social arrangement with its own rules and
familiar procedure different from the ad verscprial
procedure, and which because of the significance attached
to them and their meaningfulness within the village setting
have come to infiltrate proceedings in the customary-
courts. The consensus and community-oriented approach of
dispute settlement in the chief's courts is seen as
appropriate and most relevant to the ends that a village
hearing seeks to achieve - mainly to ease strained
relationships. The arguments made so far lead to the
conclusion that not much success has ben made to supplant
the indigenous courts with the official customary courts,
rather the two function as extensions of each other in a
mutual relationship influenced highly by cultural
expectations of the people regarding dispute settlement.
The failure of these reforms seems to have been
welcome to some extent, and this becomes evident from the
justifications given in its support, such as the lack of
resources on the part of many people for obtaining legal
representation, and that the system would be beyond their
understanding. Judge Molai indicated that he was himself
in favour of the integration, as a way of shortening the
process of appeal in the customary courts. But as he
further explained:
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Arguments are very strong against that
[integration] and I didn't shed tears
when it did not work although I had
wanted it to (Molai: 4.3.1987).
The position of the customary courts and the appreciation
of their "simplicity" of procedure were thus left in a
strong position. Even the already upgraded courts
reverted to their usual status, following the failure of
the experimentation. One could conclude that it was
deemed better to let the customary courts continue in their
normal practice, than to complicate issues by forcing them
to operate in the similar fashion to that in the
Magistrates Courts. The significance of this in the
context of this work is that, effectively it means the
customary courts have been left to function in a manner
similar to and in close relationship with the "unofficial"
chiefs' courts in terms of relaxed procedural and
evidentiary rules, drawn away from the received law model.
The jurisdiction of these courts is, however, limited to
non-indictable criminal matters and to civil cases
involving mainly the customary law and other minor
statutory provisions such as compensation for injury,damage
to property and land disputes.
Within the official courts structure, the customary
courts and the received law courts are set apart from each
other in a number of respects. First is the fact that the
customary courts are concerned mainly with the application
of the customary law, while the latter primarily administer
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the received law. Another important element in spelling
out the relationship between the two, is that the latter
occupy a position of seniority over the former as
demonstrated by factors such as the revisionary and powers
of control the Magistrates possess over the Central and
Local Courts, the appeal cases from the customary courts
ending up in the High Court and the Court of Appeal, the
received law courts having wider jurisdiction
geographically and handling most serious cases and having
greater sentencing powers. This suggests that the
customary courts are subordinate to the received law courts
generally, but in turn the Magistrates' Courts are
subordinate to the High Court, leading to the conclusion
that even within the received law courts structure alone,
one cannot speak of the parallelism of various courts,
rather of a hierarchically ordered judicial structure. Nor
could such a relationship be said to exist between the
received law courts and the customary courts, let alone
extending it to describe the relationship between the
latter and the "unofficial" chiefs' courts. The customary
courts as described earlier, for all practical purposes are
regarded as appeal courts for cases which cannot be settled
or which prove beyond the capabilities of the "unofficial"
courts.
Furthermore, from the descriptions that were made the
application of the adu£.rsarial rules is more visible
within the received law courts structure than in the
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customary courts. This is reinforced not only by the fact
that the judges and the majority of the magistrates now
possess training in the rules of procedure and evidence of
this model, but also by provisions which grant legal
practitioners the right of audience in civil and criminal
cases equally. In the High Court this is further
illuminated by provisions for pro deo and legal aid
services, all of which promote adherence to ad4/4?TSQrial
model. From these it can be expected that in practice
legal representation in guaranteed for all cases coming
before the High Court. In practical terms, legal
representation is almost mandatory in civil cases both in
the Magistrates' Courts and the High Court because of
procedural requirements which ought to be satisfied in
instituting proceedings, which as demonstrated earlier,
individual parties would not be able to handle on their
own. However, as we noted in C0/6/HC/JK/9.3.87 some
people still come before the received law courts
unrepresented, either because they have no means of
acquiring such assistance or because of their lack of
knowledge of how to acquire it. The issue becomes even
more complex because the legal aid provisions as we noted
are fairly inadequate.
In criminal matters before the Magistrates' Courts on
the other hand, many accused, as earlier descriptions
indicate, still appear unrepresented even in most serious
cases. But even where represented such assistance comes
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at the trial stage. An additional factor is that
prosecution in the Magistrates' Courts is mainly in the
hands of public and police prosecutors whom besides their
work experience, do not have training skills in the
acJu-£-CS>C{rial principles. So that in the vast majority of
criminal prosecutions, the Magistrates act as the only
knowledgeable people coming into contact with the cases and
hence have to wear "the many hats" (El-Naiem, 1978), which
means they do not act only as impartial referees as
expected under the ad v-e,rsq_rial model, rather they
constantly have to supervise and direct police prosecutions
which while not equivalent to actually assisting them to
prepare cases for prosecution, it involves looking to see
if there is a case. In other words, the Magistrates have
to assess the sufficiency of evidence or whether more
evidence in support of the case for the prosecution is to
be allowed. They supervise the work of the prosecution
and as some of the descriptions reveal, of the defence as
well. We have also seen how in many cases they have to
partake in cross-examination, all these, are in addition to
their role in trying cases. On the whole this shows how
the Magistrates have to be able to shed the role of the
prosecution-adviser and assume those of the defence and
judge as and when necessary.
Because of the higher degree of legal representation
in the High Court and because the prosecution in this case
is carried out by the "senior men trained in law",
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(interview with Judge Molai), the position is rather
different. However, this does not suggest that the
proceedings are always without flaws. For instance we
noted that the judges also sometimes engage in activities
that go beyond just refereeing the proceedings such as
suggesting what alternative procedure the prosecution could
follow, probing into issues of how the counsels handle the
cases, assisting with the interpretation, cross-examining,
reframing questions, raising objections and interjections
and so on.
Beyond the above we have noted failure by legal
practitioners to turn up for proceedings, medical
practitioners failing to appear to give evidence, cases
brought to court without sufficient evidence, failing to
bring all important evidence to the attention of the court,
inadequate provisions for legal aid, complications caused
by the use of the English language which necessitates
interpretation, insufficient numbers of legal
practitioners, lack of sufficient established legal firms,
concentration of legal practice in the Capital Town. All
these make the application of the adUe.rsa>rial model less
effective (easy). Contributing to what we have evidenced
as unending requests for adjournments and postponements and
extreme delays in the administration of justice. This
confirms the observations by Von Benda-Beckmann (1985)
about how what is considered to be "western" state law is
also transformed, frozen, modernized, changed, or perverted
463
in the different contexts within which it is reproduced.
The thesis has portrayed some vital problems of
effective administration of justice in a situation in which
two or more different legal cultures coexist and interact
in a progressive and inevitable change and adaptation
(Holleman, 1979), Lesotho in this case being the case
study. By focusing on what goes on at the practical
level, I have sought to visualize a full picture of dispute
settlement as composed of the official courts consisting of
the received law courts and the customary courts, and the
"unofficial" courts of the chiefs at the bottom, with the
last two interacting in a highly complex process of
progressive association and compromise. The overall
conclusion that could be reached from the foregoing
descriptions is that the ad^C rscgrial model does not work
in this case either, although in this context it is mainly
for different kinds of reasons and principles - special
class of influences (Woodman, 1985) - other than purely
manipulative practices of those who operate the system as
stressed in studies in the western world. On the whole
what one finds in this case is a struggle to make the
ac|u e.r;i»c\rial model work in an environment infested with
different sorts of conditions and obstacles, many of which
have to do with the model being implanted in a non-western
setting, reflecting also upon indications by Woodman (1985)
that norms cannot retain their original content as
components of a different system, and one could add the
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cultural expectations of the people involved. For the
judicial system as a whole what has been produced is a
hybrid system working partly on adue. rs cjrial principles and
partly along procedures of the "unofficial" courts which
are more inquisitorial by outlook. This is an
approximation of what Fitzpatrick (1983) has called the
emergence of "combined law" resulting from the interaction
of legal forms in plural legal systems or what Von Benda-
Beckmann (1983) has sought to recapture with the words
"compounding structuration" by which he referred to
processes in which actors draw upon elements of different
normative systems and combine them in compounded legal
rationalization and justification schemes.
Through examination of what goes on at the practical
level, this study highlights some of the shortcomings met
in the application of the transplanted a<du€.rscurial model,
because in its ideology it tends to demarcate dispute
settlement from the rest of social life of a great majority
of Basotho people. What happens in the "unofficial"
chiefs' courts and the customary courts, demonstrates the
importance still attached to dispute processing mechanisms
which emphasise on reconciliation, consensus, and are
community-orientated. This is supported, as has been
noted, by the multiplex relationships the people who live
in the village context have with one another. But in
addition, the study dismantles the notions which depict the
judicial system as being dualistic, and as consisting only
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of the customary courts and the received law courts,
functioning parallel to each other. Such notions create
artificial boundaries which, as demonstrated, can only not
be found in practice, but also serve to obscure a true





1. In the District of Teyateyaneng.
2. These would also be called "banna ba lekhotla" men of
the court because of their participation in processes
of dispute resolution, which was a complementary
function to their administrative and other duties.
3. Signifying how some of the men of the Chief's Courts
continue to be influential in the customary courts
("Treasury Courts").
4. Merry (1979) shows how threats to resort to courts may
be used to effectuate a desired exit.
5. The man was actually a relative of the woman
(neighbour) who was mentioned to have made the claims
referred to at the beginning.
6. An indication of what kind of cases would be heard by
the "unofficial" chiefs' courts, and those that would
be referred to the customary courts. But could also
signify an event whereby a criminal offence through
the discretion of local police, was referred to a
"Treasury Court" and not the Magistrates' Courts.
The Local Court in Mapoteng is still popularly known
as a "Treasury Court".
7. Shows the traditional aura that surrounds the
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activities of customary courts, usually not present
for the received law courts, except perhaps in R. v
Pitso Phakiso Makhoza and Others, CRi/T/32/84 reported
by M. Mamashela in CILSA Vol. XVIII, 1985, p.127.
8. Could be taken to signify the allegation of the
Attorney General about the decisions of the official
courts causing bitterness as indicated in Ch.4.
9. I believe this would be before the Roving Stock-theft
Central Court, which has rightful powers to hear such
matters, or its equivalent at the time. See Ch.4 for
further explanations concerning this Central Court.
10. Principal Chief in the area.
11. Presume this would be a Central Court.
12. From Central Court cases proceed to the Judicial
Commissioners' Court on appeal, which sits in District
Headquarters in this case Teyateyaneng, and I presume
this is what was happening.
13. Shows how some of the chiefs continued to act as
president in the customary courts. Elaborated in
Ch.3.
14. I believe the Magistrate had recused herself as
demanded by new procedures.
15. Only the High Court has the jurisdiction to hear cases
of ritual murder and treason as a matter of first
instance. See explanation in Ch.5.
16. Provisions for legal representation are made only for
proceedings in certain courts. In the Local Courts
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"Treasury Courts" at that time legal practitioners
could not appear hence why I could not see them in my
village. Now they can appear in criminal cases only.
See full descriptions in Ch.6.
17. As herdboys. Usually they would be involved in
stock-theft cases, trespass by animals onto the
fields, stealing mealies, and others.
18. Pertaining to the chiefs' courts ("unofficial" courts)
Ch.3; customary courts, Local "Treasury" Courts,
Central Courts (including the Roving Stock-theft
Central Court), and the Court of the Judicial
Commissioners, Ch.4; Magistrates' Courts and the High
Court (received law courts), Ch.5; legal
representation, Ch.6.
19. De Sousa Santos mentions that forms of legal pluralism
are sometimes very clear in African countries. I
return to this point again in Ch.l under the
literature review section.
20. Quoted in Galanter (1981). See also A. Griffiths
(1987).
21. Particularly descriptions made in Ch.2 now
constituting the "unofficial" Courts structure as
labelled in this thesis.
22. Initiated the customary courts structure, Ch.4.
23. Part of the received law courts. There is also a
Court of Appeal, see Ch.5.
24. That is, with the training of more nationals in the
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received law.
25. A concept adopted from Abel (1979).
26. Which is a foreign language.
27. As stressed in studies that have focused on practices
of similar courts in the west, refer to Ch.5.
28. See Appendix C.
29. Refer to the Methodology, Ch.l.
CHAPTER 1
1. See pp.48-54.
2. Refers mainly to Chapter 2, the History and
Development of the Present Judicial System in Lesotho.
But also, portions of other subsequent chapters make
reference to the trend of changes brought by these
enactments.
3. The works referred to here became particularly useful
in working out the characteristic nature of dispute
settlement in pre-colonial times, especially in view
of the fact that not much has been written in this
regard about Lesotho itself; the only renown work
being that of Ashton (1952). These works become
vital in making the descriptions contained mainly in
Chapter 3, entitled. The "Unofficial" Courts : The
Indigenous Framework for Dispute Settlement among
Basotho.
4. The literature reviewed under this section became most
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pertinent in Chapter 5, The Official Courts II : The
Received Law Courts, which form the more accusatorial
level in the overall judicial system of Lesotho.
However, as discussed in the chapter the employment of
these works in the context of the courts in Lesotho
should be approached with outmost caution. For a
complete argument on this see Ch.5.
Equivalent of "formal justice" (Perelman, 1945)
meaning the application of the same norms to all
members as described in Kamenka and Tay (1979), pp.23-
24. See also Passmore (1979) pp.33-5 in Kamenka and
Tay Supra. Also Rawls (1971), Tonnies (1936).
Principles of social justice as formulated by various
theories such as Marx are undoubtedly principles of
distributive justice. They concern distribution of
goods in society. For a more elaborate discussion of
this type of justice refer, e.g. to Lang pp.116-148 in
Kamenka and Tay Supra; Rawls (1971); and Tonnies
(1936).
With the limitations of the length set for this
thesis, it has not been possible to deal with this
subject in any extensive manner, but it remains an
area of research for the future as part of the attempt
to understand how the official courts, in particular,
operate.
Further explanation is made about observations in the
"unofficial" courts on pp. 37-41.
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9. Main reasons why the disguised entrance alternative as
being suggested here was avoided are explained further
below. It is not simply a speculative statement of
what could have happened, but it also involves ethical
standards of social research.
10. Concept adopted from Goodwin-Jones (1984).
11. During the proceedings of CO/4/MCM/MM3/16.3.87 when
the magistrate raised a question about my note-taking,
it was the public prosecutor who came to my rescue.
The Magistrate had, by mistake, not been informed
about my research, since when I started to attend the
proceedings of the Magistrate Courts in Maseru, she
had been away on leave. An explanation having been
made she permitted my exercise to continue.
13. It was also for purposes of assessing whether the
observed behaviour recurred in proceedings of various
matters brought to court, e.g. whether in civil or
criminal proceedings, in different courts, when
handled by different court personnel, etc.
14. Appendix G contains interview schedules which were
prepared as a guideline for questions which were to be
put to various categories of informants as envisaged
during the preparatory stages.
15. See list of key informants, Appendix F.
16. Provision is made under the Children's Protection Act
No. 6 of 1980.
17. Many of the respondents made their descriptions in
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Sesotho, and these have had to be translated into the
English language without losing the context and sense
of the viewpoints as expressed during the interviews.
CHAPTER 2
1. Elaborated versions of the history of the Basotho can
be found in the works of Palmer and Poulter (1972);
Ashton (1952); Burman (1976); Duncan (1960), etc.
2. Referred to in this thesis as the Official Courts,
consisting of the customary courts and the received
law courts.
3. Now largely constituted by the "unofficial" chiefs'
courts in the conception used in this work.
4. See mainly Ch.3 for a detailed description of the
continuing existence of these courts. Noted also in
the works of Palmer and Poulter (1972); Hamnett
(1970).
5. Refer to Appendix J for a list of official documents
making provisions referred to here.
6. The actual statement of Moshoeshoe is quoted on p.79.
7. See, for example, the words of Queen Regent Mantsebo
Seeiso (1951) cautioning the Resident Commissioner
that the colonial government should not take upon
itself, powers not included in the covenant of the
alliance and protection between Moshoeshoe and Queen
Victoria. See also the response of the Resident
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Commissioner Forsyth Thompson in Machobane (1985),
p. 5.
8. Interview with George Bereng, 3.4.1987.
9. Rolland's Memorandum, dated 30 March 1968 BR Vol. VI
Part I (1871-72), p.126.
10. Ibid. p.129. See also Burman (1985).
11. See generally Burman (1985); Machobane (1985, 1986);
Palmer and Poulter (1972); for an elaborated version
of the feuds involving Moshoeshoe's sons, issues on
Moshoeshoe's succession.
12. Interview with Bereng, 3.4.1987.
13. It was viewed as contrary to the arrangement which
Moshoeshoe had proposed in seeking British protection.
14. This was expressed clearly in the interviews with
Damane 13.2.1987 and Bereng 28.4.1987 (continuation).
15. Interview held on 3.4.1987.
16. Interview held on 13.2.1987.
17. See in particular Burman (1985), p.31.
18. This could be interpreted as well fitting within the
context of the idea that Lesotho would finally be
incorporated into South Africa.
19. Proclamation No. 44 of 1 July 1877.
20. Burman (1985) p.34, argues that at a stroke of a pen,
customary law was changed from being the normal law
of the country to being a concession made to the
Basotho, since it was stated that in cases involving
Natives (Basotho) could by discretion (may) be dealt
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with according to Native law.
21. Proclamation No. 44 of 1 July 1877, Sec.24.
22. In the interview held with Maope on 16.2.1987, he
does, however, accept the continuing existence of the
"unofficial" chiefs' courts. Not only thatj he
expressly indicated their usefulness in the
administration of law and justice, as shall be noted
in Ch.3.
23. See Burman (1985), for example.
24. Viewed by Poulter (1972) as having sparked off the War
of Guns.
25. For details of the Award see Burman (1985), p.39.
26. Refers to a public assembly. See also Palmer and
Poulter (1972) pp.32-34.
27. Berea, now known as T.Y. (Teyateyaneng). See
quotation from Bereng, last sentence below.
28. See particularly pp.84-86.
29. Sec. 4, Proclamation 2B, 1884.
30. This parallelism is later on contended, that in
reality even the customary courts and the received law
courts cannot be claimed to be operating parallel to
each other, that the former are actually subordinate
to the latter. See in particular Ch.4.
31. This was before the Basutoland National Council, which
had by now been set up.
32. Not all these can be described in full in this work,
but see the following explanation.
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33. Cape Parliamentary Papers, 1876.
34. Sir Alan Pirn's Report on the Financial and Economic
Position of Basutoland, 1935.
35. In his work Machobane (1985) argues that this whole
situation was prompted by the question of the unclear
constitutional position of Lesotho under the colonial
rule,see in particular pp.2-6. Hobson (1938) also
noted Britain's laissez-faire attitude in Basutoland
pp.245-246.
36. In the customary courts, reference is often made to
the Laws of Lerotholi. In CO/4/JCCQ/JCS/3.6.87
during the debate concerning the allocation of the
piece of land in question, the counsel for the
appellant made reference to the Laws of Lerotholi.
In CO/18/JCCQ/JCS/8.6.87, reference was made to the
same Laws by the appellant. These proceedings
involved some cattle which had been confiscated.
Judge Molai in an interview emphasised the importance
of the Laws of Lerotholi in the customary courts.
37. For a fuller description see Poulter (1972).
38. Work parties.
39. This was confirmed in the interviews with Damane
13.2.1987; and Bereng 28.4.1987 (continuation).
40. See in particular pp.117-119.
41. Quoted from the Autobiography of Jingoes compiled by
Perry and Perry (1975).
42. This view, however, does not contradict the former,
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since Pim reported on the factors which ensued within
the relations between the colonial administration and
the indigenous government and the contradictions that
resulted from the attitude of the former which he
described as "protection without control". Also see
the following paragraph.
43. Which can be viewed as connected to the increase in
the numbers of chiefs as a result of the system of
"placing" described on pp.117-119.
44. A comprehensive discussion of the 1938 reforms is
found in Hailey (1953), Native Administration in
British African Territories, Part V, pp.70-111.
45. See in addition Ashton (1952) and Palmer and Poulter
(1972).
46. Continuation of interview with Bereng on 28.4.1987.
47. One of the popular sayings among Basotho, denoting
that while chieftainship is hereditary, its stronghold
rests on the people's popular approval.
48. Bereng, interview held on 28.4.1987 (continuation).
49. Bereng, as above.
50. Bereng, as above.
CHAPTER 3
1. Only used in this context to depict that these are not
officially and in legal terms accepted as institutions
possessing judicial powers. But practice as against
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theory shows that they operate just as the official
courts do in the settlement of dispute.
2. Report of Commission on Laws and Customs of Basotho
(1873) under chairmanship of Charles D Griffith as
recommended under the head "Courts of Law".
3. It was mentioned in the methodological chapter (Ch.l)
that permission to carry out observations in the
"unofficial" courts was not obtained hence that was
supplemented through obtaining detailed descriptions
about the nature of proceedings in these courts as
given by some of the chiefs.
4. Maope in an interview held on 16.2.1987, mentioned in
particular the continuing use of "family councils" in
such matters as marriage breakdown.
5. Used mainly to substitute information that could have
been obtained through the observations. See note 3,
above.
6. Hamnett (1975) points out that when the population of
Lesotho was estimated at 800,000, the number of
gazetted chiefs alone was rather over 1,100, thus the
number of courts would be the same. These were on
the onset recognised in terms of Proclamation No.61 of
1938, and were also issued warrants to exercise
judicial powers under Proclamation No. 62 of 1938.
7. From observations CO/MSLC/2/23.4.87, Ch.4, p.286,
p.287, p.288.
8. The "unofficial" chiefs' courts sit daily, and
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whenever there are disputes to be resolved these are
dealt with, otherwise other business of the day such
as "administrative" matters would be proceeded with.
9. See footnote 6 above.
10. See quotation from the interview with the Chief
Magistrate Matete on p.161.
11. Director of Public Prosecutions, Peete, was
interviewed on 30.1.1987.
12. Refers mainly to "fights" or acts of violence among
children, women, herdboys, which seldom get reported
to the police, except where serious injuries are
caused.
13. Especially the Magistrates courts.
14. Interview held with the Acting Chief Justice on
16.2.1987.
15. That is if the Chief fails to resolve the matter
himself.
16. Reaffirms the point made by Resident Magistrate Mohale
as referred to on p.157.
17. Judge Molai, interviewed on 6.3.1987 (continued).
18. Understood in this sense to mean initiating court
proceedings.
19. Also mentioned by Damane, interviewed on 13.2.1987.
20. Except in matters of extreme seriousness.
21. Quoted from an interview with the Chief Magistrate,
Matete, held on 8.5.1987.
22. From an interview with Damane, 13.2.1987.
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23. That is, the Official Courts.
24. Read (1966) p. 51, explains that the absence of the
distinction between civil and criminal cases in
traditional African law is linked to the importance
granted the reconciliation of the offender to the
community and to the emphasis placed on "restoring the
equilibrium" between the parties.
25. Used in this sense as a form of restitution to the
injured parties.
26. See above. Known as Sesotho as "ho rothetsa leqeba".
27. This is addressed fully in the next chapter, but this
would be in cases first heard as criminal matters
before the official received law courts, following
which civil proceedings before customary courts can be
instituted to claim compensation.
28. For example, Acting Chief Justice, Kheola, 16.2.1987,
Judicial Commissioners, Sennane and Loko, 7.5.1987;
Maope, Attorney General, 16.2.1987. However,
conflicting opinions were offered in respect of such
offences as "assault", see pp.170-171 for explanation.
The word "normally" does indicate that in certain
instances and for particular cases, the "unofficial"
courts are still consulted.
29. Quotation from an interview with Peete, Director of
Public Prosecutions, 30.1.1987.
30. The situation, as shall be indicated in the next
chapter, is still largely the same.
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31. From an interview with Damane 13.2.1987.
32. Could be translated to mean "he who stumbles in court
cannot be prosecuted for it".
33. Closest translation could be "In court men do not skim
facts", meant to indicate that all participants can
add whatever evidence or put whatever questions that
could assist the court to reach a just and
satisfactory solution.
34. The book contains two stories involving dispute
settlement. Here reference is mainly made to the
first in which the smallest birds lodge complaints
against the bigger ones, expressing their grievances
openly in court without fear of further attack and
persecution.
35. While this may be a procedure in more industrialised
societies, the similarity here is made in terms of the
role played by the court in investigating the matter
before it.
36. Implicitly stated in an interview with Crown Counsel
Ntsonyana, 18.3.1987. But see statement of Resident
Magistrate, Mohale, below.
37. Confirmed by Damane, interviewed on 13.2.1987.
38. Refers to newly qualified legal practitioners. The
Chief Magistrate's observations arise from the
proceedings before the Magistrates' Courts, but are
used here to reinforce the point made by Resident
Magistrate, Mohale and Crown Counsel Ntsonyana.
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39. See generally Gluckman (1969) on procedures and
evidence in African customary law and criticisms
levelled against them.
40. This means that "no one speaks for another when he is
there to speak for himself".
41. Refers to both the Native Administration Proclamation
No. 61 of 1938 and the Native Courts Proclamation No. 62
of 1938.
42. Specifically mentioned in the interviews with Peete,
Maope, Mohale and Kheola (see Appendix F).
43. See e.g. p.155, p.157 and also pp.172-179 for cases
outside the jurisdiction of the "unofficial" courts.
44. See quotation on p.148.
45. Full statement appears on p.158.
46. Used in this context to denote the whole official
court structure.
47. See full quotation on p.205.
48. Maope's statement about "bitterness" comes relevant
here, see p.169.
CHAPTER 4
1. Refer to Diagram 1, p. 15 for the hierarchy of these
courts. Also see Appendix B for the schedule of
Central and Local Courts at present.
2. Established in terms of the Native Courts Proclamation
No.62 of 1938.
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3. Referred to, in this thesis, as the "unofficial"
chiefs' courts, Ch.3.
4. Refers mainly to such aspects as payment of fees,
personnel, fixed hours of work, accusatorial
principles.
5. It is generally held that the indigenous system is
more inquisitorial in approach, while the received law
system is accusatorial. See Maope (1985), Palmer and
Poulter (1972).
6. Expressed and admitted by informants such as the
Acting Chief Justice, Kheola; Attorney General,
Maope; Judge Molai; Director of Public Prosecutions,
Peete.
7. For elaborated descriptions of criticisms against the
indigenous system see especially pp.218-223.
Reference must also be made to Chs. 2 and 3.
8. Not Native Courts as at the beginning, but now called
Local and Central Courts, and also not the Paramount
Chief's Appeal Court but the Judicial Commissioners'
Court. The Native Courts came to be called Basuto
Courts in 1958, and the Paramount Chief's Court was
at one time (1944) replaced by the District
Commissioners' Courts.
9. i.e. The Native Courts Proclamation No.62 of 1938, and




11. The Native Courts Proclamation No. 62 of 1938.
12. Maintained in a subsequent law - Proclamation No. 23
of 1958, Sec.3, which divided these courts into First
Grade: The Basuto Central Courts (with a headquarters
at Matsieng, and regional divisions), and Second
Grade: Basuto Local Courts.
13. Interview with Bereng, 28.4.1987.
14. Royal village.
15. Also see Ch.2.
16. See also Palmer and Poulter (1972) below.
17. Set in accordance with Proclamation No.11 of 1946.
18. Appointed by the Resident Commissioner in Concurrence
with the High Commissioner. See explanation on
pp.218-219.
19. See Pirn Report of 1935.
20. Pursuant to the idea to separate the "judicial" from
the "administrative" powers of chiefs.
21. The number of Court clerks varied from one to four,
and of messengers from one to three.
22. Refers to the men of the Court. But see again Ashton
(1952) as referred to on the next page.
23. i.e. in the Local and Central Courts.
24. Should be read along with the view of Ashton (1952)
appearing on p.222.
25. Similar additions have been made to the jurisdiction
of the customary courts in recent years as noted on
p.246.
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26. For more elaborate discussions of this clause, see
Poulter (1972).
27. Central and Local Courts Proclamation No.62 of 1938,
Sec.9(a).
28. This view is contained in the existing literature, for
instance, Palmer and Poulter (1972) as quoted on the
next page.
29. Refers to Proclamation 2B of 1884.
30. Sec. 26, Central and Local Courts Proclamation No.62
of 1938.
31. Fines and imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12
months.
32. See p.218 for a detailed description of the various
ranks into which the Native Courts were classified.
33. Proclamation No. 23 of 1958.
34. See pp.232-234.
35. Refers to 3 classes (ranks) into which these courts
are categorised, now consisting of Local Courts,
Central Courts, and the Judicial Commissioners' Court.
36. Native Courts Proclamation No. 62 of 1938 to Basuto
Courts Proclamation No.23 of 1958.
37. Also true in the sense that this system has its
foundations in the rules of the English and Roman-
Dutch laws as dictated mainly by Proclamation 2B of
1884.
38. Throughout most of this period Chieftainess Regent
Mantsebo reigned.
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39. The Paramount Chief's Appeal Courts, later District
Commissioners' Courts; and the Native Courts, later
Basuto Courts.
40. From interview with the Acting Chief Justice Kheola
held on 16.2.1987.
41. The case is discussed on p.277.
42. See p.281.
43. In accordance with Proclamation No.25 of 1950.
44. Provided for in terms of the Judicial Commissioners'
(Amendment) Act No. 9 of 1976.
45. See further details in Ch.6.
46. These statistics were obtained by going through the
fieldwork diary, and counting the cases observed when
this court was on circuit in Quthing.
47. Refer to the above statistics.
48. These are the courts which in 1938 came to be entitled
the Native Courts in terms of Proclamation 62 of that
year, and later came to be known as Basuto Courts
under Proclamation 23 of 1958.
49. See explanation on pp.220-221 and pp.222-223.
50. In association with the Basuto Courts Proclamation
No.23 of 1958.
51. See explanation on p.236.
52. See example in the next paragraph.
53. See explanation p.245.
54. Reprinted as amended in Volume X of the Laws of
Basotoland, 1965.
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55. Sec.9 Central and Local Courts Proclamation No.62 of
1938.
56. In terms of Sec.26 of Proclamation No.62, of 1938.
57. See example of pp.295-296.
58. Refers mainly to those dealt with by Local Courts when
they fall out of their jurisdiction.
59. Refer to arguments in Ch.6.
60. Regulation 10 of 1965 as amended.
61. Refers to the Central and Local Court Rules as stated
above.
62. See Ch.6 since they are common in cases where legal
practitioners appear.
63. See Perry (1977) referred to on p.260.
64. Quoted from interview with Chief Magistrate Matete.
The fact that the assessor in CO/6/JCCQ/JCS/3.6.87
discussed on p.267 was previously a president of a
Central Court, confirms the point about the system
producing its own personnel.
65. Refers to the received law courts, to which the Acting
Chief Justice was addressing himself at this juncture.
66. Refer to p.266 for descriptions of observation in this
case. Also discussed on p.283.
67. Should be read together with the point raised by the
Chief Magistrate, the Acting Chief Justice and the
Attorney General on pp.263-265.
68. Speaking of traditional customary procedures in Africa
generally.
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69. See quotation on p.282.
70. Refer to Ch.6.
71. Respondent had been in court earlier, but had
disappeared shortly before his case was called.
72. The reforms described in Ch.7 pp.457-461 were made in
the light of this observation.
CHAPTER 5
1. By the completion of the fieldwork, two more
expatriate judges had been appointed, one who whom
became the Chief Justice.
2. The districts were established in terms of
Proclamation No.74 of 1871.
3. See complete account of this point in Ch.2.
4. For the classification of the Magistrates Courts
during this period see p.307.
5. In 1967, as reported by Palmer and Poulter (1972),
there were no Magistrates Courts of the Third and
Special Classes in operation.
6. Now there is a Chief Magistrate and provision has also
been made for Senior Resident Magistrates' posts, in
accordance with qualifications held by the newly
emerging cadre of Magistrates and the prospects that
more will attain professional degrees.
7. Diploma in Law Course was referred to on p.307. The
Diploma in Law graduates are now taken at Third Class
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level when they come into service. With the
consideration that all Magistrates should hold minimum
B.A. Law qualifications, the intention is that they
will enter service at the Second Class rank, meaning
the Special Class and Third Class ranks will be
scrapped.
8. Decisions of the Third Class Magistrates are reviewed
by those of the First Class and not the High Court.
See Sec.4 of Proclamation No.58 of 1938 as amended.
9. e.g. Refer to PART 1(4) of the Criminal Procedure and
Evidence Act of 1981, the Subordinate Courts
Proclamation No.58 of 1938 as amended, Sees. 60, 61,
62 and other relevant sections.
10. PART VII of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act of
1981.
11. e.g. Attorney General, Maope; Crown Counsel
Ntsonyana; Chief Magistrate, Matete.
12. Refer to PART II of the Subordinate Courts
Proclamation No.58 of 1938, as amended.
13. The relevant Section in the Subordinate Courts
Proclamation No.58 of 1938 refers to matters beyond
the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Courts.
14. The point about legal practitioners is followed up in
Ch. 6.
15. Including e.g. the High Court Act No.4 of 1967, the
High Court Order No. 17 of 1970 introduced following
suspension of the 1966 Constitution; the High Court
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Act No. 5 of 1977; superceded later by the High Court
Act No.5 of 1978 in almost identical form.
16. e.g. The right to life, freedom of movement and
residence, freedom from inhuman treatment, the right
to respect for private and family life, the right to
a fair trial, the right to equality before the law,
and equal protection of the law.
17. Customary marriage being the duty of Customary Courts,
Ch.4.
18. An example would be an instruction that a different
Magistrate should preside over the proceedings.
19. Refers to instances where Judicial Commissioners
decline to grant permission for appeal to the High
Court, in which event application could be submitted
to the latter.
20. See statement of the Acting Chief Justice about
"Circuit" courts on p.325.
21. Understood in this sense to refer mainly to the
Magistrates Courts.
22. Report read at the opening of the first session of the
High Court in February 1987.
23. At the time of the field research only 3 judges were
in office. But see Footnote 1 above.
24. One of the 3 judges in post as mentioned above.
25. Refer to Appendix H.
26. For complete descriptions of the Privy Council see
Palmer and Poulter (1972).
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27. Reference was being made to the High Court.
28. Refers mainly to High Court Rules of 1980 and
Subordinate Courts Rules of 1938.
29. Court of Appeal Rules of 1980.
30. Sec.21 of High Court Rules of 1980.
31. Further descriptions on legal representation appear in
Ch.6.
32. Similar point to that made in the works of Carlen
(1976), Ericson and Baranek (1982), Friedland (1975)
etc.
33. Descriptions in Ch.6 actually demonstrate that in the
customary courts, except perhaps in the Roving Stock-
theft Central Court, prosecutors do not appear nor is
legal representation a common phenomenon.
34. Disclosure of this Magistrate's name is withheld for
confidentiality.
35. Some of these people were mentioned to have been in
custodial remand for periods of close to a year, yet
police investigations were not near completion.
36. Packer (1968 : 225).
37. See p.300 for the other studies referred to here.
38. Used in this context to denote both the "unofficial"
Chiefs' Courts and the customary courts processes
based more on Sesotho custom.
39. By this the Acting Chief Justice was referring to the
received law courts, as he explained in a further
statement.
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40. In the customary courts people are simply warned to
speak the truth.
41. Accepted as Exhibit A.
42. See other examples of similar inadequacies further
below.
43. e.g. in CO/3/TC/MM2/14.5.87, Ch.6. p.435, where the
Crown Counsel mentioned, having "heard" that the
accused had been to South Africa.




47. See Subordinate Courts (Amendment) Order No. 3 of 1973.
48. i.e. Chief Justice Mapetla.
49. See CO/4/MCM/MM3/16.3.87 on p.358.
50. Interview with the Chief Magistrate, Matete dated
8.5.1987.
51. Discussed further in Chapter 6.
52. See footnote above.
53. Refer to descriptions in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER 6
1. See the works of Tomasic and Feeley (1982), Danzig and
Lowy (1975), Garofalo and Connelly (1980), Merry
(1978), Sander (1976), Nader (1969), Nader and Singer
(1976), Bell (1978), etc.
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2. Weaknesses of adjudication and the adversary system
are contained in works of Paterson and Bates (1983);
Galanter (1976); White (1975); noting the inequality
in representation, Bottoms and McClean (1976);
McConville and Baldwin (1977); McBarnet (1981);
Carlen (1976); noting delays in court processes and
its causes, Greer (1971); Frank (1949) noting
weaknesses of evidence. Also see Bankowski and
Mungham (1976); Friedland (1975); Freeman (1981),
Twining (1984).
3. Refer to interviews with Maope, Matete, and Kheola for
confirmation of this statement (see Appendix F).
4. Such as financial reasons, absence of lawyers in the
districts, etc.
5. Refers to the Native Courts Proclamation No.62 of
1938.
6. Regulation 10 of 1964, Section 14 and also see Section
20 of the Central and Local Courts Proclamation No.62
of 1938 as quoted below.
7. Section 20 of the Central and Local Courts
Proclamation, see Footnote 6.
8. See Chapters 3 and 4.
9. From interviews with matete and Molai (refer to
Appendix F).
10. Interview with Judge Molai, in particular.
11. Interviews with Molai, Matete and Maope (see Appendix
F).
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12. That is continuity between the "unofficial" chiefs'
courts and the customary courts.
13. Refer to Matete's statement quoted further down.
14. See particularly descriptions on pp.400-404.
15. The fact is that the counsels had been there in the
morning but decided to disappear for whatever reason.
16. For classification of the legal profession, see Palmer
and Poulter (1972).
17. Stated by the Chief Legal Aid Counsel in an interview
with him. He was making indications that the same
applies to lawyers taken in legal aid cases.
18. Report of Proceedings of a Seminar on Legal Services
in Rural Africa, Limuru (Kenya) 1-4 October 1984.
19. Legal Aid Act No.19 1978, Section 4.
20 Section 5 of the above Act.
21. Section 6 of above.
22. Section 7(1) of above.
23. Section 7(4) of above.
24. Section 13 of above.
25. Appendix I
26. Refer to the works of Paterson and Nelken (1984),
Paterson and Bates (1983), Bankowski and Mungham
(1976), Zander (1969), White (1974), Paterson (1979),
etc.
27. In criminal cases it would be against the state
prosecutors or crown counsels.
28. Refer to an instance in C0/6/HC/JK/9.3.87 discussed
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later on pp.431-432.
29. See explanation of Street Law Project in Ch.l, pp.67-
68.
30. Discussion of this case is continued on p.432.
31. Chapter 5, pp.367-368.
32. For complete descriptions on this case refer to Ch.4.
pp.282-283.
33. Following several attempts to make the counsel state
question correctly.
34. The ones who had already adduced evidence before the
court.
35. See descriptions from Judge Molai and the Chief
Magistrate on pp.394-395.
36. Refer to Chapter 5, pp.370-374.
37. e.g. CO/104/HC/JK/17.3.87, p.435.
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APPENDIX B
SCHEDULE OF CENTRAL AND LOCAL COURTS AT PRESENT
MASERU
Matsieng Central Court
1. Maseru Local Court*
2. Matala Local Court
3. Maja Local Court
4. Ralejoe Local Court
5. Likalaneng Local Court
6. Marakabei Local Court
7. Setleketseng Local Court
8. Semione Local Court
9. Ramabanta Local Court
10. Semonkong Local Court
11. Rothe Local Court
12. Matsieng Local Court
MAFETENG
Ramokoatsi Central Court
1. Mafeteng Local Court
2. Van Rooyen's Local Court
3. Mphobe Local Court
4. Mapotu Local Court
5. Kolo Local Court
6. Thabaneng Local Court
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7. Ribaneng Local Court
8. 'Mamaebana Local Court
9. Ramokoatsi Local Court
10. Thabana Morena Local Court
MOHALE'S HOEK
Likueneng Central Court
1. Tsoloane Local Court
2. Maqoala Local Court
3. Likueneng Local Court
4. Khuiting Local Court
5. Ketane Local Court
6. Phamong Local Court
QUTHING
Quthing Central Court
1. Mokanametsong Local Court
2. Dilli-Dilli Local Court
3. Sebapala Local Court
4. Mt. Moorosi Local Court
5. Uphaki Local Court
QACHA'S NEK
Makhaola Central Court
1. Seforong Local Court
2. Sekake Local Court














































































WORK PLAN OF FIELDWORK ACTIVITIES
October, 1986 - August, 1987 = 11 Months
a) Phase 1
October, 1986 - January, 1987 : Setting up the fieldwork.
i) Gaining access to the courts, writing out
letters of request for permission to conduct
the study to the Ministries of Justice and
Ministry of Interior.
ii) Research in the National Archives of
Lesotho.
iii) Collection of other documents relating to
the Courts - Proclamations, Acts, Orders,
Regulations, etc.
iv) Drawing up a list of important and relevant
institutional sources of information e.g.
Law Society, Directory or list of legal
practitioners.
v) Translation of interview schedules into
Sesotho.
vi) Selection of Courts' sample for observation
and choosing geographical areas of study
i.e. Districts and villages, the latter for
the Chiefly Courts in particular.
vii) Consultations with resource persons e.g.
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viii)
lawyers at the University of Lesotho; Court
Clerks (Registrars for the High Court);
Courts' Organiser (Ministry of Justice).
Making appointments with key informants.
b) Phase 2
February, 1987 - June, 1987 : Setting up the fieldwork.
Courtroom Observations
OFFICIAL COURTS UNOFFICIAL COURTS
c) Phase 3
Interviews:




















GUIDE TO CODES FOR COURTROOM OBSERVATIONS
CO Courtroom Observation (followed by a number
of the case observed)
HC High Court
JCC Judicial Commissioners' Court
MCM Magistrates Court, Maseru
MCQ Magistrates Court, Quthing
TC Traffic Court
RSTCC Roving Stock-theft Central Court

















Last digits in each of the codes as they appear in the
thesis signify the date when the observation was conducted.
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APPENDIX E
POSITION OF MAGISTRATES IN OFFICE
DISTRICT NUMBER OF MAGISTRATES
BUTHA-BUTHE : 1 Resident Magistrate
1 First Class Magistrate
LERIBE : 1 Resident Magistrate
1 Second Class Magistrate
TEYATEYANENG : 1 Resident Magistrate
2 First Class Magistrates
MASERU : 1 Chief Magistrate
1 Senior Resident Magistrate
3 First Class Magistrates
4 Second Class Magistrates
MAFETENG : 1 Resident Magistrate
1 Second Class Magistrate
MOHALE'S HOEK : 1 Resident Magistrate
1 First Class Magistrate
QUTHING : 1 Resident Magistrate
1 First Class Magistrate
QACHA'S NEK : 1 First Class Magistrate
MOKHOTLONG : 1 First Class Magistrate
THABA TSEKA : 1 First Class Magistrate
1 Third Class Magistrate
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APPENDIX F




































































17. Moorosi, Chief Legal Aid Counsel 18.2.1987
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NOTES
1. In addition 10 female inmates were interviewed at the
Maseru Female Prison (14.5.1987) and 10 male inmates
from the Central Prison in Maseru (20.5.1987). For
confidentiality their names cannot be revealed.
2. * Indicates the chiefs who provided descriptions of how




INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR MAGISTRATES, JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER,






1. How long have you been in this job?
Have you previous experience in court work?
If so, please state place and position.
2. What made you decide to choose this job?
What is it about it that attracts you?
ROLE AND PURPOSE OF COURT PROCEEDINGS.
3. How do you view your role as Magistrate/Judicial
Commissioner/Court President/Court Clerk/Assessor/
Chief in the administration of justice?(
Do you think your purpose is achieved?
4. Do people want their cases heard in court?
If yes why?
Do you feel parties in dispute achieve what they are
looking for?
If not, why is that?
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COURT PROCEDURES, RULES OF EVIDENCE, ORGANISATION AND
STRUCTURE OF COURTS.
5. What do you think of the way the courts are organised?
6. Do you feel everyone understands the court procedures?
Do these procedures present any problems for either
the accused or the prosecution during the proceedings?
Do they present problems for you?
7. What do you think of the manner evidence is presented
in court?
Is there any difference between what you think is
relevant and important information and the evidence
brought up in court?
Why do you think this occurs?
8. Do you think the language used in courts is too far
removed from the parties ordinary, every day language?
How do you feel about English being used as a medium
of communication in some of the courts?
When you see the accused standing in the dock what
impression do you get of whether or not they can
follow what is being said?
UNDERSTANDING AND PARTICIPATION OF PARTIES IN PROCEEDINGS.
9. When you see the parties in court do you get the
feeling that they do/do not understand what is going
on?
If yes, can you give examples?
If no, why is that do you think?
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10. Do you feel they should understand?
How about their participation in the proceedings,
should they participate?
PERSONNEL AND TRAINING.
11. Should magistrates and court presidents be legally
trained?




Not very much/none at all
Why do you say that?
12. How important is the role of assessors, chiefs and
interpreters in court?
13. What do you think are the most important qualities in
a good magistrate, court president, judicial
commissioner?
GENERAL IMPRESSION ABOUT COURTS.
14. Do you think the courts are the best way of dealing
with the sort of disputes normally brought before you?
Would you like to see some matters or cases removed
from the courts and dealt with elsewhere?
If yes, please explain.
15. It has been argued (e.g. by some academics) that
defendants in criminal cases face difficulties in
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obtaining legal help.
Would you agree of disagree with this statement?
What sort of difficulties do you think they
experience?
If so, how do you think such problems can be solved?
QUESTIONS FOR CHANGE.
16. Have you suggestions for change in the courts, any
improvements you would like to see made in the nature
of the proceedings (e.g. structure and organisation,









OPENING QUESTIONS: EXPERIENCE AND SOCIALIZATION.
1. What made you become a court lawyer?
What is it about court work that attracts you?
What other kinds of work do you deal with?
(chamber work, civil or criminal)
In which courts have you appeared on behalf of
someone?
Have you not appeared in other courts?
If not, why is that?
ROLE, NEED AND PURPOSE OF COURT PROCEEDINGS.
2. What does your role as a representative of someone in
court consist of?
Is that role fulfilled?
If no, why not?
3. Do people want their cases heard in court?
If yes, why?
Do you feel parties in dispute achieve what they are
looking for?
If not, why is that?
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UNDERSTANDING THE PROCEEDINGS BY LITIGANTS.
4. When you see your clients before court do you tell
them what to expect in court?
Please explain the sort of things you bring to their
attention, are there any routine points you discuss
e.g. pleas, presentation of evidence, etc?
Do you have time to explain what to expect?
What sort of things get into your way in explaining
proceedings to the clients, if any?
5. Do you feel they participate in the proceedings?
Do you feel parties do understand the proceedings and
the procedure?
If yes, can you give examples, if not, why is that do
you think?
COURT STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION, PROCEDURES AND RULES OF
EVIDENCE.
6. What do you think of how the courts are presently
structured and organised?
e.g. number of courts and distribution, hierarchical
structure, jurisdictions, etc.
7. What do you think of the court procedures; can they
be understood by everyone?
What is your opinion about the manner in which
evidence is presented in court?
Do these present problems for the parties during the
proceedings?
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Please explain your answer.
How do you feel with these problems on a day-to-day
basis?
8. Have there ever been cases where you have thought a
difference exists between what you think is relevant
evidence and what you client thinks of as relevant to
the court?
If yes, why do you think this occurs, and do you do
anything about it?
9. Do you think the language used in court is too far
removed from your clients ordinary, every day
language?
How do you feel about English being used as a medium
of communication in some of the courts?
When you see an accused standing in the dock what
impression do you get of whether or not he can
understand what is being said?
Do they look puzzled, do they ask questions, do you
have to give explanations.
PERSONNEL AND TRAINING




How much of such training is needed? Please indicate.
A lot
A fair amount
Not very much/not at all
11. How important do you think is the role of assessors
and lawyers in court?
Why do you say that?
12. What do you think are the most important qualities in
a good magistrate, court president, judicial
commissioner?
GENERAL IMPRESSIONS ABOUT COURTS.
13. Do you think the courts are the best way of dealing
with the sort of disputes normally brought to you?
Would you like to see some matters or cases removed
from the courts and dealt with elsewhere?
If yes please explain.
14. It has been argued (e.g. by some academics) that
defendants in criminal cases face difficulties in
obtaining legal help.
Would you agree or disagree with this statement?
What sort of difficulties do you think they
experience?
If so, how do you think such problems can be solved?
QUESTIONS FOR CHANGE.
15. Have you suggestions for change in the courts, any
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improvements you would like to see made in the nature
of the proceedings?
e.g. structure and organisation, personnel, training,
legal formality, evidence and procedures?
Why is that?
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR DISPUTING PARTIES:






1. Have you appeared before a court of law before?
If yes, please explain in what capacity, in which
court.
2. Why did your case go to trial?
What were you expecting to get?
Was there any other alternative besides deciding to go
to trial?
If yes please explain.
3. Did you choose this court yourself?
If not, who did?
REPRESENTATION
4. Were you represented?
If yes, by whom? If anyone besides a relative, how
did you come to know that person?
5. Before the case got to court, were you advised of what
to expect in court?
If yes, who gave you the advice?
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What sort of things were brought to your attention?
PHYSICAL SETTING IN COURT.
6. When you first entered the court on the day of the
hearing what did you see?
Any people present, who were they, how were they
positioned, manner of dress?
7. What was your first reaction?
Could you explain what you saw and how you felt?
UNDERSTANDING THE CHARGE.
8. What were you charged with?
9. Was what the crown said about the charge basically
correct?
Please explain.
10. How did you plead? Please indicate.
Guilty
Not guilty
Where it is more than one charge, were any of the
charges dropped, what finally were you charged with?
UNDERSTANDING THE PROCEEDINGS: PROCEDURES AND RULES OF
EVIDENCE AND SATISFACTION WITH THEM.
11. What do you think about the
procedure
Manner of presenting evidence
Court setting
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Were they different from what you had expected?
If yes, in what way?
12. Were you able to follow everything during the
proceedings?
Is there anything you could not understand?
If yes, did you ask or request for clarification, if
not, why was that?
13. Do you know who the other people participating in the
proceedings were and the role of each of them?
Anyone you remember e.g. counsel, who was sitting with
the judge, etc.
14. Were you able to understand what everyone said?
Your lawyer, crown counsel, clerk of court, etc.
Anyone you did not understand?
If yes, why is that?
15. What is your opinion of the counsel, including your
lawyer?
16. Was all the evidence you thought valuable in your case
brought up?
If not, what did you do, if nothing, why not?
What bits were left out?
Any difference between what you regarded as valuable
evidence and questions asked by the counsel, etc?
UNDERSTANDING AND PERCEPTION OF OUTCOMES.
17. Were you found guilty or not guilty of the charge(s)?
How do you feel about the outcome?
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Is if fair, just?
How do you feel about the way in which the court
handled your case?
Are you satisfied? If not, why?
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APPENDIX H
STATISTICS OF CASE FILED IN THE HIGH COURT ; 1985/86
FILED 1985 1986
Criminal Appeals 111 85
Criminal Applications 329 287
Criminal Sentences 18 15
Criminal Trials 38 46
Civil Appeals 26 22
Civil Applications 403 305
Civil Trials 902 810
Source: Acting Chief Justice' s Address, 2 February 1987
NOTE
For cases disposed of and automatic reviews on decisions of
the Magistrates Courts, see Ch.5.
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APPENDIX I
STATISTICS OF CASES REPORTED AND
REVENUE COLLECTION (CONTRIBUTIONS)
BY LEGAL AID OFFICE






Judicial Separation 14 15
Compensation claims - criminal cases 4 5
MAGISTRATES COURTS
Claims and maintenance (non-support) 275 257
JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER
Appeals 13 19
LABOUR DISPUTES AND WORKMANS' COMPENSATION
8 7
M.V.A. CLAIMS
Road Accidents 59 107
TOTAL 422 456




1877 Proclamation No. 44 of July 1 which was the
original source of the 1884 Proclamation.
1884 The British High Commissioner's proclamation of
Roman-Dutch Law as the Common Law of Lesotho.
1903 Earliest version of the Laws of Lerotholi, which
were published and circulated for the guidance of
the Chiefs' Courts with the High Commissioner's
authority.
1928 Proposals for reforms placed before the
Basutoland Council following dissatisfaction with
delays in courts.
1935 Pirn's Financial and Economic Report which finally
culminated into the 1938 reforms.
1938 Native Administration and Native Courts
Proclamations which introduced the gazettement of
Chiefs and the separation of their administrative
from judicial functions and began the system of
Courts of Warrant (Proclamation No. 61 and No.
62).
1938 Proclamation No. 58, Subordinate Courts.
1938 Proclamation No. 57, establishing the High Court.
1944 Judicial Commissioner's Court Proclamation, No.
16, establishment of
1946 National Treasury Committee which recommended a
further reduction in the members of the then
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existing Chiefs' courts.
1946 The High Commissioner's Notice No. 32, Native
Court Rules.
1958 Basuto Courts Proclamation, No. 23.
1961 Basuto Courts (Practice and Procedure) Rules,
Government Notice No. 21.
1965 Central and Local Courts Proclamation on the
recognition Constitution, powers and jurisdiction
of the Courts of Warrant.
1966 The Lesotho Independence Order.
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